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

GANESA. METAL FIGURE FROM PATTIAVARAM.
From H. Chrishna Sastri, *South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses.*

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE COSMIC TEETH

BY LAWRENCE PARMLY BROWN

DENTAL concepts are comparatively scarce in the nature mythos, and while the majority of extant tooth-myths have been developed with much confusion and obscurity, a few will be found quite simple and transparent.

The more or less individualized flames of fire are sometimes considered teeth, as suggested by their form as well as their biting and devouring nature; and fiery teeth are sometimes allotted to the sun, which is conceived to have a burning bite, especially in the tropics. Again, the lightning flashes or thunderbolts, which burn or bite in another way, are sometimes recognized as teeth of fire. These concepts appear in some of the most transparent dental myths that have come down to us; and we shall find reasons for concluding that thunderbolts are represented by the dragon's teeth in the obscure myth of Kadmos (and in that of Jason), while the Quiche Vacub-Cakix was conceived with materialized flame-teeth in the most obscure and elaborate of all dental myths.

As the fiery teeth of the sun belong to the day, the cool night was naturally conceived by some as edentulous (toothless), which concept agrees with the ancient idea that the night is older than the day; and we shall find various night figures, human and animal, represented as both aged and edentulous, while others have the crescent moon for a single tooth, a canine, or for two canines. But in a variant view it is an invisible lunar figure that has the visible single tooth or two teeth.

I. *The Lunar Tooth or Teeth*

In all probability the single lunar tooth (as a canine) appears in connection with the single lunar eye in the myth of the Graiai ("Gray-women") or Phorkides ("Daughters-of-Phorkys"), which has come down to us through the Greeks and Romans. The earliest extant allusion to the Graiai or Phorkides is found in the *Theogony* of Hesiod (*circ.* 725 B. C.), where it is said that the two daughters of Phorkys and Kētō were called the Graiai because they were gray (i.e., gray-haired) from their birth; one of them being "Pephrēdō, handsomely-clad," and the other "Enyō, saffron-veiled." And Hesiod adds that they were sisters of the three Gorgones, who "dwell beyond the famous ocean, in the most remote quarter nightward" (*Theog.,* 270-275). But here we have nothing of the tooth and eye.

The two gray and aged females in the original myth probably represented either the rising moon and setting moon, or that luminary as successively crescent and gibbous; in either case the dwelling place of the Graiai being the celestial sea of night rather an island in the terrestrial ocean. The names Pephrēdō (or Pemphrēdō) and Enyō (also a goddess of war, in Homer) are of very uncertain meaning; but the garment of the former probably was adorned with stars, while the saffron or yellow veil of the latter is appropriate enough for a lunar figure. Like the sun and the stars, the moon is mythically born from the eastern side of the earth-surrounding ocean of the ancients, or from some hugh fish or sea-monster; and the name Kētō seems to be a feminine form of *ketos* (any large fish such as a porpoise or whale), while Phorkys is an ancient sea-god of Asia Minor, where the myth of the Graiai doubtless originated. Probably because of the familiarity of the western ocean to the Mediterranean peoples, Porkys and Kētō are also the parents of the Hesperian dragon in the account followed by Hesiod (333), who gives the western quarter of the ocean as the dwelling place of the Gorgones.

The next extant allusion to the Phorkides (*circ.* 470 B. C.) is in the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus, where they are not called Graiai (790-797). According to Aeschylus there were three of these aged sisters, whose names he does not give; and he says that they dwell with the Gorgones and other monsters across the sea, far to the east, on the plains of Kisthene (doubtless in Asia Minor, where two places of that name were located). Aeschylus describes the Phorkides as

> "......................aged maidens,
> Three, swan-shaped, possessing in common but one eye
> And one tooth,[1] upon whom the sun never looks
> With his rays, or the nocturnal moon."

The three Phorkides of Aeschylus and later writers appear to represent the three forms of the moon recognized by the ancients as belonging to the eastern, the central (overhead) and the western divisions of its path through the heaven; the sun also sometimes being given three forms in these stations (See the present writer's *"Cosmic Transmutations,"* in the *Open Court,* Vol. XXXIV, p. 293). Again, some personifications of the night and the day, as well as solar and lunar figures, have three eyes, or three heads, or three faces; and thus while the Hindu moon-god Chandra has three eyes, Horace (*Carm.* III, xxii, 4) and Ovid (*Met.* VII, 94) speak of *"Diana triformis,"* and Ausonius says that "virgin Diana has three faces" (*Griphus Tenarii Numeri,* 18).

The primary suggestion for the swan-shape of the Phorkides in Aeschylus is probably found in a fanciful resemblance of the curved neck of the swan to the crescent moon and the bent body of aged persons: and swans are also gray or white and swim on the terrestrial waters, as the gray-haired Phorkides in one view float on the celestial sea. The statement that neither the sun or moon ever look upon the Phorkides appears to have been derived from some lost myth acording to which these lunar figures dwelt in the depths of the celestial sea of night, which some erroneously supposed to be the terrestrial sea where Phorkys dwelt on the coast of Asia Minor.

The further elaboration of the myth is thus set forth by Apollodorus (first or second century A. D.), who gives Deinō as the name of the third sister: "The three had but one eye and one tooth, and these they passed each to the other in turn. Perseus took possession of their eye and tooth, which they asked him to return; but he said he would not unless they showed him the way to the nymphs"; and when they had done that, he returned the tooth and the eye (*Bibliothēke,* II, iv. 2). Perseus is generally recognized

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[1] There is no apparent connection between the lunar single tooth, the *monodous* of Aeschylus, and the several *monodonta* or one-toothed individuals mentioned by ancient authors, such as Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (Plutarch, *Vit. Pyr.* 4), and a son of Prusius II of Bithynia (Pliny, *H. N.*, VII, 16). They probably had teeth that appeared to form a single bone in one jaw or both jaws, these teeth perhaps being of square form, close set and partially worn down, and perhaps also encrusted with tartar.



GEOFFROY WITH THE GREAT TOOTH.
From a Spanish version of the *History of Melusine,* 1489, in the British Museum).

as a solar figure, and his seizure of the eye and tooth perhaps relates to the monthly disappearance and return of the moon; but according to Hyginus (*Poet. Astr.* II, 12), Perseus cast both eye and tooth into Lake Triton, which seems to be put for the western ocean into which the moon goes daily. In the true mythic view, however, the lunar tooth and eye do not exist at the same time, and therefore both could not have been seized by Perseus. This may have been recognized by Ovid, who speaks of the eye alone as used by the two daughters of Phorcys (Phorkys) and stolen by Perseus when one of the sisters was handing it to the other, the supposition evidently being that neither then could see (*Met.* IV, 764-766). The scene is engraved on an Etruscan bronze mirror from Palestrina, where we have the only generally recognized ancient representation of the Graiai, two of whom are there shown and named in a group with Perseus and Minerva. According to the *Bulletin Épigrahique* (1884) this representation shows Enie (Enyō) with an eye in one hand and a mirror in the other, while Pherse (Perseus) puts forth his right hand to seize the eye, "at the same time taking possession of the tooth which Pemphetru (Pemphrēdō or Pephrēdō) presents to him" (Vol. IV, p. 152); but it is possible that only the eye is figured on this Etruscan mirror. In a copy of it published in the *Monumenti Inediti: Instituto di Correspondenza Archeologica* (1873, Vol. IX, plate 56, No. 2), the tooth does not appear, and even the eye is somewhat uncertain; but it is there according to the description in the *Annales* of the Institute (Vol. XLV, p. 127)[2].

In classic mythology the lunar tooth appears to be found only in the Graiai myth; but there are reasons for suspecting that the single large protruding canine of Geoffroy of the Great Tooth originally represented the crescent moon, while his mother, Melusine

[2] Further information regarding the Graiai and Gorgones will be found in the long articles devoted to them in Roscher's *Ausführliches Lexicon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie,* where we learn that the Graiai are generally interpreted by modern scholars as gray clouds, with their tooth as the lightning and their eye as the sun or moon, while the Gorgones are often recognized as storm figures. But it is not improbable that the Gorgones (females) as well as the Graiai were originally lunar; for while the later Greeks and Romans speak of three Gorgones, Homer knew only one Gorgo, whose frightful head was figured on the aegis of Athena (*Illiad,* V. 741, etc.,) and an Orphic poem referred to the moon as Gorgonian, "because of the face in it" (Clemens Alexandrinus, *Strom.,* V. 8). It therefore seems that the four huge canine teeth of the more ancient Gorgon faces were depicted simply to enhance their frightfulness, while the original Gorgon head represented the full or gibbous moon with the face in it.

of Lusignan, had the character of the underworld sea-monster who gives birth to the moon. Their fabulous story is set forth in the old French *Histoire de Melusine* (fourteenth century), according to which Melusine was changed periodically into a creature half fish and half woman, while Geoffroy was born with his great tooth, just as the Graiai were born gray (and the moon is born each month with its single tooth). In the early English translation of the *Histoire de Melusine* (*circ.* 1500), Geffray (Geoffroy) is described as a man "which at his birth brought in his mouthe a grete and long toth, that apyered without [i.e., protruding from his mouth] an ench long and more, and therefore men added to his propre name Geffray with the grete toth" (Ch. XIX, fol. 61). It is probable that the epithet originated in a misunderstanding of some colloquial phrase designating this redoubtable and ruthless warrior as figuratively "long-toothed" (i.e., having extraordinary destructive or biting power); and the same may be said of most of the other warriors who are declared to have been born with teeth, such as M. Curius Dentatus (Pliny, *H. N.*, VII, 16), for the cognomen Dentatus means simply "Toothed." But human beings are occasionally born with a tooth or teeth.

One of the most ancient and wide-spread concepts of mythology is that of the crescent moon as the two united horns of an invisible animal, and we still speak of the horns of the crescent moon; but it seems that these horns were conceived by some as two teeth. In Egyptian mythology there are "two divine envoys" (perhaps for the sun and moon), the name of one of them being Betti, "He of the two teeth (or two horns)," according to Budge (*Book of the Dead,* Theban Recension, XXXI, 3). An elaborately ornamented moon amulet which the modern Jew of Palestine hangs about the neck of his horse consists of the two tusks of a wild boar so mounted that their points represent the horns of the crescent moon (S. Seligmann, 1910, *Der böse Blick und Verwandtes,* p. 116).[3]

[3] The moon is invoked in many European toothache charms, with various applications of the number three (L. Kanner, 1928, *Folklore of the Teeth,* pp. 155-157). To insure healthy dental organs; the Ukrainians stop at the first sight of each new moon, pray three paternosters and spit three times backward over the left shoulder: and others suppose that he who first sees the new moon will have a set of healthy teeth (*ibid,* p. 67). This association of healthy teeth with the new moon doubtless originated in the ancient belief that all things grow or increase while the moon waxes and decrease or decay while it wanes, whence a German cure for toothache and other pains is to look toward the waning moon and say, "As the moon decreases, so may my pains decrease also." (J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris,* Ch. IX, ed. 1907, p. 377).

Some of the Greeks, Romans, Hebrews and others, who knew little of the elephant, referred to its tusks as horns; and while there seems to be no evidence that any one-horned animal (monoceros or unicorn) had a lunar character, we do find one of the two tusks (upper central teeth) of an elephant broken off, leaving the animal with a single tusk, in the case of the Hindu Ganesa, who appears to have been a figure of the moon-lit night with his remaining tusk for the lunar crescent. Thus Ganesa ("Lord of the host of Ganas," inferior divinities, perhaps originally stars) is conceived as a short fat man of yellow color, with the head of an elephant, one of his tusks being broken off close to his mouth, whence he is called Eka-danta or Eka-danshtra ("Single tusked"). He is sometimes represented with three eyes (for the gibbous moon in its three stations), and sometimes also with four or more arms (for the cardinal points or quarters of the universe). He is the Hindu God of Wisdom (as probably suggested by the ancient Oriental belief in the influence of the moon on the minds of men and beasts); and he is generally considered a son of Siva, but there is some reason for supposing that the two gods were originally identical. Thus Siva was sometimes represented with three eyes, which serve to identify him with the moon-lit night; and he is called Ganesa in the ancient *Mahabharata* (Ganesa the God of Wisdom being mentioned only in the Introduction, a comparatively late addition to this work).

In the *Puranas* and other later Hindu books we find several variant and highly fanciful accounts of how Ganesa obtained his elephant-head and how one of his tusks was broken—the left one according to some legends and representations, but the right, according to others. In the *Siva Purana* it is said that the missing tusk had been broken off before the elephant-head had been put in the place of the original human head of Ganesa; but according to the generally received legend (as in the *Brahma Vaivartha Purana*), Parusu-rama broke off the tusk with his ax when he forcibly entered the apartment of the sleeping Siva (for the night sky), which was guarded by Ganesa (here seemingly for the moon).[4]

The so-called white elephant (which is really yellow, like Ganesa) was recognized as a symbol of wisdom by the Buddhists, some of whom taught that Gautama Buddha descended from heaven in the form of a white elephant, with six tusks, to be born of the virgin Maya (*Buddha-karita of Asvaghosha,* I, 20, in *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. XLIX). Among the Siamese Buddhists this fabulous animal is known as "the king of elephants" and "the elephant of six defenses," who is named Chatthan or Chaddanta; the shores of a lake of the same name in the Himalayas being his reputed dwelling place (E. Young, 1898, *Kingdom of the Yellow Robe,* p. 396). In view of the probable lunar character of this elephant, it is a plausible conjecture that his six tusks originally belonged to the six divisions or stations of the whole zodiac path, three of which are above and three below the earth at any one time.

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[4] For lengthy considerations of the Ganesa legends and many illustrations of the god, see T. A. Gopinatha Rao, 1914, *Elements of Hindu Iconography,* Vol. I, Part I, pp. 35-67, and H. K. Sastri, 1916, *South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses,* pp. 165-174.

The tusks of elephants, boars and other animals grow continually in length and thickness, while the waxing moon (in its first quarter a tooth or two teeth) grows in thickness only. Moreover, it was generally held by the ancients (including Aristotle, *De Gen. An.,* II, 6) that a human being's teeth continue to grow during his whole life (an erroneous belief, first opposed by the anatomist Eustachius in the sixteenth century, *Libellus de Dentibus,* cap. xxiii); and it is not improbable that in the growth of the lunar teeth we have the original suggestion for an old Jewish legend of the Biblical Og, King of Bashan. According to the *Talmud,* the gigantic Og (as a lunar figure?) tore up a great mountain (for the night sky?) and carried it on his head, intending to throw it on the camp of the Israelites; but God caused certain insects (for the stars?) to dig into this mountain, so it fell about Og's neck, and at the same time his teeth on both sides of his jaw became "distended" or enlarged to such an extent that he could not throw off the mountain and consequently was shortly slain by Moses (as a solar figure?). In confirmation of this account, it was taught that *shibarta* ("break") should be read *shirbabta* ("distend") in Psalm III, 8, "The teeth of the wicked dost thou [God] break" (*Berakoth,* fol. 54b; the same revised reading appearing in *Sota,* 12b, and *Megillah,* 15b. For a slightly different version of the Og legend, see *Targum Ben-Uzziel* on Numbers XXI, 33, and compare S. Baring-Gould, *Legends of Patriarchs and Prophets,* XXII, 12).

Tooth symbolism had an important place in the mythology of the native races of Mexico and Central America, who represented many of their deities with teeth, or clearly indicated the partially or wholly edentulous condition of old age by the manner of picturing the mouth.

It is probable that the Mexicans originally indicated the wholly edentulous condition of their aged deities by a marked contraction of the corner of the mouth (with the face in profile); this contraction in extant pictures often having the appearance of a short rounded tooth projecting from the upper jaw, as in a figure of the moon god Tecciztecatl in the *Codex Fejérváry-Mayer,* sheet 24, and in numerous figures of other aged deities (see especially E. Selar's *Codex Vaticanus B,* Elucidation, p. 70, fig. 256; p. 190, fig. 397, etc.). In fact, some of the later Mexican and Maya artists seem to have supposed that a tooth was intended, and therefore pictured one instead of the mouth contraction. Thus in the *Codex Vaticanus B* we find Tecciztecatl as an old, bent and white-haired man who rises with difficulty from his chair; and he seems to have a tusk-like upper tooth at the corner of his mouth, the face being in profile (sheet 54; compare sheet 30).



THE MAYA GOD D.
(*Dresden Codex,* sheet 46).



THE MEXICAN MOON-GOD TECCIZTECATL.
(*Codex Fejérváry-Mayer,* sheet 24).

The Mexican Tecciztecatl equates with the Maya God D of the alphabetical pantheon of Paul Schellhas. God D is generally represented with a prominent aquiline nose, perhaps originally for the gibbous moon. His name is not definitely known, but Schellhas calls him "the Moon-and Night-God" and describes him as generally "pictured in the form of an old man with an aged face and sunken toothless mouth," who frequently appears with a head ornament in which is the sign *akbal* ("darkness," "night"). This sign also appears in his hieroglyph, placed in front of his head and surrounded by dots for stars; and "his head appears in reduced cursive form as a sign of the moon." (Schellhas, "Representations of Deities of the Maya Manuscripts," in *Papers of the Peabody Museum,* 1904, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 22). According to H. J. Spinden, in a lengthy account of God D, "The corners of his mouth are drawn back and surrounded by deep wrinkles. Sometimes a single tooth projects forward from the front part of the upper jaw [with the face in profile], and when this is absent a stub tooth may appear in the lower jaw. But as often as not both jaws are toothless" (*A Study of Maya Art; Memoirs of the Peabody Museum,* 1913, Vol. VI, p. 69).

It is quite probable that the lower "stub tooth" resulted from a misunderstanding of some of the crude representations of lip contraction; but no such origin can reasonably be assumed for the projecting upper front tooth. Spinden refers to the latter as "a peculiar terraced tooth that is commonly described as filed" (*Ib.,* p. 72), and a similar tooth is sometimes given to God L, "the Old Black God," and to God M, "the Black God with the Red Lips," and to Goddess O, "with the features of an old woman"—all three being edentulous (Schellhas, *op. cit.,* pp. 35, 38). This "terraced tooth" is figured with some variation of form, and may represent a conventionalized compromise between the lunar crescent and an upper incisor tooth as viewed in profile. (See accompanying illustrations).

In the Mexican *Codex Borgia* the aged deities are edentulous with the exception of a very curious U-shaped or staple-like object of large size projecting downward from the front of the upper jaw. It is given to a moon goddess on sheet 65, No. 6; to the goddess Xochiquetzal, the divine mother, on sheet 9; to Tonacateculti ("Lord-of-our-subsistence"), probably the heaven-father, on sheets 9 and 61, and to a god and goddess, perhaps the celestial father and mother, on sheet 60. L. Spence refers to this staple-like object as a "gobber tooth" (*Gods of Mexico, pp.* 147-308). E. Seler calls it "a ring-shaped appendage," and says it "is probably a mistaken formation arising from the contracted corners of the mouth of old





MEXICAN DEITIES WITH THE U-TOOTH.
(*Codex Borgia*, sheets 55 and 60).

gods, and in any case in this manuscript is characteristic of old gods" (*Vaticanus B*, p. 130). It is certainly employed in the *Codex Borgia* instead of the mouth contraction which becomes a tooth in other codexes. But nevertheless its large size indicates that it was not originally a tooth, and its peculiar shape suggests that it originally represented the visible ridge of an old person's edentulous upper jaw. Furthermore, it is not impossible that it was secondarily intended as a symbol of the crescent moon, being attached to the upper jaw because the moon is naturally associated with the heaven above.

The crescent moon as an edentulous mandible (lower jaw) quite probably suggested the jaw-bone of an ass which Samson (primarily a solar figure) used as the weapon with which he slew a thousand Philistines, according to the punning account in Judges XV, 15-19. After the slaughter, Samson cast away the jaw-bone in a place that was known, probably from its shape, as the Hill of the Jaw-bone (Ramath-Lehi): and water came out of a hollow place in the hill, corresponding to an empty tooth-socket in the jaw-bone; whereupon Samson drank and was revived. The Septuagint and English translations make the water come from a tooth socket in the jaw-bone (from a molar tooth, according to the Vulgate), which seems to be in accordance with the original mythic concept of the jaw-bone as the lunar crescent, for the moon was often supposed to be the source of dew and rain. De Gubernatis (*Zoological Mythology,* Vol. I, pp. 303-305) compares the Biblical account with the Hindu myth of the slaying of the Vritras (storm figures) by Indra (the sun) with the bones of a horse's head that had belonged to Dadhyach; but practically nothing is known of this obscure myth.

It is also quite probable that the crescent moon was the original mandible of the Japanese Agonashi-Jizo ("Jizo-who-has-no-jaw"), to whom the Buddhists of the Oki Islands pray for the cure of toothache. They had a statue of him without a lower jaw, but it was destroyed when his shrine was burned, and they say that in one of his incarnations he had such a violent toothache in his lower jaw, that he tore it off and threw it away and died. The people of Izumo, on the island of Nippon, also pray to him for the cure of toothache, and when cured go to the sea, a river or any running stream and drop into the water twelve pearls (*nashi*), one for each of the twelve months; believing that the current carries these pearls to Oki across the sea and that in some mysterious way toothache is thus prevented throughout the year—in connection with which folk-custom we must remember that teeth have been compared to pearls from the most ancient times (See Lafcadio Hearn's delightful *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,* 1895, Vol. II, ch. xxii, pp. 594, 595).

It is generally held that the name Agonashi-Jizo is a popular corruption of Agonaoshi-Jizo ("Jizo-the-healer-of-jaws"); but it is more probable that the god was anciently represented to have torn off his (lunar) jaw because he suffered from toothache and thus came to be invoked for the cure of that malady.

This myth and the epithet Agonashi appear to be peculiar to the Oki Islands and Izumo; but Jizo is one of the most popular Buddhist deities everywhere in Japan, and altogether a rather mysterious figure. His Sanskrit name is said to be Kshingarbha, which means "Born-on-earth" (as an incarnate Buddha). He is the compassionate helper of all in trouble but especially of pregnant women, of children and of travelers; and he is the protector of the souls of children in the place to which they go. As he has no close counterpart elsewhere among the Buddhists, it is a plausible conjecture that he was known to the Japanese in pre-Buddhist times; and it is not impossible that he was originally a moon-god, the helper of travelers at night, and of pregnant women at all times—for the gestation period is often supposed to be regulated by the moon. Hearn speaks of "the white Jizo-Sama," and describes a Japanese painting in which "Jizo comes, all light and sweetness, with a glory moving behind him like a great full moon" (*Op. cit.,* Ch. iii, Vol. I, pp. 51, 56).

Possibly the concept of the jawless Jizo, if not the god himself, was derived from the early Malay settlers in southern Japan, for a similar jawless god seems to have been known in ancient Java. J. Crawfurd (*History of the Indian Archipelago,* 1820, Vol. II, p. 202) tells us that "a monstrous face, without a lower jaw," was sculptured on all the most conspicuous parts of the temples of hewn stone at Brambanan and elsewhere in Java, where the natives stated that it represented Siva—with whom Buddha was identified by the Javanese.[5]

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[5] A head without a lower jaw appears frequently in the Maya codices. E. Forstemann says: "I consider it the sign for fast-days" ("Comment on the Maya Dresden Manuscript," in *Papers of the Peabody Museum,* 1906, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 109).

In the Hindu *Ramayana* (VII, 28) it is said of the macrocosmic Purusha ("Man"), whose body is the material universe, that "the divisions of time are on his teeth"; while the sun and moon are his eyes, the sky is his body, the ocean is his belly, certain mountains are his bones, etc. The text is obscure and vague, with details that seem to be somewhat inconsistent; but the divisions of time are actually marked in the heavens on the zodiac band alone; those of the year on the solar zodiac and those of the month on the lunar variant —the latter generally being recognized as more ancient than the former.



THE MEXICAN TONACATECULTI WITH THE U-TOOTH.
(*Codex Borgia,* sheet 61).

The original lunar zodiac of south-western Asia was sometimes divided into 30, sometimes into 31 houses (R. Brown, *Primitive Constellations,* II, pp. 4, 60, etc.), probably as a compromise between the true lunar month of 29½ days and the soli-lunar month of 30 or 30½ days. But the Hindus, and also the Arabs and Chinese, had only 28 houses in their lunar zodiac, no doubt originally for a month of 4 weeks of 7 days each (H. T. Colebrooke, in *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX, p. 330 *sq.*). And as there are 28 human teeth in the permanent set without the late-coming wisdom teeth (32 with them, but sometimes 30 without two of them in one jaw or the other, generally the upper), we may reasonably conclude that the teeth of the macrocosmic man in the *Ramayana* belong to the lunar zodiac, with one tooth for each of the daily phases of the moon. This seems to require a human figure with wide open mouth and the zodiac band on the circle of teeth.

Half the zodiac is always beneath the earth; and in the *Bhagavat Purana,* where the macrocosmic figure is a porpoise, the upper jaw is allotted to Agastya (identified with the star Canopus), while the lower jaw is allotted to Yama, the god of the underworld (See translation of Sir W. Jones, in *Asiatic Researches,* Vol. II, p. 402). Thus in one view the palate of the cosmic figure corresponds to the northern celestial hemisphere, for the north is always considered the top of the sphere; and the roof of the mouth (Latin *palatum,* from its resemblance to a shovel, pala) is in Greek *ouranos,* a vault, originally for the vault of the heaven, while Ennius even calls the celestial vault "the palate of heaven (*coeli palatum*)," according to Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, II, 18). In the *Vishnu Purana* (II, 12) the two jaws of the macrocosmic porpoise, for unknown reasons, are identified with different gods. But nothing is anywhere said about the teeth of this porpoise, perhaps because the real porpoise has 80 to 96 teeth.

Some of the Egyptians seem to have conceived the macrocosmic animal as a crocodile; for Horapollo says the sunrise was represented in Egypt by the eye of a crocodile, "because it is first seen as that animal rises out of the water" (*Hieroglyph,* I, 65), and according to Achilles Tatius in his romance of *Leukippe and Kleitophon,* the teeth of the crocodile "are said to be identical in number with the days to which God gives light during a year" (IV, IX). But the common varieties of African and Asiastic crocodiles have 66 teeth, 36 above and 30 below, and Aelian (*De An, Nat.* X, 21) connects the number 60 with the Egyptian crocodile in various ways, stating that it has 60 teeth, 60 vertebrae, etc. Aristotle says that all snakes "have as many ribs as there are days in a month; namely, thirty" (*De Part. An.*, III, 1); but the ribs of snakes are far more numerous and vary in different species, some of which have as many as 300 pairs—whence it is possible that the original statement related to 360 or 365 ribs as identical in number with the days of a year. Some of the medieval anatomists held that there are 365 veins in the human body (*Regimen Sanitatis Salernitanum, lxxxvi,* etc.).

Some of the ancients assigned 10×7=70 years to the normal span of human life (the Biblical "three score and ten years"); the second septenary of that span sometimes being recognized as marked by the eruption of the second or permanent teeth (with the exception of the late-coming wisdom teeth), while the seventh month was accepted for the appearance of the earliest teeth of the temporary or first set (the "milk teeth"): And it was also recognized that the 28 permanent teeth comprise an upper and lower set of 14 each, and are divided by the median line of the face into 4 groups of 7, each of which corresponds in number to the days of a week.

The eruption periods of the temporary and permanent teeth are given with approximate correctness in *De Carnibus* (one of the Hippocratic monographs, in Kühn's edition of Hippocrates, Vol. I, p. 252), where it is stated that the first teeth begin to appear in the seventh month, and (begin to) fall out at the end of seven years; their successors appearing between the ages of seven and fourteen, in which interval also appear the first of the large teeth (our first and second molars), being followed by the wisdom teeth in the fourth septenary (i.e., between the ages of 21 and 28). Aristotle also says that children begin to cut their teeth in the seventh month (*Hist. An.*, VII, 10). But Solon (*circ.* 575 B. C.) erroneously stated that the child produces and casts forth its first teeth during its first seven years (in Clemens Alexandrinus, *Strom.*, VI, 16); Pliny has it that the first teeth are produced in the seventh month and shed about the seventh year (*H. N.*, VII, 37), and similar erroneous statements reappear continually in later writers.

Aulus Gellius has preserved the following erroneous statements from the lost *Hebdomades* of Marcus Varro, the most learned of the Romans (first century B. C.): "The teeth, too," he says, "come forth in the first seven months, seven in each part [*septenos ex* *utraque parte;* i.e., seven in each half of each jaw[6]], and fall out in seven years; and the cheek-teeth [our first and second molars] are added, as a rule, in twice seven years" (*Noct. Attic.,* III, X, 12).

Varro's statement to the effect that the temporary teeth comprise seven in each half of each jaw, indicates that some of the ancients supposed that children had the same number of teeth as adults (this number being the lunar 4×7=28, whereas the actual number of the temporary teeth is only 20). And in Europe during the first Christian millenium there seems to have been a widely accepted belief that children as well as adults had 28, 30 or 32 teeth, so when the true number of the temporary teeth began to be recognized, it was fabled that they had been suddenly reduced, more or less miraculously.



TWO VARIANT FORMS OF THE MAYA "TERRACED TOOTH (B. C.) COMPARED WITH THE CROWN OF A HUMAN UPPER CENTRAL INCISOR, SIDE VIEW (A), AND THE CRESCENT MOON (D). FORM B IS FROM THE *DRESDEN CODEX*, SHEET 46, AND FORM C IS FROM SPINDEN, *MAYA ART,* P. 72, FIG. 91.

According to the French historian Rigord (thirteenth century), all children born after the capture of the cross of Christ by Saladin in 1187 had only 20 or 22 teeth, whereas they had 30 or 32 before that event (*Gesta Philippi Augusti,* ch. LV, trans. by Delaborde, *Oeuvres de Rigord,* I, pp. 82-83). Later writers state that the reduction occurred immediately after the great pestilence or Black Death midway in the fourteenth century, and was caused by it; this reduction, according to some, being from 32 to 22 or 20 (*Continuatio Chronici Guillemi de Nangiaco* [Guillaume de Nangis], *circ.* 1360, edition Geraud, II, p. 217; D'Achery, *Spicilegium,* 1653-1677, edition De la Barre, III, p. 110. See also J. F. C. Hecker, *The*

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[6] W. Beloe, 1795, translates: "The teeth, also, seven above and seven below, are produced in the first seven months"; and the rendering of J. C. Rolfe in Loeb's *Classical Library,* is even worse: "seven at a time in each jaw."

Black Death, Babington's trans., IV, p. 21). Others, including the physician Savonarola (1560, *Practica Major,* VI, vii, 1, p. 106) put the reduction from 32 to 22 or 24; the last number being correct for children between the ages of 6 and 12, when the 4 permanent first molars are found in connection with the 20 temporary teeth, or some of them and some of their successors. But according to *The Brut or The Chronicles of England,* 1480, ch. xxviii (translated from the French *Brut d'Engleterre*), children born after the great pestilence had two cheek-teeth less than they had before—doubtless an error for two cheek-teeth less in each half of each jaw, with the normal number of permanent teeth recognized as 4×7=28.

It is quite probable that the allotment of the moon-teeth to the twenty-eight houses of the lunar zodiac suggested a lost Assyrian myth which in turn suggested one of the obscure statements in one of the extant Izdubar Tablets, translated by H. F. Talbot ("Ishtar and Izdubar, being the Sixth Tablet of the Izdubar Series," in *Records of the Past,* 1877, First Series, Vol. IX, *Assyrian Texts,* p. 119). There can be no doubt that Ishtar and Izdubar were originally lunar and solar respectively; but in these tablets, as elsewhere, Ishtar is conceived as the goddess of night and more than the moon, though still with lunar characteristics; and the Izdubar Tablets give us a comparatively late poetical romance based on a very ancient mythological legend. On Tablet VI, Ishtar is conceived as the queen of witchcraft, who has perpetrated seven acts of cruelty and treachery on men and beasts; the allusion to one of these acts being as follows (in Talbot's translation):

> Thou hadst a favorite lion, full of vigour:
> thou didst pull out his teeth, seven at a time."

As a lion has thirty permanent teeth (16 above and 14 below), it is a plausible conjecture that he was supposed by some to have 2×14 or 4×7 (or 28 in all), which suggests that the above-quoted allusion is to some mythological legend containing a statement to the effect that the teeth of Ishtar's lion were arranged seven on a side, above and below, and that 4×7=28 teeth were extracted. Therefore, with Ishtar recognized as the night-goddess, we may conclude that her harmless lion was originally a solar figure (like the human-headed lion of Assyria), and that he was recognized by some as the macrocosmic animal whose teeth belong to the 4×7=28 days of a lunar month, with one tooth for each of the daily phases of the moon.

There is also an old English story according to which King John succeedd in forcing a Jew of Bristol to part with a large sum of money only after seven of the Jew's molar teeth had been knocked out, one a day for seven days (Roger of Wendover, *Flores Historiarum, ad An.* 1210, and others following him).

Saint Apollonia ("Of Apollo"), to whom for a thousand years or more prayers have been offered for the cure of toothache, is said to have had all her teeth knocked out as the distinctive feature of her martyrdom (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, II, xxxiv); and according to one of the later forms of her legend (in the Bollandist *Acta Sanctorum,* Feb. 9; see also W. Bruck, *DasMartyrium der Heiligen Apollonia,* p. 12), her name was originally Dina (for Diana, the Roman moon-goddess), while that of her father was Apollonius (for Apollōn or Apollo, the sun-god). Indeed it is not impossible Eusebius describes Apollonia as an aged virgin of Alexandria, while that the original story was suggested by some lost moon-myth; for Artemis-Diana is a virgin, and various lunar figures are bent and white with age.

According to the Gospel of John, xviii, 22, a certain Jew struck Jesus with the palm of his hand—on the cheek, as the *Sinaitic Palimpsest, Syriac Peschito* and *Diatessaron of Tatian* have it. Popular tradition generally identifies this Jew with the Malchos of John xviii, 10; and according to a Sicilian tradition Malchos knocked out all of Christ's teeth with his iron glove, for which offense he was condemned to walk incessantly, till the day of judgment, around a column in the center of a circular room underground (G. Pitre, 1875, *Fiabe, Novelle e Racconti,* no. 120, in his *Biblioteca della Tradizioni popolari Siciliane;* followed by T. F. Crane, 1889, *Italian Popular Tales,* no. 57, p.196). It is not improbable that the circular path around a column originally represented the zodiac with the pole of the ecliptic at its center; in connection with which there is a further probability that Jesus was identified with some lunar figure whose teeth were knocked out by a personification of the storm. This conjecture is supported to some extent by a Venetian variant tradition, according to which the Virgin Mary (for the moon as feminine?) has her teeth knocked out by Malchos (D. G. Bernoni, 1874, *Preghiere popolari Veneziane,* p. 18).

Jesus is generally assumed to have lived about 31¼ years according to the Synoptic Gospels, or about 33¼ years according to John; a naturally suggested compromise between these extremes being 32 years, corresponding to the full normal number of a human being's permanent teeth. And in Hungary a sufferer from toothache forms around him a circle of 32 birthwort flowers, each of which he chews and spits out in turn, and then says: "Christ was thirty-two years old when he died; I have thirty-two teeth, and have gnawed thirty-two flowers," etc. (H. von Wlislocki, 1893, *Aus dem Volksleben Magyaren,* p. 128).

POSITIVISM AND HUMANISM

BY EDWIN H. WILSON

THE process of integrating the new world view of science to the religious needs of man is going on continually. One sees it taking place in the ranks of modernism. Men like Harry Emerson Fosdick,[1] Reinhold Neibuhr,[2] and Russell Henry Stafford[3] have made notable concession to the position of the new humanists although eager to retain old symbols. In the Unitarian denomination the issue is more clear cut, with friendly controversy openly engaged in between theists and humanists. In this controversy the terms *Positivism* and *Humanism* are continually confused. The effort has been seemingly to try to heap all the old sins, real or alleged, of Positivism upon the New Humanism and to push the latter scapegoat fashion over the cliff into oblivion. By Positivism I understand these critics to mean the philosophy and cult of Auguste Comte, the French social theorist of the nineteenth century. The repeated confusion of the two terms led me, while I was studying abroad, to supplement the thesis I had already written upon *The Religion of Humanity According to Auguste Comte and Alfred Loisy* with an investigation at first hand of what is left of the movement. This investigation brought me into immediate contact with the present leaders, both in England and France and access to information upon the movement in South America.

My conclusion is that the two movements are so unlike that the effort to use Positivism as a shibboleth for Humanism is not justified on the grounds either of content or of form. To be sure both movements might be said to be religions of life, based upon the things of this life. But their respective ideas of what true religion is, what life values are most worthful, what constitutes evidence, and how the religion of humanity is best to be stated and propagated, are so unlike that the movements are altogether different plants producing different fruits. The history of the Comtian cult, with its few scattered handfuls of adherents, each group claiming to represent the true Positivism, gives in miniature form a review of the errors of a static church policy and doctrine based upon centralized authority. A comparison of the two movements however, is interesting because it shows rather effectively what humanism is and what it is not.

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[1] See Harpers for March and April.

[2] *Does Civilization Need Religion?*

[3] *Christian Humanism.*

I shall begin with what I found out about Positivism as it exists today. Within the limits of a milieu itself not large enough to furnish the interstimulation necessary to life, schism and isolation have set up further barriers to increase the inherent sterility of the movement. A few persons drawn by Positivism as a method and stimulated by Comte's social theories have escaped the boundaries of the letter of his cult. The rigid outline of Comte's thought however, has clamped itself onto the mentality of most of his disciples and has served to set up harmful barriers to the free advance of their thought.

Auguste Comte, we must remember, attempted to found a cult without theology or metaphysics but in imitation of the Roman system, with a central ecclesiastical authority, a systematic and relatively static body of doctrine and a uniform method of worship. At one time he even negotiated with the Jesuits in the hope of a rapprochement. Judging Positivism by its results upon those under its influence it seems to serve in just about the same way as does Catholicism, producing minds subservient to authority and the past.

There are a number of Positivist groups surviving. Of these the Liverpool and Rio de Janiero groups have followed most closely the minute instructions of the founder. They are the conservatives of the sect. Comte took himself very seriously. He expected to be the high priest of a movement which was about to sweep the world. A few disciples accept his "mastership" in the full sense of the word, taking him as seriously as he took himself. One of the positivists in South America even tried in the manner of Saint Francis to imitate his master Comte, to think His thoughts, perform His acts, submit to His will in every detail of his existence.

Temples, modelled scrupulously after the specifications outlined by Comte have been erected in Liverpool and Rio de Janiero. Preaching near Liverpool brought me an opportunity to visit the temple there. One sees as he enters, a statue of Comte. At the opposing end of the temple in the middle of the chancel is a life-sized statue of the Sistine Madonna. Along each side are the niches with busts of the thirteen saints for whom are named the months in the Positivist calendar: Moses, Homer, Aristotle, Cæsar, Saint Paul, Charlemagne, Dante, Gutenberg, Shakespeare, Descartes, Frederick, and Bichat.

I introduced myself to the leaders as a humanist interested in the similarities, if any, between the two movements. I was invited to return to preach in the Liverpool Temple, even when I warned them that I should speak freely. But they told me I must not sit in the chancel nor mount to the pulpit until the mystical service had been conducted. The leader was, he said, "very canonical," as I gathered later from his meticulous gestures and intonations.

Certainly in regard to ritual he may be called a fundamentalist of the cult. One set service is used for regular worship week in and week out, and on the evening of my sermon I heard it conducted in canonical fashion.

There were an invocation, responses, a doxology. Then the leader stood at the right hand side of the altar and began:

> "Thus saith Humanity: "I am the source of all purity and the giver of all sanctity"

and other sentences. Then he turned around and kneeling before the altar said:

> "I beheld and lo, a great multitude which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues stood before the throne. These are they which came out of great tribulation. We adore the sacred company of the dead; and among them our own dear ones; through whose life has arisen the mighty life of Humanity, the Supreme Mother of men, now here among us."

Then followed some responsive chanting. Up to this point the service had been conducted, one must admit, with great dignity and beauty. Were one to go there as though he went to a pageant that beauty might have a proper chance to show itself. But one was from the very start of the service conscious of an unnaturalness about it all. I experienced a feeling of revulsion that I promptly held in check in order to enter into the service as sympathetically as possible. The chanting was rather ineffectively done, not in Latin, but in the Spanish as used in the Positivist temple in Brazil.

> "Donna se' tanto grande e tanto vale, Che qual vuol grazia, e a to non ricore, Sua disianza vuol volar senz ali'."
>
> (Lady thou art so great, and so prevailing, that he who wishes grace, nor runs to thee his aspirations without wings would fly.)

This and more chanting was followed by a silent meditation, music, a reference to the festival of the day, and then, all kneeling chanted the words arranged from Comte:

> "In the name of Humanity, may Love be our principle, may Order be our basis, may Progress be our aim, may we live for others. May we live openly."

Mounting to the pulpit I faced a "multitude" of some forty who listened attentively and as I was later told appreciatively, to a sermon on "The True Religion of Humanity." I told them of Humanism as a living movement of this century, of its vital differences from their movement, and urged them to meet the challenge of the new day by taking a constructive humanistic step forward. Only later did I learn that Mr. F. G. Gould of London had been doing the same thing for some time without effect.

The leaders of the Positivist movement in Liverpool are possessed of a delightful culture of the pre-Comtian era, but seem hardly to have been affected by the thought that has developed since Comte's death. They did show a decided tendency to convince themselves that whatever had since been written is included in Comte's all-wise pronouncements. This is not a hard task to minds predisposed to it since Comte's all too ready generalizations were at the least sweepingly inclusive. That has probably been his chief value to the world of thought. He has set up some very broad hypotheses which future generations, especially in sociology have often used as a starting point for purposes of verification and reference. But with the true Comtian these writings are authoritative and, in practice, fence in the minds of his followers to an astonishing degree.

The Bishop of Liverpool recently undertook to edit a series of little pamphlets on the subject "God in the Modern World." Mr. Otto Baier, the active leader of the Liverpool movement spoke on that subject in February, 1928, identifying the God concept with Humanity which he interpreted as follows:

1. "The Humanity of our individual nature, which we find as the incentive to every action for good. The GOD within."
2. "The Utopia of the future Humanity, the industrial world co-operation realising the highest social speculation of a scientific priesthood, the ever more clearly seen *Social Ideal,* that inspires and leads: *The* GOD above.
3. "The Humanity of the families, tribes and nations, the teeming millions, with their work and play, their dreams and aspirations, the earth prepared to bear an ever richer harvest, the atmosphere of confident expectation, gradually replacing the primeval fear of the unknown, the consciousness of the growth of this Humanity through many generations under terrible catastrophes and back-sliding in humanity and bestiality, the consciousness of this slow, laborious and yet so triumphant development of human worth, this power realized in part as civilization, yet still more potent in the conviction of a much higher self-realization, this protector and upholder of our lives, this living Humanity is: *GOD In The World.*

   "And this divine Humanity, so viewed in its three-fold aspects—within, above, around—is one. Humanity is the consensus of powers that converge. It is the only reality of which we are conscious. Humanity IS and nothing touches us but through Humanity."

This effort to read the positivist theories into the idea of God is an unusual procedure for a Positivist. Usually the sharp distinctions between the scientific and theological has made them turn their backs rather unsympathetically to the advancing content or psychological function of theology. Mr. Baier shows a broader sympathy in this statement, but one still finds evident that lack of the integration of humanity to the universe from which it has emerged for which Positivism has been criticized. Any religious philosophy, however, which fails to take into consideration the inner drives, the projection of social ideals and the growing stream of human values from out the past which form the substance of this three-fold interpretation will be an impoverished theory.

The leaders of the Chapel Street Temple in London and one group holding meetings at its own foyer in Paris believe that Positivism is to be propagated by a combination of poetry and music.

These groups are also fundamentalists but according to their own interpretations. Comte in his general view of Positivism "revealed" to the world that the philosophic priesthood of the true Positivism would one day usurp the functions of artist, musician and poet. In the past there were two movements in London, driven apart by a modernish schism, but the bare necessities of survival have forced the scattered remnants to unite again.

In the Positivist worship, the theistic faith object is clearly to be replaced by the personification of Humanity in the madonna.

> "Humanity the one Great Being under whose providence we live can neither be conceived nor worshiped except under the concrete image, the ideal form of the Virgin Mother."

These are the words of George Legarrigue, an apostle of Positivism in Chile. Some of his prayers have true poetic feeling in them. But the worship of Humanity as person in the virgin is by no means conducted symbolically. They conceive it realistically as an organic being whose substance is in the madonna.

> "Oh holy and divine Humanity, I adore and bless in thee the immaculate Virgin, in whom no selfish stain of animality is found to soil thy sublime and incomparable purity."

Somehow these groups cannot get beyond Comte. Much of the unnaturalness of the movement is easily understood when we remember that it has not been evolved as was Christianity over a long period of time. Comte conditioned it in his own image and by the rigid organization he left behind doomed it to a living death. What exists today is but the ghost of his hopes. Comte talked of the relativity of his thought but his spirit was authoritative. He made his calendar a tentative one for his own century but there has not been dynamic enough in the movement to change even that. The leader at Liverpool for instance could not officially make a change if he so desired without the approval of the controlling council which meets twice a year at Paris, as required by Comte's testament.

A peep into a few of these council meetings as revealed by their printed records reveals a quibbling over minute points of interpretation of what Positivism is, or what Comte, or Laffite, his Peter, intended. It is quite comparable to the early gatherings of Roman prelates. Here is an instance: For three sessions the council debated the matter of seating one M. A. Nour-Eddine, a native tutor of Medea, Algeria, formerly a Mohammedan. After a year of waiting he had finally submitted with the witnessing signatures of two members of the council, a statement of his conversion to Positivism. The statement asserts that he has read carefully all of Comte's important works, no mean task in itself, and continues:

> "I declare that I entirely adhere to the synthesis of the Master, consider it the best that I have yet known, consider it not only as preferable to all other but also as sufficient to the orientation of my existence. Accordingly I avow all my efforts to the service of the Family, the Country and Humanity."

But this complete giving of self to the movement is not enough to satisfy one M. Felician as to his orthodoxy and M. Nour-Eddine was not seated. This event, about as significant to us as the debate at a Mennonite conference over whether buttons will or will not be worn, is cited merely to show the deadly nature of a church polity having centralized authority.

A visit to the apartment of Auguste Comte in Paris furnishes the crowning touch to the picture of Positivist orthodoxy. A little old man meets one by appointment and shows you through the sanctuary with the same awed and hushed voice which one encounters in a cathedral crypt where rest the alleged bones and relics of the church Fathers. Here is the book-case of Comte just as he left it and never opened since his death. One is shown the desk at which he wrote his works, his lamp, pictures of Clothilde de Vaux, of Sophie Thomas who took care of him, and others intimately connected with his life and cult. Then in tears the guide explains that the young men are not coming to them and that the beautiful heritage will be lost to Humanity.

In practice then the orthodoxy of Positivism has been even stronger on the side of ritual than of organization. The thought patterns left by "the Master" have also played their part in making the movement an obstruction to creative expression on the part of its adherents. Like the Bahaists and others who have proclaimed the ideal of world unity, the Positivists have merely set up further barriers to that unity by acting as if they had a new revelation and a new saviour.

Positivism has its modernists as well as its fundamentalists. In London there are still vestiges of the liberal wing which brought about the old schism. Mr. F. J. Gould who is well known for his splendid stories for the moral instruction of children, also a member of Stanton Coit's Ethical Society, and of the Rationalist Press association, has become alienated from the Chapel Street Positivist temple because he does not believe it an effective expression of the religion of humanity. A Professor Hayward conducts some rather tedious memorial services to great men at various points in England. The same preoccupation with formalistic means of worship and the same inability to understand the practical psychology of people which vitiates the entire Positivist cult, made a bore of the memorial service to Robert Owen and William Blake which I attended at the Highbury public library.

In France we also find Positivists of more modern tendencies. M. George Deshermes is a prolific writer working more or less independently. M. Emile Corra, the head of the *Positivist Internationale,* an organization which dates from an old schism and competes with the Council as the true representative of Positivism, is not in touch with the Council, or with the Liverpool Positivists. He is in communication with liberal Positivists in England, Argentine, Brazil, Mexico, the United States and China. "I do not want it to become mummified, I want to see it live," he says of the movement. He recognizes none the less that Positivism today is a pathetic sprinkling of anemic little groups each claiming to be the true representative of the religion of humanity.

In a series of annual conferences conducted in Paris, M. Corra has read the more recent sociological knowledge into the framework of Comte's inclusive synthesis. Like the modernists he is busy with putting new wine into old skins. He retains the famous slogans: "Love for principle and order for base" and "Live for others, Live openly."

These conferences have been published separately or in the *Revue Positiviste Internationale.* Through the columns of this paper we learn that Rio de Janiero and Sao Paulo, Brazil, each have groups of apparently substantial size. The Sao Paulo society was founded in 1924. In the original political organization of Brazil, Positivist thought played an important part. The principle of a spiritual power and a temporal power was accepted from Comte's writings by governmental leaders and put into the constitution. That Positivism should do its best among the Latins is natural, although we hear nothing of it from Italy. In Argentine, a Dr.

Alfred Ferrera has gathered together a group which seems to be very much alive. Its bulletin *El Positivismo* claims to have five hundred subscribers and to be "injecting virility into the Argentine mentality," by making known the word of Auguste Comte on the social and political issue of the day.

M. Augustin Aragon, an engineer, gave forty-five lectures in Mexico during the year 1926, some of them on social and political issues of the day, some in the field of comparative religions and some as direct propaganda for Positivism.

A few other scattered voices such as Dr. Zodin in Roumania and Prof. La Grange in the United States, both ardent Positivists with a small personal following, go to make up the dwindling ranks of what is left of the movement. In Pekin there is an *Ecole Auguste Comte* for the study of the social sciences.

One who looks more for points of agreement than for points of difference will find much in the values desired by the Positivists that is equally desired by the humanist or the christian with a social gospel.

> "Everywhere," writes M. Aragon, "we see the doctrines of our founder direct the thought and action of societies. Women are more respected and loved. Children receive better care and education every day. The sentiment of human solidarity, aside from all theology, becomes each day more clear. The aversion to war is more powerful, and begins to manifest itself even in countries where war is an industry. Ethics has begun to enter politics. Science and the fine arts progress enormously from one generation to another. The most terrible maladies are being cured or soon will be. Public schools and libraries multiply. The occident is treating the orient better, and beginning to understand it as Comte and Plaffitte understood it. A hundred other progressions could be enumerated as conquests of the positivist spirit."

Once, when I was a boy of high school age, a state Secretary of Agriculture pointed out to me that in the field in which I was working, a field which produced in that one year a thousand crates of strawberries from a variety of his own breeding, no two leaves were exactly alike. Verily I learned that day that one thing is different from another.

From my observation and study I find that Humanism and Positivism are two entirely different plants, grown in different climates, different soil, and from different seed. They are not of the same species. Positivism is a hybrid developed in the stuffy hothouse climate of one man's study. It bears the limitations of that man's personal foibles, we might fairly say abnormalities. It bears, moreover, the limitations of his century. The time was not yet ripe for such a synthesis. If in outer form and symbolism it retained certain similarities to the Roman Catholic church, it was uprooted from the human content of the religion of this hemisphere. Hence it has failed to win the response necessary to its success as a religion.

Comte's mentality was dominated by his so-called "Law of the Three Stages," the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. It is on the surface an intriguing theory. Space will not permit me to go into the critique which Renan and others have made of this doctrine. It led Comte and his followers into doctrinal errors as costly as was his imitation of the Roman church organization. Comte failed adequately to gauge the survival power of superstition. He did not see that we have all three stages with us at any time. He failed to get behind the theological formulas of Christianity and see the service they were performing for inner life. Humanism has a grasp of the problems of the inner life not within Comte's range of experience. This inadequacy on the part of Comte arose from a false philosophy, an inadequate historical knowledge, and the oddities of his own personality.

We must bear in mind that Humanism has tools which Comte did not have to help him in his work. The results of half a century's research in the social science are now available. It has an immense body of new facts and hence a sounder orientation. It has at its disposal a developed method of research which controls the subjective limitations which handicapped Comte's system of thought.

Comte's system grew, not from an understanding of the needs and life problems of many other people but from the intellectual demands of his own system. Although the one to suggest that psychology become a science, a suggestion which George Eliot pointed out in speaking of "the egotistical Frenchmen" was met with derision, Comte was himself constitutionally unpsychological. He lacked even the common sense knowledge of practical psychology which is gained in a full and healthy life of normal acquaintanceship with many types of persons.

In his course introductory to the study of society at the University of London, Professor Hobhouse points out that Comte's thought is dominated throughout by the Cartesian philosophy. He tried to give to social relations the certainty of mathematical knowledge. Comte did on paper give a place to the feelings in his theory of knowledge. A thread of this influence has been traced from William James, through Renan to Comte. But it was Comte's arrogance and dogmatism which Renan most disliked. Whereas Comte's effort to found a cult of humanity was artificially and theoretically pragmatic, Humanism is experimentally pragmatic with human needs the measure.

Comte did not escape the mechanism and rationalism of his century. This, no less than his notoriously inadequate knowledge of history and his false "three stages," successfully dehumanized Comte's system of doctrine and left it a rigid formulation of abstractions.

In philosophy the New Humanism has arrived at a point far from that to which Descartes led Comte. The fact is that a number of modern philosophical schools emerge religiously at Humanism. The chief argument advanced against Positivism by its early critics was that Comte had isolated his Humanity from the universe. Certainly that cannot fairly be said of Humanism. Its world view is naturalistic, but also organic and emergent. Although he participated in the development which foreshadowed Darwin, Comte was tarred with the pre-Darwinian stick. We of today have seen the break-up of the atom restore on organic world view. We possess a developed evolutionary theory. Says the Humanist, "Man is an earth child, born of the same star dust and fired with the same life force that moveth every living thing." "Man is the measurer of all things," in constant interrelation with and sustained by the surrounding world.

Feuerbach has been called a Positivist, but that was because he adhered to the evidental method and not because he adhered to the Comtian cult. To the contrary Feuerbach believed all systematisation to be an arbitrary setting of limits to our perception. He wished neither to imprison life in a formula nor to violate reality by his own rigid definition. The New Humanism is similarly in a state of development, rather than in a static condition.

Alfred Loisy of the College de France has been called a neo-

Positivist. In answer to an inquiry concerning the relation of his religion of humanity to that of Comte, Loisy wrote:

> "Although I have never studied Comte deeply I see everything in his system as fixed and rigid while I view all things as relative and in flux."

Loisy is less individualistic than the American Humanists. His Catholic heritage seems to have led him also to make out of Humanity a substitute for his theistic faith object, but it is usually as an inner ideal rather than an objective being. His thought is like that of the New Humanism in that it is relative. "I never could find inspiration," he says, "in an abstract absolute radiating with frigid clarity."

Nor can the charge that Humanism has severed the current of Christian idealism be fairly made of the New Humanism. The transition is being made slowly and normally. The New Humanism is a hardy plant deeply rooted in the human needs of many people. It is not rationalism. It arises in surprising similarity from independent sources. It is a subtle, permeating influence rather than a cult. Where it has come to conscious unity, its unity is the unity of freemen. Using a similar method, and disciplined by the same loyalty to truth, they break through the complexities of a transition period to find enthusiastic fellowship and co-operation in the fulfillment of a shared ideal freely won by each and all. The humanist sees that ideal of the abundant life implicit not only in Christianity but in all religions. He stresses the planetary origin and the human values in all religions.

Feuerbach was of direct influence upon at least one American Humanist, Dr. F. C. Doan. Where Comte turned his back upon theology as entirely in error, it was Feuerbach who looked within the human heart for the explanation of things which man had projected into his gods and his heavens. Where Comte's unsympathetic break with theology meant a failure sufficiently to appreciate that our ideals have been raised to the heights through centuries of aspiration, the Humanist believes he sees those ideals in sufficient clarity to be able to go on without the theological scaffolding of the supernatural within which those ideals were erected.

If the Humanist does not find conclusive evidence of personality and conscious purpose elsewhere in the universe he finds them in man. They are to him the new and real differences emergent in man out of a continuity of precess to make man human. Truth, beauty, goodness are the world become interiorized and becoming person in man through his experience of the outer world progressively unified within.

The Humanist's protest is partly a demand for sincerity in the use of words that we may continue to make distinction between black and white, between guesswork and fact. If he emerges at an essentially different type of religious experience from that of the Roman church it is to restore the element of challenge and renewal for that of resigned dependence and escape. This is a Puritanism of words. It is a discipline which will not permit speculation to soar far from evidence, words to be divorced from content or faith to offer escape from duty. The Humanistic faith demands fulfillment in abundant living.

Positivism represents clearly a different conception of what religion is and what it should do for its members, from the aim of the Humanist to produce significant persons, to develop "individuality with standards." Comte was near enough to the French revolution to put such a price on order that he sacrificed individuality and creativeness to solidarity and unity. The Humanist doctrines of the catholicity of values and the uniqueness of each individual are quite foreign to Positivism. Equally foreign to Humanism is the Positivist conception of a hierarchy of intellectual snobs conditioning the masses by a religion which was justified chiefly by its ability to maintain docile order and subservience to the past.

Positivism could only have come from France. In that country the heralders of a new religion always must needs formulate their cult in such manner that should sudden success come to them they could pack up and move into Notre Dame at a moment's notice. Religion apart from its cathedrals with their particular form of worship is not thought of as religion in France. Comte hence assumed that the new religion would retain essentially the same experience as the old. The manufacture of a faith object by the personification of Humanity in the madonna, (or was it Clothilde de Vaux?), the provisions for his Calendar of saints, and for an apostolic succession arose from such assumptions. Comte failed to recognize that the religious experience of the emancipated mind is of an essentially different kind. He did not see that the institution which would successfully meet man's need for freedom must also be inherently different from the authoritative systems of the past.

The importance of ritual in the present controversy between Humanism and Theism should not, however, be overlooked. From the point of view of the lady in the theistic pews, religion is definitely associated with the hymns, responses, collects, and benedictions that she has been used to all her life. What she demands of the theistic apologist is that he continue to make valid intellectually the use of the Lord's prayer, the psalms, and other service elements which never fail to develop the feeling of complacent dependence and reassuring consolation she is used to. From the point of view of the man in the Humanistic pews these same elements which he once loved, no longer are valid. If he loves the hymn tunes he wants words that will not disgust his intellect. The highest function of the religious service is to organize and renew the inner life and direct the energies thus released. This is valid insofar as it has done that and not merely meant escape from reality and social duty. Hence a real need for Humanistic services is felt in many quarters.

If the ritual of Positivism was predestined to sterility by its own shallow soil, the New Humanist service can be expected freely and gradually to evolve from the needs of vigorous and living congregations. The whole Positivist experiment is a vindication of the congregational polity and its way of individual religious liberty. Unitarians welcome differences as a sign of life and yet are able to co-operate in unity. By free exchange of materials the Humanists may fairly expect to develop as the years pass a mellow and sound service which will not only effectively feed the inner life but which will continually be refreshed with new materials. Though it puts more trust in challenging sermons, Humanism thirsts for beauty in its services as a religious value necessary to renewal in a machine civilization. That a body of service material freely gained in this way should have in it more vitality, should ring more truly to human needs than the Comtian ritual is seemingly inherent in its source.

The heritage of religious liberty which the Unitarian Humanists claims and the Humanists in the universities likewise possess is a guarantee that the Humanistic thinkers will not yield their critical faculties to any particular leader. They may go to the past for inspiration, weigh its values and glean its experience, but they will apply their own reason to the task of meeting the emerging needs of the present. The past is so full of error and so inadequate with its answer to the spiritual needs of an industrial society that the Humanist, if he does not entirely disown it, will by no means worship or submit to it. The Humanist moreover has no messiah complex.

Let us recognize also that modern Humanism has a framework in society upon which to survive which Positivism did not have. The world is more nearly ready for a constructive answer to its religious needs. The new world view has had more time to develop and to make itself felt! Important concessions have been made by the theists. Seeking to justify their faith by the type of person it has produced, the more recent apologists have admitted the good life to be the most important thing. They thus subordinate theology to the supreme ideal of Humanism and admit its contention that religion is a way of living and not of believing. Where Positivism was ably met by a deluge of apologetics which by sheer mass it could not answer, Humanism has shown a considerable ability to defend itself when it wants to and to go on about its own tasks when it doesn't. The weapon of indifference is two-edged. Moreover the growing literature of Humanism makes the use of Positivism as a shibboleth increasingly ineffective.

One real issue between Humanism and Theism is found in the opposing claims of metaphysical speculation and the authority of verifiable evidence. To the Humanist the price of superstition is too great to make possible anything other than a reverent agnosticism which is unwilling to place speculative answers at the center of the scene and suspend the moral life therefrom. However interesting as matters of speculation metaphysical questions may be they are relatively remote from the immediate fulfillment of life. He believes that the road to world unity is through ideals so rooted in human experience that they are not controversial.

There is a possibility that if the more liberal Positivists could take an unbiased look at history before and after Comte and see him in his proper perspective they might yet be able to take an active part in the Humanistic movement of today. Their exaggerated view of Comte's importance prevents this. They simply fail to give due credit to such men as Saint Simon and Condorcet whose thought helped tremendously to shape up that of Comte. They do not face Comte's personal peculiarities. To try to heap onto this one man glory borrowed from great scholars before and after bespeaks a distorted power of observation. But there are so few younger men in the movement that it seems consigned to the museum of unfulfilled dreams. Comte's works may be read as we'd read Plato's *Republic* or More's *Utopia* with great profit. By the very comprehensiveness of his system Comte has demanded attention. His works are undoubtedly a mine of stimulating ideas. But the New Humanism is a product of another soil, another century, another epistemology and another spirit.

For the impulse he gave to the development of the social sciences Comte deserves the statue which is placed to his honor before the Sorbonne. Let us give him his due, he was a great savant. His thought has been of greatest influence outside of his cult. But let us have an end of this absurd effort to attach the Positivist label to Humanism. The confusion comes from the dual use of the word. Positivism as a cult with an exact system of thought and the positive method are different things. In a discussion of Positivism we must distinguish not only between the philosophical system of Comte and his cult, but must remember that the word is frequently applied in a limited way to various thinkers such as Feuerbach, J. M. Guyau, and Alfred Loisy who are like Comte only or chiefly in their desire to be scientific. As used on the continent and sometimes here the phrase *positive method* means remaining close to the facts and refers neither to the Comtian religious cult nor the Comtian philosophical system.

The Unitarian doctrine of the freedom of the truth has been taught as the duty to follow the truth whatever its test. If they adhere to that their churches will continue to make Humanists because what they are teaching is essentially the positive method. That method is less ambiguously called the scientific method. We should adhere to the word *scientific* for the sake of clarity although its demands are severe. The word *Positivism* includes too much else which cannot be found in the Humanist movement to make it a usable term. To say that the New Humanism is the old straw of Positivism long since well thrashed and hence unworthy of consideration on its own merits is a worn out argument, unjustified by the facts.

FROM MODERN PHYSICS TO RELIGION

I.—Professor Eddington's *Metaphysics, Philosophy and Theology*

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

PROFESSOR A. S. EDDINGTON, the distinguished British astronomer, physicist and educator, has published an extraordinary book entitled *The Nature of the Physical World.* It is, in reality, a revised series of university lectures, and has some of the defects of semi-popular lectures. These defects, however, will not trouble the general lay reader, or even the studious and cultivated reader. The book is brilliant, unconventionel as to form, exceptionally well written and in more than one place delightfully humorous and witty. Critics have said that the book is literature as well as rigorous science, and they may be right. It fascinates, intrigues and diverts even while it instructs and elucidates the most difficult problems in modern physics and modern philosophy.

It is hardly necessary to say that it is up to date in every respect. It is Einsteinian and Planckian, and more. As an exposition and interpretation of the new physics, it leaves nothing to be desired. But in that part of its task it is not in any sense original.

The original, daring and surprising elements of the book are to be found in the pages—and there are many of them—in which the metaphysical, philosophical and religious aspects of modern exact science are discussed by the author. For he does not stay within the safe limits of science. He is interested in the deeper and more important problems that challenge the mind of man. He ventures boldly beyond science; he even admits and defends mysticism; he has room for and need of theology, religion and God. He upholds the validity of claims which other savants decline to recognize, or treat with scorn and supercilious contempt.

It is the extra-scientific parts of the book that I propose to notice and comment upon in this paper. The reader who is conversant with the teachings of Whitehead, Russell, Jeans and other British scientists will find much in Professor Eddington's book that will suggest fruitful comparisons and pregnant questions.

Perhaps the best way to call attention to the issues raised by Professor Eddington is that of direct quotation. Here is what he says about "the nature of the conviction from which religion arises":

> "The conviction which we postulate is that certain states of awareness in consciousness have at least equal significance with those which are called sensations. Amid [the former] must be found the basis from which a spiritual religion arises. The conviction is scarcely a matter to be argued about; it is dependent on the forcefulness of the feeling of awareness. . . . The idea of a universal Mind or Logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific inquiry; at least, it is in harmony with it."
>
> "We have to build the spiritual world out of symbols taken from our own personality, as we build the scientific world out of the metrical symbols of the mathematician . . . . We must be able to approach the World-Spirit in the midst of our cares and duties in that simpler relation of spirit to spirit in which all true religion finds expression."
>
> "We cannot pretend to offer proofs. *Proof* is an idol before whom the pure mathematician tortures himself. In physics we are generally content to sacrifice before the lesser shrine of *Plausibility*."

In addition to the foregoing significant quotations, we may note that Professor Eddington believes that the stuff of the universe is mental, not material, nor neutral, and that modern physics, in his view, has wiped out the old distinction between natural and supernatural phenomena. Since the world is full of marvels, mysteries, unknown and perhaps unknowable things; since we do not know what the atom is, what it does, and why it does it, it is no longer an objection to any affirmation to say that it *implies* the "supernatural," or an argument *pro* any statement that it *avoids* the assumption of supernatural phenomena.

Finally, we may quote verbatim Professor Eddington's own very useful summary of the cardinal points of his metaphysico-philosophical reflections.

> "1. The symbolic nature of the entities of physics is generally recognized, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something else.

> "2. Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction, and it is not possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject to deterministic law, or, alternatively, that it can suspend deterministic law in the physical world.
>
> "3. Recognizing that the physical world is entirely abstract and without actuality, apart from its linkage to consciousness, we restore consciousness to the fundamental position instead of representing it as an inessential complication found in the midst of inorganic nature at a late stage of evolutionary history.
>
> "4. The sanction for correlating a real physical world to certain feelings of which we are conscious does not seem to differ in any essential respect from the sanction for correlating a spiritual domain to another side of our personality."

We are now in a position to analyze and comment upon the author's remarkable admissions or concessions to theological and metaphysical orthodoxy.

Physical entities are undoubtedly mere symbols. Naive realism is dead. But is it logical to contend that behind the phenomena we deal with symbolically and abstractedly there is something mental, something higher than the physical? The world, to us, is what our sensations, perceptions, inferences and reasoning processes make it; but are we justified in assuming that what we do not sense and perceive is nobler or higher than that which we think we understand? The table which we use, or the typewriter, is not really and exactly what it appears to be, but the aspects we do not perceive are not necessarily nobler than those we do perceive. What is the Universe? We do not know, but we have formed certain notions of it, and these are inevitable, given the human mind and the human body. What is behind and beyond the things we see, hear, smell, touch and reason about, no human mind can possibly know. Our notions and conceptions are pragmatic; they cannot be anything else. That which we cannot conceive remains a mystery. Neither science nor common sense has anything to tell us about the wider or higher entities referred to by Professor Eddington. The Agnostic declines to speculate concerning those other entities.

But what of the assertion that the stuff of the world is mental?

If that be granted, does it not follow that the stuff of the world is also noble and spiritual? By no means, for we have to define the term "mental" as well as the term stuff. Let us pause to consider Professor Eddington's own definitions of these terms. They are, to say the least, singular and paradoxical.

He writes:

> "To put the conclusion crudely, the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. . . . The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness. . . . The mind-stuff is not spread in space and time. . . ., but we must presume that in some other way or aspect it can be differentiated into parts. Only here and there does it rise to the level of consciousness, but from such islands proceeds all knowledge. . . . We are acquainted with an external world because its fibres run into our consciousness; it is only our own ends of the fibres that we actually know; from these ends we more or less successfully reconstruct the rest, as a paleontologist reconstructs an extinct monster from its footprint. The mind-stuff is the aggregation of relations and relata which form the building material for the physical world. . . .
>
> "Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into subconsciousness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite but yet continuous with our mental nature. This I take to be the world-stuff. We liken it to our conscious feelings because, now that we are convinced of the formal and symbolic character of the entities of physics, there is nothing else to liken it to."

Bertrand Russell's view, that the stuff of the world is "neutral," our author rejects, because, he says, that view implies that we have *two* avenues of approach to an understanding of the nature of the world, whereas we have only *one, namely, through our direct knowledge of mind.*

The reasoning in the last quotation seems extraordinary. In the first place, we are told that the terms mind-stuff do not mean what they mean in ordinary discussions. Mind is not mind, and stuff is not stuff as we know these things, or have conceived them in the past. What we are to understand by mind-stuff is "the aggregation of relations and relata which form the building material of the physical world." This stuff we must liken to conscious feelings because we cannot, now that we have discarded crude materialism, liken it to anything else. But what necessity is there for likening that stuff to anything at all? What end is served by calling it mind-stuff? Does the comparison help us to understand that part of the stuff which is beyond the fibres we know? The answer is in the negative, unless we adopt the simple and naive beliefs of the orthodox theologians. What we are entitled to say is this—that a certain process which seems physical up to a certain point becomes mental at that point, in our own use of the terms physical and mental. Where and how the translation occurs, we do not know. The differences we feel and know in the stages of the process need names, however, and we coin them; but let us not forget that the names *are our own creation* and remain just names. Professor Eddington says that we "more or less successfully reconstruct the rest" of the chain or process, the part beyond the fibres we know; but he stops here, tantalizingly enough, and does not tell us *what we have reconstructed* and what the creation of our reason and imagination looks life.

He does say, indeed, that it is not illogical or unreasonable to assume a Great Universal Mind, behind the mind we ourselves possess and the mind-stuff of the universe. This is a new version of the old and fallacious Paley argument, but the version is scarcely an improvement on the old notion. If it is not unreasonable to infer a Great Mind, a Knower and Creator, a God, is it unreasonable to infer that the Universal Mind is lodged in a brain resembling the human and that the brain is part of a body resembling the human body? If so, we are back in the camp of the fundamentalists, the believers in a personal God amenable to prayer and persuasion. What a lame and impotent conclusion that would be!

The scheme of physics is indeed part of something else, but why pretend that we *know* anything about the whole of which physical entities are a part?

Strict causality is abandoned by modern science, says Professor Eddington truly, but does it follow that the mind of man is not subject to deterministic law? Is *all* causality to be dropped, and is chaos to replace the conception of the reign of law? Certainly not. The universe, after all, is *not* chaotic. We cannot trace all consequences to causes, but that does not prove that the consequences have not causes which we are ignorant of in our present state of development. Because certain phenomena are as yet obscure and incomprehensible, are we justified in asserting that they are fortuitous and causeless?

The recognition that the physical world is abstract, continues Professor Eddington in his summary, restores consciousness to its former fundamental position. Why? Fundamental to humanity, perhaps, but not fundamental in the cosmic scheme. We cannot assue that our consciousness is as important to nature as it is to ourselves. And of what significance is the fact that consciousness is again fundamental, if it stops exactly where it did when it was regarded as "an inessential complication of inorganic nature?" Where we *put* consciousness is a matter of no moment. The question is, what do we do with our theory of consciousness?

And here we come to the crux of the discussion. Because of the rehabilitation of consciousness, and because of our new orientation in physics, Professor Eddington claims, a new sanction has emerged for religion and mysticism. We correlate, he points out, a certain "real" world to certain feelings of which we are conscious; why, then, may we not correlate a certain *spiritual* domain to *another* side of our personality? We may and, as scientific thinkers, should, according to Professor Eddington. The sanction is of the same kind in both cases, he contends, and the process of forming the conception of a world of which our feelings give us only fleeting glimpses is also the same.

The author illustrates his point by showing that mere physical phenomena lead us to such concepts as Beauty, Harmony, Unity. Mere physics thus engenders admiration, wonder, exaltation, reverence. Why should not other experiences and feelings in us lead to concepts of the religious type? he asks. Well, the answer is that they do not necessarily or always engender such concepts, and, where they do, the concepts are barren and might as well not exist. There are no Agnostics so far as Beauty is concerned, but there are Agnostics in religion and theology. Professor Eddington fails to account for widespread Agnosticism, although he does insist that those who claim they have vivid religious feelings and experiences should suit action to profession and show that religion is to them a living and potent reality, not a mere empty form of lip-service.

There is absolutely no objection to correlating a spiritual domain to a given side of our personality, provided we know what we mean by a spiritual domain. Professor Eddington does not stop to characterize or delimit the spiritual domain. He assumes that morals and esthetics belong to that domain, but neither morals nor esthetics are dependent upon theology.

Repeatedly Dr. Eddington mentions God, but he refrains from telling us what he means by that term. He fails also to attribute any rôle to his God. As Bertrand Russell says, Professor Eddington seems to believe that his God had something to do with the world in a remote past but abdicated long ago and has forgotten his creation. Such a conception of God is neither philosophical nor practical or sensible. How can we correlate it with our feelings and experiences, pray?

Mr. Russell suspects that Professor Eddington is not wholly candid with his readers, but holds something back. This is extremely improbable. He is misty and nebulous, to be sure, but only because his ideas "beyond physics" are vague and rudimentary. He feels that there is *something* beyond physics, as does Santayana, but what that something is, no one is able to conceive. Why not confess ignorance and stop there?

It is impossible to escape the conclusion of a certain rational idealism—namely, that we know nothing of the actual physical world, and that our senses and perceptions may be grossly unfaithful to reality. But we have no appeal from our senses and perceptions. We have no other data or materials wherewith to build conceptions and theories. We can only admit that the world *may* be different from our image and idea of it; we can only bear in mind that real, actual, ideal are our own terms coined to make distinctions which we find necessary.

The claim of some thinkers that modern physics is furnishing unexpected support to religious orthodoxy and undermining Agnosticism is arresting enough, but, when we examine it closely, we find that it is baseless. Modern physics tends rather to strengthen Agnosticism and to extend it.

Professor Eddington himself virtually admits this. For instance, in discussing the electron and its antics, he says that we may describe these things as "something unknown doing we don't know what," and he maliciously and shockingly compares his own formula with

The slithy toves
did gyre and gimble in the wabe,

and similar delightful nonsense.

Well, if all this be true, what meaning is there in the statement that the stuff of the world is mental, or that physics as now taught has abolished the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, the real and the mystical? If we know *nothing,* what basis is there for God and a so-called spiritual domain?

Dr. Eddington is at times the victim of his own wit, cleverness and breadth. He is a foe of dogma in science or elsewhere, but he mistakes the open mind, the genuinely scientific attitude, with a mushy, thoughtless, demoralizing sentimentality. Science should be modest, tentative, as he insists, but it is absurd to pretend that science has no better foundation or sounder sanctions than, say, orthodox theology. We have the right to demand that theology shall be at least as scientific as are the more exact physical branches of knowledge.

II.—NEO-NATURALISM AND NEO-RELIGION

Religion, by Edward Scribner Ames. Holt and Co.

Here is a book which rationalists and Agnostics should welcome as sincerely and fervently as will those who cling to a certain degree of what may be called orthodoxy in their religious philosophy. Prof. Ames may not be—indeed, is not—strikingly original in the views he presents in this volume, but he is very persuasive, plausible, lucid and candid. His essential teachings differ little from those of Whitehead, Eddington and Millikan, but he is more intelligible than any one of the erudite metaphysicians and physicists who have lately attempted to return to religion, God and mysticism *via* physics and mathematics. He has made a strong case, from his own point of view, for the fundamentals of religion, and he will have to be reckoned with,—that is, discussed and elaborately answered.

In the present brief notice only a few points can be considered, but they will be the points which test at once the merits and the weaknesses of Dr. Ames' position.

To Dr. Ames religion is something so profoundly natural and human that to defend it, to try to prove its validity and legitimacy, is to be guilty of the absurdity of laboriously demonstrating the self-evident. But what is religion? To Dr. Ames, a way of contemplating and reacting to the whole of nature, the totality of all phenomena, physical and spiritual, intelligible and incomprehensible. Nature is studied by the science piecemeal, and properly so. Things have to be isolated for the purposes of science, and all observation and experimentation have to be made under artificial conditions. Truths yielded by science are valuable as far as they go, but they leave much unexplained. The same is true of any philosophy that claims to be scientific. Not so with religion. To religion nature is something organic and indivisible. Man is part of it, and cannot be supposed—as Huxley, for example, contends—to be *at war with the rest of nature.* That is, human ethics cannot be really incompatible with cosmic ethics, whatever the appearances may suggest to the superficial observer. Men's ideals and noblest conceptions are as natural as the so-called animal passions and appetites which he must satisfy, albeit in sublimated forms. The basic harmonies of nature are clear to religion, if not to science. And religion inspires effort to banish apparent discords and reduce or eradicate apparent evil.

God, to Dr. Ames, is nature viewed as functioning in a certain way, the way that leads to the most abundant and worthiest of lives from the human point of view. In other words, God is a name we humans give to the ideal and the excellent *in ourselves* and therefore in nature. Since ideals exist, and since moral progress is real, God exists. To doubt his existence is to doubt what we most value and cherish in life and in thought and feeling—and this is inconceivable. God is *not* a person in the literal or strict sense of the term, but he has a personal aspect, since he personifies, *to us*, our own personal qualities of goodness, virtue and moral beauty. When we pray to God, we pray to a whole aspect of nature and life, and prayer is efficacious, because something in us answers the prayer and grants the favor sought. Prayer makes us purer, gentler, sweeter, more human, and by affecting *us* affects *nature*—though not what we may call physical phenomena, like wind, flood, earthquakes, fire, etc.

It will be seen from the foregoing inadequate summary that Dr. Ames is neither heterodox nor orthodox, but a cross between the two types. He has little sympathy with the ordinary modernist, and none at all with the Humanist. He stresses the impossibility of *ignoring* the supernatural or drawing a sharp distinction between it and the natural—agreeing in this respect with Professor Eddington. He thinks the position of the Agnostic unscientific and unphilosophic, out of date and out of harmony with contemporary habits of thought.

However, the unrepentant Agnostic, while paying tribute to Dr. Ames' sincerity and courage, will not hasten to surrender his position unconditionally after reading the book under notice. After all, Dr. Ames coins terms and makes definitions to suit himself. He stretches logic rather violently when he contends that God is "personal" in a sense. And how many men would pray if they thought they were praying to themselves—to their better natures—and asking these better selves to conquer the worse selves? If God is a name for one side of nature, the good and ideal side, what is the name for the ugly, seamy, disagreeable and odious side or sides of nature? The Devil? Again, how many intelligent persons will accept these definitions as satisfactory substitutes for the old and conventional definitions or conceptions?

But, going a little deeper, let us ask whether Dr. Ames is not guilty of a naive anthropomorphism in his reasoning regarding human nature and nature at large. It is true, and no one has ever denied, that *man is part of nature*—what else, indeed, *could* he conceivably be? But what grounds are there for magnifying his importance in nature? Man is supposed to be the last word in Evolution, but even if that is the case—and we cannot be sure, since there may be life on other planets, and that life may have assumed forms superior to ours—what ground is there for assuming that man is of interest or significance to anybody save himself? Man's habitat is the tiny, unstable, inconsequential globe. Man's destiny is uncertain and his career is short and full of terrible misdeeds. He is still rapacious, brutal, stupid and ignorant. He kills for fun and is not ashamed. He slays his fellows without reason because he is full of envy and malice. He is vain, petty and arrogant and cannot be trusted with power. He is hypocritical, professing creeds he has no intention of practicing. He is superstitious and gullible. There is no evidence that his disappearance would cause a ripple in the cosmos. What does he *know* of nature? Nothing. How presumptuous, then, it is in him to propound theories concerning his relation to nature and his rôle and place in nature.

Words may serve the purpose of concealing intellectual poverty.

But the critical thinker is not deceived by words. The Agnostic is first and last a critical thinker and a frank realist. He knows that human knowledge is pitifully meager, and that it will always remain meager so far as the ultimate problems of nature and life are concerned. Man does well, indeed, to identify himself with his better nature; he shows sense in endeavoring to make his existence more and more comfortable; he is slowly learning the advantages of kindliness, forbearance, mercy and generosity, and occasionally he rises to the plane he calls altruistic. He is to be encouraged to persevere in his difficult and thorny upward march, but it behooves him to remain humble and simple. He must bear in mind that nothing is more ridiculous than pretension to wisdom where no wisdom exists and where at every step one encounters insurmountable obtacles to understanding.

The Agnostic, remembering all these things, refuses to claim knowledge beyond science and empiricism. He will not accept Dr. Ames' religion or philosophy of religion because they are largely verbal and rhetorical creations.

RELIGION ALWAYS COMES BACK

BY WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

AMERICA at last is class-conscious!

Not, we must add at once, in an economic or Marxian sense. The most strenuous efforts of such doughty fighters as Debs, LaFollette, Upton Sinclair, and Norman Thomas, if we may judge by the results of the last election, have failed even to attract serious attention. The division is along other lines. It is a division and a conflict that could scarcely have been predicted twenty years ago.

What the Socialists have failed to accomplish, the Fundamentalists have achieved! Socialism in America seems distinctly on the ebb. Religion, on the other hand, is steadily assuming greater and greater social and political significance. Its influence on the recent presidential election cannot be ignored and should not be discounted. The success of the Prohibition movement made the Protestant religious elements of our population conscious as never before of their political power. What shall we do next, was a natural question. Resulting conflicts deepened the fissures of cleavage and consolidated the opposing factions.

In a democratic country no good reason can be assigned why any group whatever should not utilize all the political force it can command. That which the churches can summon is enormous. Organization and a technique of propaganda are being rapidly perfected. Religion is in politics. It is in to stay. And its influence seems bound to increase.

What new issues will be raised? What changes will result? It is impossible yet to foresee. In the meantime Prohibition, surveys of industry by the churches, "monkey laws," programs and agitation for week-day religious instruction, the activities of "The Lord's Day Alliance" and the American Association for the Advancement of Atheism—all these are facts big with menace or promise, or merely interest, according to one's point of view.

A glance at publishers' statistics tends to confirm our estimate of the place held by religion in the thought of America today. In 1928 it is reported that 7,614 new books were published. Of these 1,135 were fiction, 766 dealt with religion, and 634 were juveniles. These three classes contain one-third of the entire output and the works on religion more than one-tenth.[1]

It is scarcely possible to pick up an issue of a magazine more serious than the "confession" type without finding at least one article expounding, attacking, defending, or attempting to appraise religion. Newspapers are on the alert to feature dissensions and doctrinal controversies. The American Association for the Advancement of Atheism is an active missionary society for pious irreligion. Dr. Watson preaches the gospel of Behaviorism with the fanaticism and the tactics of Billy Sunday. And Clarence Darrow argues for evolution as he would for a crook or a murderer.[2] Scientists, meanwhile, are on the defensive and inclined to be conciliatory or even friendly. Millikan reiterates his conviction that religion and science are not merely compatible but mutually supplementary and both indispensable. Eddington, in what may be reckoned the most important scientific or philosophical or religious book of recent years (*The Nature of the Physical World*) finds science literally driving men's thought toward essentially religious conceptions.

The exciting possibility emerges that questions of faith and belief may again, and before very long, become the supreme concern of men and of nations. Religious wars, we certainly hope, are forever past: but that seems by no means sure. If they come again, they will at least restore something of color and glamor to a world that is rapidly losing its sense of spiritual values in a mad, and apparently futile, struggle to keep pace with its machines.

Religious wars cannot possibly be more cruel or more devastating than economic wars. On the contrary, if, as has been confidently asserted, gentlemen really prefer wars and will have them, a religious war would seem to be the best of all possible wars. Eight or nine centuries ago men fought for a Holy Land. Today they fight only for oil lands—or perhaps diamond fields. To call that *progress* is ironical.

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[1] Other items are: biographies, 640; poetry and drama, 595; sociology and economics, 502; history, 394; general literature, 363; geography and science, 685. (Willard E. Hawkins in *The Author and Journalist,* March, 1929, p. 9, quoting the Publishers' Weekly.)

[2] Why, by the way, has no one ever protested that science does not require a criminal lawyer to defend it? And why has no one pointed out the stupid tactical blunders, the complete misjudgment of all the significant factors in the situation, that made the self-elected defenders of science the really simian figures in the famous Scopes trial?

If men must fight, religion is the one thing most worth fighting for. If men must again train cannon and high explosive shells upon the bodies of living fellow men, let us pray to whatever gods there be that they will do it for the glory of some God or other, or for the salvation of whatever may then be serving as the equivalent of immortal souls. It will be an immeasurable calamity, if they are willing to do it for the salvation of the Maximum Petrolatum Company's investments in the Andes or for the glory (and profit) of the international bankers, Messrs. Judas and Hogg.

But just what should we fight about? Of all stupid procedures, the silliest is to *fight* for truth. Truth is not disseminated in clouds of poison gas. It is not thrust home by stabbing bayonets. Violence is a sign of panic, not of certainty and assurance. What *is* religion? How can it become anyone's supreme concern? And what is the secret of its vitality?

It is commonly held that religion cannot be defined. I believe it can be adequately, even completely defined in eight words.

Religion is the goodness of the good man.

More than eight words will be required to explain the definition. We must, in the first place, come to agreement upon our "good man." I do *not* mean the morally irreproachable citizen. He *may* be that, too. He is more likely to be an object of suspicion to good citizens. He is that sturdy, indomitable person, quite possibly a "rough neck," who according to a popular saying cannot be "kept down." He just won't stay down. Beaten, deceived, disappointed, failing times without number, he comes back again and again and as often as need be. Smiling or grim, he carries on. Destiny weakens before such a man. Circumstances "break" at last in his favor. In the end he wins. And in his triumph he is more than a mere man. He is a symbol of MAN toiling through the ages.

By his "goodness" I mean whatever it may be that keeps him going. We may call it energy, determination, will-power, or other names. I prefer to call it goodness. If we analyze it, we may be able to discern "fighting reflexes" "conditioned" to opposition and difficulty as stimuli. We may describe in detail emotional elements —visceral disturbances and their attendant sensation-complexes. But that with which I am concerned just now is an "intellectual" element. It can scarcely be called a judgment, or even a theory. It is rather a belief, or an assumption. It may not always be fully conscious, or verbalised; yet it is always present as the foundation of every intelligent or purposeful effort.

The "good man" could not be "good" at all, in the very special sense in which we are now using the term, if he did not assume in his environment a *goodness* answering to and supplementing his own. No one can pull at an imaginary rope. We cannot push at an imaginary obstacle. We cannot walk except on some firm support. · We live, we move, we undertake, and we succeed in our undertakings, only because the world at once resists and cooperates with us. The "good man" discerns, however dimly or confusedly, the cooperation in the resistance. That is *faith*.

This is not faith in his own powers alone. That would be nonsense. If the environment were utter chaos; if no effort or forethought of his could possibly bring to realization any of his desires; his effort would be paralyzed by a sense of its own futility. Indeed, he would not so much as know what effort is. Desire itself could never arise. He would be incapable of anything but blindly reflex actions and such a vague mass of feeling as we may attribute in imagination to an oyster.

To act otherwise than reflexly is *possible* only in an ordered environment. And whenever intelligent or purposeful behavior appears, it evinces a *trust in things.* To the extent to which this trust is not merely occasional but characteristic, and is directed not simply to this or that particular situation but to life as a whole and to the environment in its totality—to the Universe—it is religion.

Religion, then, is *trust in a cosmic goodness.* If we turn from our "good man" to that of which he is the symbol, religion is MAN'S attitude toward his environment—let us say, the Universe—when MAN confronts its vastness and mystery with hope and aspiration.

Every discovery of science is a vindication of religion, *if* this definition can be made good. Every achievement of civilization can be traced to a faith that is essentially religious. Not one high human enterprise can possibly be carried to successful completion severed from its roots in religion.

It is no longer an exasperating mystery that religion, "exposed," "refuted," outlawed, banished, makes its way slyly or in open triumph back into the hearts of men. To outlaw it is to outlaw one's very self. To be irreligious is simply to be sub-human. To abandon religion is to surrender hope and high emprise. It is to relinquish all dreams of happiness and lasting satisfaction, to turn from energetic, eager labor to dejection, apathy, and despair.

Our definition must be either very original, very profound, or very foolish. For it is evident that most men do not believe that religion is anything so simple, so fundamental, so vital, so ineradicable, or so indispensable. If they did, they would not be forever attacking or defending it. Only a few hard-bitten, desperate souls, hopelessly at odds with life, would disavow it. They would find no listeners.

The rest of us would feel no interest in the controversy. We should see that all the particular religious beliefs and practices are only symbols of something that is very different—something very simple and very profound. Without dismay we should watch the great symbols glow and fade, knowing that they are only flames flung up from the central fires of human energy and aspiration. Until the fires grow cold, new flames will ever leap up to replace those that die away and to illumine the field of our endeavors.

Religion, then, is the *elan* of the human race. Trust in a cosmic goodness is the common and unifying element in all the particular religions. Even those that seem the most absurd or hideous are but variations upon this theme. Dogmas are attempts to define, to explain, and to defend men's hopes. Rites and ceremonies are the struggles of faith to realize and lay hold on the mercy that, it is felt, must underlie the rugged and apparently hostile facts of life.

An awed sense of *the explosiveness of things* is about all that can be discerned in the lowest forms of religion. A mysterious power, often called *mana,* is believed to pervade everything. The most trifling object, the simplest act, may be attended by appalling consequences. One who can learn the laws by which events happen can control them and bend them to his purposes. So he can insure rich harvests, plentiful supplies of game or fish, victory in war—in a word, whatever seems to men good.

The point is that there *are* laws and that men *can* achieve well-being. That faith is religion. The environment is not hopelessly capricious nor invincibly hostile. Man is not utterly helpless or alone.

The first guesses, the first attempts to control events, are of course in the light of later knowledge grotesque. Strange incantations and rituals develop. Soon they lose their character as scientific experiments. They congeal into superstitions. Progress is halted until they can be shattered and men will experiment anew with wider knowledge and improved methods.

Religion, however, must not be confused with any of its merely incidental features or its temporary expressions. It is neither incantation nor ritual, nor both together. These are but conjectured *ways* to happiness. Religion is not a way at all, but the confidence that there is a way.

The distinction is both real and important. The first ways are certainly nearly all wrong. If religion were merely a collection of devices to control the weather, multiply possessions, or vanquish enemies, it would collapse when the particular devices are discovered to be futile. Were men limited to their first conjectures, they would soon sink into inertia and despair. Actually we see that religion survives one disillusionment after another; and man rises from each disappointment still believing that a promised land lies just ahead. Religion is at once the energy that drives him, the hope that beckons him on, and the faith that runs before achievement.

At a higher cultural level, spirits and gods appear. Varied as are their forms, they are all embodiments of hopes. They are beings from whom men may purchase or entreat favors. The Roman poet Lucretius was wrong when he wrote his famous line, "Fear made the first gods." And Rabbi Lewis Browne is wrong again, when he accounts for all religion by the simple formula, "Men were afraid."

Fear, the psychologist knows, is a profound and extensive organic disturbance. Fear alone produces *nothing* but panic. If men do not act merely frantically in terrifying situations, it is because something other than fear controls them. If panic turns to religion, it is because there is present at least a gleam of hope and a measure of sanity. Religion is not fear but the attempt to master it.

No man, civilized or savage, ever prayed to a being of whom he was only afraid. If he prays or sacrifices, it is because he hopes. An American chauffeur does not pray to his automobile, because he knows it is no use. A Hindu may. He thinks there is at least a chance. A man may believe, with good reason, that the deity in control of his destiny is ferocious. This is not religion, until it occurs to him that the god may be appeased. Divine favor may be won. At least the worst of the divine anger may be averted. So the most horrible of idols, the most atrocious and cruel rites, bear testimony to man's irrepressible hope that things are at least not quite so bad as they seem.

From the supreme horror savage man was probably free. It seems never to have occurred to him that his cries would win *no* answer, that there was no meaning at all to nature, no goodness anywhere in the vast universe responsive to his own. To feel the anguish of that discovery, if it be a discovery, is one outstanding characteristic of our own culture. "We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead."[3]

However we extend our survey, we shall always find that religion is a faith in a cosmic goodness. It is a faith sometimes tremulous and uncertain, sometimes stalwart and assured. Whether the one or the other, it is ineradicable and indispensable. If particular formulas prove inadequate, it will devise new ones. The only alternative to it is apathy and inertia.

But religion is not alone hope. There would be no ground for hope unless in some way, and in spite of appearances, the Universe were *already* good. So religion is hope *and* appreciation. It is trust illuminated by the vision of goodness already present. For Christians all this is symbolized in The Heavenly Father.

What controversies we should be spared, if we could only realize the functions and the limitations of a symbol! A symbol is of value because it at once resembles and does not resemble the object for which it stands. We call Lindbergh "The Lone Eagle." It is a splendid metaphor. But it is splendid just because Lindbergh is *not* an eagle. If he were, we would shut him up in a zoo. When Christians speak of the Great Power that is the Ultimate Basis of All as "God the Father," they do *not* mean that He must have hot water every morning for His shave. What *do* they mean? What is it that is symbolized?

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[3] Clifford: "The Influence Upon Morality of a Decline in Religious Beliefs," in *Lectures and Essays*, Vol. II, p. 250. Cf. also Theodore Dreiser, "I can make no comment on my work or my life that holds either interest or significance for me. . . . Life is to me too much a welter and play of inscrutable forces to permit, in my case at least, any significant comment. . . . In short I catch no meaning from all I have seen, and pass quite as I came, confused and dismayed." (Quoted in "The New Student," April, 1929, p. 9, from *The Bookman*.)

Stripped of all metaphors, the Christian faith is that, if men will confront the Universe not with fear and hostility but with love, reverence, and a will to cooperate, things will "break well" for them. If they will talk with I T, as loving children would with an ideal father, they will receive "answers"—insights, peace, and happiness. Time may bring health, success, and obvious pleasure. It may bring sickness, failure, and seeming misery. Whatever comes, in the depths of man's being, it will be well. It will be "well with his soul." Even death can be only another triumph for life that is consciously in touch with the Energy of the Universe.

Him or I T? Nature or God? Universe or Heavenly Father? It is almost evidence of a cosmic irony that men should engage in bitter controversy over these terms and contend for one or another of them, when they all mean so nearly the same thing. There is not the least difference in meaning, so long as we are concerned only with the present facts and their causes. Of the great Power or Principle that serves for the last term in our thinking, we know only one thing. I T has given us the kind of a world we have. I T is revealed in the world which I T has made. Our thought moves, and must move, in a circle. From known facts we infer a Cause. But of the Cause we know only that it has produced the facts. What name we shall apply to I T is a matter for individual tastes? Mumbo Jumbo would do as well as Zeus, if by Mumbo Jumbo we *mean* the same.

Man's hope, though, is a *new* fact. When man hopes, he reckons not merely with the world he knows but with the world he doesn't know—even with the world that isn't yet. And the hopeful man does not seek an escape to a world of dreams. He grapples with realities and transforms them. He builds cities where there were only jungles or deserts. He carves rocks into statues. He extends the span of his life and postpones till its very end the infirmities of old age.

But to struggle, he must find firm foothold. And this is just what blind force, matter, energy, or even "Nature" cannot afford. It is impossible to discern in them the goodness which must supplement and cooperate with man's own.

A cosmic goodness must be defined in other terms. It cannot be derived in any way from that which is not good—from "dirt going it blind" (to use an expressive phrase of Dr. Fosdick's). What religion means by an "Infinite Spirit" or an "Almighty Father" is a goodness at the heart of things. Probably it can never be proved either inductively or deductively. But it must be assumed, if human effort is not to collapse in one vast despair. In "God the Father Almighty," as Christianity has given meaning to the terms, men register the highest and most exuberant—it may be the wildest and most extravagant—of their hopes.

"God" is as bad as "blind force," if He has given us no better a world than "blind force" would have produced. "Nature" is as good as "God," if it is to "Nature" that we owe the poets, the heroes, and the saints of our race, and if we can trust "Nature" to satisfy our craving for a life that is truly good. Indeed "Nature," if it is all that, is obviously only another name (I think a very inferior one) for "God." If "Nature" has given the world Jesus Christ—"Nature," for any Christian, is "God" enough.

Can the cosmic goodness ever be conclusively proved or disproved? It seems scarcely possible. To achieve this, we should have to know all the facts of the Universe and interpret their relations without error. That at best is a remote possibility. In the meantime we must live. Life demands adventure. We venture upon either our hopes or our misgivings.

Today is a strange time for despair. To be sure, it is apparent that the religions of the past pictured the cosmic goodness in too simple a fashion. We can no longer believe, for example, in a divine errand boy executing the orders that we call our prayers. Our universe is vaster, in many ways sterner, than our ancestors supposed. And yet today we understand, as we have never understood before, how "Nature" serves, or at least can be made to serve, man's purposes—even those that are subtlest and most spiritual.

We know that the sun's light was stored in forests that were later buried deep in the earth. So coal was prepared—a storage battery surpassing any that man has yet invented. In deep mines Power lay hid, to be released when men had learned the secret of its use. Water and fire are yoked together to transport him in safety and with amazing speed over vast distances. Even the air sustains his flight. The lightning has made of his speech "winged words" in a sense of which Homer never dreamed. Physical health, for individuals or for communities, is no longer a matter of chance. Psychology seems to be at least on the threshold of knowledge that will transform life in its most inward aspects. What greater goodness could Omniscience and Omnipotence devise than a world in which there is no limit to what intelligent effort may achieve?

Have we been speaking of material progress only? Is all that we have mentioned something entirely apart from religion? It depends upon the use to which men put the goodness of the Universe. Words that fly to the most secluded corners of the earth may carry only orders to buy or sell; or they may bear messages of light and inspiration. Speeding planes and leviathans of the air may carry poison gases and promoters of frauds; or they may transport works of art and the apostles of new and grander faiths.

In all this there is surely the stimulus to grander hopes and higher emprise than man has hitherto dared to contemplate. A more wonderful world than he has ever before even imagined calls for his admiration and challenges his spirit. To hope, to adore, to dare, is religion at its highest: and never before have there been such splendor to adore, such grounds for hope, or such adventures to undertake. The situation calls not for retreat but for advance. If our age fails to make the advance, the failure may well prove the supreme calamity of history. The disaster, if it comes, will have about it a strange and tragic irony—as when a victorious army flees in panic from its beaten and routed foe.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DR. McTAGGART

BY GILBERT T. SADLER

SINCE the publication of the second volume of *The Nature of Existence* which completes the work of this great Cambridge philosopher, Dr. McTaggart's credit has steadily risen. He was known in his lifetime as a brilliant debater and inspiring teacher: but, though he had published important works,[1] his great system of philosophy was only partially delivered to the public at the time of his death. It can now be studied in its completeness in the two volumes of *The Nature of Existence.* This work is the positive and logical presentation of what McTaggart desired to say. His previous works on Hegel and *Some Dogmas of Religion* had prepared the way for this last remarkable effort. Briefly, he believed the universe to be souls related in groups or primary wholes, or in one primary whole, perhaps. Their unity is a unity of system, not a unity in one Person or Super-Person or God or Unitive Mind. It is like a state, consisting of men. Thus McTaggart was both a Pluralist and a Monist; a Pluralist as to the souls of which reality was composed: and a Monist as to the unifying love which united or related souls to one another, in varying degrees of love.

Such, in brief, was the philosophical result of years of study, discussion and tuition at Cambridge. Drafts of his books used to be submitted by McTaggart, to his friendly critics at Cambridge, ere he published his works.

It is necessary to state the main philosophical argument of Vol. I of *The Nature of Existence,* and then an estimate can be made of the value of the second volume recently published. Volume I declared that *only souls or selves exist, and their parts are perceptions, which are divisible ad infinitum.* All selves are related, each loving one other or a few, or a group of other souls or selves. Each is unique, and so has a sufficient description. No two plants, animals or men are exactly alike.

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[1] His principal publications are: *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic,* Cambridge, 1896; *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,* Cambridge, 1901; *Some Dogmas of Religion,* London, 1906; *The Relation of Time and Eternity,* Berkeley, 1908; *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic,* Cambridge, 1910; *The Nature of Existence, Vol. I,* Cambridge, 1921; *The Nature of Existence, Vol. II,* Cambridge, 1927.

What exists then is souls, and so groups of souls, and parts of souls, and their perceptions: briefly, souls and their perceptions. And all are related and form a universe, whose unity is not a God of any kind, but it is love in all stages or degrees. Every substance (viz. selves, parts of selves, and groups of selves) is in relation to each other, and so each is unique, and with an infinity of relationships or qualities. Each self (or group of such, or parts of such) is unique to some extent, and so has a sufficient description. Each has a varying relatedness, or relationships. So each has an *exclusive* description. Characteristics are inter-dependent, and some determine others, or cause others. Hegel said that everything is determined by everything else. The universe is an organic unity, and the parts manifest the whole. There is an inner teleology. The parts are alive and in relation. So the whole is an organic or living unity, not a unity of composition, like a book of words. The universe is of living parts overlapping with "enormous complexity." But now a difficulty occurs, and it may be best represented by an example. Take a family of two brothers the parents being dead. The family is real, but it only now consists of two brothers. Each man has love to the other one, in some degree. But the idea of a family does not of itself give us reality, as it presupposes people but does not describe them. They might be father and son, or widow and sons, and so forth. We cannot reach reality except by overcoming such presuppositions and finding real persons who give us something sure, for they only have parts within parts to infinity. *Every substance, being unique, must have a sufficient description.* So groups of souls (say a family) and souls, and parts of souls (their perceptions) must have, each, a sufficient description. Now we can only realise that if the parts are *perceptions,* and if such are determined or influenced by other souls. A = a group, say a family. B and C = 2 sons, the only parts left of the family of A. These perceive (and love to some extent, therefore) one another, and so cause one another to feel such love; i.e. each has a part (or perception) determined by the other, corresponding to the other. Selves and their parts are the sole reality. Selves are the realities that *determine* their parts of other selves (= *perceptions* of other souls, or of parts of souls, or of groups of souls). Perception is the only power by which we can get an infinite series of parts within parts to infinity viz. B perceives C, i.e. loves C in some degree. So C determines a part of B, viz. B's perception of a love to C. C educes that perception or love. C determines B in that part of B. B may love others also, or have a faint affection to others, and again complaisance to yet others; and all for C's sake. "Love me, love my dog" even! McTaggart works out these implications of love in detail. We get then B! C, B loves C. C *determines* that part or perception of B. B! B! C= B perceives that he, B, perceives C; and so on infinitely if we desire to pursue the perceptions of perceptions.

But McTaggart says no one really does pursue it down and down. Enough that we have found reality as souls, and their perceptive love to other souls.

McTaggart shows us that if we do not love we are not really ourselves. We may be clever animals, or rich citizens, but we have not found (i.e. felt) our eternal nature. We doom ourselves to a terrible awakening some day. *"Determining correspondence" is thus a relation between souls,* i.e. between a soul C, and part of another soul B. B! C = B perceives (and so loves) C, in some degree or sense of the term perception. C determines a part of B thus. No two souls are alike: each is unique, and so had a unique description.

The King of England 1500 A. D. = Henry VII, and no one else. Each soul has an infinity of parts, for no soul is simple, or a single fact.

But reality is souls, parts of souls, and groups of souls, or selves. If we take groups of souls we get no true infinity of parts, for there is no sufficient description possible of a group of souls. The group presupposes males or females, young or old souls in its group, and we need to go to the souls themselves to get a sufficient description. Nor can the parts of souls give us sufficient descriptions. They again presuppose various powers in the souls. We need, then, to fix our attention on *the unique souls of the universe.* They alone give us an infinite divisibility that is not a vicious infinite by endless presuppositions. Our souls have implications, viz., our perceptions of one another, and their parts within parts to infinity. It is impossible to reach reality—substances with sufficient descriptions—by a category or description such as "family," for it does not decide what the parts of it are: they may be husband and wife and child, or brother and sister, and so forth. It *presupposes* so many possibilities. We must get to a category which tells of something that is unique and self-contained, and from which the parts are implied *ad infinitum*.

The only category is a self. When we reach selves we have substances, spiritual substances whose parts are perceptions, and their parts are perceptions of these perceptions, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Hence reality is selves or souls, all eternal and related, and perceiving other souls, and loving in some degree whom they perceive: for there can be no real perception without some degree of sympathy or love.

The universe is such souls, in one or more primary wholes or groups of souls, and perhaps all in one such whole or gathering of inter-related souls of all stages, degrees, kinds, in some attitude of love, and its joy. The argument of McTaggart is of this nature. To recapitulate—substances are souls of all degrees, and their parts, which are perceptions. But such exist in and by their relatedness. If I see a stone, I see lowly souls or selves. All is alive, in some degree: and all is related to some other souls, and to their parts or perceptions. Now no substance (i.e. self) is simple. It is divisible, and divisible therefore infinitely, for its parts are divisible.

But groups of souls give us no infinite divisibility, for they have no definite relatedness to souls. So with parts of souls. They give us no starting-point for an infinite divisibility of parts. These (groups or parts) presuppose various souls below or above them, and they (the groups or parts) have no sufficient and unique description. Only souls can give us infinite divisibility. From them proceed parts, viz. perceptions, and they have parts, viz. perception of a perception, and so on down *ad inf.* They imply their parts within parts. Groups and parts of souls only presuppose a variety of parts, giving us a vicious infinite.

In volume II McTaggart deals with the probable rather than the necessary facts. He declares that *souls are not in time, that matter does not exist, and that love really unites souls, each to one or a few* *other souls.* Love is not pity merely, resulting in almsgiving, as in some religions. It is real emotional love to a person or persons.

Hence such persons are eternal, for love is inexhaustible in its nature. Their perceptions are really grades of love to other souls, or to what are dreaming souls, as forms of so-called "matter."

We thus come to the many themes with which our author deals. *As to "matter,"* McTaggart says it is really souls or selves of a low order. It seems to have primary qualities (as size, shape, position, mobility and impenetrability, excluding other forms of "matter"), and secondary qualities (as colour, hardness, smell, taste and sound). The latter are effects produced by something on an observing object. "Matter" cannot exist, as it has no parts within parts to infinity. Even space is now said to be made up of "indivisible points of matter," and so does not exist. There can, then, be no "determining correspondence" as to matter, and so it does not exist. It has no perceptions of souls, and perceptions of those perceptions. *As to the idea of God,* McTaggart discussed it in *Some Dogmas of Religion,* and concluded there could be no Omnipotent God, and no non-Omnipotent God either. In Volume II of *The Nature of Existence,* we have a chapter on the subject. "No self can be part of another self." "Every primary part is a self." So there can be no All-inclusive self, as God. If God be one self among many selves, He would not be creative of selves. All selves must have come into existence together, or else be eternal. So there is no God, either Creative or Unitive. *As to time,* there is no A-series of past, present or future: and no B-series of earlier and later events: though we believe these to exist. But there is a C-series of expressions to us of eternal events: as we read a book in stages, which yet exists all the time and all at once. So we count 1 2 3 . . . or A B C . . . ., whereas numbers and the alphabet exist all at once, and all the time.

History is of events which really and eternally interpenetrate; in a timeless order of souls, of love and their relations to one another. "We have come to the conclusion that there is no real A series and no real B series (before and after), and no real time-series." (p. 30.) Yet there is a real series, but it is not a time series. This is the real C series, felt by us in misperceptions, not entirely erroneous. The terms in it are really connected by *permanent* relations, like A, B, C. . . . our experiences of time occur in a "specious present"; in what seems to be a "present," as opposed to past and future. There is no such thing really. We have experiences which really are aspects of our external experience.

We misperceive the C-series (a reality) as if it were a B series of earlier and later facts of experience. The C-series actually exist, in eternity. *In regard to immortality;* McTaggart believed all souls to be eternal in an eternal present. The "C-series" is misconceived as if it were the B series of events before or after any given event. The C-series is not a time-series. It moves from less inclusive to more inclusive reality: and such a process is outside time.

"All that exists is really timeless. What seems future is present in some sense now." "The system of the determining correspondence parts is the universe, since it contains all existing content." "If heaven is timeless, it cannot be really future."

"Selves, though not in time, appear as in time" (.372).

"The same is true of all parts of selves which are determined by determining correspondence: viz. the perceptions which each self contains of selves and of parts of selves to infinity." "Nothing is really past, for nothing is an event in time."

Thus, our ordinary events, as having a breakfast and writing a letter, are related to other events in our self-manifestation. In that series we are but partly expressing ourselves. We exist as a whole eternally but we partly express ourselves, and call that our "life" here, or a series of such lives, by reincarnations. We are more than we think we are.

What is the heart of every soul, then, but love? McTaggart discusses this in great detail, and with a very great insight. It is an astonishing piece of work to find, in a philosophical book, the power and enthusiasm of a soul of love, freely given to us.

"The entire life of each self centres round and depends on his love for other selves, and, as I believe, *it is love which is the supreme value of life* . . . . Love has no end but itself" (II p. 392).

"I shall never permanently lose my friend or his love."

"A self will love every other self whom he perceives directly." In the future, beyond death, after our reincarnations here, love will be stronger and more joyous than here and now. Barriers will be swept aside. "Unity will be unhampered." Uncongenial qualities will be largely overcome, in "absolute reality." All perceptions of other selves will be states of love. They ever are such states really, but we misperceive them here on earth. "Absolute reality is timeless and . . . . infinite." (p. 160). Love here cannot keep permanently in its intensity. We are drawn aside by life's toil. But in the full life to come love will be free, unfettered, ecstatic even. By determining correspondence (B ! C = C influences or determines B, and so B perceives or loves C) one soul differentiates another. A chain of causation runs through the universe then.

There is, then, no space (no fixed lengths of miles) and no time (no fixed experiences of years), but *only souls in love with souls;* and thus kindly to all who are associated with the beloved souls; and complaisant to all parts of the beloved soul or souls.

And if the beloved one has faults, even these are tolerated, if not a cause of enhancing the love felt to that soul. For shadow can relieve and make brighter tints more beautiful. McTaggart endeavoured to show and *explain the evils of life.* He has treated "Evil" as error, vice, pain and disharmony. But what of loneliness, ennui, disappointment, over-work, a nagging wife or husband, poverty, fear of death, disease, physical weakness without pain, being hated or hating another?

In the last section of *The Nature of Existence,* our author wrote "There may await each of us, and perhaps each of us in many different lives, delusions, cries, suffering, hatred, as great as or greater than any which we now know. All that we can say is that this evil, however great it may be, *is only passing.* The final stage is one in which the good infinitely exceeds all the evil in the series by which it is attained. Of the nature of the good we know something. We know that it is a timeless and endless state of love,—love so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystic rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection. We know that we shall know nothing but our beloved, and those they love, and ourselves as loving them, and that only in this shall we seek and find satisfaction. Between the present and that fruition there stretches a future which may well need courage. For, while there will be in it much good and increasing good, there may await us evils which we can now measure only by their infinite insignificance as compared with the final reward."

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SINISM

A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE WORLD-VIEW

by **H. G. CREEL, Ph. D.**

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

ENTRANCE TO THE DALAGA MALIGAWA, THE TEMPLE OF BUDDHA'S TOOTH, AT KANDY, CEYLON.

(The octagonal building on the right is a Buddhist Library.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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NEWTON'S IDEA OF GOD AS FOUND IN THE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF HIS PRINCIPIA

BY F. CAJORI

IN the first edition of Newton's *Principia* (1687) no statement is made on the nature of God. Nevertheless, criticism was passed upon the *Principia* on theological grounds, by two prominent thinkers—Bishop Berkeley who in 1710 published his *Principles of Human Knowledge,* and by G. W. Leibniz who on Feb. 10, 1711 wrote a letter to Hartsoeker, a Dutch physician at Düsseldorf, which was published on May 5, 1712, in the *Memoirs of Literature,* a weekly sold in London.[1]

Berkeley attacks Newton's exposition, in the *Principia,* of the notion of absolute space, absolute time and absolute motion. "This celebrated author," says Berkeley, "holds there is an *absolute Space,* which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable." As to absolute motion, "I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than *relative*; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies." "But the chief advantage arising from it [relative space as advocated by Berkeley] is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, . . . of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, unmutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd motions."[2] Thus the absolute space, time and motion of Newton was attacked as an atheistic conception.

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[1] This letter of Leibniz is found in Leibniz's *Opera omnia,* Vol. 2, Geneva, 1768, Part II, p. 60; *Philosophische Schriften von Leibniz* (ed. C. I. Gerhardt), Vol. 3, Berlin, 1887, p. 519.

See also D. Brewster's *Memoirs of Sir Isaac Newton,* Vol. 2, Edinburgh, 1860, chap. 22, p. 219-222; J. Edleston, *Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes,* 1850, p. 153. Leibniz attacks the theory of gravity also in his *Essais de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu,* 1710.

Leibniz, the second distinguished critic, does not mention Newton or the *Principia* in his letter to Hartsoeker, but the reference is obvious. Leibniz says:

"Thus the ancients and moderns who avow that gravity is an *occult quality,* are right, if they mean thereby that there is a certain mechanism unknown to them, by which bodies are impelled toward the center of the earth. But if their notion is that this transpires without any mechanism, by a simple *primitive property* (qualité primitive), or by a law of God which brings about this effect without using any intelligible means (moyens intelligibles), then it is a senseless, occult quality, which is so very occult that it can never be cleared up, even though a Spirit, not to say God himself, were endeavoring to explain it."

Neither Newton nor Cotes who edited the second edition (1713) of the *Principia,* make a direct reference to Berkeley. But Cotes, writing to Newton in March 18, 1713, refers to the letter of Leibniz to Hartsoeker, and says: "I think it will be proper [to] add somethings by which your Book may be cleared from some prejudices which have been industriously laid against it. As that it deserts Mechanical causes, is built upon Miracles, and recurrs to Occult qualities. That You may not think unnecessary to answer such Objections You may be pleased to consult a Weekly Paper called *Memoires of Literature* and sold by Ann Baldwin in Warwick-Lane. . . . You will find a very extraordinary Letter of Mr. Leibnitz to Mr. Hartsoeker which will confirm what I have said. I do not propose to mention Mr. Leibnitz's name, twere better to neglect him, but the Objections I think may very well be answered and even retorted upon the maintainers of Vortices."[3] Cotes made a spirited reply to Leibniz toward the end of his Preface to the second edition of the *Principia.*

That Newton was misinterpreted by Leibniz as regards the nature of gravity is quite evident. Newton did not believe in action at a distance without the aid of an intervening medium. That he was interested in theological questions even before he wrote the

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[2] G. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge,* Part I, Paragraph 111, 117.

[3] J. Edleston, *op. cit.,* p. 153.

Principia is evident from his annotations of Henry More's book, *On the Prophet Daniel and the Apocalypse,* found in a copy of this book which the University of California received as a gift from Julius Wangenheim. It was Newton's own copy, "ex dono Reverendi Authoris." These annotations have not yet received due attention in the study of Newton's theological and cosmological concepts at different periods of his career. As regards the *Principia,* Newton said in a letter to Richard Bentley (Dec. 10, 1692): "When I wrote my treatise about our system, I had an eye on such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose."

And so, in 1713, twenty-six years after the first appearance of the *Principia,* Newton, then seventy-one years old, prepared the famous General Scholium, printed at the end of the second edition of his *Principia.* In the third edition (1726) certain parts of this Scholium were expanded. These new parts are printed below in italics. Omitting the early section on vortices, and the closing one on the forces of adhesion and cohesion, the General Scholium is as follows:

> "This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being. And if the fixed Stars are the centers of other like systems, these being formed by the like wise counsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially, since the light of the fixed Stars is of the same nature with the light of the Sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems. *And lest the systems of the fixed Stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those Systems at immense distances one from another.*
>
> "This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all: And on account of his dominion he is wont to be called 'Lord God παντοαϱάτωϱ, or Universal Ruler.' For 'God' is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and 'Deity' is the dominion of God, not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; for we say, my God, your God, the God of 'Israel,' *the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords*;

but we do not say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of 'Israel,' *the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect:*[4] These are titles which have no respect to servants. The word 'God' usually signifies 'Lord'; but every Lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God; a true supreme or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows, that the true God is a Living, Intelligent and Powerful Being; and from his other perfections, that he is supreme or most Perfect. He is Eternal and Infinite, Omnipotent and Omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from Eternity to Eternity; his presence from Infinity to Infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not Eternity or Infinity, but Eternal and Infinite; he is not Duration or Space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is every where present; and by existing always and every where, he constitutes Duration and Space. Since every particle of 'Space' is always, and every indivisible moment of Duration is 'every where,' certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be 'never' and 'no where.' *Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and in different organs of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person. There are given successive parts in duration, co-existent parts in space, but neither the one nor the other in the person of a man, or his thinking principle; and much less can they be found in the thinking substance of God. Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and every where.* He is omnipresent, not 'virtually' only, but also 'substantially'; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. 'Tis allowed by all that the supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists 'always' and 'every where.' Whence also he is all similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act; but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of colours, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought to be worshipped under the representation of any corporeal thing. We have ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of anything is, we know not. In bodies we see only their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savours; but their inward substances are not to be known, either by our senses, or by any reflex act of our minds; much less then have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion. *For we adore him as his servants; and a God without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity,*[5] *which is certainly the same always and every where, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find, suited to different times and places, could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. But by way of allegory, God is said to see, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate, to desire, to give, to receive, to rejoice, to be angry, to fight, to frame, to work, to build. For all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind, by a certain similitude which, though not perfect, has some likeness however.* And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.

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[4] The passage, "the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect," in the 1726 edition, takes the place of, "We do not say my Infinite, your Infinite, the Infinite of Israel; we do not say my Perfect, your Perfect, the Perfect of Israel," in the second edition, 1713.

"Hitherto we have explained the phaenomena of the heavens and of our sea, by the power of Gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centers of the Sun and Planets, without suffering the least diminution of its forces; that operates, not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles upon which it acts, (as mechanical causes use to do,) but according to the quantity of the solid matter which they contain, and propagates its virtue on all sides, to immense distances, decreasing always in the duplicate proportion of the distances. Gravitation towards the Sun, is made up out of the gravitations towards the several particles of which the body of the Sun is composed; and in receding from the Sun, decreases accurately in the duplicate proportion of the distances, as far as the orb of Saturn, as evidently appears from the quiescence of the aphelions of the Planets; nay, and even to the remotest aphelions of the Comets, if those aphelions

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[5] This part, though first published in 1726, was written six months after the appearance of the second edition of the *Principia* in 1713, and was inserted in a list of Corrections and Additions which Newton sent to Cotes. *See* J. Edleston, *op. cit.* p. 165.

> are also quiescent. But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phaenomena, and I frame no hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phaenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferr'd from the phaenomena, and afterwards render'd general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough, that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.
>
> "And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle Spirit, which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which Spirit, the particles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this Spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things that cannot be explain'd in a few words, nor are we furnish'd with that sufficiency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates."

The very last sentence is of interest for two reasons. First, it was not in the original draft of the General Scholium; Newton added it, as the second edition was going through the press.[6] Secondly, Newton gives here his justification for treating of this subject in the *Principia.* To obtain an idea of God "from the appearances of things does certainly belong to natural philosophy." That is to say, the earnest contemplation of the physical world, in its microcosm and macrocosm, affording ideas relating to the creator of that world, is a legitimate part of the study of physical science. This thought receives emphasis through the conviction expressed in his statement, that "we know him only by the most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes." "All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places" could not arise from "blind metaphysical necessity," nor could it be due to a "God without dominion, providence and final causes"; such a God would be "nothing else but Fate and Nature."

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[6] See Edleston, *op. cit.,* p. 155.

Newton makes a striking attempt to prove that God exists in space and time "Since every particle of space is *always,* and every indivisible duration is *every where,* certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be *never* and *nowhere.* The omnipresence of God, stressed by Newton, is in contrast to the old doctrine of the localization of God, remote from the world, and acting intermittently by suspending the operation of some natural law. Considerations involving the science of mechanics, which Newton helped to create, is seen in the following argument: "He is omnipresent, not *virtually* only, but also *substantially,* . . . God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God." Newton encountered the same question in the luminiferous ether which offers no perceptible resistance to the motion of the planets. What is meant by "substantially"? Newton does not know. "What the real substance of anything is we know not." Nor is our present day science much better informed. Newton sees an instance of design in the fact that the fixed stars are placed at "immense distances" from each other, so that they can not "fall on each other."

The omnipresence of God involves the geometrical idea of extension in space. This attribute of extension, the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, applied to all spirits and to the human soul. More's spirits and souls were finite, but variable, in extension. He found it desirable also to postulate the existence of a fourth dimension of space, to afford a suitable abode for spirits. No such ultra-speculative notions are found in Newton's *Principia,* even though Newton was doubtless familiar with More's views. More and Newton had been under the same roof as boys at the school at Grantham, and, as already stated, Newton later read and annotated at least one of More's books.

That God is known only through his works was a tenet from which Newton departed in some of his statements, particularly in the last interpolations printed in 1726, when he was 84 years old. There we read that "all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind"; "by way of allegory, God is said to see, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate. . . ." Similar is the following thought: "Every man is one and the same man during his whole life in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and every where." In a broad sense there is no conflict between the two views expounded by Newton, for man and mankind are a part of the "works" of God.

THE COSMIC TEETH

BY LAWRENCE PARMLY BROWN

II. Flame Teeth and the Teeth of the Sun

EVERYWHERE and always fire has been conceived as something that consumes, devours or eats like a hungry animal or human being; and the more or less individualized flames of fire are sometimes viewed as teeth, but more commonly as tongues.

In the very ancient Hindu *Rig-Veda* the god Agni primarily represents ordinary fire, but secondarily the fiery sun; and there it is said that "He crops the dry ground strewn (with grass and wood), like an animal grazing, he with a golden beard, with shining teeth" (Mandala V, Sukta VII, 7; translation of H. H. Wilson, Vol. III, p. 247), while his light "quickly spreads over the earth, when with his teeth (of flame) he devours his food" (*Ib.* VII, iii, 4; Wilson's, Vol. IV, p. 36).[7]

The Mexican goddess of devouring fire is called Chantico ("In-the-house," with reference to her character as divinity of the domestic hearth) and also Quaxolotl ("Split-at-the-top," for the flame divided into two tips) and Tlappalo ("She-of-the-red-butterfly," perhaps from the flame-like flickering of the insect). Her image is described by Duran with open mouth and the prominent teeth of a carnivorous beast; and she is associated with the dog as a biting animal, according to one account having been transformed into a dog as a punishment for disregarding a prohibition relating to sacrifices (Seler, *Vaticanus B,* p. 273; Spence, *Gods of Mexico,* p. 283). According to Sahagan (1829, *Historia General de las Casas de Neuva Espana,* IV, xxii), the Mexicans looked upon the dog as the fire-god's animal and the emblem of fire; and the Maya name for the dog means "the biter"; on Maya monuments the dog is often seen spewing fire from its mouth, and flames are sometimes figured coming from the mouth of Chantico (Seler, *op. cit.,* p. 157 and fig. 474, p. 229).

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[7] In a modern poem, *circ.* 750, a blacksmith's forge is personified as a fire-breathing monster with "sharpe teeth," which neither brass nor steel can resist (R. O. Cambridge, *Archimage,* stanza 71).

In the Mexican *Codex Telleriano-Ramensis* (*fol.* 21, *verso*), Chantico is represented with three large upper anterior teeth, curved and pointed (Seler, *ibid.,* fig. 534, p. 275); and as her face is in profile, doubtless all six of her upper anterior teeth (centrals, laterals and canines) were conceived to be of the same type. In the *Codex Borgia,* however, Quaxolotl (in profile) shows three large but normally shaped incisors in the upper jaw (sheet 60), and in the same manuscript another fire-goddess, Itzpapalotl ("Obsidian-butterfly"), has three such teeth above and three below (sheet 11). Also in the *Codex Borgia* (sheet 69), the fire-god Xiuhteculti ("Lord-of-the-year") appears with four moderately large upper teeth; but he seems to have been associated especially with the solar fire (H. H. Bancroft, *Native Races,* Vol. III, p. 114; Spence, *Gods of Mexico,* p. 278).

The ancients often considered the sun and the sun-light to be golden (for yellow), and in various ways associated gold with their solar figures, whose teeth are sometimes described as golden or composed of gold. Thus Agni with the golden beard and shining teeth (see above) is also described as "golden-toothed, bright-coloured, wielding (flames like) weapons" (*Rig-Veda,* V, ii, 3; Wilson's trans., Vol. III, p. 235), and Savitri is the "golden-handed, golden-jawed" sun-god who "rises regularly at the close of night" (*Ib.* VI, X, 1; Wilson's Vol. IV, p. 18). Again, the Scandinavian sun-god Heimdall ("Lord-of-the-home"; i.e., the earth) is called the God-toothed (Gullintanni) and is said to have teeth of pure gold (*Younger Edda,* I, 27).

The concept of the golden teeth of the sun was doubtless known to those who fabled that Harold Hildetand, King of Denmark, in the eighth century, had golden or gold-covered teeth, to which the origin of his surname was erroneously referred. According to Saxo Grammaticus (thirteenth century, *Gesta Danorum* or *Historica Danica,* VII, p. 247), some declared that Harold's surname was obtained "on account of a prominent row of teeth," which is the true explanation, as "Hildetand" really means "War-tooth" (from Danish *hilde,* "war" and *tand,* "tooth"). But Saxo also gives a variant explanation, referring the origin of the surname to a legend that two new molars grew unexpectedly in Harold's mouth, in the place of two that had been knocked out by a cudgel; which explanation has been recognized as suggested in connection with a fanciful derivation of "Hildetand" from the Danish *hylle,* "cover, and *tand,* "tooth" (See O. Elton, 1894, *The First Nine Books of the Danish History of Saxo Grammaticus,* Note, p. 297). There is nothing in Saxo of the teeth as conceived to be "covered" with gold, but in the Danish *Sogubrot af Fornkonungun* (p. 5) it is said of Harold: "this mark was on him, that the teeth in the front of his head were large and gold-color was on them [i.e., covered] them." It is possible that Harold's teeth were naturally very yellow or encrusted with yellow tartar, or both.[8]

In an old Welsh bardic text, the pestilence known as "the yellow plague of Ross" (of the sixth century A. D.) is personified as "a most strange creature" that came from a sea marsh, "his hair, his teeth and his eyes being of gold" (*Mabinogion,* translated by Lady Charlotte Guest, p. 485). A somewhat similar concept is that of the nixes or water-sprites of Teutonic mythology, who inhabit lakes and rivers and are sometimes described with green hair and green teeth (T. Keightley, *Fairy Mythology,* ed. 1850, p. 258); and the country people of the north of England have a murderous "water-boggart" known as Jenny Greenteeth, who lurks in the green vegetation of stagnant ponds and has green hair as well as green teeth (C. S. Burne, 1883, *Shropshire Folk-lore,* p. 79; J. M. Mackinlay, 1893, *Folk-lore of the Scottish Lochs and Springs,* p. 158, and others). Harold Blaatand ("Blue-tooth"), King of Denmark in the tenth century, doubtless had remarkably blue teeth (See especially the *Saga of Olaf Tryhhvason,* edition 1911, p. 34, and T. Carlyle, 1875, *Early Kings of Norway,* p. 24 sq.).

[8] That the ancient Romans, sometimes covered defective natural teeeth with gold caps is evident from one unearthed at Satricum, the cap in this case being connected with loops of gold to hold it in place by encircling the adjoining teeth (See V. Guerini, 1909, *History of Dentistry,* p. 101); and similar caps of both gold and silver seem to be mentioned in the *Talmud* as worn by women and easily removed (*Sabbath,* fol. 64 b, 65 a; *Nedarim,* 66 b). The earliest known gold tooth-cap independent of supporting loops and permanently attached was inserted about 1593 in the mouth of a Silesian boy and exhibited as a golden tooth of natural growth—the most celebrated hoax in history (See especially W. Bruck, 1915, *Die Historie vom Güldenen Zähn*). In 1673 a three-year old boy of Vilna in Poland was reputed to have a golden tooth, which proved to be only a natural one covered with yellow tartar (See A. Serres, 1817, *Essai sur l'Anatomie et la Physiologie des Dents,* p. 169).

In the *Bhagavad-Gita,* one of the books of the *Mehibharata,* Krishna as the macrocosmic pantheos is described with a wild exuberance of Oriental exaggeration, some of the mythic elements being utilized in metaphorical statements. Thus the macrocosmic Krishna is described with many arms, legs, eyes, mouths and other members, including "rows of dreadful teeth" (originally for the many biting rays of the tropic sun, in all probability); and in his character of destroying Time, it is said to him that even the rulers of the land and the leaders of the army "seem to be precipitating themselves hastily into thy mouths, discovering such frightful rows of teeth, while some appear to stick between thy teeth with their bodies sorely mangled" (Ch. xi).



THE MAYA TREE OF LIFE.
(From the Codex Cortesianus)

In the Egyptian text generally known as the *Litany of Ra,* that sun-god is represented as both the panethos and macrocosmic deity, and is said to be Nehi, who is described as a fire-god (I, 71). Budge leaves the name Nehi untranslated (*Gods of the Egyptians,* Vol. I, p. 347), but Naville renders it "He who is armed with teeth" (*Records of the Past,* Vol. VIII, p. 112).

Pushan is a very ancient Hindu sun-god who has his teeth knocked out and replaced shortly after losing them. De Gubernatis recognized him as "the sun which enters into the cloud or darkness of night" (*Zoo, Mythol,* Vol. I, p. 409). In the *Rig-Veda* he is called *adantaka* ("the broken-toothed" or "toothless"—IV, xxx, 24, Wilson's translation). In the *Mahabharata* he is a god "having a thousand rays, who, after warming the earth, goes to the western mountain at the close of day" (V, CLXXIX, 30); and in that ancient epic there are several allusions to the story of his teeth which were broken and knocked out by Rudra or Siva (identified as the same deity, probably for the moon) when he attacked the other gods while they were offering "Daksha's sacrifice." Nothing definite is known of this mysterious rite; but it is evidently of a mythic nature and connected with the thunder-and-lightning storm. Enraged because he was not invited to the sacrifice, Rudra-Siva destroyed the offering with his arrows (the lightnings); broke the arms of Savitri (the solar flabelli); plucked out Bhaga's eyes (the stars),[9] and broke and knocked out Pushan's teeth (his "thousand rays" of light and heat). The vault of the sky cracked and the trembling earth was covered with darkness and threatened with destruction; but the frightened gods shortly succeeded in pacifying the angry Rudra-Siva, so he restored the arms of Savitri, the eyes of Bhaga and the teeth of Pushan, and also the sacrifice itself, "and the world was once more saved" (*Mahabharata,* VII, ccii; X, xviii; XIII, CLX). In the Puranic accounts of this event, Rudra-Siva is replaced by his manifestations, the Rudras (storm figures). According to the *Taittiriya Sanhita,* Pushan broke his teeth while attempting to eat part of a sacrificed offering after it had been pierced by one of the arrows of Rudra; and some late accounts have it that he remained toothless and ate only soft food, so the cooked oblations offered to him contained nothing hard (See J. Dowson's *Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology,* s.v. Pushan).

The name of the Hindu god of wealth, Kuvera (or Kubera) is from two Sanskrit words signifying "vile" and "body," alluding to the deformity of the god, "who is represented as having three legs and but eight teeth," according to H. H. Wilson's *Sanskrit-*

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[9] See the present writer's "Cosmic Eyes" in *The Open Court,* Vol. XXXII, p. 685, and "Cosmic Hands," *ibid,* Vol. XXXIII, p. 8.

English Dictionary (1819, s.v. Kuvera). This statement regarding the legs and teeth, which is followed in nearly all subsequent accounts of Kuvera, seems to have been derived from some little known Purana of late date, as it is not found in any of the earlier accounts of the god. In all probability Kuvera was originally a figure of the sun in the lower regions, like the Greek god of wealth, Ploutos, whose name was at first a surname of Hades; and there can be little doubt that the former's legs belong to the three divisions of the underworld, while his teeth represent his fiery light radiating toward the 2×4=8 points of the compass.[10]

The longest and most formidable teeth of carnivorous animals and most of the primates (monkeys, apes, human beings, etc.) are the four canines or tusks, sometimes called "the master teeth"; and canines of exaggerated size are often represented protruding from the mouths of anthropomorphic monsters such as the Gorgones and the demons or devils of various peoples.[11]

The four canines of Gautama Buddha were generally recognized as the most important of the few body relics rescued from his funeral pyre. An early legend of these relics, in which the teeth are not mentioned, is found in the *Mahavamsa* (XXXI, 17-19), where it is stated that Buddha foretold on his death bed that his body relics would be divided into eight portions, one of which would be adored at first by the Koliyas in Ramagama, whence it would be

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[10] Schellhas recognizes the Maya God G, as the sun-god, ("Deities of the Maya Manuscripts," p. 27), and Spence says that this god is represented with pointed teeth, and that his hieroglyph is a circle enclosing four such teeth ("Gods of the Maya," in the *Open Court*, Vol. XL, p. 71). But Spence is evidently mistaken in regard to the hieroglyph, for Schellhas shows that it "contains as its chief factor the sun-sign Kin," a circle with four symmetrically placed signs within it and joined to its circumference, these signs often having the shape of denticles or little pointed teeth, doubtless for the four directions in space, thus:



[11] The four teeth extracted from the mouth of the slain Sultan of Bagdad in the thirteenth century romance of Huon of Bordeaux were probably the four canines originally, though said to be "great teeth" and "great molars" in the extant version of the story (xviii, xxvii); for the canines are the chief weapon teeth, and the extraction of the Sultan's teeth appears to have been suggested by a figurative use of "drawing one's teeth" for "depriving one of the power to injure."

taken by the Nagas into their kingdom, and finally be enshrined on the island of Lanka. The eight portions were allotted to as many places in India, corresponding roughly to the eight points of the compass. Ramagama of the Koliyas was in Nepal, to the north; the Koliya tribe being related to that of the Sakyas, to which Buddha belonged, also in Nepal. In the *Mahavamsa* text, as often elsewhere, the term Nagas is applied to human enemies; but it is otherwise a designation of the inhabitants of the underworld, who are sometimes conceived in the form of serpents. Lanka is the Sanskrit name of Ceylon.

The *Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta* of the *Digha Nikaya* closes with two variant accounts of the body relics of Buddha, both being additions to the original work, according to the Pali commentator. In the first account there are ten portions of relics, but no mention of the teeth. In the second account, in verse, the teeth are the most important of the relics, which are divided into eight portions, with seven of them worshipped in Jambudipa and one by the Nagas in Ramagama. The word Jambudipa is sometimes applied to the whole earth, but here and elsewhere it is India as the principal part of the earth; and the Ramagama of the Nagas is in the underworld, as noted by E. J. Thomas in his *Life of Buddha,* where we have a close translation of the account now under consideration (p. 159). A variant translation by Rhys Davids is found in his English version of the *Sutta* (in *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. XI, and *Sacred Books of the Buddhists,* Vol. III, Part II). The account continues as follows (VI, 28), according to the rendering of Thomas:

> "One tooth by the Tidiva gods is worshipped
>   [i.e., in heaven, as in Rhys Davids' translation],
> And in Gandhara city one is honoured;
> In the Kalinga raja's realm one also
>   [in Dantapura, 'Tooth-city,' capital of Kalinga],
> Another still the Naga rajas honour
>   [in Ramagama of the Nagas, in the underworld].

The ancient city of Gandhara was in the country of the same name on the west bank of the Indus, above Attock, in the northwestern part of modern India; and the Kalinga realm lay along the Coromandel coast, north of Madras, on the southwestern side of modern India. In all probability the Gandhara tooth was recognized as belonging to the west and the Kalinga tooth to the east, and there is a further probability that the tooth in heaven was originally allotted to the north of India (Nepal), while the one in the underworld was originally allotted to the south (Ceylon). The allotments in the text are in accordance with the ancient location of the heaven of the gods above the northern quarter or top of the celestial sphere, with the underworld realm in its lowest or southern quarter. In the probable allotment to the four quarters of the earth, the four teeth correspond to the four "great kings," the guardians of the world, who belong to the four quarters of the heaven, according to the *Mahavamsa,* (XXX, 89).

In the commentary on the *Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta* and in the *Burmese Life of Buddha* (translated by Bigandet, II, iii), it is stated that the right upper canine of Buddha was taken to heaven; the right lower canine, to Gandhara; the left upper canine, to Kalinga, and the left lower canine, to the Naga realm. The mouth positions of these teeth are indicated in the following diagram in connection with the two variant allotment schemes considered above:



The best known of the tooth relics of Buddha, and the only one that can be considered further in our limited space, is said to have been deposited originally in Dantapura ("Tooth-city").[12] There it remained, according to tradition, some eight hundred years, till the fourth century A. D., when it was removed to Kandy in Ceylon. Its marvelous early history is set forth at length in the Pali *Dathavamsa* (thirteenth century; translated into English by Bimala Charan Law, 1925), which is based on a lost Singhalise work written about 300 A. D. (See also J. G. da Cunha, *Mémoire sur l' histoire de la Dent-relique de Ceylon,* 1884). In the extant *Dathavamas,* the Dantapura-Kandy tooth is called "the left tooth-relic" of Buddha. The Portugese burned it midway in the sixteenth century, but the Buddhists claim that a substitute for the original was then destroyed. The tooth still preserved as the original, the most celebrated of all body relics, is generally described as four inches or more in length, and is supposed to have come from a prehistoric animal or to be merely a carved piece of bone; and some early travelers say that the original tooth came from a monkey, while others say from a horse.

In *Purchase his Pilgrimage* (1613; V. xi), the sixteenth century traveler Linschoten is cited for the statement that the Kandy relic burned by the Portugese was a tooth of the mythical ape Hanimant; which seems to indicate that the Brahmans at one time claimed it as such. Again, the Mohammedans of the thirteenth century seem to have claimed the relic as a tooth of Adam; for Marco Polo in his *Travels* (III, xxiii) tells us that the Saracens of his time declared that some of the hair and teeth of Adam were preserved in Ceylon,[13] and that Kublai-Khan the Mongol emperor made a demand for the relics and received a part of the hair and two large molar teeth.

In the texts relating to the tooth relics (four canines) of Gautama Buddha there is nothing to indicate that he was conceived with more or less than the normal number of human teeth; but

[12] The pre-Buddhist Dantapura was perhaps a market for ivory, with its name referring to elephant's tusks.

[13] The celebrated footprint of enormous size on Adam's Peak in Ceylon is claimed for Buddha by the Buddhists, for Adam by the Mohammedans, and for Saint Thomas by the Christians. It does not appear that either the tooth or footprint of Ceylon has ever been claimed for Jesus; but prints of his feet are shown in Rome, Jerusalem and elsewhere, and one of his milk teeth had some celebrity as a relic in France in the eighteenth century, while teeth of the Virgin Mary and various Saints have been adored from early Christian times (See G. Dagen, *Documents pour servir à l'Histoire de l'Art Dentaire en France,* pp. 33-40).

according to other Buddhist texts, one of the thirty-two signs that marked Gautama and other Buddhas as supermen was the possession of forty teeth in the temporary set. A similar and much older concept is found in the *Mahabharata,* in the description of the men of Cetadripa ("White Island"), a mythical paradise in the Ocean of Milk far to the north. These white and sinless men (or supermen), adults who require no food, have great strength; bones as hard as adamant; eyes that never blink; a multiplicity of tongues, and sixty white teeth, including eight canines (*Marab,* XII, cccxxxvi, 8). Here we evidently have, in a round number, a simple doubling of the normal human permanent teeth; and as all the thirty-two signs of a Buddha are discernable immediately after his birth, we may safely conclude that his forty teeth represent a doubling of the normal twenty or the temporary set (each in duplicate, with eight canines). This seems to imply an original doubling of the thirty (properly 32) teeth of an adult Buddha, as in the case of the adults of Cetadripa; but there is no statement of the kind in extant Buddhist works. Furthermore, it is possible that the signs of a superman were originally fixed at thirty-two as a typical complete number suggested by the full normal complement of the permanent human teeth.

The earliest extant accounts of the thirty-two signs of an infant Buddha appear to be found in the *Mahapadana Suttanta* of the *Digha Nikaya,* where it is related that these signs of a superman were recognized by a Brahman soothsayer in and on the body of Vipassi, the first Buddha, shortly after his birth (in *Sacred Books of the Buddhists,* Vol. III, Part II, pp. 14, 15). In the *Lakkhana Suttanta* of the same work (*S. B. B.,* Vol. IV, Part III, pp. 137, 162), Gautama Buddha describes the signs, and is said to have acquired them through his virtues in former lives. In both texts the signs are described in substantially the same words, in verses evidently derived from some older work. The signs include a complexion the color of gold (the solar color); a large white mole between the eye-brows (instead of the third eye of some cosmic figures), and the forepart of the body like that of a lion (a solar animal, Gautama being elsewhere called "the lion of the Sakyas"). Of a Buddha so marked it is said (in the words of the *Lakkhana Suttanta,* as translated by Rhys Davids, who has "eye-teeth" for canines):

> "His jaws are as a lion's;
> He has forty teeth,
> Regular teeth,
> Continuous teeth.
> The eye-teeth are very lustrous;
> His tongue is long."

The thirty-two signs appear with minor variations in many later Buddhist works, in some of which it is not clear that the forty teeth belong only to the temporary set. But it is always evident that they are conceived in the normal arrangement of a single row in each jaw; and in all probability a Buddha was originally fabled to have been born with all the thirty-two signs, including the forty teeth, although it was supposed by some in later times that the teeth were seen in the infant by anticipation, through the aid of a seer's supernatural eyes (S. Hardy, 1860, *Manual of Buddhism,* p. 148). The jaws but not the teeth of the infant are like those of a lion, which animal has only thirty permanent teeth.

Some of the stars in some constellations seem to have been conceived as teeth in Egyptian mythology. Thus one of the forty-two Assessors or judges of the dead (probably constellations) is addressed as "thou whose teeth shine" (*Book of the Dead,* Theban, CXXV, 12, trans. of Budge); and the teeth of the deified deceased "are the souls of Annu" (in some part of the heaven) according to a very ancient text (Pepi I, 576; in Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians,* Vol. I, p. 109).

THE WAR FOR THE WORLD

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

AS the ruler of Heaven and the ruler of Hell are pitted against each other in an eternal combat for the mastery of the world, it is really a wonder that our earth, which, in this perennial war, has been constantly hurled to and fro between the two contending powers, has not long ago been shattered to pieces.

In this war for the world, it is man who is actually the bone of contention. The rivalry between the Eternal and the Infernal to win this planet has for its aim the possession of the human race, which is thus pulled in two different directions. The Lord tries his best to lift man upward, and Lucifer does his worst to drag him downward.

As soon as the Devil learned that the seats which he and his angels had vacated in heaven would be occupied by a new generation, of whom Adam and Eve were to be the parents, he determined to balk the sacred will of the Deity in regard to the destiny of man. From the moment Adam was created, he was tempted and tormented by Satan in body and soul. No sooner was Adam formed out of clay, so runs a Russian legend, than Diabolus, profiting by a moment when the Lord's dog was not watching, thrust seventy diseases into him. When Adam was given a woman, through her, Satan, disguised as a serpent, tempted him to sin, thus driving both of them out of Eden. By this master-stroke, Satan succeeded in wheedling out of God the assignment of the human race as his property. According to St. Augustine, man is condemned by the original sin and has become the Devil's legitimate prey. Satan thus turned man away from the path leading to Paradise and put him on the high-road to Hell. In this way, he clipped man's wings so that he could not fly upward to fill the vacant seats in the celestial choir-stalls.

Encouraged by his first success, Satan continued to sow the seeds of sin in the newly formed earth. He induced Cain to murder Abel and even incited him to hurl stones on his brother's prostrate form. Satan survived the Deluge by hiding in Noah's Ark and was thus enabled to renew violence in the drunken curses of Noah. The Tempter again used woman as an accomplice. It was by working upon both the curiosity and jealousy of Noraita,[1] Noah's wife, that he managed to get on board the Ark. But he repaid her hospitality by treachery. There is an ancient tradition that, after having smuggled himself as a stowaway into Noah's Ark, Satan tried to sink it in order to do away with the human race for ever. This infernal project, however, was defeated, and the human race was saved by the hedgehog, who stuffed himself into the hole which the Devil had bored in the floor of the Ark.

Satan exhibited great activity in biblical times. He accused Abraham, and induced the Lord to test the patriarch by ordering him to sacrifice his son Isaac.[2] He was even bold enough to attempt to carry the body of Moses off to hell when the great Jewish lawgiver died, and fought over it with his old enemy, the archangel Michael. But the commander-in-chief of the heavenly militia, the hero of heaven, as this affair is recorded in the Epistle of Jude, did not bring any railing accusation against him, leaving it to the Almighty to rebuke his Adversary. Satan tempted Job in body and mind after having asked the Lord to put the poor man in his power. He indicted the Jews to their God and obtained through Ahasuerus the decree of annihilation against them in the days of Esther.[3] But the Fiend was finally foiled, and the Jews were delivered from death through the vigilance of Mordecai.

Descending to earth to destroy the deeds of the Devil (1 John iii. 8), the Son of God was continually harassed and hampered in his mission by the hosts of hell. Satan, in his efforts to frustrate the providential purposes, persuaded the rabbis to persecute Jesus. After having failed with promises of power to win Jesus away from the Lord (Luke iv. 1-13; Mark i. 13), just as he had previously failed with Buddha and Zoroaster, he planned his death and, to this end, induced Judas to betray his Master (John xiii. 2). When Jesus died on the Cross, Satan was jubilant; and, ignorant of the real character of his victim, even dared to try to carry his soul off to hell. Satan, however, had no reason for rejoicing over this success. The death of the Saviour spelled the Devil's defeat. The kingdom of Satan was overthrown by the vicarious death of Christ on the Cross at Calvary.[4] In the execution of his mission, Jesus, according to the old interpretation of several biblical passages (Acts ii. 31; Eph. iv. 8-10; Rom. x. 7; and especially 1 Pet. iii. 19), descended after his burial to hell, broke open its gates, set free its prisoners and put its ruler into "everlasting chains" (Jude 6; cf. 2 Pet. ii. 4). This act was performed "as a special punishment for his audacity in tempting and persecuting our Lord on earth or for some other unfathomable intention of the Lord for the salvation of his Church and his elect" (Suarez: *De angelis;* cf. also Gregory: *Moralium libri xxv*). The events of Christ's descent to hell are recorded in full detail in the apocryphal Descensus Christi ad Inferos, which forms the second part of the Evangelium Nicodemi (3rd cent.). This tradition took a strong hold on the popular mind and was considerably elaborated by the medieval poets and playwrights.[5] The medieval English poem *The Harrowing of Hell* is a poetical treatment of this subject. The descent of Christ to hell forms an important part of the medieval mystery-plays of all European countries.[6]

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[1] In other versions, the name of Noah's wife is Naamah.

[2] Cf. Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1909-25), I, 272.

[3] *Ibid.*, IV, 415.

The belief in Christ's Descent to Hell forms part of the Apostolic Creed. Many Protestant sects, however, have abandoned this belief and struck the words "He descended into Hell" from their creed. This denial of Christ's descent to hell is considered pure heresy by Bishop Thomas Bilson, who, in his *Survey of Christ's Suffering for Man's Redemption, and of His Descent to Hell* (1504), opposes the Puritan doctrine that Jesus suffered the pains of hell in his soul on the cross, and maintains that Christ actually went to hell "to destroy the Devil's kingdom."

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[4] The poet Cumberland treated the subject of Satan's overthrow at Calvary in his poem *Calvary* (1792).

[5] Christ's Descent to Hell has in modern times been poetically treated by W. W. Lord in his poem, *Christ in Hades* (1851).

[6] On the medieval stage, the Devil was often represented with a chain around his neck and with fetters on hands and legs, which symbolized his captivity.

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It would be wrong, however, for man to consider himself thus delivered from the Devil forever. Honesty compels us to admit that Satan's imprisonment in hell has in no way stopped his activity on earth. In fact, we can still see his tail wriggling in the world. It is all too evident that the Devil still enjoys the liberty of walking up and down the earth to molest mankind. The trier of men's souls, the tempter, is just as much "on the job" now, as he was in the days of Job. Although sealed at the bottom of the bottomless pit, his evil influence on the affairs of man has not suffered any diminution. The world's experiences of the past dozen or so of years should certainly uproot any belief we may have cherished that Satan is bound and sealed in some hellish solitude where he is superintending the tortures of the non-elect among humanity (Book of Enoch x. 37). The consensus of opinion among fundamentalist folk would be that the Evil Spirit now more than ever roams about on earth, "seeking whom he may devour" (1 Pet. v. 8).

The Princedom of the Air, far from being overthrown by the vicarious death of Christ, seems, indeed, to have been in commission all through the ages down to the present day. The conduct of men and women in this world has never changed. Satan still lurks in the best and strongest of hearts and directs and controls men's minds and wills. This fact has led many thoughtful men to maintain that, as far as mankind is concerned, the Incarnation has been of no avail. If certain Protestant sects teach the truth by contending that Christ put into men's hands the power to resist the Tempter, it is evident, from all we know about human history from the death of Christ to this day, that very few men ever have availed themselves of this power.

It would almost seem that in this war for the world, the victory lies not with the Saviour but with Satan. Is Diabolus not still the prince of this world (John xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11; Eph. ii. 2, vi. 12), nay even the god of this world—*deus hujus sæculi* (2 Cor. iv. 4)? Do we not infer from another biblical passage that the authority over the world has been delivered to Satan, who can give it to whomsoever he will (Luke iv. 6)? The earth is recognized by the Church as the Devil's property. The chief ceremony in the consecration of a church is the expulsion of the Devil from the building. The demons thus driven from the interior of the church perch themselves on its roof. This idea accounts for the gargoyles on the exterior of medieval cathedrals. The custom which prevailed in olden times of immuring a child in a new building is explained by the necessity of paying a purchase price to the Devil for the land on which it was erected.[7] The Reformation in no way disputed the Devil's authority over this world. Martin Luther saw in Satan a real living power, who was incessantly working in human affairs. In the eyes of the German reformer, the Devil was the good Lord's hangman, and the instrument of the Almighty's anger and punishment. His famous hymn "Ein' feste Burg" (1529) breathes from the beginning to the end with the conviction of Satan's great power in the world. The English reformer, John Wycliffe, in his great treatise, *De dominio divino,* goes as far as to imply that here on earth God must obey the Devil. Anatole France, sceptic though he is, assures us that "the Old Enemy, the Spirit that denies, still holds such power in the spiritual world that even God must reckon with him. I will go further: that God, who fears him, has made him his steward" (*la Rotisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* 1893).

But, one may ask, do we not have scriptural sanction and orthodox authority for the belief that Christ conquered hell? This question refers to the Christian theory of salvation, which may thus be briefly summarized: All men, by reason of the Fall, became the rightful and exclusive property of Satan; and it would have been unjust on the part of the Deity to take from the Devil by violence that which was in reality his due. Satan, however, was willing to relinquish his claim to the human race on condition that Jesus should be given to him as the ransom price of humanity. But Heaven outwitted Hell in the bargain for man's redemption. When Satan got the price, he found that he could not keep it. In demanding Christ as payment, he did not know the dual nature of his price; and, as Rufinus so aptly puts it, in swallowing the bait (the humanity), he was tortured by the hook (the divinity) and was only too glad to relinquish both.[8] Whether by fair dealing or foul, you will say, the fact remains that, through the death of the Saviour, man was redeemed from the power of Satan, and the victory was won by Heaven over Hell.

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[7] A custom prevailed in England to hang consecrated palm crosses over the doors on Palm Sunday and put them into the purses in order to drive the devil out; cf. Wilhelm Mannhardt: *Baumkultus* (Berlin, 1875), pp. 291-92.

[8] *The Devil's Lawsuit* written in the fourteenth century by the lawyer, Jacobus de Theramo, gives an excellent idea of the medieval interpretation of the Christian scheme of salvation. The evolution of the theory of salvation in the Church is thoroughly presented in Hastings Rashdoll's *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919).

If we look at the world with open eyes, however, we cannot help believing that the contrary comes nearer to the truth. The ecclesiastics themselves believe that, in the eternal conflict between the Deity and the Devil for supremacy in this world, the latter gradually has been gaining the upper hand. The *Malleus maleficarum,*[9] a large volume on the procedure in witchcraft cases, written by two Dominican Inquisitors appointed by Pope Innocent VIII, who, on December 4, 1484, issued the fatal bull against witchcraft, the famous "Summis desiderantes," contains the singular avowal that the Devil is constantly gaining ground, or, in other words, that the Deity is constantly losing ground; that man, who was destined to go to heaven, is rather headed downward. If such was the condition of affairs in the Middle Ages when the Church was supreme, how great must be the Devil's power over men today? It was a comparatively easy matter for man in the Middle Ages to make his escape from the jaws of Hell. The Catholic Church by its holy offices and blessed sacraments offered weapons of protection against the assaults of the enemy of mankind. The Devil was routed by the recitation of an *Ave Maria* or with a few drops of holy water.[10]

The monks exorcised the demons by singing the breviary hymns at vespers. The sign of the Cross was considered the surest defence against the snares and stratagems of malignant spirits. The very mention of the Lord often sufficed to put to flight the fiends of hell. But Satan, as Bret Harte remarks in his story, "The Devil and the Broker" (1867), is no longer scared by any holy signs. "The Christians," Voltaire said already a century and a half ago, "have lost the power to expel the Devil by the sign of the Cross." Indeed, Beelzebub no longer shudders behind his mask when the Cross confronts him, nor does he shrink from the test of holy water.

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[9] An English translation of this "Witch-Hammer," published in 1489, recently appeared in England under the ægis of the Reverend Montague Summers, an exponent of medievalism in modern times. A German translation of this book appeared in Berlin in 1905.

[10] The story by Rabelais about the Devil in the holy-water basin is well known to all acquainted with the writings of that monk. A play entitled *le Diable dans un bénitier* written by Clémence Robert appeared in the fifties of the last century. The book, *le Diable dans le bénitier* (1926) by G. de la Fouchardière, the clever "columnist" of the Paris daily, *l'Oeuvre,* may well be called the Gospel according to Satan.

Furthermore, the saints in heaven gave succor to the penitent sinners. The Mother of God mediated between the evil-doer who prostrated himself at her feet and the wrath of the Lord provoked by his guilt. Even in his very last hour, the Catholic could escape Satan's clutches, no matter how closely he had been identified with him, by means of a skilfully added sum of pious externalities. But the Reformation robbed the saints of the power of intervention on behalf of the sinners and abolished all the ceremonies supposed to send Satan away from his victims. The German Reformer, Martin Luther, antagonized with all his might what he called the unbusiness-like and demoralizing relations of the Catholic Church to the powers of Heaven. In the Protestant Church, the Devil must have his pay, and the Devil's pay is the soul of the sinner. Thus, ever since the days of the Reformation, Satan's power in this world has considerably increased.

It is fully in conformity with the Christian creed when we see the paw of the Devil rather than the hand of the Deity in the affairs of men. The Church has always taught that the evil influence has a stronger hold upon mankind than the good influence. It is a part of the doctrinal system of the Church that Satan can and actually does exercise over man a greater power than God—physical as well as moral. The direction of human destinies lies in the hands of the Devil rather than of the Deity. "C'est le diable qui tient les fils qui nous remuent," affirms the French poet, Charles Baudelaire. It is the Prince of the Pit who pulls the human puppets on this stage which we call the earth. The whole world lies in his grasp. He has bruised man's head. Apart from a few elect individuals, the whole human race, according to the Calvinistic creed, is doomed to hell.

* * *

Many theories have been advanced to bring into harmony scriptual authority and practical experience. The Franciscans believed that the Fiend was in fact fettered for a full thousand years (Rev. xx. 2), but that after his millenary captivity, he was let loose again from hell to "deceive the nations" (Rev. xx. 3).[11] Certain demonologists taught that it was only the Devil who was laid in chains by Christ, but that the demons have retained full liberty to go up to earth in order to carry out the plans of their chief. The effect on the affairs of men, however, is unchanged inasmuch as the Devil directs his work from his dungeon and effects his will among men through millions of messengers, who carry his commands to the ends of the earth with the rapidity of a flash of lightning.

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[11] The French novelist, Maurice Magre, published a pseudo-medieval play, *l'An mille,* which deals with the current belief toward the end of the tenth century in the imminent second coming of Christ and the end of the world, which are to follow, according to Christian eschatology, the liberation of Satan from his millenary bondage. In this play, the harsh and pitiless fanaticism of the monks, the medieval spokesmen of the Deity, is opposed to the longings and aspirations of youth, which are encouraged by the wizard, who is the mouth-piece of the Devil.

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The demonologists further maintain that even the other great devils, for the most part, keep in a mystical seclusion and appear upon earth only in cases of the greatest urgency or when compelled to do so by conjuration. But they each have a number of legions of lesser devils at their disposal, who are their agents on earth. Certain grand devils have under them as many as twenty, thirty, forty or even fifty legions of inferior spirits; and each legion is composed of six hundred and sixty-six demons. The monarch of hell himself has at his command myriads of myrmidons, whom he sends out as his recruiting agents to the four corners of the earth to turn men's minds and steps downward instead of upward. The Devil, in his war with the Deity for the possession of the human race, has developed a monstrous passion for catching souls. He directs all his efforts toward enlarging his kingdom (*Dr. Faustus* v. 40).

The messengers of hell aim to counteract the messengers of heaven. When man's guardian angel whispers good counsel into his right ear, a demon is always near to whisper evil counsel into his left ear. The angel and the demon thus carry on a debate across man's brain over the merits and demerits of a certain act. He who advances the stronger arguments wins. In the Catholic Church, namely, each act of man is accounted for by the whispering of either a good or a bad angel. From the days when Athanasius related the life of St. Anthony in devil-fighting heroics, man's evil thoughts and acts have always been considered by the theologians as the machinations of the evil spirits.

In addition to prompting men to sin by whispering evil counsel into their ears, the demons also enter into their bodies to possess their souls. It is a part of the doctrinal system of the Church that the Devil has the power to enter both men and beasts, but can be driven from his human habitation by the conjuration of the pious.

Indeed, a man's piety was judged by the power he had to drive the Devil out. It was believed that the Devil slipped into the body of a man together with the food he swallowed.[12] One interesting feature of diabolical possession is that, though always on the watch to aid the evil-doers, the Devil, having entered the body of a person, proceeds to reveal his victim's secret sins. The stories of demoniac possession are numerous, from that of Mary of Magdala, who harbored at least seven demons in her heart (Luke viii. 2), to the nuns of Loudun, who received frequent visits from the evil powers in the year of our Lord sixteen hundred and thirty-three.[13]

On the other hand, the demons of hell can be conquered by man and imprisoned in black bottles. This conception of a demon enclosed in a phial of black glass hails from the Orient.[14] The Asiatics believed that, by abstinence and special prayers, evil spirits could be reduced into obedience and imprisoned. This tradition is frequently found in esoteric works and forms a part of the Solomonic lore. In the cabalistic *Vinculum spirituum,* a book of Eastern origin, it is said that Solomon discovered, by means of a certain learned volume, the valuable secret of inclosing in a bottle of black glass three millions of infernal spirits, with seventy-two of their kings, of whom Beleh was the chief, Beliar (*alias* Belial) the second, and Asmodeus the third. Solomon afterwards cast the bottle into a deep well near Babylon. Fortunately for the contents, the Babylonians, hoping to find a treasure in the well, descended into it, broke the bottle, thus permitting the emancipated demons to return to their ordinary element.[15] The art of imprisoning an evil spirit in a phial of black glass is also mentioned by Gervase of Tilbury, Gerson, Ariosto, Bodin, Agrippa and Palingenius. The *motif* of a demon enclosed in a liquid container occurs also in the tale of the Fisherman and the Djinn,[16] which will be found in the *Arabian Nights* and which was also treated by the German poet Klopstock in his poem "Winter märchen" (1778.)

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[12] Cf. Julius Lippert: *Christentum, Volksglaube und Volksbrauch* (Berlin, 1882), p. 561.

[13] The reader will find a good account in English of this most interesting case of diabolical possession in modern times in the article "The Devils of Loudun," *National Review,* vol. XI (London, 1860), pp. 70-93, which is an unsigned review of the book in four volumes entitled *Histoire du merveilleux dans les temps modernes* by Louis Figuier, which appeared that year in Paris.

[14] Naturally, there can be no question of a bottle in the early form of this belief. Glass was not known in the desert. We need but refer to the story of Aeolus and his bag of winds. The Asiatics imprisoned the demons in goatskins. Anybody can see that wind comes out of a black "goatskin" cloud. In Abyssinia, the Abouna blows a skin full of his breath, which is then tied up, and with a puff from which priests are ordained in that country.

[15] Cf. *The Little Key of Rabbi Solomon, containing the Names, Seals and Characters of the Seventy-Two Spirits with whom he held Converse, also the Art Almadel of Rabbi Solomon, carefully copied by "Raphael."* London, 1879.

This legend of an imprisoned demon was introduced into Spain from the East by the Moors and finally acclimated to find a place in local traditions. From Spain it spread over the whole of Europe. This idea will be found in the work of the Spaniard Luis Velez de Guevara called *El Diablo Cojuelo* (1641), from whom Alain LeSage borrowed both title and plot for his work *le Diable boiteux* (1707). This *motif* has also been employed by Fouqué in his tale *Das Galgenmännlein* (1810), and by Fernan Caballero in her version of the Andalusian legend, "The Devil's Mother-in-Law" (1859), and by Robert Louis Stevenson, in his story, "The Bottle Imp" (1891.)

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The demons of hell tempt men of all classes and callings. They do not distinguish between prince and pauper, philosopher and fool. "It must not be thought," assures us Charles Baudelaire, "that the Devil tempts only men of genius. He doubtless scorns imbeciles, but he does not disdain their assistance. Quite the contrary, he founds great hopes on them." Although aiming to bring all men to destruction, the demons feel a particular delight in leading a good man to sin. Their greatest triumph, as Brother Palemon says in Anatole France's novel, *Thais* (1890), is "to sow black and bitter thoughts in the heart of a good man." Among all good people it is the priests whom the Devil persecutes most, because they teach, as the French master has said, that "God takes delight in seeing his creatures languish in penitence and abstain from his most precious gifts" (*les Dieux ont soif,* 1912). Even within the sacred walls of the monasteries and convents, the holy men and women are not safe against Satan's snares (2 Tim. ii. 26). "The Devil is more busy in the monasteries," we are told by Joris-Karl Huysmans, in his novel, *En route* (1895), "than in the cities, as he has a harder job on hand." Another reason for his greater activity in cloisters than in clubs and class-rooms is that he prefers to work among priests rather than among laymen. The priests cannot find safety from Satan's snares even at the very altar. In Alphonse Daudet's story,

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[16] Djinns, jinns or genii are the chief race of spirits (some good, some malignant) with which Arabian mythology has peopled the world.

"les Trois messes basses" (1889), we learn how the Devil, assuming the form of the little clerk Garrigou, describes to the officiating priest the magnificent meal that is awaiting him at the castle after he has read the three masses and, by ringing a little bell, seems to say constantly, "Hurry up, hurry up, the sooner we finish here, the sooner will we be at table." The priest cannot get his mind off the excellent dishes; he hurries through the holy service, swallowing words, jumping over passages until he is finally through and, with a sigh of relief, says *"'Ite missa est."* He eats that night so much that he dies without having repented of his sin. He is not admitted to heaven until he has read three hundred masses in his own chapel in presence of all who have sinned through his fault for the one mass that he has stolen. One can still hear all this in the chapel on Christmas night.

On the other hand, Satan often renders good services to the clergymen. In fact, the Fiend seems to be rather fond of the gentlemen of the cloth and seeks their company a good deal. It is told that a Scotch minister was riding home one day through a wood when Satan called out to him, and warned him not to eat a poisoned chicken which his wife was ignorantly cooking for his supper. Diabolus has often subtituted for many a preacher who was prevented from preaching his sermon on a Sunday morning. Lord Morley recently told the French story of the monk who was a particular friend of the Devil. One Sunday morning, the monk was too ill to preach, and as Diabolus chanced to appear in the sacristy for a chat with his frocked friend, the latter asked that obliging person to occupy his pulpit for the special edification of his congregation. The Devil preached a most masterly sermon, covering himself with shame and confusion. "How now?" said the monk when the Devil came down, "you have pretty nearly ruined yourself with that sermon."—"Oh! dear no," replied the Devil, "no harm done, no harm done; there was no unction in it."[16a] As may be seen from this story, the Devil's speech to St. Guthlac, the Irish St. Anthony, is not the only instance extant of a diabolical sermon. Diabolus is said to have preached a sermon, among *others, in the church* of North Berwick, and has occupied pulpits in other countries than England. In fact, the Fiend is famed as a pulpit orator. Satan's general oratorical ability renders further comment superfluous. Lord

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[16a] Quoted from by Mr. John O'London in the New York *Times Book Review* for 1921.

Broughman, as we know, recommended Satan's speeches to barristers and parliamentarians.

The Devil is also a frequent visitor in nunneries. But he often finds his match among the holy women. Father Eisen, in his book, *Ancient Origin of the Festival of the Body of Christ,* tells us that the sister nuns of Cornelia Juliana often heard in her cell a prodigious noise caused by the frequent fights she had with the Fiend, whom she would seize and thrash with all her might, trampling him under foot and bitterly reviling him.[17]

It will perhaps be permitted us to offer here in full a very interesting Provençal legend about the temptation of a nun, retold a quarter-century ago in English verses by a Manchester poet, B. H. Berti:

"The good folks in Provence the story oft tell,
How the Devil once tapt at a Nun's holy cell,
When began the night-raven to croak;—
In a Monk's cowl his horns and black features he veil'd,
His huge cloven feet and fork'd tail were conceal'd
In a long spreading sanctify'd cloak.

" 'Father Peter is come to absolve thee of sin';
Said the arch-fiend, and stifled a horrible grin,
'Confession and tears I require!'
The Nun drew the latch;—in the cell-bolt he came,
His garments flew off in a blue sulph'rous flame,
His eyes roll'd like meteors of fire.

"With terror she shriek'd at his horns and his tail:—
'In the name of the Virgin! thy purpose reveal;
'O Jesu! preserve my poor soul!'
With long ave-maries the fiend seem'd dismay'd,
Full of wrath he breath'd forth noxious steams, and display'd
In his black iron claws a red scroll.

" 'Thy soul's all I want—these few articles sign,
'And ev'ry delight of this life shall be thine,
'All hell to thy pleasure shall kneel!'
'O fie! prince of darkness, 'tis not quite polite
'To pay court to a lady, in such a sad fright;
'Prithee take off that strange deshabillé!'

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[17] A very beautiful medieval legend about the Devil in a nunnery will be found in the collection of stories published by Mr. F. O. Mann under the title *The Devil in a Nunnery and Other Medieval Tales* (1914). This story has also been reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (New York: Knopf, 1921).

"The demon then vanish'd, and shortly up sprung,
Strangely alter'd indeed, he was comely and young,
In a dress quite cut out *à-la-mode*:—
'Well, you're something at last, you look handsome and spruce:
'And now, my dear Devil, the writings produce,
'Let us see what new joys they forebode!

" 'Hey day, fourteen years! why the time is too short,
'These walls while I live can yield frolic and sport,
'Then away with thyself and thy bond!'
'Go to,' said the tempter, 'to sign prithee haste;
'Fly, fly from these cloisters, and true pleasure taste
'Midst my vot'ries, who form the *beau monde!*'

" 'Dear Sir, you're outbid, and your tongue's of no use;
'In transports the purest this world can produce
'Friar Lewis and I nightly revel!
'Take your blood-written scroll; take your curst scarlet bait!'
'Ah!' mutter'd the fiend, and went shaking his pate,
'A Nun has more wit than the Devil!' "

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The emissaries of heaven and the emissaries of hell frequently engage in a pugilistic battle over the souls of men at their death, similar to that carried on by Michael and Satan over the body of Moses (Jude 9).[18] According to medieval tradition the two parties contending for our souls, often resort to gambling as a means of settling their disputes. In the pseudo-medieval mystery-play *le Prince des sots* (1803) by Gérard de Nervel, an angel throws dice with the Devil, with human souls as the stakes. The angel cheats, through excess of zeal, with the object of taking back as many of his friends as possible into Paradise. The Devil in the end loses his temper, calls the angel "great gawky fellow, sly fool," and threatens, if he catches him again at his tricks, to pull every feather out of his wings, so that he will be unable to fly back to his Master.

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[18] The devils and angels are often shown in the Italian plays in conflict over the souls of mortals, with varying success, according to the virtues of the souls in question. In the play *The Virgin Martyr* by Massinger and Dekker (1622), a struggle between the good and the bad angel, who followed a man through life, is continued over his soul after his death. Good and evil demons were also wont to fight over the souls of mortals in the drama of the Buddhists. In Edouard d'Anglemont's poem, "l'Ame du Moine" (1829), the Devil fights, near the old abbey of Saint-Ouen situated on the banks of the Robec river, over the soul of an unworthy monk, who has just died, with his guardian angel, who maintains that the monk repented when he was on the point of death. Robert sans Peur, the Duke of Normandy, arbitrates between the two parties, and decides in favor of the angel.

Baudelaire, in his story, "le Joueur généreux" (1864), tells how he himself gambled with the Devil for his own soul.[18a] Satan is famed as the greatest gambler ever known upon or under the earth.[19] He taught the Roman soldiers how to cast lots for the raiment of Jesus (John xix. 24). Old Nick invented playing cards, which are therefore often called the Devil's Bible; and it is he also who invented dice, which are sometimes termed the Devil's bones.[20] Mr. H. G. Wells, in his novel *The Undying Fire* (1919), has Diabolus play chess with the Deity in heaven.

* * *

Satan, on account of his search for souls, has often been portrayed in popular legend as a fisherman. There is a long poem entitled "The Devil Fishing," from which we will quote the first three verses:

"The Devil sat by the river's side,
The stream of Time, where you'll always find him—,
Casting his line in the rushing tide
And landing the fish on the bank behind him.

"He sat at his ease in a cozy nook,
And was filling his basket very fast;
While you might have seen that his deadly hook
Was differently baited for every cast.

"He caught 'em as fast as a man could count;
Little or big, it was all the same.
One bait was a cheque for a round amount;
An assemblyman nabbed it, and out he came."

* * *

The Devil was wont to carry off the souls that belonged to him in a basket, as may be noted on the doorway of the Cathedral of Fribourg in Switzerland, where he is represented with a pig's head, a crook in his hand, and a rag-picker's basket on his back.[21] He was so certain of his prey that he was accustomed to leave his basket open. When he observed, however, that many souls managed to run off, he put a heavy cover and a good padlock on the box. But the cover did not prevent the souls from escaping. Aided by the rosy fingers of the cherubs, they found a way of sifting through the wicker-work of the basket. When the Devil realized his loss of souls, he slew a dromederay, and with the skin of the hump contrived a leather sack, into which he crammed as many souls as he possibly could find. "It is usually in Upper Egypt," says Victor Hugo, who has incorporated this legend in his beautiful story of the Bold Pecopin (in *le Rhin,* 1842), "by the shores of the Red Sea, after going his rounds among pagans and unbelievers, that the Devil fills his leather bag." But one day as he was promenading on the shore of the Red Sea, St. Medard saw Satan carrying on his back a bag full of damned souls. The heart of the saint was filled with compassion for the poor souls, and he quickly slit the Devil's bag open, whereupon the souls scrambled for liberty:

[18a] There is an allegory representing Satan playing with a man for the latter's soul in Carl Militz's *Die Schauspieler*. Illustrations by Moritz Retzsch. The title and text are printed in German, French and English.

[19] An excellent story about Beelzebub as a golf player is Charles Deulin's "The Devil's Round" (1874), reprinted in the collection of *Devil Stories* already mentioned.

[20] In Eduard d'Anglemont's legend, "la Partie de dés" (1833), Satan plays dice, in the ruins of the monastery of Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire, with the saint over a manor which has been bequeathed to the abbey and over the possession of which the two have long disputed with each other. The Devil shows a pair-royal of six, but the abbot is not dismayed and produces a pair-royal of seven.—As a dice player, Satan is the successor to Woden.

> "Away went the Quaker.—Away went the Baker,
> Away went the Friar—that fine fat Ghost,
> Whose marrow Old Nick had intended to pick
> Dressed like a Woodcock, and served on toast!
>
> "Away went the nice little Cardinal's Niece
> And the pretty *Grisettes,* and the Dons from Spain,
> And the Corsair's crew, and the coin clipping Jew,
> And they scamper'd, like lamplighters, over the plain!"
> —From *The Ingoldsby Legends, or Mirth and Marvels.*

In the medieval mystery plays, each demon is represented as bringing an individual soul and narrating the sin which condemned it to hell. In many plays, a long procession of such souls is shown, representing all classes and professions, from princes to paupers. Among the sinners whom the demons in the medieval drama carry off to hell, amidst the clattering of caldrons, we meet peers and peasants, dukes and dustment, admirals and artisans, bishops and boilermakers, millionaires and milliners, judges and jobbers. In the Redentin Easter Play of 1484, a priest who has been dragged into hell is able, by the vapor of incense and by his curses, to drive even the Devil into a corner so that he is only too glad to let his victim go. In his distribution of punishments to representatives of the various classes, Lucifer pronounces the severest penalties on the cheating craftsmen. The tavern-keeper who fails on earth to give a full measure of beer to his customers is certain in hell to be offered a hot beverage composed of oil, molten lead, pitch and sulphur.

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[21] The conception of the Devil carrying lost souls to hell, common to all forms of medieval literature, may be traced back as far as the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul (4th cent.). The Devil inherited his basket from Thor, who carried a basket slung over his shoulders when he went on his journeys among men.

It may thus be seen that the war for the world between the Almighty and the Adversary is still waging as strong as ever, and that Satan has not wholly been subdued by the Saviour. The jaws of hell are still open to swallow the sinners, and the Church is right in continuing to threaten us with pitch and brimstone.

NATURAL OBJECTS AND IDEAL OBJECTS

BY W. TUDOR JONES

IT is certainly true to-day that there is a lamentable want of interest in some, and, indeed, in most of the higher things of life. This fact is, in the main, due to the over-emphasis which is being laid upon natural objects at the expense of ideal objects, which are relegated to the background of consciousness, and are given but a shadowy kind of reality. Of course this is not, in some senses, peculiar to our age: the phenomenon of man clinging closely to natural objects is the story of the human world on the whole in the entire march of its evolutionary life. The result of this close affinity with natural objects has kept the mind constantly on the level of the senses: and, speaking generally of the average human life, there is only a minimum of intelligence required in this mode of activity. The interest in the external world may become so intense—and is, I think, actually so—that whole realms of reality hardly exist for the vast majority of mankind even in civilized countries. These domains of reality which are outside their ken are the most important ones. Certainly this is the conviction of all those who have realized in some degree the reality of the world of *ideal objects*. But if there have been no attempts, or only feeble attempts, to enter the second realm, what that second realm contains does not exist in any effective way in the mind simply because it has been swamped by the over-emphasis which is being laid on the objects which lend themselves to the senses. As I shall try to show, objects in the external world play an all-important part in human life, and human life, in its turn, plays an all-important part among the objects of the physical world.

Thus we pass to the statement that objects in the external world are in no sense to be ignored. It is fundamental for the development of the higher life that not a single step backward be taken with regard to any object which lends itself to the senses. A knowledge of such objects constitutes the true and necessary "jumping-off ground" to the higher levels of life. Much of the advancement of the Natural Sciences has come about in this way of keeping the natural object constantly in front of ourselves and allowing concentration of attention to do its work upon it. But it is often forgotten that *mind* is a work in all this. And not only is it forgotten, but the insistence and pertinacity of the sense or senses used are so strong, and make the object so alluring, that there is the very natural tendency of conceding reality to natural objects and to them alone. The consequence of this is that people become content to remain on this empirical level, and some go so far as to state that the search for anything behind and beyond this is hunting after phantoms. I am only hinting at this point of the investigation that in all this there is present something of value and significance.

At the present stage it may be pointed out that one is apt to forget how much that is mental is present and included in our perception of natural objects. To those acquainted with the Theory of Knowledge all this is a truism. But it is not a truism to state that a vast amount of inattention is to be found on the side of describing and explaining what takes place from the side of the mental structure of life in the very act of becoming aware and of knowing any object in the external world. Add to this the nature of what is happening when the object has ceased to be present to the senses and yet is still present to self-consciousness. Let us return for a moment to one of the facts enumerated above, i.e. the forgetfulness of how much that is mental in the perception of the natural object. All idealistic thinkers (and, I suppose, nearly all empirical thinkers) are agreed that the consciousness of the object is mental; that any axioms and postulates which enter into the *meaning* of the object are also mental; and that the totality of the impressions do enter, in some mysterious kind of way, into a realm which lies beneath the sensory level. It is of course true that reference may be continually necessary to the natural object as an actual existence in a world outside consciousness. Still the *meaning* is within consciousness. It certainly takes the ordinary individual a long time to become aware of this fact. And even cultivated men very often are only partially aware of it. An eminent Professor in Jena once told me that Haeckel had been so long looking at things outside himself that he had come at last to forget entirely that there was anything at all happening inside himself. The temptation to the production of such a type of mind is very natural to those who are constantly engaged with objects and their behaviour in the external world. Thus it may be said that it is not merely the naive mind that needs supplementary ideal objects to enrich the physical ones, but also the man of science is often in need of a constant reminder in the same direction. The result of this constant monopoly of the object is to relegate the remainder of life to a subsidiary place. First things are placed second, and second things placed first. My contention is that the backwardness of mankind concerning the fundamental meanings and values of life is due entirely to this. The natural tendency is to keep perpetually on the level of the *thing* as it presents itself to one or other of the sense. Consequently to-day we witness the failure to grasp the meaning of any object outside its immediate effect upon us.

I have already referred to the fact that such a trait as I have mentioned is present even in men of science. By an increased interest in the physical object the mind is continually forced into considering the empirical aspect as the one of fundamental importance, and thus forgetting more important aspects and attempting to transform mental constructions of various kinds into objects which exist in the world without. That is one of the great illusions which governs much of the natural science of the present day. But if all scientists had remained on such a level mathematics and the more conceptual sciences (e. g. mechanics and physics) would be in a very bad way to-day; it may even be stated that they would never have arisen. This is not the place to show the hypothetical and conceptual character of the Physics of a Newton or of an Einstein. And it is out of the neglect of the meaning and significance of the world of ideal objects that so much criticism has been levelled at some of the most important elements in Einstein's Theories of Relativity.

Some of the countries of the world are only too prone to live, on the whole, on the empirical level, unconsciously ignoring the impressions which the external objects make upon self-consciousness in its fulness of meaning. Of course it is most fortunate that the mind does much of this abstract work, which has to be constantly connected with physical objects, without awareness of what is actually included in our knowledge of physical reality. But the question may be legitimately asked, How much more comprehensive and how much richer would the reality be if the awareness of what lies beneath the impression of the physical object were actually present?

It is of fundamental importance to bear in mind that we are deceiving ourselves when we imagine that, in our examination of anything in the external world, there is none more present to self-consciousness than the impressions of the bare object. No object lends itself to any of the senses in its entirety. I have touched on this point in an earlier part of this paper, but it is necessary to repeat it on account of the fact that important consequences follow from such a fact. I am aware, of course, that the fact is a well known psychological one, but that it is something greatly more than this is far too often forgotten. We are certain that some element of what the object *means* is to be found in the concept of the object. The concept of elements of an object cannot possibly be the same as the mere perceptual view of the object. Something is abstracted from the object, and this something becomes another kind of object, i. e. a mental one within consciousness itself. The concept which we possess of any object may be of an elementary kind, and generally is so in the initial stages of every investigation. But as the investigation proceeds in a perceptual way, more and more elements or aspects of the object are passed on into the concept. And, what is often overlooked, other elements or aspects still which are not actually present in perception—and, consequently, absent from the object—are present in the concept and these in their turn work upon the conceptual elements which have issued directly from the perceptual elements. Thus ever richer concepts are formed: these become objects in consciousness, and these cannot possibly have a counterpart in any objects in the world without. Into the formation of such objects in consciousness the perceptual elements have made their contribution, but it is a contribution which has to be compounded into the prior conceptual knowledge and experience that were already present. My main point here is to emphasize the fact that such a contribution of objects in consciousness is apt to be overlooked or, in any case, is apt to be referred back continually to the perceptual level. Certainly such a procedure as this is legitimate and absolutely necessary in connection with the description and explanation of all objects in the external world. But all this is very different from merely granting an existence to such objects within consciousness only in so far as they are related and referred back continually to the external world. The objects in consciousness, as already pointed out, are something more than a replica of objects perceived. It looks then as if we were in a world of another kind of "dimension" than the external world. Certainly the external world has made its contribution. I am ready to go so far as to say that the objects in consciousness would have had no existence (at least in a physical world like ours) had it not been for the impressions which objects in a physical sense make upon us. But the story only begins there. Something which is not physical but conceptual is called up to observe, to reflect upon, and to transmute all the material that enters through the various avenues of the senses.

When we look into the matter of the nature and workings of the mind we discover such a process of transmution occuring, and it occurs not only by means of the impressions of objects upon self-consciousness but also by means of a conceptual power in man working upon the material that enters. It is in this sense then that it is stated that *ideal* objects are created by mind. There is no need of repeating that they are not created out of nothing. We may then accept with Husserl's School of Phenomenology the statement that alongside of the *existence* (Dasein) of objects there is their *subsistence* or *their being as they are* (Sosein or Wesensschau). This means that alongside of the perception of natural objects we obtain a still more inward perception of the *Sosein* or *Wesensschau* of objects. In this latter aspect the *relation* of the object to consciousness is not now taken into account. What is taken into account is the conceptual meaning itself of any object as it exists in consciousness. We are certain then that the *ideal object* exists or subsists in self-consciousness, and it is what it is—no more and no less. There is nothing very mysterious about all this. It is all a certitude. But, as I have pointed out at an earlier stage, the trouble begins when no kind of reality is conceded to the *ideal objects,* and when it is believed that such objects have no function whatever to perform save to be referred back to the external world. The main object of this article is to concede a reality to the *ideal objects* of a "dimension" other than that of physical things. The failure to do this—i. e the failure to take the *Sosein* or ideality of objects in consciousness—has been the main cause of the lamentably slow progress of humanity in all kinds of directions. The matter we are dealing with here belongs to the realms of the Theory of Knowledge and of Psychology, but it is not confined to such realms. It has consequences of a practical nature—consequences which affect the whole progress of the human race. Let me turn to this point.

In what a fragmentary, elementary stage we should be in to-day had it not been for this passage from *Dasein* to *Sosein*—from physical to ideal objects! Wherever and whenever such a passage has taken place, a further stage of development was reached, because the *truth in itself* and not merely in its relations with physical objects was taken into account. Suppose for a moment that the idealism of a Socrates and a Plato had never entered this world of ours. It would be impossible for us to conceive of the advancement of man in knowledge and in recognition of the most valuable things of life. There is no need of multiplying instances. It is sufficient to state that it is by means of conceptual and ideational experiences that man has been able to shape his life into a domain of civilization, culture, morality, and religion. This could not possibly have happened without man conceiving and feeling in some very deep kind of way that his experiences meant what they stated in his deepest self-consciousness. If he had granted to such experiences no reality other than is to be found in their reference back to levels of perception and to objects existing in a physical world outside his consciousness he would never have achieved what has already been gained.

Turning to the need of affirming the reality of ideal objects, in all their meaning, value, and comprehensiveness, and of working them out in life, we may ask the question, what objection can there be for professed teachers of science, philosophy, and religion to accept the doctrine of the ideality of all knowledge and experience? An atmosphere could thus be created within a generation which could be breathed by vast numbers of people concerning the meaning, value, and significance of the things of the spirit. Radical changes are at present needful in the personal applications of all forms of knowledge. In Natural Science, it is generally felt that there is no need to deal with the purely epistemological and metaphysical elements. It is probably true that so many men of science are pure novices in the Theory of Knowledge. The result is that their methods and conclusions are nearly always of an almost empirical nature. In Philosophy it is often the same. Metaphysics and its allied sister, Logic, do not obtain the place they deserve in the writings of many professional teachers. The result is that Truth and Principles are very largely discarded for scraps of knowledge which have a biological and physiological connection. Of course this kind of work is necessary, but the time has more than arrived when it should be supplemented by something more substantial and more closely allied to the deepest needs of human life. Matters do not seem very much better, but in some sense worse, when we consider the methods of teachers of religion. Here the training has dealt with material of a very doubtful nature. An acceptation of the great creeds of Christendom may leave the religious teacher absolutely blind to the vast mass of knowledge that has already accumulated on the fields of science and philosophy. It is only here and there that we discover anything more than a naive kind of acquaintance with all this. Is it then a wonder that an increasing section of the community in all the civilized countries of the world —and this section often the more intelligent one—has drifted from organised religion and has lost its anchorage of the great and permanent values of life? Many teachers of religion are conscious of this fact, and confess that they do not know where to turn for a solution. The solution seems to me to lie in granting a reality to the contents of experience and of conceiving of these as constituting an order of existence other than the order of the physical world. It is a tremendous help for man to realise that he is in possession of a nature that is not only capable of interpreting the world without, but that it also includes a real kind of mental and spiritual existence or subsistence which will carry him onward and upward to ever higher realms of thought and feeling and action.

The justification for taking into consideration *ideal objects* in their ever increasing depth and comprehensiveness is, I hope, thus seen to be the main problem to-day. It is an actual mode of penetration nearer to the heart of reality. It must not be taken as any form of delusion. As I have tried to show, it is the meaning which *ideal objects* grant us that interprets the world and passes beyond it. The warrant for proceeding in this manner may be found in the nature of man himself whenever that nature comes to an awakening. In the awakening nature of man there is always to be found a *need of completion* (Ergänzungbedürfnis) as Frege and Husserl show. Although by these two men the "need of completion" is taken in a logical sense, still I believe that it applies also to man's whole nature. The mind has needs and demands beyond physical existence. By obliging the dictates of these needs and demands the mind fills the gaps left by perception. To such an awakening nature, to live on the level of perception is impossible. This does not mean that we expect to discover anything which is idealistic in the unfilled gaps of science. But it does mean that mind is so made as to complete more and more, without end, the meaning and experience of reality.

The pathway of *ideal objects* is not confined to a Theory of Knowledge or to branches of the Natural Sciences. The ever greater completion of the meaning of reality has other "needs of completion" within the realms of Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics, and Religion. Thus we discover various levels which the "need of completion" has to pass through. As the various steps of this hierarchy of the sciences are scaled the *ideal objects* within self-consciousness become more and more comprehensive and significant. Also, the content becomes more and more unseen and spiritual, and there is no final goal discernible in front of the individual or of the race in the transmutation of reality. Why, then, concede reality to the elementary stages of the ascent and deny it to the more advanced ones? I am bound to say that I cannot understand why. It is the advanced stages which have made the world what it is on its physical side and on every other side. The final goal, as already stated, is not in sight; and, further, is not to be conceived in any perceptual, pictorial sense. But we proceed by taking each object as it is on its own level and meaning, and passing on and on to its further meaning and significance. If such a mode of viewing things can be presented in as simple and intelligible way as possible to mankind I believe that a universal response will be found among many men and women of ability and good-will. And thus we win them to a form of religion which will be constant in its nature, and which will view physical existence as preliminary to the formation of the reality of the "second dimension" found within self-consciousness, and ever deepening there as an experience of the things of the spirit. At the same time the "forward view"—the "need of completion"—will constantly pass from natural objects to ideal ones, and when the passage backward to natural objects is taken, as it will have constantly to be taken, it will cast its halo and glory even on the natural objects themselves. It is something of this nature that seems to me to be the legitimate outcome of all branches of science, history, philosophy, and religion.

UNIVERSAL UNITY

BY AUGUST F. STEFFEN

SCHOLARS of the next age of man, with light of knowledge in their eyes and wisdom of a lofty mould, will be likely to look down upon us as a queer lot. Reviewing the process of the ages, in the murky wastes of a dim antiquity, they will no doubt discover our hieroglyphics and endeavor to analyze our philosophy. Unable to come in contact with the living soul of things, and obliged to base their judgment only upon dead forms, shrouded in the darkness of the past, they will likely conclude that through the various stages of our civilization, we wandered in the wilderness of contradiction, that with all our diligent search for truth, with all our discoveries, inventions and progress, we never found our way to the Canaan of universal order, never arrived at the Baconian Atlantis.

Yes, from Thales and Xanophanes to Plato and Aristotle, from Hippolytus and St. Augustine to St. Thomas of Aquino and Duns Scotus, from Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton to John Locke and Immanuel Kant, from Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer to Albert Einstein and William James, from one stage of our Western civilization to another, the atmosphere is thick with apparent contradictions and seeming incoherences; but in the final analysis these differences are due largely to superficial observation, narrow viewpoint, or fragmentary knowledge. Underneath it all, through it all, and above it all, can be seen gradually and unmistakably dawning the light of Universal Unity.

Even the Doubting Thomases will be generous enough to grant the hypothesis that unity is the universal law of the universe, and that human endeavor attains toward this universal law in its process of evolution. Unity is implied by the very name of universe, which in Latin means turned into one. The Greeks observed its orderly arrangement and called it cosmos. The entire realm of creation is a system of order in which harmony is king, and contradiction is an outlaw. The matter-world is a unit operating under the universal laws we call physical forces; so too, the mind-world is a unit in which the mental energies work in harmony. These two realms are intimately related, each lower force or energy being involved in the higher. The infinite accord of all physical phenomena is interwoven, and has its parallel, in the system of order and harmony of all mental phenomena. Finally, all substances, all physical forces, all mental energies, are but the expression of Divine Energy, an Infinite Will, who includes all and unites all.

II

The cosmos of the visible universe is readily comprehensible, being mainly a matter of observation. Man can see matter with his own eyes; he can place it under a microscope or in a test tube, and deduct universal laws that govern all matter. By the use of a telescope he can study the planets and the billions of distant stars, and observe their systems and order. He can see the forces of nature respond to the energy-laden rays of the sun, bringing forth vegetable life in wild profusion; he sees that the vegetable kingdom sustains animal life, and he observes the inter-dependence one upon the other. He cannot escape the conclusion that there is a universal order of all things material, and in a poetical vein, can say with Robert Browning:

> "For many a thrill
> Of kinship I confess to, with the powers
> Called Nature; animate, inanimate,
> In parts or in the whole, there's something
> Man-like that somehow meets the man in me."

Then there is the atomic unity of the physical universe, far-reaching in scope and specifically scientific. Remotely conceived by Kanada and expressed in the old Sanskrit literature of India, the atomic theory of matter became "a star in the East" to the "wise men" of Europe, at least in the suggestion of the idea. The Greek philosopher Leucippus, was the first to work out the atomic theory in detail, and the physical principles laid down by this ancient atomist in the fifth century before Christ, might almost pass muster today. Democritus, Pythagoras, Epicurus, and others added to the development of the theory; and it survived the School of

Alexandria, and the slumbers of the Middle Ages, to shine with new luster in a new era. Through researches by Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, Hoygens, Boyle, and others, the doctrine became clothed in scientific dignity, gradually developing into the modern chemical atomic theory, perfected by Higgins and Dalton. The researches of Sir Humphrey Davy, J. J. Berzelius, and Michael Faraday led to the recognition of the atomic constitution of electricity, resulting in the development of the electron theory of matter which is now generally recognized by scientists.

Embracing a period of twenty-five centuries in its development, and championed by eminent philosophers of every age, the doctrine of the atom brought down to date, may be summarized as follows:

All matter is composed of atoms; or rather, the smallest particle into which matter can be divided is called an atom. It is the ultimate unit of each of the ninety-two elements that constitute all matter. It is so small that no one has ever seen an atom, not even with the strongest microscope. About a million atoms could be placed on the diameter of a human hair. Now, the atom itself is an aggregation of negatively charged particles of electricity, called electrons, which revolve at enormous rates around a central nucleus of protons carrying a positive charge. But all atoms do not contain the same number of electrons and protons; an atom of hydrogen contains only one electron and one proton, while atoms of heavier elements contain a larger number; an atom of mercury contains eighty electrons and eighty protons. One element differs from another only in the number of electrons and protons composing the atom.

According to the most recent physical science, light is nothing more or less than free electrons, that is, electrons which are not bound up in atoms; and liberated electrons always travel at the highest possible velocity of which matter is capable—186,600 miles per second. The dualism of matter and energy, therefore, falls into the discard, since the two are found to be one; and even the hypothetical ether is no longer needed, since the liberated electrons need no such medium of conduction.

Here then we have the atom as the unit of all matter, including light and every other form of physical energy; here then is the evidence of universal unity of the entire physical universe.

Someone may raise the objection that all this is theory and that theory cannot be submitted as positive fact. Now that the atom has been weighed and measured, and classified as to contents of electrons and protons, it would seem that the atom has passed from the theoretic to the scientific stage; but be that as it may, the great fact remains that the atomic structure of matter is the finding of those who have weighed the evidence adduced by twenty-five centuries of investigation and research, and for want of better evidence, the verdict stands.

III

Interwoven with the physical or objective universe, but extending beyond it, is a subjective or intellectual universe, the product of the human mind, a universe of unseen realities, a universe of mental phenomena. It embraces all sense-perception and holds in addition thereto the entire wealth of purely mental conception. It is the universe of ideas.

Democritus and Pythagoras advanced the notion of "soul atoms" and the atomic theory of knowledge, materializing all mental phenomena. Modern sensationalists and materialists hold much the same view. On the other hand, Plato held that the senses are deceptive and cannot yield reliable truth, that the immutable does not exist in the world of sense, but in the world of ideas. Immanuel Kant combined the two and asserted that every scientific judgment necessarily contains sensible elements and pure or rational elements. Will Durant gives the matter a modern cast in these words: "There are two modes of approach to an analysis of the world; we may begin with matter, and then we shall be forced to deduce from it all the mystery of the mind; or we may begin with mind, and then we shall be forced to look upon matter as merely a bundle of sensations. For how can we know matter except through our senses? And what is it then for us but our idea of it?" No matter which viewpoint is taken, the domain of the mind exists even though quite in unison with the domain of matter.

According to Kant the mind of man is not so much passive wax upon which experience and sensation write their abstract and imperfect impressions; nor is it a mere abstract name for the series or group of mental states; it is an active organ which moulds and co-ordinates sensations into ideas—an organ which transforms the chaotic multiplicity of experience into the orderly unity of thought. Herbert Spencer holds that knowledge of the lowest kind is ununified knowledge, that science is partially unified knowledge, and that philosophy is completely unified knowledge. The essentiality of unity, therefore, is apparent in the functions of the mind as well as in knowledge, the product of the mind. Nietzsche testifies to this unity when he says: "Too long we have been fragments, shattered pieces of what might be a whole."

There is a truly universal philosophy, combining, as Leibniz puts it, "whatever there is of good in the hypotheses of Epicurus and Plato, of the greatest materialists and the greatest idealists." The materialist Democritus admits that everything in nature has its reason for existing, and the idealist Plato assumes the existence of things material. The atomist Herbert takes for granted a first cause, and Hegel, his antipode, considers the atom as a necessary form of being. The optimist Leibniz and the pessimist Schopenhauer both teach that "effort" is the essence of all things. Spinoza, in his "one and indivisible substance" acknowledges two attributes: extension and thought. Newton's law of inertia is not so much contradicted but rather extended by Einstein's doctrine that it is natural for matter to be in motion, nothing having been discovered to be at rest. Philosophers may become widely separated in their explorations of the unknown, but the territories they discover are ultimately united in the realm of the known.

Yes, philosophers are divided into multitudinous groups by multitudinous doctrines; there are monists and pluralists, spiritualists and materialists, idealists or rationalists and sensationalists or empiricists, dogmatists and sceptics, and many others; and volumes have been written on the perpetual differences of the rival movements and schools; but these disagreements are largely due to the subjective elements which play an essential part in the formation of systems and mouldings of philosophers. Professor Alfred Weber, in his *History of Philosophy* says: "Take away from each that which is the result of circumstances under which it was produced, the self-love of the philosopher, his desire to be original, all the particular, accidental, and fortuitous elements due to his nationality and individual character; take away, above all, the numberless misconceptions occasioned by the imperfections of philosophical language,—and you will find, at the bottom of all these theories, one and the same fundamental theme, one and the same philosophy, one and the same system, to the construction of which each philosopher adds his share."

The love of bringing the unknown into the perspective of wisdom and converting it into beneficial agencies, the study of life in its redeemed and unredeemed complexities, the pursuit of the science of things divine and human, in short, the search for truth has ever provided the impulse and determined the direction of human thought and progress. The only mental achievements, therefore, worthy of consideration are those that deal with the discovery, classification and application of truth—truth in the physical sciences; truth in logic, esthetics, ethics and social science; truth in metaphysics and all its kindred branches; truth in the sum-total of human knowledge, adjusted, weighed and balanced in the universal science men call philosophy. As the atom is the building-stone of the physical universe, so truth is the building-stone of the mental universe. Truth is the unit of all knowledge, permitting of no contradiction, because truth cannot contradict itself.

IV

The voices of matter and mind have spoken and have testified to their individual and common unity; but no word was uttered as to their metaphysical nature; no answer was given as to their ultimate reality. We are, therefore, faced by the third and final phase of our hypothesis—that all substances, all physical forces, all mental energies, are but the expression of Divine Energy, an Infinite Will, who includes all and unites all.

What is it that makes electrons and protons act upon each other the way they do? What is the origin of sensation and consciousness and rational thought? What is truth, beauty, harmony, love, faith and hope? Why the apparently preordained orderly arrangement of nature? What is the ultimate cause of all things? What is the answer to the riddle of the universe? We ask our senses, and the answer is, God. We ask modern science, and it corroborates the answer of religion, God. We ask the sages of the ages, and the only answer is, God.

Every religion on earth teaches a more or less developed notion of Deity, or a Supreme Being, whether he be Buddha, Brahma, Allah, Jehovah, or just plain God. No matter how crude the conception, even the worship of ancestors, or lifeless images, express the groping of the human soul after the Divine. According to Emerson, "all things proceed out of the same spirit, and all things conspire with it. Whilst a man seeks good ends, he is strong by the whole strength of Nature. The perception of this law of laws awakens in the mind a sentiment which we call the religious sentiment, and which marks our highest happiness. This sentiment is divine and deifying. It is the beatitude of man. When man chooses to do the good and the great deed, guided from on high, then deep melodies wander through his soul from Supreme Wisdom."

At the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, its president, Sir William Bragg, in the course of his address, uttered these words: "There are some who think that science is inhuman. They speak as though students of modern science would destroy reverence and faith. I do not know how that can be said of the student who stands daily in the presence of what seems to him to be the Infinite. Science is not so foolish as to throw away that in which the slowly gathered wisdom of the ages is stored."

Thus religion has spoken and science has recorded its findings; but in the final analysis, it is up to philosophy to answer the fact of God. Philosophy, as completely unified knowledge, includes religion and science as well as metaphysics, and must answer the ultimate cause, and therefore, the reality of God.

Philosophy, ancient and modern, centers around the fact of God. Xanophanes, proclaimed as the real creator of philosophical monotheism, found that there is one God, one only God. Socrates believed in the supernatural and strongly emphasized the universality of Providence. Plato taught that God is life and the creator of life. Aristotle proclaimed that God is the object of philosophy, embracing the principles of all sciences and first causes of everything that exists. During the Middle Ages theistic philosophy built its structure on the ruins of the ancient world, and championed by the early church fathers, by St. Augustine, Scotus Erigena, Abelard, St. Thomas of Aquino, and others, the christian conception of God became firmly fixed in the groundwork of a new civilization. Modern philosophy, though largely devoted to the problems of the physical sciences, is nevertheless rich in theistic thought brilliantly interpreted by Bacon, Descartes, Montague, Pascal, Leibniz, George Berkeley, Thomas Reid, J. J. Rousseau, F. H. Jacobi, Victor Cousin, and a host of others, to say nothing of the religious leaders. Even the atheistic philosophers, from Protagoras and Epicurus down to modern materialists, have but a negative philosophy of God.

Bacon testifies: "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without a mind." Spinoza teaches that God is the invariable sustaining order of the universe and says: "the mind of God is all the mentality that animates the world." Voltaire reasons that, "perceiving, on reflection, the wonderful relations between all things, I should have suspected a Workman infinitely able." Herbert Spencer, in his final summary concludes: "Amid all mysteries, there remains one absolute certainty: we are ever in the presence of the Infinite and Eternal Energy, from whom all things proceed."

Yes, the fact of God, the wisdom of the ages, is slowly but certainly evolved by philosophy, ancient and modern, scientific and religious. God is in the electron and the atom as well as in the widest realms of the universe and infinite space. God is in life, consciousness and rational thought. God is in truth, beauty, harmony, love, faith and hope. God is the ultimate unit of the universe. In him and through him matter, mind and spirit are harmoniously arranged in universal unity.

V

From the foregoing postulates, brief as they are, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that universal unity is the common ground upon which science, religion, and philosophy can stand; it is the apex of all knowledge; it is the one road by which civilization has ever advanced to higher and higher ground. It has in it the assurance that the discovery of a bit of truth anywhere in any age is in harmony and fits in with every other bit of truth discovered anywhere in any age. It means that contradictions are but the dross from which the truth must be freed. It implies the assimilation, classification, and unification of all truth.

The inventor who discovers a new principle in mechanics, the physician who finds a new cure for disease, the physicist or chemist who discovers a new truth in the test tube or under the microscope, the botanist or biologist who reveals a new fact about plant or animal life, the geologist who reads a new lesson in the layers of the rocks, the astronomer who discovers a new law in regard to the heavenly bodies, or finds a new nebula—all of them add their bit to the total of truth that enhances human progress.

The same principle holds good in the subjective universe. The psychologist who adds to the understanding of the mental functions, the logician who intensifies the process of reason, the mathematician who clarifies calculations, the ethicist who ennobles the sense of human duty, the theologian who makes a bit clearer the relation of God and man—all of them add their bit to the total of truth by which the human race advances.

Throughout the ages man has ever been on the search for truth, and though tossed about in a sea of contradiction, befogging the mind and retarding progress, he has ever added bit by bit to the sum-total of truth. This accumulating wisdom of the ages is gradually bringing men to a better understanding; it gradually breaks down the barriers and lends impetus to progress; it gradually makes the possibilities of devastating wars a bit more remote, and gradually awakens the principle of universal brotherhood of man, and the universal fatherhood of God. Bit by bit the human race is evolving into a better, nobler and finer type of men, with light of knowledge in their eyes and wisdom of a loftier mould. The advent of the next age of man is heralded by man's progress in this age on the road of universal unity.

INERTIA AND FAITH

BY HAROLD BERMAN

MAN is an essentially conservative and tradition-bound creature. This tendency of his is especially noticeable in the realm of the things abstract and unmaterial, the things concrete man is able to apprehend with either one of his five senses, so that he could detect their defects if any, or their shortcomings, if they fail to respond to his own needs. Nor does he entertain any vague or superstitious fear of them, being that he is familiar with their properties and physical limitations. Not so, however, with the things abstract, things which men cannot perceive at all but may only speculate about one way or another. In such matters he feels not only uneasy and uncertain, but it is quite possible besides to "take the dare out of him," so to say, by attributing all sorts of hypothetical and unproved powers to them. Hence, we find that while man is ever-ready to exchange his personal and home furnishings or the implements of his business for newer and more efficient or more decorative ones whenever he becomes convinced of the inferiority of his present tools to the newer ones, he is hesitant about exchanging his outworn mental furniture for those that are more in harmony with the state of his own and humanity's intellectual development and knowledge at any certain given time or stage of his, or it's, development. Being that these concepts are not visible to his physical eye, or subject to the sense of touch or smell, his process of rationalization limited, while his fear of the unseen elements great—and balanced, once more, by his mental inertia—he allows himself to render lip service to objects and to concepts that in his more sober and more analytical moments, when these moments do come upon him, he would view as quite outworn and meaningless to him in his present mental and intellectual status.

Nowhere in human life is this clash between the abstract and the concrete elements out of which our life is woven so noticeable as in the realm of faith. In that realm of inherited concepts and rites, there are ever so many things that are the heritage of an earlier and cruder age, things that are repugnant to one's clear-thinking self, run counter to all demonstrated truths of science and observation, and would be unceremoniously rejected by most enlightened men were it not for this mental inertia and fear, or the lack of constructive and consistent thinking.

All of man's faiths, with the sole, possible, exception of the teachings of Confucius, have their creeds, conceived by and imposed upon their successors in coming ages, by men who, while exceeding in deeds of piety towards God and of charity towards their fellow-men, were yet totally ignorant of the laws of the Universe and their workings. They were men to whom the forces of life and death, sickness and well-being, sunshine and rain, heat and cold, the flood of the tides and the changing of the seasons were but *anarchical mysteries,* capable of supernatural interpretation and therefore also of miraculous intervention, to either accelerate or to interrupt their normal action. In a certain sense they still are, of course. We do not know *the origin* of these elements, the cause of their being and their action. But they have ceased to be mysteries *in their constituents* and in *their regulated workings* and manifestations. Yet it were men of that pre-scientific age who imposed such creeds and dogmas on us, and devised certain commensurate rites and ceremonies to be followed faithfully by us as a consequence of their own immature and erroneous conceptions. And yet we, after we have studied the natural sciences, including geology and astronomy, have learned the physiology of the human and animal Kingdoms, still persist in accepting without quibble or thought the dogmatic interpretations of our forebears, and follow the rites and ceremonies, the *embodied symbols* of these misconceptions, prescribed by these men as a result of these notions. We do so simply because we are naturally inert and timid, too lazy to think consistently, unable to follow the thread of our thoughts, afraid of the possible consequence, or both, simply because they have their being in the abstract realm, a realm full of mysteries and forces that are beyond us, and hence, had better be left alone and not be tampered with by us, poor, insignificant little beings!

Even Socrates, as reported in Plato's *Dialogues,* said: "If one does not believe in these" (the legends popular among the Greeks of his day) and he undertakes, in a mood of provincial wisdom, to interpret each one of them in a Natural manner, *he will need to have much time.* But I have no time for it, and the reason, my friend, is the following. I am not as yet in a position, as the Delphic inscription tells us, to know myself, and it appears ridiculous to me therefore to *inquire into other matters.* Therefore, I leave *these things alone,* and accept the current belief about them."

"A dogma," says Taine, "is nothing in itself; *look at the people who made it."* We have already looked at the people who made it, and found that they belonged to a different age, the pre-scientific age, and hence, wanting in capacity to teach our beliefs. Yet, that outstanding fact does not deter the greater majority of us from unctuously accepting and repeating the creeds taught us by them.

Charles Darwin, on being asked by a certain Bishop whether his theory of evolution and the gradual development of the species through natural selection conflicted in any manner with the Christion belief, replied: "none whatever!"

But then, Darwin was a *naturalist* and *not* a theologian. Had he been half as good a theologian as he was a good naturalist he would have realized that the two could not possibly dwell peacefully together, and that if man had not been constitutionally inert in things abstract, and especially theological things, but had reasoned things out to their logical conclusion, he would soon realize that there was no room in the one heart and one mind for the two. For, Darwinism not only contradicts the story of the Book of Genesis, but drives all dogmatic creeds, and especially the Christian, onto the shoals of doubt, to say the very least. Unless, like the Buddhists, one concedes the possessions of an immortal soul to all one's fellow-creatures on earth, there is no room in it for the belief in the soul and its survival. There is no room in it for Salvation, for Vicarious Atonement, for the Resurrection, for the Hereafter, for Reward and Punishment, for the miraculous birth of a Saviour, as well as the other mainstays of a creed based on an egocentric interpretation of the Universe.

To the primitive mind, ignorant of the laws of nature and life, a mind to which all phenomena were miracles pure and simple, a few miracles more or less presented no obstacle, and a faith could be made to hang securely on them. But the modern mind, steeped in science, to which all these phenomena have long ceased to be miracles and have become well-defined, and thoroughly understood laws, balks at the acceptance of any miracles as the basis of its philosophy of life, its ethics and behavior after it had thoroughly eliminated the element of miracle from its interpretation of the laws of the Universe and from its own physical and mental life and being.

From the foregoing premises we arrive at still another conclusion, which is as follows. When the spokesmen of the Christian Church, from the beginnings of the teaching of the new natural sciences in the days of Galileo and Bruno down to the days of Darwin, Wallace and Haeckel, were waging war to the finish against the exponents of these sciences, they were, not at all motivated by purely obscurantist bigotry but by the far-deeper and all-embracing instinct of self-preservation and the desire for survival. They thought that the human animal was *logical* and consistent in its thinking, and hence thought to read the doom of the faith entrusted to their keeping in the writings and the theories propounded by these exponents of science. They could not foresee the workings of that counteractory force inherent in and, at work in, the human mind—mental inertia,—which eventually came to their rescue and maintained the *Status quo* to this very day. The Catholic Church, being nothing if not consistent and thorough in its policies, has, however, placed the works of Darwin on the Index of the books forbidden to the faithful.

From dogma we come, of course, to prayer; prayer as a means for influencing the Deity to perform certain deeds resulting in our favor, or to abstain from doing certain others that would harm us. The representatives of the old creeds, with their naive belief in this earth's being the center of the Universe, and man, who lives on it, the central focal point and object of all creation and creatures, as well as the special object of God's solicitude, while all the other visible phenomena were nothing but a series of disjointed and unrelated manifestations, or miracles if you please, experienced no difficulty whatever in asking his God *to deviate a bit* from His beaten path for his sake. But to the modern man this becomes an increasingly difficult process. He has his scientific Cosmological philosophy, with its minute and well-regulated order of progression. He knows that *order* is the *basis* of life, his own life as of the rest of this infinitely-complex Universe. And prayer appears to him as nothing more than blasphemy pure and simple, as was duly indicated long ago by Spinoza, who described the process of prayer in just that term—blasphemy.

INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION AND ITS EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BY S. G. PANDIT

THE outstanding and unique contribution of the Hindus to religion has a very special significance for a real and uncoërced betterment of international relations. I shall, therefore, attempt to summarize, as clearly as I may, the thought and attitude of the Hindus in this matter, as presented in their literature from the earliest times and as manifested in their daily life.

Almost every religion in the world is forced to hang its head in shame at the fact of the butchery and bloodshed that has been perpetrated by its followers, on numerous occasions, in the name of the love of God or in that of the service of man's eternal welfare. I need only mention as examples, the massacres of the Protestants by the "bloody Mary" (queen of England), which were paralleled by the massacres of the Catholics effected by her sister whom the Protestants have called the "good queen Bess"; the Islamic practice of offering the Koran, and if it were rejected, piously severing the infidels' heads; the horrors that devastated the populations of Mexico and Peru under the Spanish Christian conception of zeal for the service of God and for the salvation of man. Probably Hinduism is the only religion that has never, in all its history, spilled one drop of human blood with the fancied object of extending God's kingdom or saving other people's souls. It may, therefore, not be without some possible use for us to look into the genesis of this happy consummation in the sunshine of which at least one religion seems always to have basked. For therein may be found some hint of a method which can be employed to neutralize the sourness that, among nations, curdles effort into the shame and bestiality of war.

We all recognize that different kinds of food are required to supply the needs for growth of human bodies at different ages and in varying conditions of health—and that the forcing of a stereotyped diet on the infant, the child, the youth, the adult, the aged, the sick and the well, would result in some sort of a slaughter of the innocents. Hinduism recognizes that a similar principle applies in feeding the souls of men, in supplying their intellectual and emotional, as well as their spiritual, wants. Hence the universality and all-inclusiveness of Hinduism: for the little ones the worship of God as reflected in toy images—the picture-books of religion; for others the communion with the grandeur and beauty of God in the objects of Nature—the sky, the wind, the mountains, the rivers, the sun, the moon, the stars and the trees; for still others the strenuous effort to sublimate all dross so the human may become a fitter vessel for the Divine to shine through; and numerous other variations. Hinduism, then, includes in its technique for spiritual growth the rationale of idolatry, polytheism, monotheism, pantheism, atheism, agnosticism and numerous variants. And each of them is regarded as a method suited to some particular stage of spiritual stature for its further growth and development.

In other words the Hindu regards the different religions of the world, or the various aspects of his own religion, as different roads all leading to God from different stages or directions, corresponding to the varieties of spiritual growth. He regards each religion as most valuable for the individual adapted to it by birth, environment, education, etc. Hence, he considers any effort towards converting a man to another religion as futile and even mischievous. The only conversion he believes in is of oneself and of no one else, and it has to come from within and is a continuing process. There is no such thing as a "one and only true religion"; and in the very nature of things such a notion is a product of provincialism and exaggerated egoism. The Hindu's view in this matter may be brought out more clearly by a story which was recently told by a Los Angeles teacher who had been giving lessons in biology and psychology for a considerable time to a devout Roman Catholic girl. One day he said to his pupil: "Now, you realize, don't you, that if you had been born to, and brought up by, devout Mohammedan parents in Arabia or Turkey you would most likely have been a devout Mohammedan and would have come to believe in Mohammedanism as the one and only true religion as you now regard the Roman Catholic form of Christianity. And similarly under appropriate other parentage and devotional environment you could have been a devout Confucian in China, Taöist in Japan, Greek Catholic in Russia, or Protestant in Holland." "Yes, yes, I quite admit that," said the pupil. "But, professor, I thank God that he had me born in *the* one and only true religion, and that he saved me from the terrible misfortune of devoutly accepting, as I might have done, a false faith and being forever damned."

Dr. John B. Watson has shown pretty conclusively, in his studies in behaviorism, that most religious beliefs are acquired through conditioning and have little to do with the intrinsic truth or falsity of such beliefs. Analytic psychology also points to a similar genesis of all unquestioned and unquestionable beliefs in "infantile fixations" which come to be regarded as self-evident and altogether above and beyond reason.

Hinduism seems to be particularly concerned in maintaining the fluidity of beliefs as opposed to their stagnation and crystallization, and insists that each belief is capable of proving itself useful to the appropriate individual; but that after all, it is only a crutch which must be later transcended if one is to travel onward and upward to the Truth which is God. For religious beliefs are merely means to an end. They are not, and can not be, absolutely true. For Truth or God is infinite; while human language and human thought are, in their very nature, limited. The limited obviously cannot encompass the infinite. Therefore everything that can be said, nay! everything that can be thought, is, in the strict sense of the term, untrue. All religions, therefore are untrue, in so far as they lay claim to being *the* Truth; their function is merely to supply a technique whereby we may develop the power or faculty to make an ever closer approach to an understanding of the absolute Truth which is God, by using the ladders of religion and finally transcending them.

The search of the man of religion is for the absolute Truth or that Uncontained Unity which he calls God and which the man of science calls Nature. The method used by both is the method of all mundane knowledge, viz. the selecting of certain details and isolating those from the rest. But in so doing—in isolating such and such details—we practically beg the question we are in search of; and moreover in supposing such isolation we suppose what is false, and therefore vitiate our conclusion. This method has been spoken of as the method of ignorance or βηδεπ (Avidyâ), i. e. of ignoring that which is inconvenient or inexpedient, and it may be illustrated even from that most exact science, Mathematics, and in its most perfect branch, Astronomy. Mathematicians have assured us that the moon in its passage round the earth describes an ellipse. But does it in reality? We must remember that while the moon is moving around the earth the latter is circling round the sun at a terrific pace, which makes it impossible for the moon to finish any closed curve around the earth at any time. We may only say that the moon is always starting a new ellipse in its motion round the earth but never gets the chance to complete one. But that is not all. There are perturbations produced in the path of the moon by its greater or less closeness to the earth in different periods of the month, and in the earth's orbit by its greater or less proximity to the sun in different seasons of the year as also by the proximity to or distance from it of other heavenly bodies at different times. Moreover, astronomers tell us that the whole solar system including the sun, earth, moon and other members of the system are moving at a tremendous rate of speed toward a distant point in space. What, then, becomes of the ellipse that the moon's orbit is held to describe around the earth? Why; it has no existence, it is not real. We may speak of it as merely a fiction, arrived at by the method of avidyâ, or ignorance, or ignoring. That is, granting the truth of the Newtonian law of gravitation (which Einstein has shaken up rather badly) and ignoring the existence of other heavenly bodies in space, and ignoring the rapid motion of the earth round the sun, and ignoring the stupendous motion of the solar system itself, if we merely consider the gravitational force as acting between the moon and the earth—the former would describe an ellipse around the latter. But our assumptions are false; the assumed state of things never has, does not, and probably never will exist. Obviously the elliptical orbit of the moon has never existed, does not exist, and probably will never exist. It has an existence merely in the mind, and is a fiction.

However, it has been said that the elliptical orbit must be real because eclipses of the moon can be calculated on that theory. But eclipses of the moon were almost equally well calculated, before the formulation of the elliptical theory, on the older epicyclical theory of Tycho Brahe. As John Stuart Mill, among others, has shown, the ability to predict does not prove the truth of the theory on which the prediction is based. It merely indicates that the theory is good enough for the purposes of that prediction.

The views of religion—in common with the views of science—are, therefore, like the views of a mountain; each is only possible as long as you limit yourself to a certain standpoint. Move your position and the view is changed.

It should, therefore, be the proud privilege of religion to seek to encompass the Truth from as many angles as possible, and to harmonise effort—not by coërcion, nor even by toleration, but by loving acceptance of the different religions and beliefs as honest gropings of finite minds after the Infinite. A necessary corrective to the danger of stagnation and to the intrusion of fraud is supplied by the admission and encouragement of complete freedom of thought and its expression—no matter how critical of, or in opposition to, the generally accepted or established order of things.

A considerable stress is laid in Hinduism on the technique for the development of the faculty whereby Truth or God may be truly known; and we are told that in the exercise of this faculty, when developed, is realised the supernal fact that real knowing and being are one. The whole system of Yoga is devoted to the study and exposition of this technique. I shall content myself here by stating that as pointed out by the great saint of modern India Mahatma Gandhi—who literally practices what he preaches even in the turmoil of active political life—that for the generation of soul-force there must exist the actual practice of truthfulness, fearlessness, conscious and willing suffering for others—all inspired by profound love. It is only by serving here and now our fellow-man (no matter of what religion or belief) in ways suited to him, that limited as we are, we may attain to a glimpse and foretaste of the serene majesty and unruffled joy of the Infinite. For if we cannot love our fellow-man whom we see, how shall we love God whom yet we cannot see?

Religion, to the Hindu mind, is not essentially a matter of the dead bones of formulated beliefs, but it is preëminently a living and dynamic process of fundamental growth leading to ever greater heights of self-unfoldment and mellowness of spirit. The religious or spiritual status of a man is determinable not by the labels placed on him by himself or by others—such as Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Mohammedan, Atheist, Agnostic, etc.—nor by the burden of self-imposed religiosity under which he be bowed to his misplaced satisfaction. It is to be determined rather by the natural simplicity of his living and by the measure in which there shines out through him, without the least affectation or self-consciousness the free radiance of the Deity who "maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

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

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

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SPIRIT, ETERNAL LIFE, IMMORTALITY

BY WILLIAM F. CLARKE

PERHAPS never before was there a more generally felt need of a clear conception and adequate verbal presentation of the fundamental realities, or reality, around which all the great problems of both religion and philosophy gather, than there is today. At the same time, in a world where all the physical, intellectual, and moral outlooks are changing from day to day, it would seem impossible to satisfy this need. But, after all, the realization of the fact that we are living in an evidently changing world may be our salvation: where all is changing we must look for the description which we seek in the meaning of change itself—in the enduring character which runs through all change, rescues change from being merely a self-destructive, incomprehensible confusion, and makes it an orderly, understandable process.

For the purposes of this paper I accept, as far as I am able to understand it, the general philosophical outlook suggested by Dewey and Whitehead, and still further developed and defined by Professor Arthur Murphy of Chicago University[1]—the philosophy of events, or of what happens. Events are the stuff reality is made of, and it is to events—to what occurs, that we must go for all our data: there is nothing prior to events. Both time and space are necessary aspects of the course of events; but take away events, and there is left behind neither vacant space nor empty, pure time: there is nothing. Both religion and philosophy are concerned with the content of events, the objects and the forces which, in occurring, enter into reality and become part of the complex, organically interrelated universe.

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[1] *Philosophical Review,* Vol. xxxvii, No. 6, Nov. 1928.

I must assume that, for modern thought, there is no meaning in the question, When was the world created? Creation is an eternal process, without beginning and without end, manifesting itself in and through the course of events; and this process being a process of development, events must show, and must always have shown, a twofold aspect, an aspect of power working against an aspect of resistence—a principle of order working against disorder, a principle of constructive life working against disintegration and death: creation being an evolutionary process the realized creatures become themselves resistent of the process, they become the old wine-skins unfit for the storage of new wine. As the creative activity is eternal so, too, the element of resistence is eternal. The life of the spirit is in the eternal conflict between the old and the new. We find both the creative activity and the universe which springs from it, and from which it springs (it is the relationship of the bird and the egg) ever present and active in events, and we must leave the questions of the *how* and the *why* not only unanswered but unasked: without the creativity there would be nothing; without the plastic element, which may be as immaterial as the known or unknown "rays" of space, again there would be nothing. Where both are eternal and each is necessary for the existence of the other any question as to priority of status may be dismissed. Any priority, if priority there be, must be priority in the status of the *whole process* over the elements which enter into it—the priority of *what is going on.*

The active creative element is the spiritual element, the material element is the world of physics, of biology, of physiological psychology, and of behaviorism. In this paper I propose to limit myself, as much as possible, to the consideration of certain aspects of the realm of the spirit—to attempt some description, within the limits of a philosophy of events, of what we mean by Spirit, Eternal Life and God. This is, I am fully aware, a hopeless and in any full sense an impossible undertaking; but if I can only succeed in suggesting the lines along which a description must be sought I shall feel the attempt has been justified: spirit can never be intellectually *comprehended*, for it is the active comprehending principle withdrawn from and beyond all comprehension. In the world outside ourselves it can only be apprehended by the "fringe of its garment," the forms manifested in the ever-changing course of events. To be found it must be sought in the depths of one's own soul where spirit is lived and trusted, willed and obeyed, loved and enjoyed, but never seen.

There is no event however trivial but has its spiritual aspect: nothing happens, no sparrow falls to the ground, without God. When we attempt to picture to ourselves an unminded event we are calling up an abstraction and forgetting that such an unminded event owes its intelligibility to the fact that, in it, there is that which corresponds with the structure of our own mind, which is, in fact, largely a construction of our own mental activities: in the very act of unminding an event we are impregnating it with mind. But for the fruitful analysis of the realm of the spirit, the realm of the realities we are attempting to describe, we must go to occurrences in which we, with all our highest conscious powers, are ourselves involved—fully minded events. As the fundamental problems of both philosophy and religion are not problems of mathematics or logic, or even of social life, but problems of the individual life as lived deep down in the soul of each one of us, it is to the depths of one's own soul that one must go for light upon the things of the spirit.

Leaving to the physicist, the chemist, the biologist, the psychologist, and the behaviorist, the objective fields of their analytical research—the outside world: all that can be dealt with by another,—in this actual occurrence, the writing of this paper, in which I am at the present moment involved, what do I find hidden within my solitary self? I find a realm of more or less hazy ideas which are concentering around a focus which is the idea of my life-process; here these ideas are being worked over by my intellectual and imaginative faculties, arranged in definite thoughts, and expressed in such terms as, I hope, may convey these thoughts to my fellow-men. But this life-process is not an automatic, undirected affair which I can sit back and passively watch: I am conscious of an effort of my will, an effort controlling and directing not only my bodily organs in the physical effort of writing, but an effort of thought in thinking, and, too, an effort of the will in willing and directing the thinking process. As a result of all this activity I am conscious of a feeling of pleasure or distress inasmuch as my efforts are, in my judgment, successful or ineffectual. And the pleasure feeling of successful effort is for me the final value of the whole event.

But here in this attempt at the analysis of my inner life something is all the time eluding me: the actual *I* who am making the analytical introspection must always remain whole, unanalysed and undemonstrated, existing and enduring in the background, through all the events which go to make up myself.

What is this I? In the physical realm it is that activity which takes of the fruits of the earth and choosing here and rejecting there builds up an organism which, although rooted in, springing from, and nourished by its environment, is something new, something which uses the world for purposes of its own and modifies the environment in which it lives. In the intellectual realm it is the conscious activity which, living in an actual world of ideas, nourishes itself upon the fruits of the mental labors of the past. But if this activity is worthy of the name of intellect it does not leave the food upon which it feeds unchanged, it is not merely a receiver of stolen goods, it assimilates and combines, rejects old and adds new material and builds up an ordered ideal world of its own: "I must create my own system or be enslaved by another man's." In the realm of the will it is the impulse from within, which, in the physical world, impels me to seek the satisfaction of my bodily needs and comfort, in the social world to seek my place and function in the social organism, in the intellectual world to seek truth, coherence, and beauty; and acting simultaneously with these activities is the supreme activity which recognizes all these values which I seek, when found, and at the same time rejoices in their finding and their recognition.

But this activity, this process, this impulse seeking, this judge finding, and rejoicing in the finding of these values, is my enduring life—the Spirit. And the values are values realized in a community of individuals inspired with the same spirit. It is this spirit which allows another to share my thought. Without community of spirit there could be no common language and all forms of distinctly human society would be impossible. It is "in the spirit" that my readers live in me and that I live in my readers, if there is to be any understanding relationship between us. It is the same spirit which breathes through all nature and makes it possible for the world to be *my* world.

Bound up with this universal activity tending towards change and development there is, as already pointed out, in every realm a resistance to progressive change, an inertia, a tendency not only to resist but to pull down and destroy. We see this in the physical realm, we are conscious of it in our social life, in every moment of our intellectual life, and indeed in all our search for the "goods" of the spirit. The world that *is* ever resists the world that is to be: there is friction, sorrow, pain, evil—ever there are tares among our wheat, and we are tempted to say "an enemy hath done this."

So then, beyond and behind the manifestations of my individual life, there is hidden in my deepest depths a synthesizing power which, directing my intellect and my will, binds all the different aspects of my life into unity, a unity of purpose and of character, a unity of direction and development—the Creative Imagination. This power it is which gathers up into the present moment the fruit of all my past experiences: that gives me my ideals: that takes of these ideals and giving them form and expression in my present action bites into the future with real creative force. It is the willing will, the thinking mind, the final judge, for me, of truth and beauty, the seat of all my sorrow and my joy—it is my inmost, real self, the Spirit.

The path of the spirit is a steep and difficult ascent; still, in spite of failure here and there, all along the line there is evidence of victory: the universe is not a balanced whole where action and reaction are equal and opposite cancelling each other, and all process is an illusion. In the physical world there is ordered movement and never fixed, immobile equilibrium. In the realm of ideas knowledge is never a dead reflex of the world of things: if all that we, in our highest and truest intellectual moments, can discover is the given, then our conscious intellectual life has no value. Ideas spring from the given and must ever be immersed in the stream of events to be purified and enriched, but they have a life and freedom of their own, and a creative power to mold and change events: the gap between the electron and man is very wide, but it, somehow, has been bridged: in spite of the world, the flesh, and the Devil, beauty and truth, fellowship and peace, still are loved and sought, realized and enjoyed, and still they draw men up and on.

Again, then, what is this real self, my spirit? Not the individual I can look out upon as a realized object, one amongst others in a society of like objects; this is the past self which, in living, I have already left behind. Again it is not the ideal self ever looked forward to but never realized. No, I am the actual present living process of creative transition running from my ideal world, through my actual self, into my realized self. If I identify myself with my past self, and "love" it, I debase myself. If I identify myself with all I hope to be, I fool myself; for there is no such self: my realm of ideals and possibilities is a necessary element in my existence as a developing being, but ideals do not enter into my permanent character until they have been formulated and fully expressed; for it is only in objective expression that falsehood and contradiction can be detected and cast off, difficulties overcome, and progress made. Day-dreaming may be an interesting form of relaxation and entertainment, but unless dreams can be brought into the actual world of expression they can have little value in the building-up of character. It is in the informing of the old with the new that my spirit is ever enriched. I *am* the living process ever growing in depth of reality through the actualization of ideals, the fruits or values of such actualizations becoming permanent elements inherent in my personality—memories which consciously or unconsciously must enter into my every action.

As the Spirit is all this in me, so it is all this in my neighbor, and in all men, and in all created things, for the Spirit is One. This universal spirit it is that gives the world to me and makes it mine, that makes possible all human fellowship, that makes my truth, if truth it be, truth for all men, that makes a vision of beauty a source of universal joy and in one prick of suffering makes the whole world kin.

But this universal spirit, which is the power in our will, the light of our intellect, the inspiration of our imagination, our companion in victory and defeat, is what we mean by God. In the spirit we are partakers in the life of God and fellow-workers with him. This is no cause for vanity. Man is not God. To be an element in, and a partaker of, a Unity, is by no means the same as being identical with a Unit: Man in his body is a member of the community of things which make up the universe, but he is not the universe. He shares in the infinite realm of reason and truth, but, if he is sane, he knows that his little store of knowledge is not the unfathomable well of wisdom. He shares the Spirit, and in spirit he is one with God, but he is not God. The supreme labor of man's spirit would seem to be that called forth in the effort to enter, ever more fully, into the riches of the kingdom of God for

> "The Gate by which we enter into the riches of the Kingdom of God is the Cross; and that Gate is narrow. They who desire to enter in that way are few, while those who desire the joys that come by it are many."

God is not *a* Person, one amongst other persons: His life is all-pervasive, His consciousness all-embracing. He is not the actual universe. He is not the infinite realm of ideals and possibilities; although he has within Himself the consciousness of both the actual and ideal worlds. God *is* Consciousness. He *is* creative Power. He *is* Imagination. He *is* Memory. He *is* Love. He is all these organized into a unity of free, self-determined activity aware of itself.

The fact that God's activity is self-determined in the direction of a definite order, and this in a universe which holds an element of inertia and opposition, is the basis for the emergence of evil, sorrow and pain. In an organic unity the whole suffers in the part: in myself, the pain in my finger is *my* pain, there are not two pains, one in my finger and one in me. So in being consciousness God is conscious in every living being. He is the Patient of the suffering of every sentient, living thing. As long as we can conceive of God as some omnipotent One, utterly other than ourselves, looking on at suffering, then the last cry from the Cross must be the cry of agony:

"My God, my God, Why hast thou forsaken me?"

and not the cry of triumph:

"It is finished. Father into thy hand I commend my Spirit."

God is the very life of this world of events. He is the Power which gives form and meaning to all events. He takes from his world of possibilities the things which *are not*, and out of the material of the world of nature, makes them to be the things which *are*. If we seek God in Nature, and worship him there, in finished, created things, we are worshipping idols, things less than ourselves. If we worship him as the Omnipotent, Omniscient, Perfect, Transcendent One, we are worshipping an abstraction from our world of events. God is Spirit, and they that would worship him must worship him *"neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem,"* nor in any fixed spot in time or space, but alone where he is to be found, *"in Spirit and in Truth"*; and Truth, here, is not a closed system of general ideas, not a definite, formulated creed, not a fixed and absolute code of moral laws, but rather a Way of life: a fearless and absolutely veracious attitude towards the realities of life, the realities of man's relationship to his world, to his fellows, and to his God.

But this Power which eternally runs through the course of events, and binds their infinitely complex patterns into an ordered. organic unity, which gathers up into its very life the values realized in every creature, so that nothing throughout eternity is lost, is what we mean by *Eternal Life.*—Spirit—God—Eternal Life. These Three are One. The gift of God to the world is Himself, the Spirit, Eternal life.

Do the centers of awareness which are our *selves* retain their conscious identity for ever? We do not know. That "all the righteous are with God" may mean either that they are constituent elements, living memories inherent in the eternal life of God, whence no power can snatch them, or that they are still conscious units in a fellowship of individual spirits. The hope and belief that we may, in some way, retain our individual identity together with the family, domestic, national and ecclesiastical relationships which go with the idea of individuality, would seem to have been responsible for most of the iniquities which have been perpetrated in the name of faith and religion from the most distant antiquity to the present day. This fact, together with the complementary fact that in our moments of most intense life, our moments of greatest joy, of most profound grief, of supreme self-sacrifice and love, whilst retaining our awareness, we lose the consciousness of our individual selves, would seem to point to the first as being the more probable meaning of the two: our consciousness not only *becomes* merged with the consciousness of God, but has, in reality, ever been one, in the unity of the Spirit, with the consciousness which is God. All things which are created are subject to change, and disappear; in our inherence in the Unity, which is the Spirit, would seem to lie our only hope of Immortality.

HINDU SPIRITUALITY IN RELIGION AND DRAMA

BY GREGORY VLASTOS

IT is not always true that a whole culture can be described in terms of a single attribute of soul, of a single quality of world outlook, that finds in it lucid and unadulterated expression. India, however, is old. It has had time to achieve that inner self-consistency and freedom from distracting motives that is the privilege of an ancient culture. In the lavish exuberance of patterns that run through the vast tapestry of its history, one motif stands out from the beginning and grows clearer and purer as the centuries roll on and the national character crystallizes into a finished maturity: Spirituality. What that spirituality means, and how it shines through at least two forms of Hindu aspiration and achievement, religion and art, we shall attempt to delineate in the discussion that follows.

The Indian Religion: Pantheism, Mysticism, Pessimism

A. *World-view: Pantheism*

The first religious documents of the Hindus are the Vedas. The word *Veda* comes from a root meaning, "to know." It was wisdom that those early seekers were after, and when they found it, it was simple: knowledge on one hand, and disillusion on the other. Their knowledge was of the Brahma, the one and only reality, supremely real because motionless and changeless, supremely free because above the accidents of existence. Their disillusion was of the world, of the objects of sense and desire, of the gross fibre of corporeal things, of the heavy drag of the flesh, of the obstinate sense of selfish individuality. The sense of the misery of life was heightened by the belief in Karma, the law of the deed, and transmigration: even death held out no longer the promise of a quiet and dreamless sleep, but meant an endless round of weary existences, of prolonged subjection to the dupery of Maya and the tyranny of fate. Then, with a Brahma who was all-real, and a world that was non-real, the course of wisdom was plain: to flee this world with all its haunting illusions and tormenting lusts, and reach the breathless silence and frozen immobility of the Brahma. Blessedness was now synonymous with extinction, and salvation with release, while the highest good was the Nirvana, the supreme felicity of untroubled nothingness.

B. *Technique of Worship: Mysticism*

Pantheism and mysticism have always gone hand in hand. It was so in the case of Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, and Spinoza. It was so in the case of these Indians. Distrustful of individuality, weary of the world, convinced that everything that is, is unreal and illusory, eager for the release of the glorious emptiness of the Nirvana, they had only one way of salvation open to them: the *via negativa* of the mystic. Despising ritual and cult as a means of salvation—for were not gods and priests, temples and sacrifices vanities?—they sought to obtain by the double discipline of asceticism and meditation a rapturous reabsorption into their pantheistic absolute. The famous statute of the seated Buddha gazing at his navel is perhaps the clearest symbolic expression of this contemplative mysticism by which the Hindus sought that kingdom that is not of this world.

C. *Strategy of Life: Pessimism*

With transcendental pantheism for a philosophy and negative mysticism for a way of salvation there was only one logical morality open to the Hindus: the ethics of pessimism and renunciation. Yet, strange as it may seem, such a gospel of other-worldliness and despair was still compatible with three different interpretations: fanatical asceticism, whimsical though disenchanted esotericism, and convulsive sensualism and superstition. Asceticism was the least popular of the three. It called for religious professionalism, demanded a stern sacrifice of all the natural enjoyments of a normal life, and tried to stifle all the passionate exuberance of tropical emotion in an inverted hunger for the extinction of body and soul. But ascetic fanaticism, exhuding the ordor of holiness and holding out the promise of the blessedness of the Nirvana, has not been without its charm to the Indian soul, and Jainism, the religion of institutionalized asceticism, has never lacked adherents.

Brahmanism was more popular because it was more sane. It saw that fanatical asceticism was really inconsistent with the true Brahmanic atarxia, that it was still a slave to passion, though passion of different order. Too wise to be fanatical, too sophisticated to be superstitious, too emancipated from desire ever to be a slave to passion, it calmly accepted the illusory nature of the world and worldly things, and attempted to conquer the world not by fleeing it but by smiling at it. It sought in elegance of manner and distinction of form a pleasant escape from the vulgar realities of life. Its ideal was a cultivated and philosophic detachment, a freedom from the domination of earthly goods, purchased not by the abstinence of the barbarian but by the temperate tolerance of the civilized man.

Asceticism, mysticism, cultivated esotericism: these are the privileges of a professional or leisure class. A speculative, mystical or enlightened religion is a luxury which the poor cannot afford. Driven to despair by the necessity of wresting a scanty means of subsistence from an unwilling earth, they too have sought release, but release of a more substantial, more palpable kind than that of the refined Brahmin. If all is vanity, then why not choose the thick instinctive pleasures, that, evanescent though they may be, possess an animal solidity that guarantees there reality while they last. Accepting, therefore, the moral pessimism that is the logical outcome of their religion, the masses have turned to an ethics of a despair, which tries to squeeze all the juice out of the pleasures within its reach. So the masses have lived a brute, unreasoned, self-regulative morality, that plucked pleasure hungrily from where it could find it, and brooked no control save that of physical force or biologic necessity.

The Indian Drama: The Art of a Spiritual Soul

A. *The Spirituality of the Indian Soul*

Our approach to the Hindu drama has been indirect but sure. For the drama is the product of a soul. To understand it we must first acquaint ourselves with the soul that gave it birth. Religion represents that soul in its most limpid, most thoughtful, most impassioned moments. Seldom realistically true of man's actual attainments, religion is always symbolically expressive of his ideal aspirations. Often it is only a reaction: having embraced life too passionately, and loved it with a drunken self-abandon, the soul returns to itself with a sharp recoil, and can only find satisfaction in an equally drastic and extreme asceticism. Yet even as a reaction it is richly revealing, for it offers an unchecked if only momentary expression to certain inarticulate longings and timid spiritual strivings that are ordinarily denied fulfilment.

Having then gazed upon the Indian soul at its moments of ecstasy and aspiration, we can feel already certain sympathetic intimacy with it, which comes from acquaintance on the deepest levels. We know something of its other wordliness, its world-weariness, its world-renunciation. We see its spirituality, its keen sense for "that vision of something that lies beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things,"[1] its secondary interest in this world as the confused reflection of a transcendent reality. We sense now the distinguishing excellence of the Indian soul: Above its pantheism, mysticism and pessimism stands its spirituality, lending it a softness and elegance, a charm and distinction, a detachment and cultivation which marks it off from the vulgar commercialism of the Anglo-Saxon, the shrieking emotionalism of the Latin, or the heavy sluggishness of the Slav. Let us be sure, therefore, of what this spirituality means: It is the gentleness and suavity of temper, which can be sophisticated without cynicism and whimsical without frivolity, which can reject the world, yet without embitterment, and can use it, yet without material absorption; not especially profound or forceful, but always elegant and refined; shunning the explosiveness of a sentimental idealism and the crudity of a photographic realism, guided always by good taste, decency and self-control.

There is a corollary to this Indian spirituality which is of special interest to us in our present study: its essentially 'undramatic' character, its contemptuous superiority to mere busy-ness. 'Undramatic' is here used in the popular sense of the word, which conceives the drama as the maximum of action in the minimum of space and time, and expects a play to be in the style of Balkan politics, where revolution and counter-revolution takes place, kings are established and deposed, cabinets formed and executed, all between sunrise and sundown. In this sense the Indian soul is undramatic in the extreme. Contrast, for instance, its colorness plan of salvation with the exciting Christian myth, where Adam, made with God's own hands, deliberately disobeys him for the twinkle in Eve's eyes, and so condemns himself and the whole race to perpetual damnation from the taint of the original sin, till God himself comes to the rescue and suffers for man on the cross. Compare the Indian calm submission to fate, its weary indifference to moral and immoral endeavor alike, its ambivalent ethics of asceticism and sensuality, with the Western puritanism and calvinistic mania for reform, "that so unspiritual determination to wash the world white and clean, adopt it, and set it up for a respectable person."[2] Whether it be the enervating influence of a tropical climate, or the disenchantment of a race grown old and gray, or the superior wisdom that comes from a detachment from material things, the fact remains that the Indian spirituality is essentially undemonstrative, unexplosive, collected, subdued and self-controlled, with open contempt for over-activity, and therefore lacking an element that is popularly deemed so essential to the art of the stage.

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[1] A. N. Whitehead's definition of religion in *Science and the Modern World.*

B. *The Religious Origin of the Indian Drama*

The beginnings of the Indian drama are obscure. Legend speaks of a certain Bharata (which, significantly enough, means 'actor'), who first brought down to men from the gods the arts of the dance and of the acted spectacle. The religious parentage of the drama already hinted at in this legend is much more clearly seen in the earliest known instance of a dramatic performance: This was a mystery-play, in which Krishna and his followers, dressed in red, symbolizing the fertility and warmth of the summer, overcame and killed Kansa, the black spirit of winter. This forms a striking parallel with Farnell's theory of the origin of the Greek drama in a mimic conflict of summer and winter, in which the black Neleid Melanthos killed the fair-haired Boiotian Xanthos. Berriedale Keith who notes this parallel suggests that the tragic outcome of the Greek passion-play and the lamentations that follow account for the "dirge-like nature of the Greek drama," while the uniformly happy ending of its Indian cousin may have contributed to establish the rigid banishment of all tragedy from the Indian stage.[3] Krishna thus figured

[2] George Santayana, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 85

[3] A. Berriedale Keith, *The Sanskrit Drama*, pp. 37-38.

in the first extant dramatic exhibition. Another of the ten incarnations of Vishnu, Rama, is the subject of popular religious festivals in which children present the story of the avatar in a series of striking tableaux before a host of devout pilgrims. A last evidence of the religious origin of the drama is to be found in the invocation to Shiva or Vishnu that precedes every Indian play, and in the fact that the Mahabharata and Ramyna, the religious epics of popular Hinduism, from the almost exclusive source of dramatic themes. We can, therefore, accept Keith's statement, that

> "the Sanskrit drama came into being shortly after, if not before the middle of the second century B. C., and that it was evoked by the combination of epic recitations with the dramatic movement of the Krishna legend, in which a young god strives against and overcomes enemies."[4]

C. The Poets of the Indian Drama: Shurdraka, Kalidasa, and Bhahavuti

It is needless to trace the development of the Indian drama through a host of mediocre authors. We shall be much more profitably occupied if we consider the great trio of the Classical Indian drama.

Shudraka is the king who received credit for the work of an unknown artist who wrote in the fifth century A. D. His only extant work is the *Mrrichakatika,* or "the Little Clay Cart," a genre-drama of middle life. It is a brilliant panorama of Indian life, remarkable for its tropical fertility of invention, exuberance of detail, and variety of character and episode, for its leisurely but keen insight into life. It is thickly studded with jewels of the brightest colors—epigrams of wit and wisdom, scenes of quaint but touching pathos, and a humor that is human enough to be felt across the wall of an English translation. Its plot consists of two complete stories joined together not without a certain amount of skill, sustaining the interest, and even effecing something like dramatic suspense. Yet its merits are those of "Martin Chuzzlewit" and "the Pickwick Papers": not an exhibition of virtuoso-like ingenuity in plot construction, but an air of broad human sympathy, naive and childlike delight in life as it is untroubled by the moralistic obsessions of its English cousins, free from affectation and rationalization alike, with a simple animal-like dignity, with the unstrained and unstudied charm of a wild flower.

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[4] *loc. cit.,* p. 45.

Shudraka's genius has given us a masterpiece that is unique because it is universal: it can afford as much delight to a western as to an oriental audience of the same cultivation and aesthetic discernment. With Kalidasa, commonly considered the greatest figure of the trio, we come to a poet who stands more definitely within the Indian tradition. He is often called the Indian Shakspeare or Goethe. Yet he is not to be equalled or even compared with these western masters, because he lacks the universality of the one and the profundity of the other. The distinguishing merit of his work is a frank naturalism of sentiment combined with an elegance, even a prettiness, which is totally unknown to the repressed and barbaric North, but quite akin to the graceful ardor of the French romantics. Kalidasa is Lamartine without Lamartine's gushiness, and Alfred De Musset without Musset's eroticism. His plots are bare and straggling, almost careless in their construction, but drawn as they are from the great epics so familiar to his audience, they offer ample opportunity to depict the very earthly emotions of nymphs and demi-gods and kings.

Two centures separate Kalidasa from Bhahabhuti. During that time the Indian drama had evolved through a period of increasing elaborateness and conventionality. The spring of the Indian drama that had given birth to the *Mrrichakatika* had passed into an early summer with Kalidasa, and now the first yellow leaves of Autumn had begun to fall. Bhahabhuti is the child of a drama that was growing old. We miss in him the freshness of Shudraka and Kalidasa. Gone is the splendid optimism of youth that welcomes life with open arms and faces it eagerly and hopefully, with an animal joy in all that it has to offer. Yet in place of the lost flush of radiant youth has come something else: a keener sense of the reality and tragedy of things, a realization that life is not only an exciting game with lusty passions whose delayed satisfaction only adds so much spice to their ultimate enjoyment, but a field of conflict and disappointment, gray with the poignancy of long drawn-out separation and unrewarded love. Something of this sober sadness of maturer wisdom breathes through his three extant dramas, of which the Uttara-Rama-Charita is perhaps the greatest. The iron rule of Indian convention holds him back from tragedy, but he often comes very near to it, and we wonder what he could have achieved with the freedom of the Greek tragedian. As it is he comes closer to the

Greeks than any of his fellow-dramatists, especially to Euripides, that other disillusioned and uneasy poet, though Bhahabhuti is too much of a gentleman to play with the emotions of his audience quite so daringly as the Greek.

D. *The Aristocratic Audience of the Indian Drama*

In his *Development of the Drama* Brander Mathews points out the influence of the audience upon the playwright, "an influence not on the form of the play, but on its substance." He than proceeds to say that "the drama is, of necessity, the most democratic of the arts."[5] We can heartily agree with the first statement, but we are obliged to dissent with the conclusion that is drawn from it; unless indeed we presume upon the ambiguity of his statement, and grant that perhaps the drama is the least aristocratic of the arts. For no art is democratic. It is created for the enjoyment of the discerning few, and any attempt to popularize it results in the casting of pearls before swine, a process as unsatisfactory to the swine as it is degrading to the pearls. Perhaps the best refutation of the delusion of democratic and journalistic drama is to be found in India. For the Indian theatre is the theatre of a class, the theatre of the Brahmins, the noble, priestly, and administrative caste.

There are several reasons which have led to this. Language was one: the Indian drama is written in Sanskrit which ceased to be popular after 300 B. C., and persisted only as the language of the ruling class. I say *chiefly;* for only the chief parts were in Sanskrit; the roles of women and inferior characters were written in different Prakrit dialects, which were intelligible to the common folks, but were still stereotyped to a high degree, so that they by no means represented the language of the people. In the second place, the commercial theatre was unknown to India. Dramatic presentations were reserved for festive or solemn occasions and then given at the palace of some rajah or prince to an audience consisting chiefly of invited Brahmin guests. Having no specially constructed theatres for the housing of such spectacles, the audience was numerically limited to the capacity of the throne-room or banquet hall. The quality of the audience, however, more than made up for its small number: the poet was assured of highly intelligent listeners to whom he could speak with hints and half-tones, suggesting rather than describing, trusting to the cultivation of the audience to supply that which the artist's self-restraint chose to leave unsaid. So the playwright could disregard the plebeian demand for farce, vaudeville or melodrama to which the commercial stage so easily degenerates, and cater to the

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[5] p. 33

> "qualities which the virtuous, the wise, the venerable, the learned and the Brahmans require in a drama: Profound exposition of the various passions, pleasing interchange of mutual affection, loftiness of character, delicate expression of desire, a surprising story and elegant language."

And the poet's disregard for popularity could rise higher yet:

> "How little do they know who speak of us with censure! This entertainment is not for them. Possibly some one exists, or will exist, of similar tastes with myself; for time is boundless and the world is wide."[6]

Here we find the first secret of the spirituality of the Indian drama: its independence of any but a spiritual audience.

E. *Structural Peculiarities of the Indian Drama*

In our preliminary discussion of the Indian spirituality which we described as a universal mildness and refinement of outlook resulting from an other-worldly detachment from material things we spoke of it as the outstanding characteristic of the Indian soul. We may have expected to see its symptoms cropping up in the national drama, though so far the first mention of it was only made in the preceding paragraph, where the shaping influence of a spiritual audience on the Indian drama was pointed out. From now on we propose to hold fast to this spirituality and its attendant disregard for realism and disparagement of action, and correlate it with the distinctive features of the Indian drama.

The prologue is the first such feature that calls for mention: Every play begins with the entrance of the manager, who pronounces a benediction, asking for the blessing and protection of Shiva upon the audience, and then in a jocular conversation with one of the actors proceeds to tell the audience something about the author, the character of the play, and a word about the plot. This deliberate effort to make plain to the audience that what follows is to be a *play* is due to the extreme care of the spiritual Indian to avoid even the semblance of deception, and to furnish a gentle transition from the world of reality to that of poetic imagination.

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[6] Both quotations from an induction to one of Bhahabhuti's plays, quoted in *Encyclopedia Britannica* article on "Indian Drama," Vol. VIII, p. 482.

The manager then withdraws, the actors enter, and the play begins. There are no curtains to be drawn back: the only curtain is the so-called "Greek wall," reminiscent of Greek influence at the time of Alexander's invasion, being a plain dark tapestry at the back of the stage, forming the background for the performance. Entrance and exit are made at the back through this curtain. A further peculiarity of the Indian theatre now strikes us, as we notice the complete absence of stage-properties, and, as the play proceeds, the stereotyped character of the movements of the actors, much in the style of the modern ballet.

The scenic bareness of the Indian stage, however, is more than compensated for by poetic descriptions of nature, that give the desired effect without the attendant illusion, and at the same time offer admirable scope of expression for the author's aesthetic sensibility and power of pictorial suggestion. These descriptions sparkle like jewels in the pages of the Indian drama, and must be classed among the highest achievements of a spirituality that could suspend the action to indulge in the purely aesthetic delight of word-pictures. The imaginative splendor and pictorial vividness of these descriptions will be made clear from examples that follow. This snatch is from the lengthy description of the storm that appears as a poetic interlude in the fifth act of the *Clay Cart*:

> "The heaven is radiant with lightning's glare;
>   Its laughter is the cry of myriad cranes;
> Its voice, the bolts that whistle through the air;
>   Its dance, that bow whose arrows are the rains.
> It staggers at the winds, and seems to smoke
>
> With clouds, which form its black and snaky cloak."[7]

Here Bhahabhuti not only pictures natural scenery, but communicates a mood and builds an atmosphere:

> "Here lies our path. Yonder is tall Kraunchavat,
> Amidst the dark glens of whose wooded side
> The raven silent flits, and hoots the owl,
> And whines through whistling caves the shrilly breeze:
> And countless pea-fowl, with discordant shrieks,
> Chase into sapless trunks and time-worn trees
> The frightened snakes."[8]

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[7] From A. W. Ryde's translation, p. 85.

[8] From Wilson's translation, p. 323.

An even clearer expression of the Indian spirituality lies in its glorious disregard for the unities of time and space: Twelve years elapse between the first and second acts of the History of Rama. In Kalidasa's *Hero and Nymph* we find the king in the fifth act handing over the reigns of government to his son, who is the product of a love-union not completed till after the third act. As for unity of place, the freedom of the Indian playwright is even greater: unhampered by stage-effects of any kind, he can make his characters wander through forests, climb mountains, travel through the clouds, and ascend to heaven in winged chariots, all in the same scene.

But what contributes more than anything else to give the structure of the Indian drama its own peculiar flavor is its carelessness in the matter of action. Judged by Western standards Indian plots are weak, inefficient, disorganized. For one thing, the inventiveness of the Indian dramatist was discouraged by the fact that he could rely on the religious epics for ready-made plots. But even in those rare cases (as, for example, in the *Clay Cart*) where he did try to work out original stories, his work was marked by fertility rather than structural ability, with a tropical profusion of episode undisciplined by subordination of succeeding incidents to a well-defined end. The Indian dramatist never lets himself be worried by structural problems. His plots are simple. In a difficult situation he can always make use of the miraculous and the extraordinary. And if the worst comes to the worst, he feels no compunction in resorting to the deus ex machina to help him out of the ditch.

An over-wise Westerner hearing about these peculiarities of the Indian drama might wonder how it could still maintain its respectability in the face of eccentricities such as these. How could such a bare series of conversations between rather stereotyped characters in fantastic situations loosely joined to form a story be called a drama at all? But little would the Indian care for the jaunty judgment of an American reporter. His audience is a spiritual audience, and his purpose a spiritual purpose. He conceives drama as the communication of experience through the medium of the stage. If he can communicate experience without bothering with an elaborate stage or an over-ingenuous plot, why not do it? It is his right. More, it is his duty. One of the first principles of art is the elimination of the unessential. In this respect Indian drama is like William Blake's poetry or a Japanese print: the maximum of meaning with the minimum of machinery. We cannot fairly blame a man for failing in something which he never attempted. The Indian never felt any ambition to compete with life in the realistic reproduction of nature or the fateful incidence of events. All he ever wished for was to share with his audience something good and beautiful in itself: the moral reaction of human beings under given circumstances. It is to the consideration of this moral and emotional content of the Indian drama, by which its ultimate success is to be judged, that we must now turn.

F. *Representation of Experience in the Indian Drama*

Two questions will occupy us here: First, the nature of the depicted emotions, second, their dramatic justice. The first is merely descriptive, the second is appreciative and critical.

The clue to the general understanding of the emotions portrayed in the Indian drama will be found in the recognition of the fact that they are the expressions of the eternal Indian spirituality. This will explain their instinctive nobility, their refinement and elegance, their moral purity, their effortless superiority to all that is vulgar, crude, perverted, or vicious. It will illuminate the complete absence of trivial or petty feelings and will justify the moral stature of a soul that could remain serenely indifferent to any but spiritual sentiments. To a Protestant and a Puritan, like myself, it may seem a matter of some surprise to mark the freedom and spontaneity of this moral elevation; to note the absence of repression and restraint, the freedom from uneasiness and inward conflict, the singleness of purpose and unity of will with which the whole personality acts.

Debarred from or rather contemptuous of lower feelings, the Indian soul finds preeminent expression in the two sentiments of heroism and love. Indeed, if it was not for the epic character of most Indian dramas, even heroism would disappear, and nothing else would be left for the uniformly noble and elegant hero but love. As it is, valor adds a welcome but distinctly minor variation to the rather monotonous melody of the gentler passion. When it does come, it is treated in a prosaic, matter-of-fact fashion, as if it was a necessary, but inherently uninteresting business, preliminary, incidental, or instrumental to the more exciting deployment of love. It is often reserved not for the principle character, but for his son, who is unknown to him, and is recognized in the final scene through some unusual exploit of courage and skill. This occurs in the History of Rama, and also in alidasa's *Hero and Nymph.* In any case, it is inconceivable that chivalry in the European medieval sense should ever possess more than a second or third-rate interest for the Indian: it does not agree with the climate.

Love, therefore, is the all-engrossing passion, yet a love that is neither Platonic, nor romantic, nor adolescent, nor jazzy, but Indian, or perhaps Italian. It is dark and violent like a tropical thunderstorm, but happily free from the protracted murkiness of a Chicago sky. It is too passionate to last, unless separation or unsatisfied desire adds fuel to the fire, and then there are no limits to its endurance. But that love is never noisy, melodramatic or vulgar. There is a poetic idealism even in its most passionate moments which prevents it from descending to the levels of mere lust. It is frankly, even innocently, animal. Yet its undisguised sensuality is not at all incompatible with a certain idyllic character delighting in coquetry and the exchange of pretty sentiment. Pururava speaks about Urvasi:

> "Here loveliness lends splendor to her ornaments,
> Her purity gives fragrance to her perfumes."[9]

Notice the Italian prettiness of the following:

> "Whom have you sent the envoy of your coming?
> None, but my heart: that has long gone before me."[10]

And something quite like joy-riding in the American style:

> . . . . "tis much
> In the unsteady rolling of the chariot
> But for a moment to have touched the form
> Of this celestial nymph; the blissful contact
> Shoots ecstasy through every fibre."[11]

Love has also its more serious side of conjugal felicity:

> . . . "What wealth need man desire,
> Who in the fond companion of his life,
> Has one that share his sorrows, and disposes
> All anxious care with exquisite delight."[12]

Its ardor does not evaporate with separation, and the constant lover is seen emaciated and worn by the suffering of an absence of twelve years, but with an undiminished affection.

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[9] *Hero and Nymph,* Wilson's translation, p. 211.
[10] *Ibid,* p. 213
[11] *Ibid,* p. 203.
[12] *History of Rama,* Wilson's translation, p. 320

"A teaspoonful of heroism in a pint of love"—this seems to be the recipe on which the Indian drama is made. But if the jelly tastes good, why quarrel with the cook on theoretical matters? If the Indian playwright chooses to restrict himself so largely to these two sentiments, we may privately regret the resultant simplification of life, but we cannot censure him for his personal preferences. The only way in which we may criticize him is on the dramatic justice of the portrayed experiences. The term 'dramatic justice' referes to the correlation of theme and material, of substance and form, of idea and technique; it denotes the measure of success with which the artist has mastered the instrument through which he has chosen to express himself, and the degree to which he has made that instrument subservient to his purpose. To be specific: In the preceding paragraph we protested against the unfairness of the critic who would depreciate the Indian drama because of scenic poverty and looseness of plot—the artist has a right to choose his own technique. Now we protest against the equal unfairness of anyone who would disparage the Indian self-limitation to certain particular experiences—it is the artist's privilege to choose his own theme. But having once selected his own theme and his own technique, his freedom can go no further: he has now a definite task before him of embodying the idea in the form. Art is the happy coordination of the two, and criticism can now be called upon to decide as to the success or failure of the artist in this coordination.

On the basis of such a criterion we shall be forced to the verdict that the Indian drama is not only art, but great art. What is its object? To depict certain emotions in their ebb and flow in response to certain natural surroundings and moral situations. What is its technique? To present certain characters to whom the desired emotions are not only possible, but natural; to bring those characters into conjunction with other characters, so as to arouse an action and reaction of will and feeling (chiefly the latter); to create constellations of episodes which will bring new and varied lights to play upon the characters and their attendant feelings; lastly to add to the incidence of events an atmospheric coloring of natural scenery which will enter into the total situation as a component factor. Does object and technique, idea and form work together? Are surroundings and situations used judiciously and economically solely to produce the desired emotions, and do the emotions grow naturally and spontaneously out of the given surroundings and situations used judiciously and economically solely to produce the desired emotions, and do the emotions grow naturally and spontaneously out of the given surroundings and situations? Looking at the trio of the classical Indian drama, we must answer, yes.

It is only in this light that we can give a satisfactory explanation to the aesthetic unimportance of the structural deficiency of the Indian drama. This somewhat puzzling question is solved when we once realize the *atomism* of the Indian spirituality in contrast to the corresponding Western *organic* view of the emotional life. That is, the West represented by Shakspeare would conceive of the inner life of an individual as something coherent and self-consistent, one emotion growing out of a preceding emotion and strictly conditioned by it. There is a growth and development in a Hamlet or Macbeth, like that of a flower or plant, a growth and development however, which proceeds entirely within the character's individuality. It is this inner continuity of a developmental view of the individual's life that must be balanced by the outward coherence of a well-constructed plot. The Indian, on the other hand, possesses no such strong sense of personality. He rejects the metaphysical dogma of the individual soul. Personality exists only as an incidental and temporary manifestation of the world-soul. Its emotions and moral decisions are not the inevitable expression of an inner organic unity, but are the passing reflections of an impinging natural and social environment, the disconnected shadows cast on the passive waters of a lake by the clouds that flit overhead. With such a view of the inner life, the Indian would not know what to do with an elaborate plot. It would be something extraneous to his art, more of an encumbrance than a help. All he needs is a series of events, no matter how impossible in their sequence and fantastic in their occurrence, so long as they will be fit to evoke certain moral reactions from his characters. In Shudraka, Kalidasa, and Bhahabhuti this is achieved to something very near perfection.

A final question now remains: Is the nature-poetry of the Indian drama a merit or a defect? At first it appears as a distinct weakness. The playwright that lingers for a whole act (as in the Fourth Act of the *Hero and the Nymph,* and the Fifth Act of the *Clay Cart*) to draw word-pictures stops the movement of the play, suspends the action, and irritates the audience. But this would be only the naive reasoning of a critic who would equate drama to action, and forget that the Indian's interest is not in a story, the outcome of which he knows in advance, but in the interplay of emotion aroused by inherently uninteresting incident. Anything that will arouse that emotion is justified. If descriptions of nature will do it just as well as events, the playwright has a perfect right to make full and deliberate use of them. And if nature can be transported to the stage through graceful and imaginative poetical descriptions infinitely superior to the best of stage-decorations, shall we not admire the Indian spirituality not only for its moral integrity in desiring to avoid illuson but also for its aesthetic instinct in choosing the better of two mediums to accomplish the same end? Again Indian art is justified, and the western critic who is willing to lay aside his western prejudices will recognize that in the representation of experience, which after all is the essence of the drama as of all art, the Indian theatre has achieved a success of the very highest degree.

THE BELIEF IN THE DEVIL

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE belief in the Devil has now been abandoned by most "enlightened" men. Lucifer has been relegated by the "advanced" thinkers of today to the limbo of medieval legends. Satan nowadays gets only a sniff or a sneer. Beelzebub is used in our times as a butt at which men shoot their arrows of wit. The mention of the Devil in this period of progress, far from causing men to cross themselves, only brings a smile to their faces. At the very thought of Old Nick men burst into laughter. "I could not think of the Devil without laughing," the poet Southey confessed even a century ago.

These "enlightened" men consider themselves too far advanced with their scientific knowledge to retain even a modicum of faith in the "bogies," with which they were frightened in their childhood. They leave the belief in the Devil to what they call the backward, blind masses. They forget, however, that it is they who are blind. These scoffers at Satan should remember that not so long ago it was authoritatively declared in the ecclesiastical courts that "a denial of the Devil's personal existence constituted a man a notorious evil-liver and a depraver of the Book of Common Prayer."

The fact of the matter is that the denial of the Devil is the most successful snare Satan ever laid for our souls. Father Ravignan was indeed right when he declared that the modern disbelief in the Devil was one of the most cunning devices of the Enemy himself. "La plus grande force du diable," said this Jesuit priest, "c'est d'être parvenu à se faire nier." The Devil admitted to Charles Baudelaire that he had been very much afraid, with regard to his proper power, when he heard this prominent preacher cry from his pulpit in Paris: "My dear brethren, do not forget, when you hear the progress of lights praised that the loveliest trick of the Devil is to persuade you that he does not exist" ("le Joueur généreux," 1864). Baudelaire's disciple, Joris-Karl Huysmans, in his novel *Là-Bas* (1891), similarly says that "the greatest power of Satan lies in the fact that he gets men to deny him." Satan expresses his satisfaction over his success in this regard in Frederick Beecher Perkins's story, *Devil-Puzzlers* (1871). In Pierre Veber's novel, *l'Homme qui vendit son âme au diable* (1918), on the other hand, the Devil mocks at this theological dictum.

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The belief in the Devil forms an integral part of every religion. "God and the Devil make up the whole of religion," said the German rationalist, Christoph Friedrich Nicolai. It will not do for a believer in the Deity to scoff at the idea of the Devil. Disbelief in the Devil cannot be reconciled with faith in God. A man cannot be a believer in the Almighty and a sceptic about the Adversary. "Dæmon est Deus inversus," says the Cabbala.[1] The Devil is nothing but the reverse of the coin called God. George Sand has said that "the Spirit of Evil and the Spirit of Good are but one single Spirit: God" (*Lélia,* iii). The German mystic, Jacob Bœhme, in the sixteenth century, affirmed that God can be known only through Evil, which means, through the Devil. To deny the Devil is to discount the Deity. Lucifer is as necessary to the Lord, as the Lord is to Lucifer. "God without the Devil is dead, being alone," affirms Samuel Butler. Though they oppose each other, they also complete each other. They are a part and parcel of the great cosmic system. John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, well realized the need of the belief in the Devil and issued to his followers the famous cry: "No Devil, no God!"

This position in regard to the belief in the Devil cannot be assailed. The assertion that the Devil is as essential to religion as the Deity cannot be gainsaid. The Catholic never has discarded the belief in the Devil. For the Roman religionist, the belief in the Devil, as any other belief, has been fixed *ne varietur* by the Church. It follows, therefore, that faith in the Fiend must form a part of the religion of every good Catholic. But it is difficult to understand how any Protestant can discard the Devil from his dogma. The belief in Beelzebub forms an essential part of the Christian religion. Indeed, it is the pivotal point of the body of Christian dogmatics. Voltaire proved himself as good a theologian as a philosopher when he said that the Fiend was the fount and foundation of the Christian faith. "Cette doctrine [du diable]," the old man of Ferney said, "devient depuis le fondement de la religion chrétienne" (*Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations,* iii). In fact, from the old orthodox point of view, Christianity cannot be conceived without Satan. To employ a hackeyed simile, Christianity without Satan would be to the old orthodox believer very much like the play of *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out. The fact is that the whole Christian scheme of salvation is based on the belief in the Devil. What need, pray, would there be for salvation through Christ if there were no Satan constantly plotting against man?

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[1] Walt Whitman, in his poem "Chanting the Square Deific," represents the Devil as a part of a quadruple divinity.

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The Devil appears in the sacred books under his various aliases in his various forms and with his various functions. He is found at the very beginning of the Holy Writ. If he plays a minor part in the Old Testament, the New Testament is full of his devices and doings. The gospels and epistles speak of his powers of opposing truth and assisting error, of accomplishing signs and wonders, of plotting and scheming, of influencing and controlling thought, of rearing children and having a residence, a royal throne and a church of his own. They portray Satan as a roaring lion, prowling about and seeking whom he may devour (1 Pet. v. 8). The Saviour himself was not safe from Satan's snares, although he escaped them.

The Devil is encountered at the very dawn of human history, appearing to our first ancestors in the Garden of Eden; and from that day on, he has been inextricably wound up with the affairs of men. Although he played a rather minor part in the days of the patriarchs and prophets, he gradually developed in power with the march of the centuries so that in the Middle Ages he was the Prince of this world. The medieval period may well be considered the heyday of the Devil's reign over the minds and wills of men. There certainly was tremendous diabolical activity in those Catholic times. The Devil was the object of the greatest concern among our medieval ancestors, who feared him so mortally and who fought him so courageously. Our forefathers were encircled by the fiends of hell, from whom they could not flee. Any uncanny or untoward experience was ascribed to the Devil. If a person disappeared, it was supposed that the Devil had carried him off.[2] The Reformation perhaps increased the Devil's power in this world still more by withdrawing from the Church the power of beating Beelzebub with book and bell. In the eighteenth century, in this *sæculum rationalisticum,* the belief in evil as well as in good disappeared, and in the following century Diabolus was relegated to the domain of old traditions and ancient superstitions.

But just when we thought that we had discarded the Devil and lulled ourselves in the fond conviction that all was for the best in this best of all possible worlds, we awakened at the beginning of this century to a new and sudden realization of a power of evil which is still at work in the midst of men. The world-war brought us a new and appalling conviction that all the attributes which used to form the personality of the Prince of Darkness were more rampant in the world than we in our former blindness ever dreamed. It was the lesson that the French Revolution and its attendant Reign of Terror taught many of the sceptics of the eighteenth century, and it was again the lesson that the devil-doubters of our day learned from the recent war and its tragic aftermath.

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The existence of Evil necessarily and inevitably points to the existence of the Devil. Victor Hugo, like so many other Romantics,[3] deduced from the existence of evil, "that terrible sphinx propounding a terrible riddle," the existence of an Evil Being. "It is this perfection of Evil," says the author of the novel, *les Travailleurs de la mer* (1866), "which has sometimes sufficed to incline powerful intellects to a belief in the duality of the Deity, toward that terrible *bifrons* of the Manichæans. . . . It is certain that Evil at one end proves the Evil One at the other. . . . If there is an Up," he continues, "there must be a Down; if there is Light, there must also be Darkness" (*ibid.,* II. iv. 2). Victor Hugo found an echo in Huysmans, who, in his novel, *Là-Bas,* previously mentioned, makes the following interesting statement through the mouth of Des Hermies: "Manichæism is one of the most ancient, the simplest of religions, at all events, the religion which explains best the abominable mess of the present time." This dualism is deep-rooted in the thought of man. It is suggested by our bisymmetrical bodies of right and left, and by the duality of the moral world of right and wrong and of the physical world of heat and cold, day and night, light and darkness, in which we live.[4]

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[2] Thomas Carlyle's graphic picture of Monk Sampson's vision of the Devil, in his *Past and Present* (1843), will perhaps do more to explain how the belief in the devil grew and flourished in the Middle Ages than pages of explanatory statements.

[3] Balzac, however, could not understand how there could be two synchronously omnipotent powers, as the Lord and the Devil. He had too much faith in the wisdom of God to believe in Beelzebub. "God would be very stupid," he assures us, "to leave in this world, which he has so curiously constructed, an abominable devil whose special business it is to spoil everything for him (*l'Héritier du diable*, 1832). Alfred de Vigny similarly said that he had too much respect for God to fear the Devil.

Our belief in the Devil may differ somewhat from that held by our ancestors. Diabolus now shows himself perhaps no longer as a blackman with horns, hoofs and tail. Nevertheless, he is just as vivid to us as he was to the hermits of the Thebaid or the monks of the Middle Ages. What Renan said with regard to the Deity may well be applied to the Devil. When this eminent historian of religion was asked if he believed in God, he replied: "I do not know if the Divinity exists, but the Divine always exists." Whether or not the Devil exists, the Diabolical undeniably exists. But the Devil is more than a mere abstraction, an idea or a principle of evil, as he is presented by our "advanced" thinkers. The unity of all the forms and elements of evil, which still is so unmistakably real in the world, seems rather to point to a personality if not to a person. "We may not believe in a personal Devil," says Mr. Stanton Coit, "but we must believe in a devil who acts very much like a person."[5]

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Indeed, how can any man doubt the existence of the Devil? Thousands upon thousands of persons, in the Middle Ages and even later, saw him with their own eyes; and if unanimous testimony may be counted as proving anything, we must admit that the Devil is the one person whose existence has been demonstrated beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt. How real the Devil was to St. Anthony and to Martin Luther! The first of the anchorites, upon the authority of St. Athanasius, was so tempted and tormented for twenty years by the Devil that he well-nigh lost his religion. Luther devoutly believed not only in the Devil's individuality but in his frequent appearance in physical form among men. The German reformer lived in a constant consciousness of contact with and opposition to the Devil. The founder of Protestantism affirmed that he had seen Satan with his own eyes and that he had frequently carried on a conversation with him. When Luther was studying at night in the monastery at Wittenberg, he often heard the Devil making a racket in the empty chapel below and was forced to slam his book and go to bed. The Fiend often looked over Luther's shoulder when the latter translated the Bible in the Wartburg and disputed with Diabolus in regard to the correct meaning of the Hebrew text. "The Devil," Luther assures us, "knows Scripture well and he uses it in argument." The founder of Protestantism carried on a serious controversy with the Contradictor on the subject of transubstantiation, and, in the course of the heated argument, lost his temper and hurled the inkstand at his visitor. The Devil dodged, and the ink splashed on the wall behind him. As proof of this episode, the inkstains may be seen to this day in Luther's former cell in the Wartburg.[6]

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[4] H. Taine also deduced the existence of the Devil from the existence of evil. Cf. J. Bourdeau: *les Maîtres de la pensée contemporaine* (Paris, 1904).

[5] Stanton Coit: *The Soul of America: a constructive essay in the sociology of religion* (New York, 1914).

Many modern writers, who will certainly never receive canonization, are staunch believers in the Devil. E. T. A. Hoffmann, the most famous of the fantastic fictionists of Germany, held a firm belief in Beelzebub. It was a settled conviction with this writer that, when anything good befalls a man, an evil power is always lurking in the background to thwart the beneficent action. "The Devil," Hoffmann used to say, "will put his hoofs into everything, however good it is at the outset."[7] This writer lived in constant dread of the Devil. He believed that, by means of a bargain, the Evil One had obtained possession of his soul, which could no longer escape eternal damnation. The poor man was persuaded that the Enemy of Mankind stood behind him while he wrote and looked over his shoulder. He so feared the Fiend that he would often awaken his wife in the night and beg her to keep watch with him and protect him, as he was sitting over his work.

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[6] Luther's dispute with the Devil is very cleverly described by Népomucène Lemercier in his *Panhypocrisiade* (1819). Concerning Luther's belief in the Devil, read Wm. Edw. H. Lecky: *A History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe* (2 vols., London, 1865).

[7] That is why one of the prayers of Charles the Fifth was: "May God do and Satan not undo."

Heinrich Heine, in a famous quatrain, warns us against doubt in Diabolus:

"Mortal, mock not at the Devil,
  Life is short and soon will fail,
And the 'fire everlasting'
  Is no idle fairy-tale."

The French novelist, Prosper Mérimée, who openly professed his unbelief in supernatural powers, was convinced that the Devil had much to do with the affairs of men. Théophile Gautier, sceptic and scoffer though he was, believed in the Devil. Barbey d'Aurevilly and Charles Baudelaire held firmly to the Catholic doctrine of the existence and influence of the Devil. The poet of the *Fleurs du Mal* (1857) was a staunch believer in the constant presence of the Great Enemy in this world. He laughed at his "enlightened" friends who imagined that "the Devil would one day be gobbled up" by manufactories and machines. Baudelaire had a certain feeling that an evil power existed exterior to man, since he failed to conceive how, save by means of such intervention, various sudden acts and thoughts could be explained. In a letter addressed to Flaubert in 1860, Baudelaire expressed his belief in the Devil as the origin of moral evil as follows:

> "From all time I have been obsessed by the impossibility of comprehending sudden acts or thoughts of man without the hypothesis of the intervention of an Evil Power not in man himself."

In his autobiographical *Mon Cœur mis à nu,* the same writer expresses his Manichæan belief in the duality of human nature with the following words:

> "There are in every man, at every hour, two simultaneous urges —one toward the Deity (spirituality), and one toward the Devil (bestiality). The invocation of God, or spirituality, is a desire to rise; that of Satan, or bestiality, is a joy in descent."

Baudelaire also believed in hell, and laughed at the freethinkers and humanitarians of his day, who proposed to abolish hell out of friendship for humanity. He particularly poked fun at George Sand and, apropos of her disbelief in hell, remarked that she "had good reason to wish to suppress hell."

Anatole France, profoundly pagan though he was, professed a strong belief in Beelzebub and the Black Bogey (*le Livre de mon ami,* 1885). This scoffer at all things sacred was scared by Satan. There is a lurking suspicion that the atheist Thibault could not divest himself of the belief in the Devil which he had imbibed with his mother's milk. This latter-day exponent of the spirit of doubt and denial also regretted his loss of faith in inferno and envied his ancestors, who never questioned the reality of the unquenching fires of hell. His poem, "la Danse des morts" (1887), ends with the following line:

"Blessed are they who believed in hell."

Ernest Renan, who carried the spirit of critical inquiry into the field of religion, likewise regretted his loss of belief in hell. "I would that I knew there was a hell," he wrote; "far better that hypothesis than that of nothingness." As he had a horror of paradise, which he considered a place of perpetual *ennui,* he diplomatically preferred purgatory. Voltaire, who is generally considered among the good Christians as the incarnation of unbelief, was not altogether certain in his mind that hell did not exist. When a light-hearted sceptic wrote him one fine morning, "I have succeeded in proving that there is no hell," the sage of Ferney replied, "You are very fortunate; I am far from that."

Rémy de Gourmont, thoroughly godless as this deep thinker was, manifested a passionate interest in Diabolus, and sang the praises of Satan much in the manner of Baudelaire and Carducci. Our own James Huneker believed in the Devil even if he denied the Deity. His pupil, Benjamin de Casseres, is more convinced of the reality of the Adversary than of the Almighty.[8]

This belief in the Devil on the part of freethinkers puts to shame the doubts with regard to Evil and the Devil which we find frequently expressed by good churchmen and churchwomen in both camps of Christianity. Happily enough, the majority of men in Christendom still hold firmly to the belief in a personal devil. Against

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[8] Casseres expressed his belief in the Devil in his review of the present writer's collection of *Devil Stories,* which appeared in the New York *Herald,* of May 8, 1921.

Diabolus the Catholics yet swing their incense and the Protestants still thunder from their pulpits. In one country of Europe, at least, the Devil has not lost his legal status. According to newspaper reports, a few years ago, a Protestant pastor was sentenced at Bromberg, Poland, to eighty days imprisonment and a considerable fine for denying the existence of the Devil. The clergyman made no comment on the case beyond saying that the Devil would be glad to know that he had such fervent defenders in Poland.[9]

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[9] The present writer was told a few years ago by the president of a Baptist college that he would advise any man who did not believe in a personal Devil not to join the faculty of that institution.

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THE COSMIC TEETH

BY LAWRENCE PARMLY BROWN

III. *Lightning Teeth*

IN the fiery nature of lightning flashes or thunderbolts we doubtless have the suggestion for their mythic recognition as the teeth of a storm figure, sometimes a dragon or serpent, which in another view darts out its tongue to produce the lightning—or is conceived as fire-breathing like some of the macrocosmic figures such as Purusha in the *Vishnu Purana* (I. 12).

Tlaloc ("He-who-makes-things-sprout") was the great Mexican god of rain, lightning and thunder; the wide-spread belief that the rain comes from a serpent or dragon probably having suggested the two serpents generally forming the face of this deity with their tails encircling his eyes, their heads meeting at his mouth, and their fangs serving for his teeth.

Antonio de Leon y Gama says that Tlaloc held in his right hand sheets of gold, representing his thunderbolts, or sometimes a golden serpent; that his front teeth were painted red, and that he had three molars (*Descripcion de las Dos Piedros,* 1792, Pt. I, p. 101; Pt. II, pp. 76-79). This description probably refers to representations of Tlaloc with his face in profile and with a large open mouth extending well toward the ear, thus exposing six upper teeth; namely, three anteriors (a central, a lateral and a canine) and three posteriors (two premolars or bicuspids and one true molar, the former of which were known as molars until comparatively recent times). In fact, there can be little or no doubt that all the anthropomorphic figures of Mexico and Central America were conceived to have the same number of teeth as human beings, with six sharp anteriors in each jaw.

But as the lightning belongs above, only the upper tusk-like teeth of Tlaloc are generally represented; and they are sometimes six in number, as in two stone images illustrated by Seler, with long tusks on either side, curving away from the median line of the face (*Codex Vaticanus B, Elucidation,* p. 107, figs. 299 and 302); while in the *Codex Borgia* (sheet 16), where the face is in profile, three dagger-like upper teeth are shown, and the god apparently has no lower jaw. Sometimes only two dagger-like teeth are shown with the face in profile and no lower jaw, as in the *Codex Borgia* (sheet 14), while four such teeth appear in two of the stone images illustrated by Seler (*Vaticanus B,* pp. 299, 302, figs. 300 and 301). Again, we find four such teeth with the face in profile and no lower jaw, as in the *Codex Borgia* (sheet 67), or four curved tusks with a profile face and a lower jaw, as in a pictorial manuscript (Seler, *Vaticanus B,* p. 109), or six long teeth with a profile face and lower jaw, as in the *Codex Vaticanus* (sheet 61). Still again, Tlaloc is represented in a highly conventionalized form; with head thrown back and mouth wide open as if in the act of shouting or thundering, and showing four or five long teeth projecting horizontally, while there appears to be no lower jaw—as in the *Codex Vaticanus* (sheet 23, with five blunt tusks, and in the *Codex Fejérváry-Meyer,* sheet 4, with four flame-like teeth).

A Maya war god worshipped at Merida was named Uac-Lom-Chaam ("He-whose-teeth-are-six-lances"). The Hindu Yama, god of the underworld, has two watch dogs, the Saramayas ("Sons-of-Sarama"), who appear to belong to the eastern and western horizons; and they may represent storm clouds, for the more prominent of the two is said to have teeth "bristling like lances" (*Rig-Veda,* VIII, 55, 3, Wilson's trans. De Gubernatis reads: "with reddish teeth, that shine like spears"; *Zoo. Myth.,* Vol. II, p. 23). According to Schellhas, the dog was the Maya bearer of the lightning and a symbol of the death-god ("Deities of Maya Manuscripts," p. 42).

The story-clouds from which come the lightnings is sometimes symbolized by a wild-boar with sharp tusks. In the *Rig-Veda,* Vishnu transforms himself into a wild-boar; and De Gubernatis says: "Vishnu, the penetrator, with his sharp golden tusks (thunderbolts, lunar horns, and solar rays), puts forth such great strength in the darkness and the cloud, that he bursts through. . . ." (*op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 8, where this writer's interpretation is decidedly hazy).

The Vedic Maruts are generally wind figures, but sometimes they appear to be storm-clouds, for they are conceived as "wild-boars rushing about with iron [i.e., strong] tusks" (*Rig-Veda,* I, 88, 5, Max Muller's translation. Wilson has "iron weapons"). Conversely, the tusks of actual boars are called "lightning teeth (*dentes fulmineus*)" in one of the *Fables of Phaedrus* (I, xxi, 5); and Ovid in his *Metamorphoses* says that "the fierce boars have sharp lightning in their curved teeth" (X, 550; compare his *Ars Amat.,* II, 374 and *Fasti,* II, 232). In Elisha Cole's *English-Latin Dictionary* of 1677 we find: "A Boar's Tush: *Dens apri exertilis, fulmen*" (i.e., "A Boar's Tush is a protruding tooth of a boar, and lightning").

TLALOC
(Pictorial Ms. Florentine Bibliotheca Nazionale. From Seler, *Codex Vaticanus* B., p. 109.)

TLALOC in Conventionalized Form.
(*Codex Fejérváry-Mayer,* Sheet 4.)

One of the storm-cloud figures of Hindu mythology is the dark and reddish monkey (De Gubernatis, *op. cit.,* II, pp. 99-101); but the comparatively inconspicuous canines of this animal do not seem to have been lightning symbols. The storm-cloud monkey Hanumant (or Hanuman) is not given lightning teeth, but his name signifies "Large-jawed," as suggested by the roaring wind and the thunder; and in the *Ramayana* he is fabled to have been struck by the red thunderbolt of Indra, which caused him to fall upon a rock and break his jaw (IV, 66). Here we have the conquest of the storm-cloud figure by the lightning, with the breaking of his jaw to account for the cessation of his howling.

The Maya God B has a long, probosis-like nose; his symbols indicate that his abode is in the air, with the rain, the storm-clouds and the lightning, and he is often associated with the serpent, being pictured with a serpent's body in the Maya *Dresden Codex* (35 b, 36 a). Schellhas calls him "the God with the Large Nose and Lolling Tongue," and describes him with "a tongue (or teeth, fangs) hanging out in front, and at the side of the mouth" (Deities of Maya Manuscripts," p. 16). Spinden says of this god that his "mouth shows a flame-shaped tooth at the front, and frequently a somewhat similar object at the back" (*Study of Maya Art,* p. 63). In all probability his face is figured like that of the conventionalized serpent of Maya art, which has the tongue hanging from the back part of the mouth, and a curious bifurcated upper tooth protruding in front (see Spinden, *ibid.,* p. 40, fig. 30; p. 117, fig. 152, and compare God B in figs. 74 and 75, p. 63); and it is also probable that this "flame-shaped" tooth was originally the bifurcated tongue of the serpent, representing the forked lightning as the celestial counterpart of the split flame.

We saw above that one of the names of the Mexican fire-goddess is Quaxolotl ("split-at-the-top"); and in the Chaldean tablet of *Bel and the Dragon,* seven thunderbolts are employed by the solar Bel-Merodach against the storm-dragon, one "with double flames," as well as quadruple and septuple bolts (*Records of the Past,* Vol. IX, pp. 135-140). A forked lightning fiash was sometimes called a *bidental* ("two-toothed") in the new Latin of the Middle Ages (Du Cagne, *Glossarium,* s. v. *Bidental*); and in classical Latin a place struck by lightning is a *bidental,* probably having been so called originally from a bifurcated thunderbolt conceived as two-toothed (See the Andrews-Freud *Latin-English Lexicon,* s. v. *Bidental,* where this probability is noted as a possibility). But the sheep sacrificed at a *bidental* was called a *bidens* (earlier *duidens*) because it was required to be of the age (about two years old) when two of its lower anterior teeth are longer than the other six (Like all other ruminants except camels, sheep have no upper anteriors);

and this led some of the Romans to suppose that the place *bidental* was so called from the sheep, but no explanation was offered as to why such a sheep was chosen for this sacrifice. (See Festus, *De Verb. Signif.*, p. 27, who in another place, p. 5, explains the *bidens* sheep as one whose two rows of teeth are complete, although it really has no upper anteriors). Aulus Gellius (XVXI, 6) preserves several other unsatisfactory opinions on the subject, one of which is that of an unnamed lecturer, according to whom *bidentes* are sheep so called because they have only two teeth; and Pliny says that the she-goat has no upper teeth except the two front ones (*H. N.*, XI, 37), which erroneous statement regarding a ruminant may have been suggested by the recognition of the she-goat as a storm-cloud figure with two imaginary upper anterior teeth for the two-pronged thunderbolt—but it is possible that the animal was recognized by some as a lunar or luni-cosmic figure with two such teeth.



THE BIFURCATED TOOTH OF THE MAYA GOD B.

(a) from the *Dresden Codex;* (b) From the *Codex Tro-Cortesianus;* (c), the head of God B. in Conventionalized ornamentation. From Spinden *Maya Art*, p. 63, fig. 75.

The mythical dragon has always been the most popular of all storm figures. It is often conceived as a lizard-like or crocodilian monster, but the Greeks generally figured it as a gigantic serpent. It is sometimes conceived as fire-breathing, as suggested by the lightning; and sometimes has wings to indicate its celestial character.

A lost Phoenician myth of the slaying of the storm-dragon, and the knocking out of its lightning teeth by the sun-god, in all probability reappears in an altered form in connection with both Kadmos (Cadmus) and Jasōn in Greek mythology; the solar character of these heroes being generally recognized. There was probably no connection between the two Greek stories in the time of Euripides, who is our earliest authority for them (fifth century B. C.) In his *Phoenician Maidens* he makes the chorus of the tragedy refer to the story of Kadmus as well known at the time. According to this chorus, Kadmus came from Tyre in Phoenician to Boeotia in Greece to found the city of Thebes; counselled by Pallas (Minerva, goddess of wisdom), he succeeded in ploughing a field with a heifer which no one else could manage, and slew the dragon of Aries (Mars, god of war) by hurling a rock upon its head; apparently at the same time knocking out the monster's teeth, which he scattered in the ploughed furrows, whereupon "mail-clad warriors" sprang up from the teeth and proceeded to mutual slaughter, which a few survived (638-675). Further on in the tragedy, these warriors are called "the race of the seed of the teeth"; "a golden-helmed harvest of sown ones" and simply "the sown," and also "the dragon-brood that cleft the womb of earth" (820, 939, 1008). Euripides recognizes some of these warriors as the founders of Thebes and the ancestors of the Spartans; but this fanciful derivation of the Spartans (*Spartoi*) from the "sown" (*spartoi*) seems to be an element that originated with the Greeks, and the same may be said of the counsel of Pallas-Minerva as the goddess of wisdom.

In his *Medea* (478-482), Euripides alludes to the following details in the variant story of Jasōn: While on the Argonantic Expedition, and as counselled by Medea, Jasōn ploughed a field with fire-breathing bulls; slew the sleepless dragon that watched the (solar) Golden Fleece, and sowed "the fatal seed," the monster's teeth.

The two stories, as connected and developed by the later Greeks, are set forth at length by Apollodorus. He tells us that Kadmos (for the sun) was led to the site of Thebes by a cow (for the moon); that the dragon had slain most of those whom the Phoenician hero had sent to draw water from a spring, and that according to Pherecydes (fifth century B. C.), the hero threw stones among the "sown" warriors, who supposed they were pelting one another and therefore began the mutual slaughter, with five survivors[14] (*Bibliothēcē,* III, iv, 1). In connection with the Jasōn story, Apollodorus says that Aeëtes had received from Athena "half of the dragon's teeth which Kadmus sowed at Thebes" and promised the Golden Fleece to Jasōn on condition that he would plough with "the brazen-footed and fire-breathing bulls," and would sow the teeth; and according to the same authority, after the teeth were sown and the warriors sprang up, Jasōn pelted the latter with stones; they slew another, and Medea lulled the dragon to sleep with drugs; whereupon Jasōn obtained the Fleece (*ibid.,* I, ix, 23; compare Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonaut,* III, 407-421; Hyginus, *Fab.,* 178; Ovid, *Met.,* III, 26-130). Obviously the original story of Jasōn, in which he slew a dragon, was thus altered so he could be given half the teeth of the dragon slain by Kadmus.

There was a white mark representing the full moon on each flank of Jasōn's cow, according to Pausanias, (IX, XII, 1; cf. Hyginus, *Fab.,* 178); and we can scarcely doubt that the same lunar animal appears as the heifer with which Kadmus ploughed the furrows that in all probability originally represented the path of the moon (this heifer being replaced by bulls in the extant Jasōn myth). The plural "furrows" perhaps loosely refers to the path of the sun as well as that of the moon; for in south-western Asia the ecliptic (sun's path) was sometimes regarded as "the furrow of heaven," ploughed by the sun-god or by the Bull as the leading sign of the zodiac. (See R. Brown, *Prim. Constel.,* Vol. I, p. 338; R. H. Allen, *Star Names,* p. 1).

The number of the dragon's teeth in the myths under consideration is not stated by any ancient writer; but they probably were conceived as quite numerous, like the teeth of crocodiles or serpents. Nearly all serpents have two outer rows (one above and one below) and also palatal teeth in varying numbers and arrangements; and doubtless some of the ancients supposed that these creatures had three rows of teeth. Thus according to Ovid the dragon slain by Kadmos had three rows of teeth and three tongues (*Met.,* III, 34; Nikander long before (fifth century B. C.) had described the constellated Dragon with teeth "in three-fold rank" (*Theriaca,* 441); Statius (first century A. D.) gives three rows of "hooked teeth" and a three-fold tongue to the earth-born dragon sacred to the Thunderer and slain by Kapaneus (*Thebaidos,* V, 510); in Homer the monster Scylla has three rows of teeth in each of her six heads (*Odyssey,* XII, 90), and very curiously, the Chians said that Hercules had three rows of teeth, according to Pollux (*Onomasticon,* II, 95).

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[14] The survivors represent the five (hypothetical) houses of the ancient Spartan nobility of Thebes, according to F. G. Welcker (*Kret. Kol.* 78; compare T. Keightley, 1883, *Mythology of Ancient Greece,* p. 291).

But in the old French *Fais du Chevalier Jason* (translated and printed by Caxton as the *History of Jason,* circ. 1477), that hero is said to have torn twelve teeth from the dragon's mouth some little time after he had slain it; and when the teeth were sown, twelve giants sprang up (Reprint, 1913, p. 138). It is not improbable that these teeth were identified with the twelve varieties of thunderbolts recognized by the Etruscans, who allotted three of them to their chief god, Tinia (Seneca, *Quaest, Nat.,* II. 41). The Etruscans, followed by some of the Romans, also held that the lightning and thunder of the night were sent by Summanus, while Jupiter was the Thunderer of the day only (Pliny, *H. N.,* II, 53). The Hindus recognized two kinds of lightning, the moist and the dry (*Ramayana,* I, 39); and the ancient Japanese had eight gods of thunder who probably



GORGONES

(From Roscher's *Ausführiches Lexicon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie,* Vol. I, Col. 1716.)

belonged to the eight points of the compass (W. E. Griffis, 1895, *Religions of Japan,* p. 64).

The interpretations thus far suggested indicate that the celestial ploughing by the solar and lunar figures was not originally connected with the slaying of the storm-dragon whose lightning-teeth are knocked out at about the time of his death—properly before his death, which represents the termination of the storm. But in all probability the ploughing had been transferred to the earth in the original (Phoenician) myth of the dragon slain by Kadmos and by Jasōn (in connection with whom the Greeks finally gave the whole story a terrestrial setting), for the production of human beings from the dragon's teeth sown in the ploughed field evidently belongs on earth. Therefore, it is equally probable that the originals of the sown teeth should be sought among the terrestrial objects mistaken by the ancients for fallen thunderbolts, and there is a further probability that the first earth-born individuals of some race of human beings (perhaps the Phoenicians) were originally fabled to have been produced from these material tooth-thunderbolts, as plants are produced from seeds.

The ancients sometimes supposed that a fertilizing power subsisted in the lightning, as in the rain; and the earth-mother is inseminated by the lightning or a lightning symbol in some myths. (See the present writers "Cosmic Porthenogenesis," in the *Open Court,* Vol. XXXIV, p. 604). In the original myth of Cadmus (and that of Jason) the storm-dragon probably had the character of a heaven-father in association with the earth-mother, while the lightning-teeth as material thunderbolts represented the inseminating intermedia.[15]

Various stones resembling arrow-heads or spear-heads, and sometimes the actual heads of spears and arrows were anciently recognized as thunderbolts and called thunder-stones, thunder-darts, etc. And some such supposed thunderbolts probably were the original stones from which the first man and woman were produced in the myth of Deukaliōn and Pyrra, although these stones are identified as the bones of mother-earth (Apollodorus, I, vii, 2; Ovid, *Met.*, I, 260). But in the myth of Kadmos (and that of Jasōn) the sown teeth of the dragon doubtless resembled the numerous teeth of a serpent, and it is not improbable that they were actually some of the cigar-shaped fossils now technically termed belemnites ("dart-ites"), but sometimes popularly known as thunderbolts and thunder-stones. These fossils are the internal shells or solid skeletons of extinct molluscs, three hundred and fifty species of which are found in world-wide distribution. They were first termed belemnites by Agricola in 1546, and first considered at length by Ducrotay de Blainville in 1827 (*Mémoire sur les Belemnites*). Some of them are quite large, as long as eight inches, and some are comparatively slender, slightly curved and pointed, much like the teeth of serpents (See especially K. A. von Zittel, 1900, *Text-book of Palaeontology,* Vol. I, pp. 594-598, with numerous illustrations.[16]

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[15] Spencer and Gillen, in their *Native Tribes of Central Australia,* tell us that the knocking out of human teeth was practiced by the Arunta tribe immediately after a ceremony for "the making of rain"; while in the Warramunza tribe, teeth were knocked out at the close of the wet season to prevent the fall of more rain, and always on the bank of a water hole, into which the teeth were thrown (pp. 451, 592-594). Frazer cannot imagine why such tooth extraction was associated with stopping rain (*Magic Art,* pp. 97-99).



BELEMNITES IN THE FORM OF SERPENT'S TEETH.
(From K. A. Von Zittel, *Text-Book of Palaeontology,* Vol. I, p. 597, Fig. 1241.)

Jane E. Harrison (1912, *Themis,* p. 435) supposes that a snake was the blazon on the Spartans; and that the teeth of the snake or dragon in the Kadmos myth were symbols of reincarnation, because they are "practically indestructible," and perhaps also because they look like "gleaming white seed-corn" (but Indian corn or maize was unknown to the Phoenicians and Greeks, and there is little resemblance between wheat seeds and teeth of any kind).

Leo Kanner has an article on "The Tooth as a Folkloristic Symbol" in the *Psychoanalytic Review* (Jan. 1928, Vol. XV, pp. 37-52), in which he accepts Sigmund Freud's interpretation of teeth as phallic symbols, especially in dreams; and Kanner goes to the surprising extreme of recognizing the same symbolism wherever teeth are found in folklore and in the customs of savages, as well as in the Kadmos myth (the only dental myth he considers). But it does not appear that Freud or any Freudian has recorded any dream in support of this symbolism theory (see the tooth dreams in Freud's *Introduction to Psychoanalysis,* edition 1920, pp. 74 and 157, comp. pp. 129, 136); and Kanner fails to give any convincing evidence in its favor, in connection with dreams or otherwise. On the contrary, the dragon's teeth in the Kadmos myth are also accepted by Kanner as symbols of the inseminating intermedia associated with a heaven-father and an earth-mother; two quite different and mutually-contradictory interpretations of the teeth thus being presented.

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[16] Among the various unsatisfactory interpretations of the sown teeth of the dragon heretofore suggested, we have space to notice only two of the most recent.

POE AND EINSTEIN

BY GEORGE NORDSTEDT

"IT has been the hard fortune of Edgar Allan Poe," wrote William Hand Browne in 1869, "that he has not only been most persistently and unscrupulously maligned by his enemies, but that he has (in our opinion) been but imperfectly estimated by his friends. All who write in his praise reserve their warmest admiration for his poetic genius; and it is possible that he himself may have considered this his greatest gift. And yet there are two faculties which he possessed in more singular perfection than the poetic faculty, be our estimate of his poetry what it may. These are the power of expressing his thoughts however involved, subtle or profound, with such precision, such lucidity, and withal with such simplicity of style, that we hardly know where to look for his equal: certainly nowhere among American writers. And this probably had its origin in his second gift: in the keen, clear, swift analytical power of his thought, combined—which is a rarity—with a wast comprehensive grasp of generalities."

Having thus maintained that Poe also in a remarkable excellence possessed the scientific mind, Browne goes on to show that the poet in *Eureka* had "anticipated some of the latest and most important results of scientific investigation." When for example Dr. Winslow in *Force and Nature* (1867) discards the theory of an ether as untenable, and conceives repulsive as well as attractive forces to be interacting throughout the universe, believing himself to be "laying the corner stone of a new philosophy," he was actually rediscovering the land Poe had touched upon years before. M. Hirn's views in his essay *Consequences philosophiques et metaphysiques de la Thermodynamiques* (1868) also, according to Browne, coincides very remarkably in at least one point with those of Poe. Hirn repudiated the hypothetical ether, maintaining the absolute existence of three principles—matter, force, and spirit. He replaced the ether with pure force (dynamics), in which force the atoms exist. "In no sense," says Hirn, "can this intermediate principle be confounded with what has hitherto been called ether. . . The intermediate element constitutes *force* itself."

Poe's view of this primary repulsive force is precisely the same. "It will be remembered," he writes, "that I have mysIf assumed what we may term an 'ether.' I have spoken of a subtle influence which we know to be ever in attendance upon matter, although becoming manifest only through matter's heterogeneity. To this influence . . . I have referred the various phenomena of electricity, heat, light, magnetism; and, more, of vitality, consciousness, and thought—in a word, of spirituality. It will be seen at once, then, that the ether thus conceived is radically distinct from the ether of the astronomers, inasmuch as theirs is matter and mine is not."

Now, as Poe wrote *Eureka* in 1848, the year before his death, his anticipation of some of Winslow's and Hirn's ideas (of whose importance Browne had an exaggerated notion) stands clear. Of course, it is not a question here as to the truth of either Poe's speculations or those of Winslow and Hirn.

"This—all this—was in the olden Time, long ago,"

might be said of Browne's paper: for although only some five decades have elapsed since his observations, more progress has been made in the natural sciences and philosophy during that short period than from the time of Aristotle to Faraday. Browne could not possible be sufficiently acquainted with, understand or anticipate the discoveries and theories of such investigators and mathematicians as Gauss, Riemann, Bohr, Planck, Minkowski, Maxwell, Millikan, Rutherford, Arrhenius, Curie, Moseley, Einstein, and others. Consequently Browne did not touch upon all the ideas Poe propounds in *Eureka*, the scientific knowledge of the day limiting his analysis and understanding of the poet's work. For though Poe, to be sure, never even dreamed of protons and electrons (holding, however, that the atom might be divisible), he certainly anticipated some of the discoveries of the new physics, particularly several of Einstein's ideas as to the extent and shape of the universe. It must not be taken, however, that Poe in any way anticipated the Theory of Relativity.

"Attraction and repulsion," says Poe, "being undeniable the sole properties by which matter is manifested to mind, we are justified of assuming that matter exists only as attraction and repulsion; in other words, that attraction and repulsion are matter, there being no conceivable case in which we may not employ the term 'matter' and the term 'attraction' and 'repulsion' taken together as equivalent, and therefore convertible, expressions of logic."

In *Einstein and the Universe* Charles Nordman writes:

"All this [the result of modern research] irresistible compels us to think that the inertia of the various component parts of atoms—that is to say, of all matter—is exclusively electromagnetic in origin. There is now no matter. There is only electrical energy, which, by the reaction of the surrounding medium upon it, leads us to the fallacious belief in the existence of this substantial and massive something which hundreds of generations have been wont to call 'matter.' And from all this it also follows. . . . that mass and energy are the same thing, or at least the two different sides of one and the same coin. There is, then, no longer a material mass: there is nothing but energy in the external universe. A strange—in a sense, an almost spiritual—turn for modern physics to take!"

This strange turn of modern physics Poe anticipated, and he explains how. Speaking of Kepler's three laws, Poe writes: "Yes! these vital laws Kepler guessed; that is to say, he imagined them. Had he been asked to point out either the deductive or inductive route by which he attained them, his reply might have been, 'I know nothing about routes, but I do know the machinery of the universe. Here it is, I grasped it with my soul; I reached it by mere dint of intuition'."

Likewise did Poe intuitively grasp what has only recently been revealed by modern investigators. In this connection it is interesting to note that Einstein himself intuitively felt the truth of his theory ere he succeeded in giving it mathematical expression. In a conversation with Moszkowski, Einstein—emphasizing the importance of invention, and that discovery is not a creative act—continued: "It is not true that this fundamental principle of relativity occured to me as a primary thought. If this had been so perhaps it would be justifiable to call it a 'discovery.' But the suddenness with which you assume it to have occured to me must be denied.

Actually I was led to it by steps arising from the individual laws derived from experience. . . . Invention occurs here as a constructive act. This does not, therefore, constitute what is essentially original in the matter, but the creation of a method of thought to arrive at a logically coherent system. The really valuable factor is intuition."

Einstein here has the same view of intuition as Poe, holding furthermore that Goethe in spite of his non-mathematical mind yet "possessed a peculiar [poetic] form of intuition, by which he obtained a clearer vision than many an exact investigator. . . ."

"All great achievements of science," says Einstein, "start from intuitive knowledge, namely, in axioms, from which deductions then are made. It is possible to arrive at such axioms only if we gain a true survey of thought-complexes that are not yet logically ordered; so that, in general, intuition is the necessary condition of the discovering of such axioms. And it cannot be denied that, in the great majority of minds with a mathematical tendency, this intuition exhibits itself as a characteristic of their creative power."

Neither can it be denied that Poe in a high degree possessed not only the poetic but also the mathematical intuition, which explains *Eureka,* perhaps the boldest speculation conceived by the brain of man before Einstein.

Although the Theory of Relativity might be said to have won out, at least in physics, it still has to overcome the prejudice of thousands of scientists who are unable to grasp Einstein's tremendous generalizations. And—defending some of his not as yet verified deductions—Einstein might this very day, without hardly changing a word, copy the following extract from a letter written by Poe in Feb. 1848 to Geo. E. Isbell: ". . . One thing is certain, that the objection of merely scientific men—men, I mean, who cultivate the physical sciences to the exclusion, in a greater or less degree, of the mathematics, of metaphysics and logic—are generally invalid except in respect to scientific *details.* Of all persons in the world, they are at the same time the most bigoted and the least capable of using, generalizing or deciding upon the facts which they bring to light in the course of their experiments. And these are the men who chiefly write the criticism against all efforts of generalization—denouncing these efforts as 'speculative' and 'theoretical'."

Einstein, however, does not care much for the opinions of "mere scientific men." Many of the world's greatest physicists are on his side, Weyl holding the Theory of Relativity to be "one of the most forceful testimonies of the power of speculative thinking."

As to Poe's and Einstein's ideas of the Cosmos, the most striking coincidence lies in the fact that both view the universe as being of limited extent and of a closed spherical shape. Poe ridiculed the idea of an unlimited distribution of matter, arguing: "Were the universe of stars (contradistinguished from the universe of space) unlimited, no worlds could exist. . . ." And so Poe conceives of a limited spherical universe of material bodies, all tending to concentrate into one "Unity," and thereupon immediately disappear as matter (*attraction* and *repulsion* having annulled one the other and vanished), provided the latter is not at once by "Divine violation" again diffused into a spherical space in the form of atoms, as it in Poe's opinion originally was diffused, and so on forever.

Einstein, of course, does not speculate about alternate eras of repulsion and attraction. His limited and yet endless universe he pictures as somewhat like the surface of a sphere, returning upon itself. "A sphere is necessarily limited," says Poe; but it is also necessarily endless, in the sense that starting out from a given point one will, of course, get back to the starting point but never reach an end. Poe imagined this spherical universe to be of so "inconceivable an extent as to be only not infinite." Explaining Einstein's views Moszkowski writes in this connection: "We have to imagine that our solid bodies, say stars, arrive at a point in their travels which we may term only 'enormously distant.' If we call the direction right and left instead of positive and negative, then the process reduces itself to this: the moving body reaches the point, which is enormously distant on the right, and which is identical with the point enormously distant on the left; this means that the body never moves out of the space continuum of this world, but returns to its initial point of departure even when it moves ever onward in what is apparently a straight line. It moves in a 'warped' space.

The magnitude of this spherical universe is wholly inconceivable, and "only not infinite," as Poe expressed it.

"It is possible," says Einstein, "that other universes exist independent of our own." As to such a probability Poe writes:

"Have we, or have we not, an analogical right to the interference that this preceptible universe, that this cluster of clusters, is but one of a series of clusters, the rest of which are invisible through distance, through the diffusion of light being so excessive, ere it reaches us, as not to produce upon our retinas a light-impression, or from there being no such emanation as light at all, in these unspeakable distant worlds, or, lastly, from the mere interval being so vast that the electric tidings of their presence in space have not yet through the lapsing myriad of years, been enabled to traverse that interval? . . . . I myself feel impelled to fancy. . . . that there does exist a limitless succession of universes, more or less similar to that of which we have cognizance, to that of which we alone shall ever have cognizance. . . . If such clusters of clusters exist—and they do—it is abundantly clear that, having had no part in our origin, they have no portion of our laws. They neither attract us, nor we them. Their material, their spirit is not ours, is not that which obtains in any part of our universe."

This is precisely Einstein's position, and as to the impossibility of ever gaining knowledge of presumably independently of our own existing universes, Einstein has this to say: ". . . It is possible, in fact, to a certain degree probable, that we shall by means of astronomy discover new worlds far beyond the limits of the region so far investigated, but no discovery can ever lead us beyond the continuum described above [the closed universe]. . . . Thus we must reckon with the finitude of our universe, and the question of regions beyond it cannot be discussed further, for it leads only to imaginary possibilities for which science has not the slightest use."

Poe, it is true, had no conception whatever of the "warped" or curvilinear nature of space—a space in which light itself must eventually return to its starting point or source, the consequence of which is that our universe is optically isolated from other supposedly existing universes—but he comes very near it when he speaks of the possibility of "there being no such emanation as light at all in [from] these unspeakable distant worlds—comes very close to the idea that light also is a prisoner in our spherical universe, and, so far as analogy holds, in all. Criticising the conclusion of Mädler, who claimed to have ascertained a curvature in our solar system's progress through space, Poe, while admitting there must be a curvature, says: "It would scarcely be paradoxical to say that a flash of lightning itself, travelling forever upon the circumference of this unutterable circle, would still forever be travelling in a straight line. That the path of our sun in such an orbit would, to any human perception, deviate in the slightest degree from a straight line, even in a million years, is a proposition not to be entertained; yet we are required to believe that a curvature has become apparent during the brief period of our astronomical history—during a mere point—during the utter nothingness of two or three thousand years."

In above strictly scientific observation Poe unconsciously makes his nearest approach to Einstein's curvilinear closed four-dimensional continuum. As to the impossibility of ever becoming aware of the existence of other universes there is complete agreement between Poe and Einstein.

To what extent are Poe's ideas independent of the scientific and philosophical knowledge of his day? Writing in 1884, George Woodberry* proved—at least to his own satisfaction—that Poe's essay is but a composite echo of the theories of Hershel, Boscovitch, Faraday, and Laplace. If so, then it must be equally true that Einstein's Theory of Relativity is but an echo of the theories of Newton, Gauss, Riemann, Minkowski, Lorenz, and others.

Woodberry speaks of "the density of Poe's ignorance," ridiculing the poet's conception of space as "not created but given"—another of Poe's pre-Einstein notions, for according to the Relativity Theory, "the universe of space and the material or stellar universe are one and the same thing, because there is no space without matter or energy." That is to say, if matter (energy) exist, space is *given.*

"I can only say that no gentleman can accuse me of the disengeniousness here implied," wrote Poe in answer to a critic, a "Theological student," who had asserted that *Eureka* was nothing but Laplace over again, "inasmuch as, having proceeded with my theory to that point at which Laplace's meets it, I then give Laplace's theory in full, with the expression of my firm conviction of its absolute truth at all points. . . . In fact, no point of my theory has even been as much as alluded to by Laplace."

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* Professor Woodberry died a couple of months ago, ripe of age and wisdom. It would be interesting to know if the old gentleman, hearing of Einstein, maybe felt a little uneasy about his own conventional and puerile criticism of *Eureka.*

"What I here propound," says Poe of *Eureka,* "is true: therefore it cannot die; or, if by any means it be now trodden down so that it die, it will rise again to Life Everlasting. . . . Nevertheless it is as a poem only that I wish this work to be judged after I am dead."

Poe's Work has been trodden down and forgotten from the very first, and many an "exact" scientist is fully convinced that Einstein's theories ere long will be even worse off. *Eureka* may never "rise to Life Everlasting," but Poe's intuitive glimpses cannot die, provided the new physics and Einstein himself are not overthrown in the future.

Even then *Eureka* will always be a splendid *poem.*

WILL SKEPTICISM TREND TOWARDS EPICUREANISM?

BY JOHN HEINTZ

BIOLOGY teaches us that man, in common with the rest of the animate world, finds it necessary, in order to survive, to adapt himself to his physical environment. But there is another adaptation that man makes to his world, which he does not share with the lower orders of creation, which constitutes an adjustment problem peculiar to man and which springs from his superior mental endowment. It has been rightly called the urge of man to relate himself to life and his ultimate destiny.

The study of anthropology reveals no race so low in the scale of civilization but what this problem has presented itself and has been dealt with in some manner, however crude. Animism, ancestor worship, wooden idols, sacred animals and mountains, totem-poles, the great religions and philosophies all testify to the effort on the part of humanity to adjust itself to its immediate condition and ultimate destiny. All along the line of man's evolution from a lower to a higher civilization there is revealed the phenomenon that he has been impelled by his reasoning faculty to answer the questions, in one way or another, which the universe aroused in his mind.

Now if we consider this apparent need on the part of humanity for bringing itself into some sort of harmonious relationship with the world in connection with the steady increase of religious skepticism, it forces one to the inescapable conclusion that there must be great numbers of persons who are at present engaged in the process of adjusting themselves to a changed viewpoint. The dissolution of the ancestral order, to use Walter Lippmann's phrase, has brought innumerable persons face to face with a readjustment problem; it has created the need for an attitude consistent with newer convictions. Faced, then, by the certainty of a gradually accelerating growth of skepticism and by the consequent necessity for adjusting themselves to a changed order of things on the part of an ever-increasing number of persons, can we predict, with any degree of certainty, just what direction this adjustment movement will take? By what intellectual form it will express itself?

But first it will be well for us to understand that in the realm of morals things do not just happen. Moral history is not merely a chronological series of events. It is a continuous chain of cause and effect. That there is a sufficient reason back of every leaf that stirs is not more certain than that every circumstance in moral history has been the inescapable effect of contributing causes. We read with incredulity about the fastings, scourgings, macerations, self-inflicted penalties and unheard of practises which were indulged in during the ascetic period of Christianity. Surely here is something so grotesque and unusual that it creates the appearance of spontaneity, but one may start with hard, practical, skeptical Roman Stoicism and trace, step by step, the gradual modifications of thought which led to that frenzied religious period.

As with the past, so with today. Cause and effect is ceaselessly at work. And while, owing to the speculative nature of thought, the inadequacy of knowledge, and the numerous historical accidents which intervened between the two periods, it would have been impossible for a Stoical philosopher to have foreseen the ascetic period of Christianity, we today, because science has given us a real conception of our world, because knowledge is more certain and diffused, and also because our machine civilization possesses a more enduring quality than did those of the warring nations of antiquity, may analyze and forecast the developments in society with a fair degree of accuracy. I believe the key to the trend of skepticism is to be found in its reaction to three fundamental problems which confront every individual—virtue, death and the meaning of life. Analyzing these three problems in the order named I shall endeavor to show that the reaction of skepticism to them must necessarily be an Epicurean one.

It appears to me that a thoroughly logical skepticism cannot go beyond utility in its search for moral sanction. Once it abandons, in its reaction to virtue, the ideas that moral sanction is derived from on high and that the moral nature of man is of divine origin, utility becomes their only explanation. It is quite true that skeptics may love certain moral ideas for their intrinsic worth. They may also recognise fully the supremacy and authority of conscience and possess a Stoical regard for virtuous actions carrying them out without regard for the effect upon themselves. Their sense of justice may be keen. Their emotional feelings may be sensitively fine and pure. Nevertheless, if they are logical skeptics they cannot regard such moral conceptions as being intuitive, originally innate, or dogmatically authorized, but must esteem them to be but a crystallized heritage from a remote past during which foretime they originated in response to utility but became metamorphosed, by an association of ideas, from but a means to happiness to an end justifying their own existence.

Skepticism, therefore, inasmuch as its reaction to the question of virtue compels it to analyze moral notions, and because it has dispensed with dogmatic authority and cannot unquestioningly accept inherited moral conceptions, must depend for its acceptance of them upon their utility. In other words, virtues, under skepticism, will be raised to the position of supreme arbiter in the field of morals, thus transferring the authority for them from a source without to one within. That reason may prove to be fallible in its findings and that some disagreement may ensue is not germane to the argument the point of which is that skepticism, driven by the logic of its position to dissociate moral ideas from the mass of superstitious and traditional elements that have entwined around them, distrustful of dogmatic authority and mindful of the fluctuations of moral history, will be compelled to depend on reason for a guide and utility for its criterion in defining what constitutes virtue. In such an attempt to place morals on a rational basis skepticism will be using a similar method to that which was used in the early days of the human race when ethics and theology were separate and distinct things; when the test of morals was how they worked in the everyday affairs of life. Thus skepticism, in its search for moral justification, simply cannot escape the Epicurean viewpoint which is that virtue has no value in itself; its sole justification consisting in its being a means for the promotion of happiness, or in other words, in its utility.

With regard to the problem of death the inescapable reaction to it on the part of skepticism appears to have been completely stated in Epicureanism. Boiled down to its essentials that philosophy affirmed that death cannot be felt. When we are dead we are just the same as if we had never been born. Therefore the only time death can injure us is when we allow ourselves to think of it. It is inevitable and worrying about it cannot make it otherwise and deprives us, for the time being, of pleasure which is the real end of existence. Thus, he who is truly wise will banish all thought of it out of his mind.

Present-day skepticism can be contrasted with its predecessors of antiquity on account of the wide scope of knowledge which has been placed at its disposal. Science and scholarship have examined into records and records left by the past and the result has been to entirely disprove all the revelations and prophecies and promises of the revealed religions. Up to the present time no acceptable proof has been presented which justifies a belief in a future existence for man. Confronted by such facts what is there left for skepticism to do but to resign itself to the possibility of annihilation and accept the thoroughly sensible and applicable adjustment to such a situation as is taught by Epicureanism?

Will skepticism accept the Epicurean viewpoint regarding the meaning of life?

Probably the most depressing thought that can come to anyone is that all the struggling and achieving of humanity, the everpressing onward to greater heights, will eventually be canceled by its annihilation. The mental image of this earth spinning through space a barren planet, utterly devoid of life, not only depicts a tragedy more despairingly poignant than any that blacken the pages of history but impresses the mind with the utter futility and purposelessness of the operations of nature considered in their entirety. However, against this gloomy background is the fact that one may extract, in a single span of human existence, a certain amount of pleasure, and in a world created by a fortuitous combination of chemical substances, in which no purpose, no reason for its creation can be discovered, in which no divine plan is discernable, and in which the true meaning of life must therefore be reasoned out, pleasure irresistibly presents itself as that which best serves the ends of existence. One world at a time must be the motto of a consistent skepticism. This being the case the immediate end of life are the logical goal of our efforts and there can be no question, I think, but that they are best served by hedonism (I am using the term broadly, in its true Epicurean sense, which differs greatly from the more constricted use of it in the modern sexy novel) for not only is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, in the broadest and best sense of these words, absolutely in conformance with human nature, and therefore a legitimate aim, but they surely constitute the most sensible reason that skepticism will be able to give, outside the struggle for survival, for the justification of everyday human activities.

Now if all this reasoning is logical and sound, in proportion as skepticism spreads through society there will develop a moral movement whose trend will incline toward, and approximate, at least, the views which Epicurus expounded to his disciples in his garden at Athens. This result, of course, will not be accomplished by deliberately attempting to foster such views upon society but will be brought about by a development inherent within skepticism itself. Science has given us positive assurance that we live in the sort of a world which Epicurus sensed, despite the imperfections of his knowledge, and his philosophy, inasmuch as it was the logical reaction of a practical mind to that kind of a universe, inevitably stated the case for straight thinking along purely naturalistic lines for all time. It attempted to relate man to a rational world, one free from superstition and supernatural intervention, which is exactly the problem that faces skepticism today.

Admittedly this Epicurean reaction to the problems of virtue, death and the meaning of life may not prove to be competent to solve all of the difficulties which grow out of the modern complexity of society. The mere fact that a man comes to regard virtue as being resolved out of utility does not necessarily make him more moral than when he regarded it as being dogmatically authorized. Walter Lippmann points out in his latest book that the danger in hedonism is due to the yielding to immature desires and that the salvation of morals in an unbelieving world depends upon a disinterested type of character in business, government and sexual relations which the demands of our complex machine civilization is bringing into existence; a sort of Stoical type which is destined to justify the wisdom of the sages and the insight of high religion.

All of which is very likely true. In which case history appears destined to repeat itself and the future skeptical society may conceivably witness Epicureanism and Stoicism developing side by side, except that where they were rivals in the ancient Roman state, in the modern one they will complement each other. Unless skepticism dispenses with logic altogether the future society will be basically and fundamentally Epicurean because that philosophy is the inevitable reaction to the place of man in nature as science has revealed it to us. If Stoicism plays a role at all it will be that of a complementary one. Supplying what Epicureanism fails to supply it will grow out of a need of modern complex machine society just as it grew out of the need for patriotism in the militaristic Roman state. Rather than a philosophy, with certain tenets to expound, it will furnish the religious motive in an age of skepticism.

THE WORLD

An Effort of Comprehension

OSKAR EMIL

IT takes indeed all sorts of people to make the world. As a department store carrying a diversity of goods so is the world a storehouse of our total variety of knowledge, of facts and explanations, often incoherent and conflicting. The presentation of all this variety is a task of all life, so what a man knows about it is very little and very abstract, while even the most complete encyclopaedias are bound to ignore vastly more than they include. To comprehend the world in a short article is therefore possible only by a most extreme abstraction. However, it pays at times to give such an account for what is in the world, for better management of life, just as a department store does in order to meet and promote its business.

The world is all that exists whether we know it or not. Only a *part* of it is human *experience,* and only a *part* of this is known in *facts.* Of these some are not known beyond the person to whose experience they belong, while some are known indirectly through signs, language and memory,—we know about them. Strictly speaking *all facts are subjective, though an indirect fact is in a way objective to our knowledge about it;* objective used in this way is practically the same as meaning. We refer in the same manner from fact to experience and existence never known as fact, but only as a supposition of what is. In both cases it is clear that any objective world conceived is based on the subjective facts in mind. That two or more persons have the same kind of facts cannot alter the *fundamental subjectivity* any more than repetition of a fact in the same mind, but such *psychic agreement,* naturally emphasizes it both directly and indirectly, increasing both its subjective and objective importance. We are most apt to believe that the most common facts are most real, not only in mind but also to the extent that we objectify them beyond; while where such psychic agreement is lacking we are more or less in doubt. When a person has a sensation, a thought, a feeling, which nobody else under any circumstances has, we call him mad, suffering from hallucinations, etc. He may have it repeatedly and consider it most real, but we don't, because we lack it. On the other hand we do not consider a blind man as authority about the reality of our visible world. Fundamentally the world which we know and know about is therefore founded on the psychic phenomenon which we call a fact, and next on psychic agreement of one fact with another. This agreement is indicated by its *degree* of comparative identity, by its personal frequency, and by its popularity. For these reasons *mathematics* are of such fundamental importance in our understanding of the world. And it will also be seen that the degree of agreement is relative, ranging from two to infinite. Far from being absolutely real the so-called objective world is a mathematical function of subjective psychic agreement; and far from being exact it is a matter of convention, depending on who and how many are giving the measure. It is also far from being complete, because even in the case of all life together it excludes what we do not know, and within its grand total there are many mutually exclusive worlds. Nevertheless, we find a *normal* world based on great averages containing the most important facts of life. *The material universe* is undoubtedly a predominant construction in such a world, based on normal sensations and thoughts developed by scientific means and methods. But this common sense and scientific creation of the world suffers after all from all the above mentioned weaknesses. Quite artifically, for instance, it excludes all feeling and human interest, and all the forceful facts of life in that connection. The material world is therefore not the world we live in but only perhaps a part of this. It does not cover even the normal facts of life, far less the abnormal, human experience beyond knowledge or existence at large; so we must deny it the worldwide authority it has been trying to assume. As a matter of scientific democracy ruled by a majority of mind it may be a powerful conception, but it has not a priori validity and its laws are subject to other facts.[1] It is really not scientific to treat emotion and thought as negligible, unreal, half-values, as faded and frothy sensations, as fancy values in contrast to the real it of matter. This fallacy is making the world of life too narrow and is leading to mistakes which may be fatal, through opinion, conviction, attitude, and action. Much degeneration of modern life is based on such popular science.

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[1] Compare my statement in *The Journal* p. 100, 1929: "That what we think is in existence must agree with what we know is in experience."

It is of the greatest importance to render a truer account of the world we live in, than rendered by what a special scientific group senses, thinks of or pays attention to. We must therefore *count with all facts and find the essentials in which they agree, and then draw our conclusions and make our suppositions about what exists beyond our accumulated knowledge.* We may agree upon that *facts are* personal experience registered in the knowing mind, they stick to a person as his skin, as Schopenhauer said. Facts are but passing knowledge, temporary and local signs of life. Whatsoever they say they tell us about some thing we do not know, and while most of the world is unknown we are trying to live by what we know, an effort the success of which can be tested only by further living and later facts. We interfere with existence by our knowledge, but unless this fits existence and foster life it will be a science in vain. This fundamental if of all science is a weakness of the human mind; *we are,* as it were, *only experiments in living,* and what we know about existence is bound to be hypothetical. Beyond explaining one fact by means of the rest we get to a point where we must try to explain the origin of any fact, whatsoever its content. *Why is a fact* at all? Not only because it exists as indicated by its content, for facts remain when this disappears. We find that a naive acceptance of the reality of the fact at its face value, does not explain the changing content of knowledge. Instead of identifying a fact with its content, we are therefore led to think that it indicates a reality beyond itself with which it is connected and to which it corresponds; in other words we are forced to admit that beside what we know there is also something that we do not know. Discarding the theory of identity we admit not only a difference between a fact and a non-fact, but find it most probable that a fact instead of being self-made, developed from nothing, is owing its existence to something which we do not know, a non-fact better called a factor. In making this supposition we necessarily try to describe or explain it by other facts, by what we know. Thus we find the factors presented in terms of facts, and easily confused with these. One theory forgetting the essential difference makes it appear that one fact is caused by other facts, which is about as impossible as a moving picture being caused by another. We may all agree that there is a continuity and connection between facts, but we can not admit that one fact is sufficiently explained by any or all other; even in the most microscopic and minutely presented succession there is a missing link, which makes it impossible to determine one fact from what we know. There is always an unknown factor, a guess coming. In some cases this guess allows a free play of imagination while in cases of systematic science, for instance the theories of mechanics and even of evolution the explanations fit almost to perfection. However the finest minds in all cases still leave room for doubt. Whether we consider a fact caused by other facts or by specific factors only indicated by the specific facts, we are bound to explain it by at least two or more different elements: whatever we think most fitting and the remaining x. One fact cannot lead to another without this link which is the most essential factor of mind. It is also proper to consider this same element not only as a connecting link between the facts, but as the common and necessary factor in any and all facts, whatsoever its specific content and cause. According to this theory a fact appears when and where this *vital factor* is combined with certain specific factors, as a mental constellation. The *general* factor of mind must be supposed as a common quality of variable quantity in order to explain the different strength, volume, span, vividness, intensity, extensity, etc., of the facts. This understanding still leaves room for discussion of the *particular factors*: are they identical with the content of the fact but for this mental differential? Or is there no more likeness or comparison between a fact and its factors than between a sign on the road and the town it indicates, or between a word and the thing it suggests? Is it a question of coexistence and coincidence and not of quality or form. We are inclined to answer this according to the particular facts, supposing things more or less like sensations, but making little or no comparative background for thought or emotional facts. Even a thing is far from the sensations and thoughts from which it is constructed, and is rather a mental drawing, a construction, a picture with a purpose of explanation, rather than being something beyond mind. As all other facts it is *a sign of life* and of importance to life,—a sign *registering the* *vital position and disposition of man.* That is the main feature of the world in which we are interested.

We are talking about the world we don't know in the language of facts we know; these supply our information about the world we live in and the position we are in. To exclude sentimental and intellectual words from this talk would be to tell less than we know. From studying this language we may assume that only a limited vital factor is available through a person under the particular conditions. A person is a fluctuating concentration of vitality developing facts according to disposition and position. Facts are personal signs in the course of life, and mean much to us but may be rather insignificant in the world at large, they may mean little beyond. Even the stars may not exist beyond our frame of life, though we have reason to believe that if nothing like stars exists without us anyhow there is something indicated thereby, whatsoever that is in itself. After all, stars or no stars, their value is *as directives of life:* not their absolute character but their consequences as measured in life is what counts. Matter may not exist beyond our imagination, it was a factor fit to figure with in mind, but so is any factor fit to explain our sentiments and thoughts; neither may be ignored without more or less serious detriment to life. Material values may be more substantial but not necessarily more essential than the spiritual. The main meaning of the world we learn in facts is after all, life, and still more life. It is not the particular content but *the vital content of a fact* which makes it interesting to us. We must learn to emphasize this general factor and gauge it by scientific means and try to increase the personal vitality, instead of losing ourselves in the particular contents of a fact. With a proper *strategy of life* we may then even succeed in surviving the stars.

PRAYER

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID

At one with love and consummate release
Of sordid wish, with essence infinite
In voiceless touch, whence creature needs invite
But simple exaltation in soul peace.

Petition mute and formless of demand,
A sense conceived of thankfulness supreme,
Or humble craving, taught of wordless theme,
A pardon for some wayward trick of hand.

An urge of soul, untrained of priestly lore,
Specific in no mortal want's desires,
Sensed only as the spirit's life requires
Sweet unction some lost balance to restore.

Prayer's temple raised within no housing drear,
No walls confine its beatific close
No forms of rote their ritualed text impose,
The peace of freedom marks its atmosphere.

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

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I. LEIF ERIKSON OF THE SAGAS

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST

NOTE: The main points in this study of Leif Erikson are as dictated by The Honorable Rasmus B. Anderson, L.L.D., and he has approved whatever additions have been made to his material, so this may stand as his final word on the subject. But for his eighty-three years and his many other activities he might even have undertaken the writing. His unified view of this subject and its ramifications makes his contribution of great value for future historians working in this field as well as for the general reader, as, also, does his great sum of knowledge, accumulated during the many years during which he has followed the subject closely. In the Sixties and early Seventies of the past Century he was lecturing on Leif Erikson and was able to enlist such men as Ole Bull and Longfellow for him, so giving the Norse Discoverer much of the strong emotional appeal that he has in America. From those days, when Dr. Anderson visited Norway twice with Ole Bull and as his guest, through the twenty-five years of his service as Professor of Scandinavian Language and Literature in the University of Wisconsin and the four years of his service of the United States as Minister to Denmark, he has known, often personally, the Scandinavian scholars who have written on Leif Erikson whose theories appear in this paper.

C. S. H.

WHEN Leif Erikson sailed his viking ship into the West and landed in America, in the year 1000, he regarded his discovery of this new land as an incident, for he was on a journey to Greenland to visit his father and his brothers and to execute a commission, or, to be exact, a Mission, entrusted to him by King Olaf Trigvason of Norway, the same King Olaf whom Longfellow's Saga shows building the Long Serpent and converting his Berserks to Christianity by a masterful threat with his sword:

Then King Olaf raised the hilt
Of iron, cross-shaped and gilt,
  And said, "Do not refuse;
Count well the gain and the loss,
Thor's hammer or Christ's Cross:
  Choose!"

The important Mission which Leif Erikson was executing for King Olaf in the year 1000 was nothing less than the conversion of the people in Greenland to Christianity, and, like King Olaf, he had become a very ardent Christian; in fact, these two were united by bonds closer than those of blood, for Leif Erikson was King Olaf's son in the new faith—it was the King who had converted him and led him to the font where he received baptism.

And no person could have appreciated better than King Olaf the value that this young convert of his might be to the Christian cause, for Leif Erikson was an Icelander and sailed with his own company of shipmates in his own ship. He was, moreover, the son of that super-Icelander, Erik the Red, who had planted the successful colony in Greenland in 984 and was still living there in Brattelid, the homestead he had built. At that time, Iceland and Greenland were both republics, politically, peopled by those independent families who had been too high in spirit to submit to the kings when they established their rule in Norway. They had emigrated instead. That was in 874. And now King Olaf was doubtless hoping that they could be won back, religiously, to a brotherhood within the Christian fold.

It is easily seen that when Leif Erikson accepted King Olaf's Mission he was placing himself in a very delicate and difficult position, doubly difficult because the people he undertook to convert were politically at variance with Norway and harbored an old resentment against her, and again doubly difficult because among those to be converted were his own father and his own brothers, his brothers named both in honor of Thor, Thorvald and Thorstein, and his father a devoted worshipper of Thor as his choice of those names for his sons proclaims.

If this bold and independent Erik the Red had been one of the King's guests at his Yuletide Festival when he forced his Berserks to that choice between the hammer and the cross, it is more than likely that Erik would not have chosen the cross at the end of the King's sword, but its biting blade, instead. . . but it is likely, too, that if this bold and independant Erik had been among the guests at his board King Olaf would not have adopted so drastic a policy to convert him as the threat with the sword. He was wisely politic now in entrusting this Mission to the old hero's son, for the son would not use threats with his father, but would approach the old hero in affection and reverence, and with a rich and most acceptable gift in his hand.

What gift? and why so acceptable? The gift of information on the important question which had remained unanswered since 986, when Bjarne Herjulfson, one of Erik's friends, had been driven far out of his course toward the south and west and had sighted a heavily wooded coast, but did not land. Greenland produced no timber, and in that land in the West might be a source of supply as well as an advantageous site for a new colony, warmer in climate, too. We shall see that after Leif Erikson discovered Vinland, his two brothers, in succession, both tried to go there.

Since Leif Erikson's purpose in this voyage to Greenland and Vinland was not merely adventure, discovery, and colonization, admirable as that would have been, but the fulfillment of a Christian Mission, he must be given rank among the great missionaries and the missionary saints of the early Church who carried their faith into foreign lands, as well as among the foremost navigators and discoverers.

It was a highly dramatic moment when at last Leif Erikson stood facing his father, Erik the Red, among the men of the Greenland Colony, a moment fraught with great consequence and historic significance. When he had accepted the new faith in Norway, his shipmates had all accepted it, too, and now he was to be almost completely successful among the men of Greenland. The Heimskringla Saga tells only the detail that he had with him a priest and other teachers, and the occasion must have been very much like that which is told of in England, when the missionaries from Rome arrived there carrying the Cross to the Northumbrian king. When the Christian story had been told to them, a Northumbrian chieftain pled for the acceptance of the new faith before the King:

> "You remember, it may be, O King, that which happens sometimes in winter when you are seated at table with your earls and thanes. Your fire is lighted and your hall is warmed, and without is rain and snow and storm. Then comes a swallow flying across the hall; he enters by one door and leaves by another. The brief moment when he is within is pleasant to him; he feels not rain nor cheerless winter weather; but the moment is brief—the bird flies away in the twinkling of an eye, and he passes from winter to winter. Such, methinks, is the life of man on earth, compared with the uncertain time beyond. It appears for

> awhile, but what is the time which comes after? . . . the time which was before? We know not. If, then, this new doctrine may teach us somewhat of greater certainty, it were well we should regard it."

The Northumbrian King and his followers accepted the new faith, and perhaps Erik the Red himself was almost persuaded to be a Christian; perhaps he even advanced to the font to receive baptism, as a Frisian king had done, but asked as he stood there, as the Frisian king had asked, where, according to this new doctrine, his own forefathers would be in that other world. Perhaps he decided then, as that Frisian king had decided, to continue to live his life to the end so that he might be with them, for he told the men of Greenland finally that he would not forsake Odin and Thor now that he was old, because they had been his gods since he was a child and had been good to him. A very loyal old man, and an epic hero worthy of epic sons, such as his sons were. Apart from Erik, all accepted the Christian faith, and clad in white robes they received baptism at the hands of the priest who had come to Greenland with Leif.

By sailing to the south and west of Greenland, Leif Erikson, the Lucky, as he was called, came to that richly wooded shore which he expected to find because Bjarne Herjulfson had sighted it, and he named it Vinland because he found many wild grapes growing there. It was too late in the season for him to reach Greenland again before the winter set in, and he wanted to take timber back with him, so he built a house large enough to shelter his party of thirty-six men and remained there through the winter. In the spring they set sail with that rich and acceptable gift of Vinland in their hands, a far richer gift than they could have had any conception of. On the way, some people who had been shipwrecked were found afloat in their small boat, and Leif Erikson rescued them and took them with him to Brattelid. The man, Thorer, who had been in command of the wrecked ship, and his wife, Gudrid, thereafter lived at Brattelid, while their ship-companions lived apart with Leif's men.

"Now Leif was very well off, both as to riches and honor," says the Flatey Bok, which tells his story—the timber he brought from Vinland must have been rated at a high price, as well as the wine from the grapes. And facts and incidents are told in the saga which show that Leif was a man and a hero after the world's own heart:

> "Leif was a very tall man, and vigorous, a wise man, and a very moderate man in every regard."

He had had the power of making friends, and friends in high places; King Olaf had thought a great deal of him; and had cordially entertained him a whole winter, with all of his men:

"Was Leif with the King all the winter well treated." His men thought highly of him, too, and followed him in the new faith as across the unknown seas:

"Was he then christened and all his shipmates, too." His father loved him, for he was a very kind son:

> "Leif begged his father, Erik, if he would a leader be in the expedition. Erik excused himself, said he was too old in age and said he could not endure the troubles of the sea as before. Leif said he might yet with best luck rule them, the kinsmen, and then Erik yielded to Leif and rode from home, when they were ready and there was not far to go to the ship. The horse stumbled which Erik rode, and fell he off from its back and hurt his foot. Then quoth Erik: not for me is fated to find more lands than this where now we dwell, we now no longer may follow together. Went Erik home to Brattelid, and Leif went to the ship, three tens and a half men."

It had been Leif's plan, then, to remove his father and his brothers to the wooded lands farther south and to build a new colony and homestead there, with them all still under his father's rule. An affectionate and dutiful son, and so persuasive that his father actually made the attempt.

Another incident shows Leif Erikson equally kind and affectionate to his old foster-father, a ridiculous Thersites in appearance, with a large forehead and restless eyes, small freckles on his face, a low stature, unseemly, and in the habit of making wry faces, but dear to Leif in spite of all this,

> "because Tyrker had been long with his father and himself and loved much Leif in his childhood."

When this old fosterfather strayed away from the rest of Leif's party and was lost in the woods in Vinland, Leif was very much troubled and blamed his men severely for letting it happen. At once he set out with twelve of his men to hunt for Tyrker, and when Tyrker they found Leif did not rebuke him but received him well and said to him kindly, "Where wert thou so late, fosterfather mine?"

Epic adventure ran in the veins of Leif Erikson's brothers as in his father's and his own, and Thorvald Erikson now, in the spring of 1002, took up the plan of exploring Vinland, while Leif Erikson remained in Greenland. Thorvald reached Vinland and lived there in Leif's house, but the natives became hostile and he was wounded to the death by an arrow from their bows. He directed his men to make his grave on a headland and to place crosses at his head and his feet to mark the spot, and this they did, returning afterward to Greenland. So far as is known, Thorvald Erikson is the first Christian man whose ashes were mingled with the American soil. That winter, Erik the Red had died, and Leif Erikson was now the head of the family. That winter, also, Thorer, died, and his wife, Gudrid, was now a widow in Brattelid.

In the year 1004, Thorstein, the third of Erik's sons, set sail for Vinland in the same good ship that Leif and Thorvald had used, but he did not reach his goal. He was obliged to turn back and died before he reached Brattelid. Again, a tragic death in this family of heroes, and deepened in its pathos by the fact that Gudrid, the widow of Thorer, whom Thorstein had taken as his wife, had undertaken this voyage with Thorstein, a very brave and gifted woman of whom much more will be heard later.

Then, in the year 1006, Thorfinn Karlsefne came to Greenland and visited Brattelid, a man of great wealth who sailed his own ship from Norway. "Soon he fell in love with Gudrid, and wooed her," says the Saga, and at Yuletide Gudrid and Thorfinn Karlsefne were married. Both Gudrid and all others now urged upon Karlsefne that he plant the colony in Vinland, and Leif Erikson lent him the use of his houses there. With three ships, one hundred and sixty-one men, and five women, they set sail in the spring of 1007, taking all sorts of chattels, including cattle; and they landed safely. They lived there for three years, and lived well, for

> "they profitted by all the products of the land, that there were, both of grapes and deer and fish and all good things. . ." "a whale was driven up there, both large and good. . ." "were then not short of food."

Thorfinn Karlsefne felled trees and hewed them for a ship after he had dried the wood on the rocks. They gave the natives a contemptuous name, Skralings, meaning *chips,* because they were not so tall as the Norsemen; and they began to trade with them. The natives offered all kinds of skins, including grey fur and sable, and they wanted to exchange these for weapons, but Karlsefne was afraid to trust them with weapons and offered them milk instead, which they liked so well that thereafter they wanted milk and nothing else. Later the natives became hostile, and after three years the settlers had to abandon the colony, setting sail for Norway. Such a handful of men as they were could not hope to stand successfully against so many, with only such weapons as they had. If they had had firearms they could have done so.

It may be that their strongest reason for leaving Vinland was that a baby had arrived in their camp, a boy, born the year after Thorfinn and Gudrid landed, and far too precious a person to be risked amid tomahawks and arrows. So they sailed away with their little son, when they had named Snorre, the first white child born on this continent, so far as is known. And if they had not done so, it is very likely that one of the world's greatest artists would never have been known, the sculptor Bertel Thorwaldson, for this great man traced his ancestry to Snorre Thorfinnson, born in Vinland, the son of Thorfinn Karlsefne and Gudrid, as has been shown.

In 1010 Thorfinn Karlsefne and Gudrid sailed to Norway, where, the Flatey Bok tells, "they enjoyed good friendship, both Thorfinn and his wife, from the most distinguished men in Norway." The Flatey Bok tells that from abroad a stranger came to visit them, "a southerner, a native of Bremen in Saxonland," who arrived the year after they left Vinland, in 1011. This man was so much interested in Thorfinn Karlsefne's ship that he offered to buy the beakhead of it. Thorfinn did not want to sell it, but he finally sold it when the man from Bremen offered him half a Mark of gold for it. "Karlsefne knew not what wood it was, but it was Mazur, come from Vinland," says the Saga, and of course this *"mazur"* must have been bird's-eye *maple,* a wood native to America and not produced in Europe.

Bremen was an important city at that time, a seaport, and the seat of an Archbishopric; and it evidently had adventurous and rich citizens, at least one interested enough to make a long Northern journey and pay a high price to a traveller who had returned from the West, with a beautiful new kind of wood. This incident is evidence, too, that important navigators from Bremen now knew about the Northmen's discoveries in Vinland, having received their information directly from Thorfinn Karlsefne and Gudrid themselves, only ten years after Leif Erikson left Vinland. A great deal of interest must have been aroused in Bremen on this navigator's return with Karlsefne's beakhead, not only by the mazur wood that he exhibited and the accounts of Thorfinn Karlsefne's three years in Vinland, but by accounts of Leif Erikson's Mission and his discovery of Vinland. The men of Bremen, also, were daring sailors, and why should they not begin to make voyages to secure this new kind of timber, and furs? Perhaps they did; and there is some reason to think that they did. It is certain that the churchmen of Bremen became eager to help in the work of Christianizing the West and the North, for the Archbishop of Bremen-Hamburg consecrated men to the work, and in 1059 a Bishop Jon of Iceland, one whom Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen-Hamburg had consecrated, fell as a martyr in Vinland beneath the arrows of the natives whom he was trying to convert. By that time, then, Vinland was known south of the Baltic, and in Rome.

II. LEIF ERIKSON AND COLUMBUS

Thorfinn Karlsefne and Gudrid, who left Vinland in 1010, seem to have been the last of Leif Erikson's own associates who tried to colonize Vinland, but many other voyages were made there and continued to be made for centuries to obtain supplies of timber; in fact, they may have continued up to the time when Columbus began his study of the facts which pointed to the existence of lands in the West.

The last of these voyages to Vinland that is recorded occurred in 1347. Until that date, Greenland had continued to develop steadily, she had many communities large enough to support priests of their own, and before the end of the 11th Century these were so numerous and so important that Greenland was made into an independent Bishopric, a fact which, alone, proves that it was considered at the Vatican. The Sagas mention seventeen Bishops of Greenland in succession, and one of these, Bishop Erik Upse, made a personal visit to Vinland, presumably at the direction of his superiors. Copies of his instructions and his report may possibly still be found among the documents in Rome.

At any rate, it is certain that Vinland was known at the Vatican, and Columbus could have obtained information there in his investigations. The disappearance of Greenland from History has usually been ascribed to the Black Death, which nearly or quite depopulated whole sections of the North of Europe, but a letter has been found, dated 1488 and signed by Pope Nicholas V, which throws new light on the subject. This letter authorized sympathetic provision for the few poverty-stricken people of Greenland who had returned to their ruined homes after a "captivity" to which "the barbarians" had subjected them thirty years before. "The barbarians" had gathered "on the neighboring shores of the pagans," had crossed to Greenland with a fleet, had "devastated the land with fire and sword," had destroyed the cathedral and carried away all survivors as slaves. "Fire and sword" were the conventional Roman expressions, it is to be supposed, but the "sword" was really tomahawks and arrows. This, then, was the fate of the people of Greenland; and this letter from the Vatican was written only twenty-nine years before Columbus made his voyage of investigation to Iceland, only forty-four years before he sailed on his own voyage of discovery to America.

The question rises whether Columbus knew of the discovery of Vinland by Leif Erikson and whether, therefore, his own discoveries are to be credited in any measure to his great predecessor. There is considerable proof that he did know:

(1) Gudrid, the sister-in-law of Leif Erikson, made a pilgrimage to Rome after the death of Thorfinn Karlsefne left her again a widow and well along in years.

A Saga records that Gudrid was greatly admired in Rome for her intelligence and her curtesie, this last word being foreign to her native language, a southern word to describe the courtly manners of Southern Europe, where Feudalism and Chivalry had been introduced; and we may conclude from the use of this word "curtesie" that Gudrid adopted the manners of the South when she was there, did in Rome as the Romans did, and did it charmingly. The fact that the Saga records these things of her is a sufficient proof that Gudrid was regarded as a notable person and had won name and fame for herself.

To win this wide renown for intelligence, Gudrid had only to tell the story of the lands that she had seen and the people she had known, remaining strictly true. And what stories she could tell, right out of the life, new, varied, ultra-romantic, and stranger far than fiction! Stories vivid, in the first person, with members of her own family as the heroes, and heroes in no merely literary sense of the word. Odysseys of shipwreck, of adventure and discovery, seas uncharted, lands hitherto unknown, perils as deadly as the worst that the adventurous Greek had survived in the Southern Seas only by the protection of Wisdom, his god! Iceland, Greenland, whales like Behemoth, icebergs like mountains floating! and a breed of heroes who had sailed their ships far beyond the Pillars of Hercules, beyond the uttermost bounds of the West! Erik the Red, her own father-in-law, and the greater son of that great father, Leif Erikson, who had out-sailed Erik and had carried the Cross for King Olaf into the North. . . . she had been herself among the many in Greenland who put on the white robes to receive baptism. . . . And all had put on the white robes to receive baptism excepting the one, Father Erik, who had chosen to go to his grave in the faith of Odin and Thor. . . . But he was a hero! Then, the tragic death of young Thorvald, lying alone on that headland with the crosses at head and feet, slain by the Red Skins; then, the tragic voyage of Thorstein, in which she had taken a part, returning his widow; and the three years in Vinland with Thorfinn Karlsefne, with the Red Skins on every hand!

In Gudrid's narratives those Red Skins were new to Europe, and to Rome, fascinating, as they have always been, eagle feathers, war paint, war dances, war whoops, scalp locks, tomahawks, bows and arrows—perfectly thrilling! Gudrid could out-Cooper Cooper in thrills, for, after all, her stories were true and needed no dressing of fiction. Her hearers may have doubted much that she told, for the stories of the pilgrims had come to be proverbially dubious, but her manner in telling must have been very convincing, to judge by the term "intelligent" that the Sagaman used to describe her. If artfulness or artistry had been apparent, "intelligent" would not have been the word.

The facts that Gudrid told were of such extreme importance that they would cause much discussion and would be carried far from Rome, to the ends of Christendom, wherever navigators and churchmen and pilgrims went. That was an era of missionary effort, of Crusades and consequent extending travel, and such stories would naturally be repeated, repeated for years, even for centuries.

In a traditional form, a navigator like Columbus would hear them, for his was a profession that can use just such information as Gudrid gave—historians have come to realize that tradition is often the means of conveying valuable historical fact. Tradition may have served well, through Gudrid, in Leif Erikson's case.

(2) However, the facts that Gudrid told were preserved in a better form than tradition, in the written work by Adam of Bremen, *The History of the Propagation of Christianity in the North of Europe,* which recorded the facts about King Olaf, Leif Erikson's Mission, and Vinland in the West. This great scholar, a Canon and Magister Scholarum, held the highest position among scholars in the Archbishopric of Bremen-Hamburg. He died in 1076 and was, thus, a contemporary of Gudrid's. He certainly knew about the important events in Greenland and Vinland that she had taken a part in and he may have met her personally when she was a distinguished and wealthy widow making her pious journey to Rome, intending to build a Convent when she returned and dedicate the remaining years of her life there to religion. She undertook this pilgrimage to Rome when her son, born in Vinland in 1008, had married and taken his father's place in the management of his estate, probably about 1030, and even before that date the Archbishop of Bremen-Hamburg may have begun to christianize Vinland, for he must have known for years about Vinland through travellers like the man who visited Karlsefne and Gudrid and bought their mazur beakhead as well as through his own ecclesiastical sources—for the northern lands were all under his jurisdiction. It is most likely that Gudrid passed through Bremen on her way to Rome, for she belonged to that Archepiscopate and she had the additional reason that she would meet there friends whom she had entertained in her own home and churchmen and navigators interested in her relation to Vinland and the Mission of Leif Erikson—it should never be forgotten that Gudrid was one of Leif Erikson's converts and that she was fervid enough to go on this pilgrimage and to give herself to the religious life of the Convent. If she passed through Bremen on her way to Rome, particularly if she did so on her way home from Rome, where she had excited great interest in the New, Western Land, her influence with the Archbishop and with Adam of Bremen must have been considerable, stimulating the Archbishop to christianize Vinland and stimulating Adam of Bremen to write his History of

the Propagation of Christianity in the North of Europe, a continuation of the great work that he had long been writing, The History of the Archbishopric of Bremen-Hamburg from 778 to his own time. The History of the Mission to Greenland and the discovery of Vinland, both centering in Leif Erikson, would seem to him merely an extension of his earlier work. The facts of Leif Erikson's efforts could have come to him through various sources: first, through the navigator who had bought the mazur wood beakhead from Thorfinn Karlsefne, in 1011, also through passing travellers before and after that, probably also directly or indirectly through Gudrid on her pilgrimage, as well as through those who had heard her, or heard about her, in Rome, the returned pilgrims. Such were the usual sources of information in that day.

But it is not likely that so eminent a scholar as Adam of Bremen would consider such sources of information reliable and quotable. However distinguished and intelligent Gudrid herself might be, she was only a woman and a pilgrim, her information to be discounted and discredited unless confirmed by a higher authority. That higher authority and that confirmation, Adam of Bremen sought and found in Denmark by discussion with the most eminent men. He certainly adopted a policy which secured for his History the respect that he aimed to secure—and his policy was, to seek an audience, first, with the Danish King. Svend Estridson, that Danish King, was himself deeply interested in all kinds of knowledge, especially in History, so he received Adam of Bremen well and gave him introductions to the most reliable authorities in Denmark, from whom accurate accounts were obtained of the propagation of Christianity in the North of Europe. And these Adam of Bremen wrote in his book.

And he did not stop there. After he had presented the history of the propagation of Christianity in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Greenland, he added an Appendix on the geography of those lands; and when he had described Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland, he added this statement about Vinland:

> "Besides, there is another country far out in that Ocean, which has been frequently visited by the Northmen, and which they call Vinland because the grapes grow there wild, producing a very good wine, and grain grows there unsown."

His account ends with these emphatic words:

> "These facts we have learned not from mythical conjecture, but from positive statements of the Danes."

Quoting the very best of the Danish authorities, Adam of Bremen agreed, thus, with the accounts preserved in the Sagas of Iceland; and his History establishes the additional fact that men of the greatest eminence, kings, archbishops, scholars, as well as navigators, were keenly interested and well informed in his day on missions, colonies, exploration, discoveries, and geography, and that this century of Leif Erikson was teeming with such activities. Adam of Bremen's work has always been regarded as standard, and numerous transcriptions were made of it, so it was known throughout Europe though published before the art of printing with type was discovered. Columbus, who was widely read on all that pertained to navigation and geography, could not have missed seeing it.

(3) The next link in the chain of evidence that Columbus knew of Leif Erikson and his discovery of Vinland is the account by Columbus himself of the voyage he made to Iceland in the winter of 1477. This was published in the biography of Columbus written by his own son and published in Genoa in 1521—this son had always been in close contact with Columbus and had accompanied him on many of his journeys. Of his father's voyage to Iceland, he says:

> "In 1477 my father made a voyage to Iceland, and in regard to that voyage he wrote me the following letter: 'In February, 1477, I made a voyage from Bristol, in England, to Iceland. Iceland is an island about the size of Great Britain,' etc."

The letter describes correctly the climate, the tides, and other physical features of Iceland, and then the quotation is ended abruptly, with "etc.", a most tantalizing "etc." to the historian, for it covers just what the reader wants most to know, (1) what facts Columbus had learned that made him want to go to Iceland, and (2) what facts he learned in Iceland from the records, Sagas, and learned men there. To make that long, expensive, and uncomfortable journey at that time in the year, he must have had a strong motive. It was not usual for ships to enter the harbor of Iceland in the winter, for it is icebound, but that Columbus did make that journey and in that month is corroborated by a record in the annals of Iceland, for 1477, that in February and March the harbor was ice-free, and that a ship entered the harbor that winter.

(4) Recent investigation has brought out another important fact about Columbus' visit to Iceland, which is, that the Bishop of Skalholt, Magnus Eiolfson, a bishop famed for his learning, was visiting the neighboring churches in Iceland when Columbus was there, and that he conversed with Columbus, in Latin. It is in the record that Columbus questioned Bishop Magnus "concerning the Western lands," and it can hardly be doubted that he obtained the information for which he came. It may have been merely by chance that Bishop Magnus was in Iceland just at that unusual time, but it is thought more probable that he had been apprised from Rome through ecclesiastical channels of Columbus' coming, and thus put himself in his way.

(5) In 1484, Columbus' theories were submitted to the learned monks at the Rabida Convent, and his son, who was with him, tells that they questioned him closely. When he spoke with the greatest assurance of the lands in the West, they asked him how he could be so sure, since he had not yet seen those lands, and he answered them,

> "I base my assurance on three things:
> (1) On the nature of things.
> (2) On the reports of navigators.
> (3) On the authority of learned writers.

Among the "learned writers," Adam of Bremen would stand high; and the "reports of navigators" would include the Annals and the Sagas of Iceland.

Too little credit has been given to Columbus for the patient and exhaustive study that he gave to ascertain the facts and verify information before he put his well-matured theories to the test. He was anything but an audacious gambler staking his Queen's jewels and his men's lives on a doubtful hazard. His estimate that he must sail 700 nautical leagues to reach the further shore of the Atlantic was proved correct, based on the distance to Vinland; and the only errors he made in his calculations concerning the size of the earth and what lands he would reach by sailing West, were inevitable, given only such data as he had been able to secure. The existence of the Pacific Ocean as a separate body of water was not known in his day.

That Columbus chose to sail far to the south of Vinland was in accordance with what he had learned about Vinland and the lands to the south of it; and it was wise of him to steer his course to the south because lands there would be nearer to the Latitude of Spain, warmer, and in the locality of India, as he supposed. It was not required of him to tell all he had learned about the northern lands and about Leif Erikson, particularly because that would have complicated the main question with irrelevant debates concerning lands in which he was not interested, and which had been abandoned probably, debates that would have deferred his own voyage indefinitely. In all of his dealings there seems to have been nothing to tarnish his honor, but everything to his credit. Like that of Leif Erikson, his aim seems to have been far higher than that of the adventurer, discoverer, or colonizer, for he foresaw, tradition tells, that the New World would be a Land of Promise, offering hope and opportunity to the oppressed and the poor of Europe. . . . Did the fact that Leif Erikson sailed with the Mission of King Olaf serve to strengthen the trust of Columbus in his own Vision of the Promised Land? One likes to think that it did.

Tried by exacting standards, both Leif Erikson and Columbus were very great men, and both are worthy to be honored as national heroes in America. In them, we of the internationally-constituted nation have a rare opportunity to unite with both Northern and Southern Europe in homage to their own heroes, who are our heroes as well. Both are celebrated in October, and it would be fit and fortunate to celebrate the two together, anything but fit and fortunate to disparage either of them through sectional or national bias or to make invidious comparisons between them. These great Discoverers are Bridges across the Atlantic, both now celebrated in Europe by the nations whence they came to us, most fitly to be celebrated on this Continent to which they opened the way, thus becoming a bond of union for the Future between the East of the Atlantic and the West of the Atlantic, between the North and the South, a bond of union that might prove stronger than treaties to bring Good Will.

THE DEVIL'S DEATH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

IT has been reported from various places at various periods that the Devil is dead.[1] Scotland, among other European countries, claims to possess his tomb. A Scotch song says: "The Devil is dead and buried at Kirkcaldy." Beelzebub is believed to be buried in Brittany. When slain by St. Michael, according to an old tradition among the fisher-folk of the Breton coast, he was buried by the Archangel under the mountain which faces Mont St. Michel, and which is, therefore, called Tombelaine—"*Tumba Beleni,* the tomb of Belenus, Belus, Bel, Belial, Beelzebub" (Victor Hugo: *Quatre-vingt-treize,* III, ii. 1)[2] The demon Saracen must have died at a certain period in the past, for in the novel, *Tristan le Roux* (1850), by Dumas *fils,* he is evoked from the dead. But his resurrection is not of long duration. In the end, his human ally once more inflicts upon him such death as he must suffer, and he is again buried at Poitiers, the site of his original tomb.

Jean-Pierre Béranger, the popular French song-writer, in his satirical poem, "la Mort du Diable" (1828), gives a new and novel turn to the old legend of the death of the Devil. He is not concerned with the demise of the high and mighty personage, but with the effect it had on the conduct of the Catholic clergy. This song is a satirical attack upon Satan's supposed successors among the monks.

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[1] The Devil's death forms the subject of the story, "The Devil and the Old Man" (1905), by John Masefield, reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (1921). Arthur Landsberger also used this idea as the subject of his novel entitled *Wie Satan starb* (München, 1919).

[2] Maupassant, in his story "la Légende du Mont St. Michel" (1888), has given an interesting version of the legend of the combat between the Archangel and the Archenemy, which occurred, according to a local tradition, on the famous mountain situated on the Norman coast. This story, accompanied by a critical essay, will be found in the present writer's collection of *Devil Stories* already mentioned.

Béranger was always poking fun at the priests. Even the Pontiff in the Vatican was not spared by his bold and boisterous satire. In Voltairean fashion, Béranger laughed Old Mother Church to scorn. This poem figured prominently among the pieces selected as a basis for Béranger's indictment. It was denounced by the priests as irreligious and blasphemous, and its author was declared an enemy to religion. The archbishop of Paris and the other bishops hurled their anathemas in pastoral letters against the poet of "la Mort du Diable."

The song describes the commotion and consternation caused among the Catholic clergy by the rumor of the Devil's death. The priests wail when the news of the Devil's demise reaches them. The reason for their dismay over the death of the Devil is not that they loved Lucifer so well. What worries these good men is the fact that they have thus lost their means of a livelihood. The Devil being dead, what man will now pay them to be delivered from his clutches? But Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Order of the Jesuits, bids them to stop their wailing. He himself intends to succeed to the power of the prince of this world; and in order to be delivered from him, men will now pray and pay more than ever before. It is not easy to render in English the delicious humor and irony which this poem contains. We shall give it nevertheless in its first English translation for the benefit of the reader to whom it is not easy of access in the original:[3]

I sing today a lay of lays,
A glorious miracle you'll see,
Give the great saint Ignatius praise,
Of little saints the glory he.
A dirty trick—if saints can trick,
And if the truth may all be said,
Has done the business for Old Nick,
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!

Old Nick went out one day to dine,
And pledg'd the saint to drink his health,
Aye, said the saint—and in the wine
Some holy poison dropp'd by stealth;
Gripes seiz'd the Devil—cruel-sick—
He swears—he storms—and hangs his head,
Then bursts, as bursts a heretic—
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!

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[3] This translation appeared in the *Westminster Review,* X (1829), 210-13.

"Alas! He's dead—the friars said,—
The Devil an *Agnus* shall we sell;
Alas! the canons cried—he's dead—
Not one *Oremus* shall we tell.
The conclave is in deep despair,
Power and the iron chest are fled,
O we have lost our Father dear,
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!

Love is not half so strong as fear,
For fear was constant with her gifts.
Intolerance is fading here,
Who now her blazing torch uplifts?
If man from us should once be free,
What light may beam upon his head;
God greater than the Pope shall be—
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!

Ignatius came—"Let me but take
His place—his right—and see; in brief—
He has made men for ages quake.
I'll make kings tremble like a leaf!
With plagues, thefts, massacres, I'll ban
Both north and south—where'er I tread;
Leave ruins both for God and man—
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!"

"Come, blessed one," they uttered, "come,
We hallow thy most saintly gall"—
And now his Order—sent from Rome—
O'ershadows, darkens, curses all.
I heard a choir of angels tell
Their sympathies for man, they said,
"Ignatius is the heir of hell,
The Devil's dead—the Devil's dead!"

The reader who is perhaps inclined to be overjoyed at the report of the Devil's death should recall that Satan has a successor who is fully capable of carrying on the government of Gehenna after his death. In the words of a famous quatrain:

"The Devil is dead. He died serene,
  Though somewhat oppressed by cares;
But his wife, my friends, is a woman of mind—
  She looks after her lord's affairs."

*
* *

Moreover, the Devil's death would be the greatest of calamities for humanity. It would mean the end of all virtue, the extinction of the human race, and even the end of the world. First of all, virtue could not exist at all without vice to offset it. It is, moreover, doubtful whether men would still practise virtue if the Devil were gone. Even lacking temptation would they continue to be good without the pitchfork? No progress can be conceived without the Prince of this world. Conflict is the father of all things. It has been said that man must know the spirit of discontent if he is to advance. Moreover, with the passing of the Devil, life would simply disappear from the face of the earth. The history of the world has shown that the supposedly opposed realms of human activity personified in the Almighty and his Adversary are equally essential and eternal. Evil, no less than Good, is an indispensably necessary element in the economy of the cosmic system.

Anatole France states over and over again in his works that "Evil is the necessary counterpart of Good, as darkness is of light," and that the Devil, in whom Evil has been incorporated, is consequently immortal.

> "Yes [this latterday diabolist affirms]. Evil is immortal. Satan, the genius, in whom the old theology incarnates it, will survive the last man and remain alone, seated with folded wings, upon the ruin of extinct worlds" (*la Vie littéraire:* "la Vertu en France," 1887).[4]

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[4] Quotations in this essay are taken from the uniform English translation of the works of Anatole France published by John Lane, London and New York, 1902ff.

> "Evil is necessary [he says elsewhere]. If it did not exist, neither would good. Evil is the sole potential of good. . . .
>
> "It is thanks to Evil and sorrow that the earth is habitable and that life is worth living. We should not therefore be hard on the Devil. He is a great artist and a great *savant;* he has created at least one-half of the world. And his half is so cunningly embedded in the other that it is impossible to interfere with the first without at the same time doing a like injury to the second. Each vice you destroy has a corresponding virtue, which perishes along with it.
>
> "I enjoyed the pleasure of seeing, one day, at a country fair, the life of St. Anthony the Great represented by marionettes. . . . Oh, how vividly it brings before us the two things working together to one end,—God's grace and the Devil's!
>
> "St. Anthony is a great saint only because he successfully resisted the Queen of Sheba. Well, is it not obvious then that in sending the beauteous lady, . . . the Devil indispensably performed an act which was indispensably necessary to constitute his Saintship?
>
> "Thus the marionettes confirmed me in my belief that Evil is an indispensable pre-condition of Good, and the Devil is a necessity for the moral beauty of the universe" (*le Jardin d'Epicure,* 1895).
>
> "Evil is necessary [this author repeats himself]. It has like Good its source in human nature, and the one cannot be destroyed without the other" (*M. Bergeret à Paris,* 1901).[5]

In his autobiographical work, *le Livre de mon ami* (1905), Anatole France tells us that one day he took his baby-girl Suzanne to a Punch and Judy show, the culminating point of which was the death of the Devil.[6] This ending delighted the common crowd, which applauded the heroic act of Punch, but it saddened our philosopher, who thought that it was a great pity that the Devil had been killed. Paying no attention to Suzanne sitting by his side, he went on musing:

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[5] The late James Huneker shows himself a pupil of the great French diabolist by his long encomium of the Prince of the Pit, which begins with the following: "The Devil is the mainspring of our moral system. Mock him and you mock God, who created him. Without him the world would be all light without shadow. . . ." (*Bedouins,* 1920).

[6] The Punch and Judy show invariably ends with the death of the Devil. Paine Collier, in his book, *Punch and Judy* (5th ed., London, 1870, p. 66), mentions a marionette-player who had religious scruples about making Punch kill the Devil, but the audience were so attached to the canonical ending that they hooted and mishandled him. On the origin of this traditional ending of a Punch and Judy show, see F. M. Cornford: *The Origin of the Attic Comedy* (London, 1914), p. 146.

> "The Devil being dead, good-bye to sin! Perhaps Beauty, the Devil's ally, would have to go also. Perhaps we should never more behold the flowers that enchant us; and the eyes for the love of which we would lay down our lives. What, if that is so, what in the world would become of us? Should we still be able to practise virtue? I doubt it. Punch did not sufficiently bear in mind that Evil is the necessary counterpart of Good, as darkness is of light, that virtue consists wholly of effort, and that if the Devil is no longer to fight against, the Saints will remain as much out of work as the Sinners. Life will be mortally dull. I tell you that when he killed the Devil, Punch committed an act of grave imprudence.
>
> "Well, Pulchinello came on and made his bow, the curtain fell, and all the little boys and girls went home; but still I sat on deep in meditation. Mam'zelle Suzanne, perceiving my thoughtful mien, concluded that I was in trouble. . . . Very gently and tenderly she takes hold of my hand and asks me why I am unhappy. I confess that I am sorry that Punch has killed the Devil. Then she throws her little arms round my neck, and putting her lips to my ears, she whispers:
>
> "'I tell you somefin: Punch, he killed the nigger, but he has not killed him for good.'"

RELIGION AND THE FUTURE OF INDIA

DALJIT SINGH SADHARIA

INDIA, in contrast with the other nations of the modern world, is notoriously a religious country, given over to the discussion of unprofitable theological speculations and devoted to the useless pursuits of the things of the spirit. All progressive nations have freed themselves from the world of medievalism and religion and direct their concentrated forces to the practical problems of human welfare and well-being. Europe and America have secularized their political, social, educational, and industrial institutions, and have compelled religion to keep itself aloof from politics and secular interests. In contemporary western society the love of country has supplanted zeal for the supernatural, and material prosperity has become far more important than future salvation. Soviet Russia has dashed Christianity to the ground and has made hecatombs of heavenly and earthly czars. The whole system of Russian government and society has been constructed on the principles of Marx, Lenin, and other proponents of the theory of communism and the Christian Bible has been replaced by *Das Kapital* as a source book of human conduct, social and sexual relations, and proletarian morality. China, after a painful humiliation and a grievous loss of national sovereignty, has awakened to world realities and has decided to shed her age-long lethargy, unchanging modes of life, contentment with her hoary past, and ancient traditions. She has fully realized that the future lies with scientific civilization which she must adopt in order to shine forth in redoubled radiance as the wonder and envy of mankind. An educational system based on the secular model has been introduced in the schools and colleges of the Celestial republic and the foreign controlled educational institutions have been obliged to conform to governmental regulations. No longer the young Chinese rocks his head on Taoist magical formulas and stultifies his mental and physical energies in qualifying himself to answer such silly questions as "how the moonlight sleeps on the lake," but studies useful subjects as science and economics, and learns the doctrines of Sun and international politics. And Turkey by a deliberate exercise of the will and an extraordinary effort, and a national resolve and rapidity for which there is no parallel or analogy has transformed herself from a medieval and theocratic state into a modern and progressive nation.

But India, in spite of catastrophic and revolutionary changes that have taken place all over the world, remains quite unaffected and the least willing to learn or follow the example of other nations. Religion is still her warp and woof and dictates to politics, law, and economics. God is the pivot around whom her whole being revolves like satellites and absorbs all her best thot and sublime aspiration. Those so-called revealed scriptures still furnish her with a philosophy of life and a rule of conduct, and determine her attitude towards the problems of twentieth century ethics and politics. India is hopelessly a religion ridden country more sorely and onerously than was Europe under the cruel domination of Christianity in the Middle Ages. She is cramped in on every side by religion. The condition of her life is such that she shall be an instrument of and shall exist for the sake of a mythical divine personality. Her whole life is sacrificed for the observance of degrading religious ceremonies and dedicated to the service of God or gods. Religion encircles her like the coil of a snake and weighs upon her feeble body and mind with a physical pressure.

The future of India is bound up with religion; it will be the most important factor in the evolution of Indian politics and in the development of Indian public opinion. Indian nationalism of which the world has heard so much of late is simply a religious fanaticism. But before we enter upon the discussion of the relation of religion with the present day Indian problems and make any forecasts about the future of India, we may cast a cursory glance over her past history and visualize clearly the influence which religious beliefs have exercised on her history and civilization. The present day India can only be understood in the light of her past.

The religious development of India may be divided into the following periods. First, Vedism, or the earliest religious beliefs of the Indo-Aryans; second, Brahmanism, or the faith inculcated and taught in the books called Brahmanas, Upanishads, law books of Manu, and numerous other works; third, the rise of Buddhism as a reaction against the sacrificial monstrosity of the priests and against the perversion of Vedic religion; and last Hinduism, or mutilation of Vedism and Brahmanism adulterated with Dravidian fetishism and superstition. It is now the prevalent religion of India.

The primitive Indo-Aryans who invaded India in the period about 4,000 to 1,000 B. C. were a hardy and warlike race. From the very beginning of their entry in the Punjab they found themselves arrayed against the aborigines and waged relentless wars against them. The Rig Veda hymns describe in beautiful language the bloody conflicts between the fair-skinned Aryans and the dark-skinned aborigines and relate the details of warfare in those far-off days. The bands of attacking Aryans marched with their leaders carrying banners. The soldiers on the march sang and shouted both of the victories of their generals and of their war gods. The leaders rode on war chariots while the soldiers followed them on foot in bands. The fighting weapons used by both sides were bows, arrows, and darts. The Aryans by their superior power, military spirit, disciplined leadership, valor, and bravery finally overwhelmed their enemies and reduced them to submission. They invaded the large part of the country and drove the aborigines to the hills. They exterminated several original tribes and burned down their villages. The Vedic Aryans lived and died in war and their religion sanctioned and glorified war. With them war was a passion and a profession. Their whole being was saturated in war traditions and was rooted in courage and military virtues.

The religion of the Vedic Aryans was comparatively simple; it was emphatically a natural religion. The elemental forces of nature served as objects of veneration symbolized in a visible phenomena. The early Indo-Aryans were a people gifted with high mental capacities and strong moral feelings. They were endowed with marvellous powers of appreciating the beauties of nature and with a profound consciousness of their kinship with the visible and invisible forces which regulated the order of the world. Their material welfare depended on the influences of the sky, atmosphere, light, and sun, and to these they turned with deep respect and admiration. Thus Agni was the fire-god, the friend and benefactor of men; Surya the sun-god, the enemy of darkness and bringer of light; Indra the god of rain, the fertilizer of agricultural soil; Rudra the god of the destructive thunderstorm, punisher of the evildoers, but a defender of the virtuous; Soma the god of inebriating juice, destroyer of every form of disease, imparter of bodily strength, and a bestower of health and so on.

The Vedic Aryans addressed their prayers to the gods to extort from them the good things of life: rain, food, cattle, health, wealth, and other boons. They did not invoke the aid of their deities as representatives of a superior being before whom they should bow in sheer awe and repent their sins. The savage idea of sin, fear of a transgression of the law of any heavenly being, and atonement for misconduct never entered into their sublime optimistic nature and never barbarized their philosophic intellect. They looked upon the gods as their comrades and servants who assisted them in their campaigns against their adversaries and showered upon them material prosperity. Their gods feasted with them and shared their joys and difficulties. They were a people thoroughly conscious of their intellectual and physical powers and refused to submit to the claims of any arrogant deity. Their religion was characterized by a passionate love of liberty, utility, materialistic advance, and a Nietzchean sense of power. They were the first people who recognized that man is essentially a material being with ethical and moral wants and that his moral life can only blossom and come to fruitage under favorable economic conditions. They were utilitarians, materialists, and self-assertives before Mill, Dewey, Marx, Feurbach, and Nietzche. They justly called themselves Aryas.

The form of Indo-Aryan worship was also a natural process. To their personified forces of nature they gave characters like their own. They attributed to them human likings, tastes, and predilections, and invested them with human qualities. They propitiated them by praise, accompanying their hymns with such presents and offerings of food and drink as was deemed acceptable among themselves. Rice, clarified butter, and the Soma plant formed their offerings. They had no temples and images; sacrifices were performed in the open air and were not fettered with meaningless rites and cumbered with demoralizing ceremonies. There were no precincts permanently devoted to worship and no idols before whom they bowed in abject servility. The gods were so closely connected with natural phenomena that no need of any invisible power was felt. Each man satisfied his moral instincts, according to his own conception of the deva or devas on whose favor his prosperity was thot to depend.

Brahmanism was the second stage in the development of religious thot in India. It grew out of Vedism but it drifted far from the original and simple teaching of the Vedas and the primitive mode of worship. In place of Vedic gods of natural phenomena, Brahmanical mythology set up one universal supreme being, the only real entity, from whom all things emanate, like drops from an ocean, like sparks from fire. The natural process of devotion by an intricate ritual and monstrous sacrificial ceremonies. The democratic Vedic organization of society was supplanted by an aristocratic system of society based on caste distinctions. The great Indian law-giver, Manu, formulated the caste system and split Indian society into four rigidly defined divisions. First were the Brahmans, second the Shatris or the warriors, third the Vaishas or the farmers and traders, and fourth the Sudras or the conquered aborigines. On each caste was fixed a definite life-programme and to each was assigned a special mission or avocation in life. The Brahmans were were charged with the duty of performing sacrifices for themselves and for others, and of ministering to the spiritual needs of mankind. The Shatris were to cultivate heroic and military virtues in order to defend and protect the other classes from marauders and invaders; the Vaishas were to follow agricultural and industrial pursuits to feed the people; and the Sudras were condemned to engage in menial and servile avocations and to serve the three upper classes. These distinctions were fixed immovably. In the place of natural plasticity and fluidity of a social organism were substituted inflexible and ineluctable moulds which could not be broken. Marriage, social and family relations, industries, vocations, military service, rights of property, laws of inheritance, every interest of human life was regulated by caste rules.

Brahmanism evolved beliefs and elaborated philosophical doctrines which were wholly unknown to the Vedas. The doctrine of Karma and spiritual salvation were quite foreign to the Vedic sages and exercised a very pernicious influence on the minds of the Indian people. The former held that man is not the author of his actions; but all his actions come from the force and from the necessary concatenation of things. An irresistible fate, good or evil, causes some to be born for good, others for evil. All men are born under the empire of one or the other of these two destinies. The latter despised earthly life and bred a sheer contempt for what savored of flesh. It replaced the worldliness of Vedic Aryans by the other-worldliness, and the love of nature with its grandest operations, by the love of an unknown deity.

As a protest against Brahmanical religious tyranny and corruption Buddhism arose during the fifth century B. C. The great leader and instigator of the Buddhist reaction was Gautama of the Sakya tribe, whose father was the king of the territory round Kapilvastu—a town situated under the mountains of Nepaul about one hundred and fifty miles north of Patna. The Buddha was well qualified by his intellectual attainments and majesty of character to stem the tide of degradation in religion and to restore the simple teaching of his forefathers to its original and pristine purity. Brought up in leisure and royal comforts, endowed by nature with graceful features and sound intellect, gifted with a remarkable power of speech and expression, and well versed in all the philosophical theories of his time the young reformer inaugurated the greatest intellectual and social revolution the world has ever seen or known. With the voice of a prophet Gautama rejected ceremonies, sacrifices, incantations, and the worship of any God or gods as a means to salvation and repudiated the authority of the priest and the infallibility of any revealed scripture.

Salvation was to be attained by right meditation, right belief, right action, right knowledge, and not by the mortification of flesh and divine grace. No traditions, no sacred writings, and no commandments of any supermundane personality were to be respected or accepted unless they satisfied the requirements of human reason and experience. The young Shatri with his indomitable courage repulsed with all the force at his command the old order of ethics which attributed the principles of morality to divine will and curbed the human will by the ordinances of God. The morality of the sky, it was argued, is subversive of all human freedom and an evident obstacle in the moral progress of man. Morality should obtain its sanctions in human relations, in the complex growth of human needs and aspirations, and not in the injunctions of a mythical divine personality. Man is essentially a moral being and the roots of morality are laid deep down in the lowest forms of organic life.

The Buddha in his social teaching was equally a most uncompromising reformer and dissenter. He denounced the claim of the innate superiority of the Brahman or Shatri over the Sudra and protested against the artificial barriers erected against the lower classes. He proclaimed the equality of the Sudra with the Brahman and eliminated social rigidity and caste discipline. The doors which the Brahmans had slammed against the Sudras were broken down with a crash, the like of which we have not heard in priest-ridden India up to the present day. *"Jarmana jaete Sudra, karmana jaete dwija";* that is "by birth every one is a Sudra, it is by action that one becomes a Brahman," became once more a practical reality. "My Dharma is a Dharma of mercy for all," said Buddha, "proclaim it to all men; it is as vast as the spaces of heaven which excludes none." All were welcomed into Buddhist brotherhood without any distinction of race or color and were put on a uniform system of morality and equality. Purity of mind, nobility of character, knowledge and goodness were set up as the criteria of man's worth, and not race or religion. Those who lead moral lives, render useful service to society, help their fellowmen in times of distress and emergency, and cultivate learning for the welfare of mankind should be honored and exalted no matter from what race, caste, creed they may hail. Those who lead dissolute lives, fall into evil temptation, and wallow in the mire of sensuality should be pitied and efforts should be made to extricate them from their moral degradation.

For over a thousand years Buddhism guided and controlled the life and thot of the Indian people and affected tremendous changes in the structure of Indian society and polity. The old iniquities in society and incrustations in religion were swept away and a new social system based on the doctrines of equality, liberty, and fraternity was reared and a positive religion founded on secular ethics and rational inquiry was established. The attention of the Indian people was diverted from metaphysical hairsplitting, from that so-called nonsense Brahmvidya, and was concentrated on the practical problems of human well-being and the advancement of the kingdom of man.

Buddhism prepared the way for and furnished the material to India's greatest Emperor and Son Chandra Gupta to construct his political edifice on a firm and solid structure and to make India a nation. It was under his glorious reign that the successor of Alexander the Great, Seleucus Nicator, was driven out of the Punjab and was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty. Nicator was obliged to give the hand of his daughter in marriage to the Indian ruler, was compelled to evacuate Indian territory, and was made to sign all the articles of the Treaty. Chandra Gupta brought the whole of India under his political control and reduced all the incoherent mass of Indian populations, warring factions, petty chiefs, and tribal organizations to one regular and compact political entity. For the first time in Indian history he subjected India to a uniform system of law and government and organized his governmental system on the principles of the great Indian political philosopher and his prime minister the celebrated Kautilya, the author of Artha Shastra. The government of the country was divided into separate departments, such as foreign affairs, army and navy, trade and commerce, agriculture and husbandry, currency and finance, and the function of each was intrusted in the hands of a competent minister. The emperor regarded himself as the servant of the state and a father of his people. He did not arrogate to himself the divine right of kings, like the European despots of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and did not claim to possess an absolute authority over his subjects. He was a constitutional monarch and his rule was based on the patriarchal ideals of government.

Chandra Gupta was followed by his grandson, Maharaj Asoka, one of the greatest and noblest sovereigns of all Indian history. He made Buddhism the state religion of India and exerted zealous efforts to put the teaching of the Prince-Philosopher into actual practice. He planted fruit trees, dug wells, established hospitals for both men and animals, founded charities for the poor and the needy and did his best to banish evil and poverty from his country. He looked upon his subjects as his children and worked with almost a fanatical zeal to ameliorate their social and moral conditions. He certainly succeeded in his sacred mission and left an imperishable record of his achievements. The thing which struck the great Chinese scholar, Hien Tsan, when he visited India was the complete absence of prostitution, gambling, intoxicating liquors, crime, theft, murder, and other social evils, among the Indian people. Asoka made his country a social paradise and raised it to the height of humanistic civilization.

But it is a prophet of righteousness and internationalism that the great Indian Emperor has earned an undying glory and has become an immortal of history. He despatched missionaries to all parts of the world to communicate the message of spiritual deliverance and intellectual enlightenment discovered by the Buddha under the Bo Tree to all the races of mankind. He did not send missionaries to fetter mankind with dogmas, ex cathedra of morals, religious superstitions, but to preach the "Law of Piety"—mercy, truthfulness, goodness, justice, human brotherhood, tolerance, and the like. He did not make religion a pretext for robbing other people of their territory, of depriving them of their place in the sun, and of despoiling them of their riches and privileges. He did not regard the world beyond India as a legitimate field of exploitation and political domination. He aimed at founding a world wide, ideal, human society, in which justice and good will should be realized and all world communities should be brought together in a spirit of harmony and love, on a moral basis. His goal was nothing less than the creation of a new world.

For over a thousand years Buddhism existed as a dominant faith of the Indian people. But, after all, it could not in the end escape the usual fate of deterioration and decline written on every human institution. Its powerful influence began to wane with the lapse of years and the impulse which it had received from the magnetic personality of its great Founder grew fainter. There was no leader to vivify its primitive zeal and no one to step in the place of the Buddha. The later Buddhist teachers such as Nagsena, Buddhgosha, and others, lost their touch with the common people and gave themselves up to metaphysical wranglings. The old forces which were smouldering beneath the surface of Indian society raised their heads and challenged its right to exist. They had not become extinct, but had simply retreated before its mighty tide. The old inveterate propensities gradually reasserted their sway over men's minds. Sacredotalism, priestcraft, and every form of superstition were too firmly planted on the Indian soil to be completely uprooted. The ponderous and mischievous longing of the Indian heart for the unseen and its shameful mystical leanings were too powerful to be wholly eradicated. The positive rationalism of Buddhism, its philosophical conception of human salvation and destiny were too abstruse for ordinary people to understand, and its cold blooded postulates were too barren to satisfy their abnormal religious instincts. It finally met with a cruel fate in India and succumbed before the onrushing tide of Brahmanical revival.

After the expulsion of Buddhism two doctrines came to the fore which led India straightforward to ruin and to the destruction of her liberties. The first was the crazy cult of Bhagti analogous to the Christian doctrine of the kingdom of God, that did more than anything else to make India a prey to foreign invasions and contributed most to her downfall. It caused the Indians, as the teaching of "Lay your treasures in heaven" caused the worldly Romans, to forsake this world for the next and to sacrifice earthly existence for the false promise of celestial felicity. The thirst for eternity induced the Indians to tear them away from their family affections and domestic ties, and to dedicate themselves to the search of God. In their erotic passion for immateriality they renounced all the good things of earthly life and withdrew themselves to the jungles. There they imposed upon themselves voluntary vows of poverty and beastly existence, practiced severe penances and fastings, inflicted indescribable cruelties and horrors on their mortal bodies, mortified their flesh, and reduced themselves to mere skeletons.

They held their arm upright for years, until the tissues withered and it became impossible ever again to bring the arm down to a normal position. They took long journeys walking on sharp spikes; sat for years by day and slept by night on a bed of thorns. Many rolled hundreds of miles in sun and storm, thru dust and mud; while others hung for half an hour at a time by the feet, head down, over a smouldering fire, or sat surrounded by five fires, thru the blistering heat of an Indian summerday. Numerous Indians loaded their bodies, and still do, with a heavy chain of iron fastened into the muscles at their back. The savage craving for the ultimate and the universal drove the Indians to mutilate and murder themselves and to destroy themselves from the face of the earth. While the Indians in their acquisition of the infinite were assassinating themselves their country was overrun by the foreign devastators and was put to fire and the sword. There is nothing which has degraded India politically, economically, socially, and morally as God. It has been the bane of Indian life and is responsible for all her past woes. "The idea of God" says Marx, "is the keystone of a perverted civilization," and the truth of the statement is completely borne out by India's corruption and degeneration.

The doctrine of ahimsa or non-killing, preached and inculcated by the founder of Jainism, Mahavira, derided the military virtues and utterly undermined the fighting spirit of the Indian people. His followers have been and are the curse of India and it is they who preserve the lower forms of animal life such as rats and precipitate infectious diseases and bubonic plagues upon the country every year. Tho born a Shatri this mischievous degenerate taught the most degraded form of effiminacy and popularized a cult of decadence and national annihilation. He entirely dehumanized the Indians and reduced them to a sodden inertia and quiescence. The hypothesis of a state of perpetual peace in the human race and mercy with every sentient existence was the hypothesis of absolute immobility and sheer debility. The Vedic hymns, the ethics of the Gita, the doctrines of the sages of Maha-Bharata and Ramayana all had taught and glorified war and had regarded it as the mother of all heroic virtues and manly civilization. But this prophet of non-killing and peace discarded primitive Aryan traditions of courage, love of war, and devotion to the cultivation of heroic virtues and erected on their place his own cult of feebleness, meekness, and mercy. He bears the same relation to India as Christ does to Rome. Just as the Romans were enervated and ruined by the demoralizing teaching of the sermon on the mount and turning the other cheek so the Indians were crippled and paralysed by the degrading cult of ahimsa and non-injury.

Thus the damnable prescriptions of bhagti and ahimsa brought down India from a high pedestal and a position of eminence to that of subjection and helotage, and exposed her to the incursions of barbarian freebooters. Her primitive buoyancy of heroic action and the principles of her Shatri morality were eclipsed, and her positive and martial virtues were entirely annihilated. She gave up, as her lover Nietzsche would say, her master morality and adopted in its place slavish morality. In her active life she followed the ethics of the Christian gospel rather than that of the Gita while Europe guided her affairs by the political philosophy of Manu and the war teachings of Mahabharata sages. And for this criminality she has paid and is still paying the price. Her history after the forsaking of her traditions is a record of wars and rebellions, crimes and catastrophes, bloodshed and murder, and of economic spoilation and political slavery. The wild tribes who poured from the north into her territory carried fire and sword wherever they went. She became to them what carrion crow is to the vulture. They razed to the ground blooming cities, magnificient and gorgeous buildings, desecrated beautiful temples, and trampled under their mailed feet all the works of art and the refinements of civilization. The white plunderers who came from the west swept India like a flight of devouring locust and enacted bloody scenes on her sacred soil. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English fought sanguinary battles for supremacy and converted her into a veritable pandemonium of bloodshed and misery. She finally passed, and deserved to pass, under the cruel yoke of the British and is now reeling under imperialistic domination. She wrote her own death sentence when she adopted the saint as her ideal man in place of the soldier and made that so-called damnation Brahmvidya (literally the knowledge or search of God) the alpha and omega of her life instead of Raj Niti or the science of government and organization.

If religion is responsible, as we have seen, for the destruction of India's civilization and national freedom, it is at present the sole bar to Indian unity and progress. It is the canker at the root poisoning and stunting the healthy growth of Indian society and patriotism. It divides family from family, class from class, and community from community, and keeps alive communal jealousies, racial antipathies, and caste distinctions. It stratifies Indian society into water-tight compartments and demarcates the Indian peoples into innumerable divisions and gradations. All sorts of religious barbarisms are running riot in unhappy India and there is no superstition invented by human imagination, ignorance, psychological illusion, or weakness that does not claim its votaries among Indian populations. The followers of each religion have their own peculiar observances, their own rules as to food and clothing, their own clubs, their own theory of life, and their own special occupations. Any intermingling of the members of different religions by intermarriage or even by intimate social intercourse, is out of the question, and is absolutely prohibited. In western lands meals, eating, drinking, and numerous other amenities of social life serve to promote mutual sympathy, friendly feeling, genuine liking among different layers of social organism and tend to draw all the members of society into a harmonious and workable blending and fusion, and cooperative goodwill. In India it is a horror for a Brahman to sit at the same table with his Mohammedan countryman and to participate in his social functions. He looks upon him as a disgusting animal, a food-eating barbarian and brands him with the stigma of melesha, a savage. A Sikh nobleman will never accept the hospitality of his Christian countryman and will not even suffer to take a glass of water from his hands tho he may be dying of thirst. Religion encloses the Indians as if in a magic circle outside of which they dare not step and checks the growth of society on democratic principles.

India, as she is at present, is a continent rather than a country—a congeries of nation races, and not a nation. She is a vast international system, embracing nationalities, languages, and religions. All the elements of nationality such as common historical traditions, universal languages, common ideas, and above all, the spirit of patriotism are conspicuously absent. There is practically no patriotic feeling among the vast majority of the Indian people and no nationalistic fervor. An average Indian is devoted more to his fantastic superstitions than to his country. To the Hindu his god Vishnu, to the Mohammedan his Allah, to the Sikh his Wahguru, to the Parsi his Ahurmazda are far more important than India and its interests. A Hindu will forego all material comforts, will sacrifice his means, and will even depart with his life for the sake of his cow religion, and will stand before his idols in a temple in abject servility from morning till night. A Mohammedan will give away all his scanty money, tho he and his family may be dying of starvation, to the cause of Islam and will gladly suffer death over a religious trifle. But ask any average Hindu or Mohammedan to do something for the country which has given him birth and he will turn a deaf ear to your request. He will not contribute anything for a national cause and will not pay any attention to the appeal of nationalist orators. The words patriotism and national sovereignty are meaningless terms to him and do not strike any responsive chord in his breast. The western man regrets that he has only one life to give to his country; the Indian regrets that he has only one life to sacrifice for his religion. Patriotism does not exist in India and will not take root until religious emotion is excised out of its moral constitution.

It is not only the ignorant and superstitious masses who are swayed by their theological outlook and lack any enthusiasm for a patriotic cause; the educated classes are equally destitute of the spirit of patriotism and are guilty of subordinating the interests of nationhood and the country to their individual and group interests. They never transcend the boundaries of race and religion, and are committed to the advancement of interests of their particular province and community, but never of India as a whole. That so-called Mahatma Gandhi has frankly told that he is Hindu first and Indian afterwards and that cow is to him more dear than India. He openly proclaims that he will not accept Russian aid, if it were offered, to free India, not because the Russians are insincere and selfish, but because they are atheists and hostile to religion. Gandhi loves more his God and future salvation and is infinitely more selfish than a servile Indian in the employment of foreign administration. The Moslem Ali brothers have declared more than once that they are Islamists first and Indians by necessity and that they owe allegiance to the country of their faith, Arabia, and not to India. They want to establish a Moslem raj, and not an Indian raj, based on the Koranic conception of law and government and controlled in the interests of their co-religionists. The English educated Sikhs are equally sectarian and clamor for separate communal representation. The founder of their nationality intended them to be patriots from the first to the last and to lay down at the altar of the Motherland what they hold most dear in life. But they have ignored Lord Govind Singh's commands and have practically degenerated to the level of other Indian communities in patriotism. There are Hindu and Moslem patriots, Sikh and Parsi patriots, but no Indian patriots. There is not a single Indian leader, with the sole exception of Jawahar Lall Nehru, who can be called a sincere patriot.

At present Hindus and the Mohammedans are engaged in a suicidal struggle and a relentless warfare. In the last four or five years there have been many physical clashes between the two communities over religious differences such as the playing of music before the mosque by the Hindus and the killing of the cow by the Moslems, resulting in much bloodshed and riots, and loss of life and property. The tension between the two is becoming more intense than ever before in Indian history and there is no prospect of the speedy demise of the demon of communal bitterness. The hatred of the Hindu and the Moslem is deeply rooted in religion, in tradition, in history and in outlook on life, and will not cease to exist in the near future. It is not the creation of yesterday and will not pass away tomorrow. There are towns and districts in India where the two religions face each other like armies on a battlefield, and where the slightest provocation given by one side or the other ignites pent-up hatreds and ushers in furious carnage and bloody human destruction. A cow slaughtered in the Hindu quarter, and a dead pig thrown into the mosque is enough to fan the flames and to incite the two communities to fall at each other's throats. Cow is sacred to the Hindu and its protection is enjoined upon him by his sacred books. The Hindu will not eat beef and tolerate beef eating because cow is always pure and divine; the Mohammedan will not eat bacon because to him it is always unclean and impure, and strictly prohibited by the injunctions of the Koran. The Hindus cannot assimilate and fuse with the cow slayers and cannot admit them into their personal and social relations. Beef and bacon do not mix, and will not mix until there is a radical change in the mentality of both.

The cleaveage between the two communities condemns India to bear the brunt of British domination and compels her to resign submissively to the will of her foreign rulers. British imperialism in India does not rest on sword or the consent of the governed, as wrongly supposed by many, but on religion. India has been brought under English imperial sway by religion and is kept down under subjection by it. Were religion to disappear miraculously from India today British rule would pass away tomorrow. No machine guns, no efficient instruments of human destruction of latest invention, no resources of materialistic science, no political acumen, and no subtle diplomacy can ever hope to keep three hundred million people in bondage if they resolve to throw away imperialistic despotism. Were Indians to withdraw their cooperation and boycott everything British the whole machinery of government would collapse like a house of cards and would come to a sudden end. But India is torn with religious dissentions and cannot make any combination against her exploiters. The British have become past masters by their long acquaintance with the country and its people in the method of divide and rule. Their two big wives, Hindu and the Mohammedan, are always jealous and suspicious of each other and cannot form an alliance against and cannot bridle the evil propensities of their lord. As long as there is religious difference between the two communities the position of the British as paramount dictators is secure and there is nothing which can dislodge them from their aristocratic authority.

The British recognize this fact more than the Indians. They are very careful of preserving religious animosities and superstitions among the Indian people in order to keep them immune from the infection of foreign ideas and to make them amenable to their rule. At present British bureaucracy is devising the most sinister methods to check the advancing tide of nationalism and secularism and to throw back Indian freedom by a century. Last year a bill was introduced in the Indian legislative assembly known as the public safety bill by British officialdom to shield the faiths of India from the onslaughts of Bolshevism and to deport from the country all communistic agitators. A proposal has just been made to thrust religion in all schools and colleges and to ram the throats of innocent Indian students with the principles of theism. The most mischievous propaganda is carried on in favor of religious education with the help of Christian missionaries, and with the religiously inclined Indians whose interests are identical with the British and whose very existence depends upon the religious superstitions of the people. Liberal grants are given in-aid to all communal institutions out of the public revenue. The sectarian schools, whether they are Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, or Christian, are the hotbeds of unscientific, unhistorical, and unphilosophical education, and are the centers of perpetuating class rivalries, and national and religious antipathies. They fasten upon the minds of poor students barbarous physics, barbarous astronomy, and barbarous history, and stuff them with antipatriotic ideas and tendencies. The puranic, the Koranic, the Granthic, and the Biblical interpretation of the universe and the cosmos is just the one and the same thing; it simply differs in detail. The religious pedagogical institutions are the greatest menace to the intellectual development of the Indian youth and the most dangerous enemies of the creation of a united Indian nation.

What India needs most is not a religious education, but a thoroughgoing secular education with universal and compulsory military training based on the French pattern. She does not need saints, mahatmas, and theologians, but agricultural chemists, mining engineers, students of hygiene, and political economists, who shall help to develop the material resources and further the industrialization of the country. She is already too much cursed with mystics and dreamers who are a notorious burden on the people. India wants a government that shall put an end to all communal schools, that shall do away with all economic and social inequalities, that shall abolish priesthood and confiscate all property allotted to monastic institutions. The Hindu temples, the Moslem mosques, and the Sikh Gurdwaras are the dens of vice and frightful immorality and the priests of the Indian religions as a class are the most immoral, the most vicious, and the most contemptible specimens among humanity extant. They are a thousand times more rapacious, cruel, and sensual than were the Catholic clergy before the storm of Protestant upheaval burst upon Europe. They are Rasputin thru and thru. They live in magnificent buildings with their hawks and hounds and with their splendid retinue of beautiful female concubines. These parasites and drones feed upon the produce of Indian peasants and workingmen and exploit them by their threats of excommunication and hell and by their promises of heaven and salvation. They eat, drink, and beget, and pass their days in ignoble revelry and in aimless sloth. They are pervaded by profound moral corruption and are enmeshed in sensuality and the lust of the flesh. They are like a barren fig tree fit only to be cast into the hell-fire.

To sum up, the path of India is beset with enormous difficulties and is strewn with almost insurmountable obstacles. The gulf between the Hindu and the Mohammedan will persist for a considerable period of time and will not be easily bridged over. As long as there is religion India's fate is sealed and there can be no true social, political, educational, and industrial regeneration of the Indian people. The sun might begin to rise in the west and set in the east but to say that India will emerge as a united and dominant nation and will take an honored place appropriate to her size and population without complete elimination of religion, in the comity of nations is a dream and by no means a sensible dream. It is utterly unthinkable and impossible. It must not, of course, be supposed that religion will continue to condemn India to an effete epoch and to subserviency to the foreigner. It is liable to go down before the new forces that are convulsing Asia and shaking India to the center. The impact of modern civilization is pressing upon the old and conservative Indian world order with irresistible fury and is bursting asunder the firm joints of caste and ancient moorings. The new ideas are a dynamite that batters down the steel ramparts of religious obscurantism and shivers the thick ice of invetrate custom and tradition. Nor must it be forgotten that the process of evolution involves the dissolution of primitive beliefs and that the advance of society on industrial lines implies the disintegration of religion. The crusade of Russia, China and Turkey against this colossal Asiatic barbarism will exercise a tremendous influence on the Indian situation and will prepare the peoples to adopt a hostile attitude towards religion. In India itself conditions are arising which make for sudden change, for distrust against established social regime, and for a wide-spread intellectual and spiritual unrest. India indeed is standing unheeding, as France stood in the second-half of the eighteenth century, on the brink of a crater which is destined to change profoundly by its eruption the whole course of her historical development and civilization. And when that explosion occurs it will be the most glorious day in the history of India and the East.

THE COSMIC TEETH

BY LAWRENCE PARMLY BROWN

IV. *The Teeth of Vakub-Cakix*

THE most elaborate and altogether the most obscure mythic concepts relating to the teeth are found in the story of Vakub-Cakix in the *Popol Vuh* of the Quiches of Guatemala in Central America. As extant, the *Popol Vuh* dates only from the seventeenth century A. D., but it purports to be a memory reproduction of an ancient lost book. The extant text was written in Quiche by a native of Guatemala and shortly translated into Spanish by Francisco Ximenez; but both the Quiche text and the Spanish translation remained concealed in Guatemala until the middle of the nineteenth century, when they were found by C. Sherzer, who published the translation of Ximenez in 1856. Brasseur de Bourbourg published the Quiche text with a French translation in 1861, and several other translations or versions have appeared since then,[17] the best of which is that of J. A. Villacorta and F. Rodas, in Spanish, published together with the Quiche text under title of *Manuscript de Chicicastenango* (*Popol Buj*), Guatemala, 1927.

We shall find reasons for concluding that in the original myth of Vakub-Cakix he was a personification of the imaginary fire of the underworld, and that as such he was recognized as a dawn figure;

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[17] An English version of Book I (otherwise Traditions I and II), including the Vakub-Cakix myth, was published by J. Price in *Lucifer,* a Theosophical magazine, 1894-1895. K. S. L. Guthrie followed with an English version of the whole *Popol Vuh* in another Theosophical magazine, *The Word,* 1905-1906. A German version by N. E. Pohoriller appeared in 1913; a Spanish version by S. I. Barberena, 1923, and a French version by G. Raynaud, 1925. We also have English epitomes of the work by H. H. Bancroft (in his *Native Races*) and by L. Spence (in his *Popol Vuh,* a booklet, 1908; in his myths of *Mexico and Peru,* 1913, and in the *Open Court,* Vol. XLII, Nov., 1928). All these versions and epitomes follow Brasseur or Ximenez, or represent a composite of both; but Brasseur is not very exact and Ximenez even less so.

for it was supposed that the underworld fire is seen in our world when the gates of the east are opened for the rising of the sun (and again at sunset when the western gates are opened). And we shall also find reasons for concluding that the personified Vakub-Cakix was conceived with a materialized body, and that as a dawn figure he was fabled to have lived in the mythical dawn period that followed the night of a universal deluge; his fabled dwelling place being the dawn land in the far east where the Quiches and other ancient Americans supposed they had originated.

Therefore in all probability the original dental organs of Vakub Cakix were flame-teeth which were conceived as materialized like the rest of his body. And there are reasons for concluding that his materialized teeth were fabled to have been the primordial precious stones, while his eyes were the primordial precious metals; the existing precious stones and metals of the earth being recognized as fragments of his teeth and eyes.

In the *Popol Vuh* we have the only extant account of the personified Vakub-Cakix. His name is translated "Seven-Fire-Plumes" by Villacorta and Rodas, while others make it "Seven-Fire" and interpret it as "Seven-times-the-color-of-fire"—which may safely be rejected. The same name is applied by the Quiches to the ara-macao, guacamaya, guaca or great macaw, a gorgeous paraquet whose predominant colors are red, blue, yellow and green; and as the personified Vakub-Cakix was decorated with plumes according to the *Popol Vuh,* there can be no doubt that they were conceived like those of the great macaw, and that the "Seven" in "Seven-Fire-Plumes" referred alike to all the colors of the bird and all the colors of the dawn—the gorgeous clouds of the dawn being the plumes or feathers of the personified Vakub-Cakix. Here we seem to have the European concept of the seven primary colors, which could hardly have been known to the Quiches except through the Spaniards; and therefore it is possible that the name as extant is of comparatively late origin. But in all probability the myth of Vakub-Cakix as we have it represents an ancient original in a more or less corrupt form.

Tradition I of the *Popol Vuh* closes with an account of a universal deluge and the destruction of a race of man-like beings who preceded the human race on earth. In Tradition II we have the story of Vakub-Cakix, which opens as follows (according to a close rendering of the Spanish version of Villacorta and Rodas):

"As yet there was not on the surface of the land more than very little light, for the sun did not exist. But there dwelt thereon a being filled with pride; Vakub-Cakix was his name.[18]

"The sky and the land already existed, but hidden still were the faces of the sun and moon.

"Then said Vakub-Cakix: 'Only in this manner shall it be possible to bring hither the pure teaching after the inundation of the people. . . . I will be their sun. I will be their light. I will likewise be the moon that illumines them.' So he spoke then.

" 'Great is my wisdom and intelligence. I will be he who looms among the people.

" 'For my eyes are as of metal, like emeralds set in their sockets where they gleam; and similarly my teeth shine as precious stones, like the clarity of heaven. [Further on he is made to say 'I hold my riches in my teeth and eyes,' and it is stated that "his teeth of emerald. . . . made his mouth gleam," while his eyes had a "metallic glitter"].

" 'In this same manner my nostrils gleam afar, like the moon; the place where I shelter myself is also of metal; the surface of the ground also shines when I go forth in front of my place of shelter.

" 'In this same manner then I am the sun and the moon, and I will be the cause that the sons and daughters of the land civilize themselves and become intelligent; and so will it be because my sight reaches afar.'

"Thus spoke Vakub-Cakix; but in truth he was not the sun that gives light, and it was only pride of his plumes and metallic glitter that made him speak thus."

That Vakub-Cakix was conceived as a gigantic figure is evident from the character of his two sons, whose adventures after the death of their father are described in Tradition III of the *Popol Vuh.* In Tradition II we have only their names and occupations. Cabrakan ("Earth-shaker") shakes the mountains and upsets the earth, while Zipacna ("Earth-heaper") is said to have heaped up certain large mountains which existed at the time of the dawn, and were in a night created by Zipacna. These sons appear to be no more than mythic variants of Vakub-Cakix himself as a figure of the underworld fire, which was supposed to burst through the earth in volcanoes, heap up mountains and cause earthquakes.

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[18] Villacorta and Rodas have "Gakup-Cakix." While their translation will be followed throughout the present consideration of the myth, the older and generally received transliterations of the proper nouns will be employed as being more readily recognizable than those of V. and R.

According to the *Popul Vuh,* the wife of Vakub-Cakix and the mother of his gigantic sons, was Chimalmat ("Shield-bearer"), whose death occurred at about the same time as that of her husband. She is well-known as an Aztec goddess (with her name variously transliterated), and is probably a personification of the night, with the starry sky or perhaps the moon as her shield. The mother and father of the great Mexican man-god Quetzalcoatl were Chimalma and Camaxtli, according to Mendieta; but according to Motolinia, they were Chimamatl and Iztacmixcoatl (See H. H. Bancroft, *Native Races,* Vol. III, pp. 249, 250). Quetzalcoatl ("Bird-serpent") is often figured with a conventionalized bird-face, the bird being the beautiful green and red trogan known as the quetzal (*pharomacrus mocinno*), the feathers of which are sometimes placed on a serpent in Maya art (Tozzer and Allen, "Animal Figures in the Maya Codices," in *Papers of the Peabody Museum,* Vol. IV, no. 3, p. 340).

Like Vakub-Cakix, Quetzalcoatl was an introducer of civilization and is said to have been very wealthy in precious stones and metals—and also in maize and other food supplies (see Bancroft, Vol. III, pp. 241, 256, 261). Though generally recognized as a god of the air or wind, Quetzalcoatl is sometimes the celestial deity of the east, the region of wealth and fertility (Seler, *Codex Vaticanus B,* p. 88), and according to the *Anales de Quauhtitlan* he wore the decorations of the fire-god and finally burnt himself to death, whereupon his heart became the Morning Star (*Ib.,* p. 138). Acosta describes an image of Quetzalcoatl with the face of a bird having a red bill with ranks of teeth (probably those of a serpent, for birds have no teeth), and he says this image was surrounded by a wealth of gold, silver and jewels (see Bancroft, Vol. III, p. 249). In some respects, therefore, Quetzalcoatl has much the same character as Vakub-Cakix; but the serpent is in no way associated with the latter.

The story in the *Popol Vuh* continues to the effect that two youths (twin brothers), named Hunahpu and Xbalanque, decided to kill Vakub-Cakix because of his pride and arrogance. They concealed themselves with their blowguns under a great tapal or nance tree which the giant was wont to climb (every morning) for the purpose of eating its fruits (which are small, round and yellow). When he had climbed into the tree, a pellet shot from the blowgun of Hunahpu wounded him in the mouth, dislocating his jaw and breaking his teeth. He fell from the tree; but was victorious in the ensuing struggle, during which he tore off one of the arms of Hunaphu. The suffering giant carried the severed arm to his shelter or house and hung it over the fire in vengeful rage, at the same time bemoaning his injuries to his wife.



THE MEXICAN TREE OF THE EAST
(From Codex Fejérváry-Mayer, Sheet 1)

Hunahpu and Xbalanque doubtless represented the sun and moon originally, their blowguns indicating that they were recognized as producers of the winds, which break the teeth of Vakub-Cakix (and scatter his cloud-plumes). These great heroes of the mythical portion of the *Popol Vuh* were conceived miraculously by a virgin mother (the earth); many of their exploits belong to a journey through the underworld, and they seem to be viewed as human figures who were finally transformed into the sun and moon. The name Hunaphu is generally rendered Master-magician, but Villacorta and Rodas have Junajup Blowgunman. Most authorities, including V. and R., agree that Xbalanque signifies Little-tiger (so V. and R. for their Ixbalanque); the animal indicated being the ocelot or American leopard-cat, perhaps suggested as a lunar symbol because of its spotted or blotched appearance. Seler says that "Hunaphu" is the Quiche translation of the Mexican Ce Xochitl ("One Flower") and a variant of the Yucatec Hunhau, Lord of the Realm of the Dead; and this authority recognizes the Quiche hero as a solar figure and notes that "at the end of his exploits he mounts to the sky as the sun" (*Vaticanus B*, p. 11).

Therefore it appears that the rising sun is represented by Hunaphu when he causes the downfall of Vakub-Cakix as the dawn, while the handlike solar flabellum is represented by the young hero's severed arm suspended over the fire of the underworld (see the present writer's "Cosmic Hands," in the *Open Court,* Vol. XXIII, p. 8). In accordance with these interpretations, the great tapal or nance tree climbed by Vakub-Cakix may be recognized as belonging to the eastern quarter of the heaven at dawn, when its small, round and yellow fruits (for stars) are devoured by the giant. This tree is probably the Quiche variant of the Mexican Tree of the East, one of the four trees of the quarters of the heaven pictured in the codices. Each of these trees is formed somewhat like a Latin cross, with three main branches. The Tree of the East is painted blue, or blue and green; and always on the top of its upright branch is a green-plumed bird (a quetzal), while the other branches have flowers or jeweled disks at their tips. According to Seler: "The flower, the jewel, the quetzal bird, are all symbols of costliness, of the precious fecundating moisture. By them the East is characterized as a region of prosperity, of fertility, of abundant food supplies" (*Vaticanus B,* p. 78). In the *Codex Fejérváry Mayer* (sheet 2) we find an eight-rayed star at the base of the Tree of the East, and a human figure standing on either side of its trunk; the one on the right being recognized by Seler as the sun-god, while the one on the left probably represents the moon; and it is quite likely that these two figures reappear as Hunaphu and Xbalanque beneath the tapal or nance tree. Furthermore, in the same codex, all four trees have seven terminal branches, each with a flower at its tip; while in the *Codex Borgia* three of the trees, including the Tree of the East, have seven such branches tipped with jewels.

Originally there may have been only two of these cosmic trees, representing the solar flabelli of the east and the west; and their flowers (or jewels) may have represented the variously colored clouds of sunrise and sunset. Therefore the seven branches, like the "Seven" in the name Vakub-Cakix, may have referred originally to the seven primary colors, of which the Mexicans and Central Americans probably learned from the Spaniards.

According to the story in the *Popol Vuh,* the heroic brothers resolve to recover the arm of Hunaphu, and proceed to the house of Vakub-Cakix accompanied by an aged man and woman (unnamed) whose assistance had been obtained. The old couple make Vakub-Cakix believe that they are the grandparents of the youths, whom the suffering giant does not recognize (probably because his eyes as well as his teeth had been injured, according to the original myth—see below). All authorities are agreed that the old couple are the divine father and mother of the human race who appear in Tradition I of the *Popol Vuh.* Their names are generally transliterated Xpiycoc and Xmucane and translated Great White Boar and Great White Tapir; but it is quite probable that they were originally the Great White Boar and the Great White Sow (i. e., male and female peccaries), for swine have always been recognized as prolific animals. Xpiycoc and Xmucane as the divine father and mother appear in the Maya *Codex Cortesianus* seated under the Tree of Life, which was possibly introduced by the Spaniards as a variant of the Mexican Tree of the East and the tapal or nance tree of the *Popol Vuh.* It is not impossible that Xpiycoc and Xmucane represented the sky-father and earth-mother in the original Vakub-Cakix myth; but in the extant version they appear in human form (probably gigantic), and tell Vakub-Cakix that they belong to a class of physicians who extract worms from aching teeth[19] and cure diseased eyes as well as injured jaws. Sahagun preserves a native account of the Mexican earth-mother Tlacoltcotl or Toci as the patroness of those who let blood, those who take worms from teeth, and those who take worms from eyes—literally "tooth-wormers" and "eye-wormers," in Aztec *tetlanocuilanque teyxcuilanque* (see Seler, *Vaticanus B,* p. 173, and Bancroft, *Native Races,* Vol. III, p. 353). There can be little doubt that Xpiycoc and Xmucane were originally represented in the *Popol Vuh* story as pretending to be both "eye-wormers" and "tooth-wormers"; but in the extant text nothing is said of eye-worms and there is only a passing allusion to the eyes of Vakub-Cakix as injured or diseased, or both (see below).

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[19] The erroneous belief in worms as the cause of decay of the teeth and toothache was probably suggested by the worm-like form of the tooth-nerve. This belief existed from a very ancient time among Oriental peoples, including the Chinese, Hindus, Babylonians and Egyptians. It was held by the Arabian medical writers of the first Christian millenium and was generally accepted in Europe during the Middle Ages, and even till the eighteenth century. But it does not appear to have been known to the ancient Greeks and Romans; the earliest extant reference to it by a classical writer being in the *De Compositione Medicamentorum* of Scribonius Lagus, cap. X, first century A. D. (See especially K. Sudhoff, *Geschichte der Zahnheilkunde,* pp. 21, 28, 36, 49, etc.).

In the *Popol Vuh,* Vakub-Cakix is unable to speak because of the pain from his broken teeth and injured jaw; but he makes signs to Xpiycoc and Xmuchane, imploring them to cure him. And then we have the following dialogue, in which the speechless giant is curiously enough represented as expressing himself by signs:

" 'Two boys, mischievous and malevolent, struck me in the mouth and produced this pain which prevents me from speaking, and I maintain myself only by keeping my jaws and teeth in restraint.'

" 'Very well, lord. Worms are what molest you. We will take out these teeth, and we will make replacements for you.' 'But this not well,' said he, 'because, being a lord, I hold my riches in my teeth and eyes.'

" 'We will put others [i. e., 'other teeth'] in place of these. We will put in some that have the appearance of bone.' Then they thought of putting in for him grains of white maize, because they are like bone [and like teeth].

" 'It is well,' he said to them, 'proceed to extract them then.' So they took out the teeth of Vakub-Cakix, and in their place they put grains of white maize which gleamed in his mouth.

"Soon his ostentation of a great personage fell away because already he was no longer such, since this state ended with his having his teeth of emerald extracted, which before had made his mouth gleam. Also they [the aged couple] acted as if to cure the eyes of Vakub-Cakix, and on uprooting them, they put an end to the metallic glitter which formerly they had."

The death of Vakub-Cakix shortly followed, as did that of his wife; and Hunaphu recovered his arm, which was replaced by the aged couple (in other words, the dawn and the night disappeared, and the sun-god rose with his flabellum hand or arm in place).

The eyes of Vakub-Cakix as a dawn figure are probably stars; and that his nose was identified by some with the crescent moon (as well as with the beak of the great macaw) is indicated by the statement according to which he said: "My nostrils gleam afar, like the moon" (see above). But it is not impossible that he originally had only one eye, for the Morning Star. There can be little doubt that the uprooting or gouging out of his eyes (or single eye) was conceived to have occurred during a pretended operation for the removal of worms; and it is possible that this treacherous act was suggested by the well-known Mexican pictures of a sacrificed human being or god (in profile) with an eye gouged out. According to Seler, this gouging out of an eye symbolizes sacrifice (*Vaticanus B*, pp. 184, 192), and Quetzalcoatl as celestial God of the East is sometimes figured in profile with one eye hanging from its socket, as in the *Codex Borgia* (sheet 51).

In the breaking and extraction of the first or natural teeth of Vakub-Cakix—probably materialized flame-teeth—we have some remarkable resemblances to the breaking and knocking out of the teeth of the Hindu Pushan, which represent the fiery rays of the sun (see above); but here we doubtless have one among many instances of similar mythic concepts originating independently.

The grains of maize (seeds of Indian corn) that became the second or substitute teeth of Vakub-Cakix were probably conceived as the product of the original maize of the dawn period and the dawn land; all things including maize being fabled to have been of gigantic size in that time and that place.

The ancient Mexicans and Central Americans had several maize deities and various myths relating to the origin of maize. In the latter part of the *Popol Vuh*, the first maize is said to have been found in a land to the east (the mythic dawn land), while the first human beings were created by the gods from the yellow and white maize of that land (see Bancroft, *Native Races*, Vol. II, pp. 716-718 and V, pp. 193, 194). Mythically this is the same maize that was originally found by Quetzalcoatl; one account representing him as the wealthy ruler of the Toltec city of Tulla in the ancient time when an ear of maize was an ordinary man's load, being so large that it required both his arms to clasp it (Bancroft, Vol. III, pp. 261, 241).

According to the Navajos, the original seeds of maize and other plants were brought by a turkey-hen which came from the region of the Morning Star (*ibid,* p. 83) ; and this bird is evidently identical with the sacred turkey of Mexico, called the emerald fowl, to which offerings of maize paste were made (See Spence, Myths of Mexico and Peru, p. 186. Seler says it was called the jeweled fowl, *Vaticanus B,* p. 75).

Nothing is said in the *Popol Vuh* as to what became of the body of Vakub-Cakix; but in the original myth it probably mingled with the earth everywhere (not only in the dawn land), while the giant's substitute teeth[20] were broken into fragments to become the seeds of the first maize plants of ordinary size. And it is also probable that the broken and extracted natural teeth of Vakub-Cakix were fabled to have become the precious stones of the earth, which are various colors and are often said to have a fire of their own;[21] while his gouged out eyes were changed into the precious metals of the earth. In the *Popol Vuh,* where the giant evidently has a materialized body, his teeth "shine as precious stones," and his eyes "are as of metal," etc.

Therefore it seems that the fire-giant as a dawn figure was conceived somewhat like the macrocosmic man of other myths, whose living body formed the material universe, or whose dead body became that universe. In the Egyptian *Hymn to Ptah-Tenen,* that god has a hidden body, with his eyes as the sun and moon, etc., and it is said to him that "the staff of life (grain) proceeds from thy back (the earth); thou makest the earth to bring forth fruit" (Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians,* Vol. I, pp. 509, 511). One of the forms of the macrocosmic Rā is that of Tenen, and he is "armed with teeth" (*Litany of Ra,* I, 3, 66, 71). It is said of the Persian Kuni that the sky came from his skin; the earth from his flesh; the mountains from his bones and the trees from his hair (*Sikandgumanik Vigar,* XVI, 8-20). According to the *Elder Edda,* the Scandinavian Ymir's skull became the heaven; his bones, the hills; his hair, trees and plants, etc. (*Grimnismal,* 40); and the *Younger Edda* adds that stones and pebbles were made from his teeth, together with some bits of broken bones (I, 8). The teeth of men and animals are the hardest parts of their bodies, and in the Mexican calendar man the sign of the flint-stone is allotted to his teeth (Kingsborough, *Mexican Antiquities,* Vol. II, plate 75, and Bancroft, *Native Races,* Vol. III, p. 129). In the case of the macrocosmic man P'an Ku of the Chinese Taoists, his eyes became the sun and moon; the hair of his head and his beard became constellations; his skin and the hair thereon became plants and trees, while his teeth and bones were changed into the metals, and his marrow into the precious stones of the earth (Mayers, *Chinese Reader's Manual,* No. 558, edition 1924, p. 186). The Mangaians of Polynesia give a similar account of their Ru, as do the Iroquois Indians of their Chokanipak (See A. Lang, *Myth, Religion and Ritual,* Vol. I, p. 246).[22]

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[20] The suggestion for these teeth is of course found in the resemblance between grains of maize and human teeth; and it is quite probable that some of the crude idols of Mexico and Central America were fitted with maize grains for teeth. No evidence of this appears to be extant; but the Hallow-e'en pumpkin heads of modern North America are sometimes given teeth of maize grains, and Sahagun tells us that some of the small images of Tlaloc were moulded of dough, with calabash pips for teeth and haricot beans for eyes. (*Historia General de las Cosas de Neuva Espana,* I, XXI; Spence, Gods of Mexico, p. 235).

[21] Anatole France makes one of his characters say that the pearls which serve for the teeth of salamanders are composed of "materialized light" (*Rotisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* IX). A fragment of a rainbow is called "a tooth" and "an angry tooth" in some parts of England (J. Wright, *Dialect Dictionary,* s. v. Tooth).

"The sky and the land already existed" before Vakub-Cakix died, according to the *Popol Vuh* (see above); but it is probable that the land was conceived as a barren waste immediately after the deluge, and that the subsequent vegetation was fabled to have come from the dead giant's skin, while his flesh became the fertile soil, etc. It is probable that his skin was originally conceived to have been of a green hue; for the dawn and sunset skies of the tropics are often remarkably green, ranging from a deep olive above to the lighter shades below, where they merge into the yellows and reds. And it is also probable that the green hue of the giant's skin was erroneously transferred by some to his teeth and also to his eyes (whence the allusions in the *Popol Vuh* to "his teeth of emerald" and his "eyes like emaralds").[23]

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[22] See also the present writer's "Cosmic Man and Homo Signorum," in the *Open Court,* Vol. XXXV, p. 10.

[23] It is thought by some that "green jadeite" should be substituted for "emeralds" and "emerald" in these allusions, as words for the latter were also quite generally employed for the former by the Mexicans and Central Americans; and as many upper anterior teeth inlaid with little disks of jadeite and haematite have been found in Central American tombs, several of the leading authorities on American antiquities have suggested to the present writer that teeth inlaid with jadeite are to be understood in the Vakub-Cakix myth. But no such explanation can be accepted in view of what is said of the giant's eyes, etc.

Moreover, it is possible that the Vakub-Cakix macaw of the Quiches, as a symbol of the dawn sky, is a mere variant of the Aztec quetzal; for the wing coverts and tail feathers of the latter are green while the breast is scarlet (fiery). And it is also possible that the tooth extraction concept in the myth of the personified Vakub-Cakix was suggested by some ancient story according to which the great macaw or the quetzal originally had teeth but lost them in some such way as those of the dawn giant are said to have been lost.

According to the very unsatisfactory suggestion of Spence, Vakub-Cakix is an earth-god; the extraction of his emerald teeth and the implantation of the maize-seed substitutes being an allegory of the agricultural removal of the green turf of the earth and the planting of maize seed (*Popol Vuh,* p. 42; *Myths of Mexico and Peru,* p. 237). Others take the mythical giant for a sun-god, while Bancroft supposes that he was originally a human monarch (*Native Races,* Vol. V, pp. 184, 187).

IS INSANITY UNSOCIAL?

BY GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK

IN a recent number of *The Sociological Review* Dr. Alice Raven enumerated the chief characteristics of various sorts of insanity. These, she held, can easily be detected, and the persons afflicted, by immediate detention and treatment in hospitals, can be saved from crime. With the article in general I am in complete agreement. I wish to raise a question about only one statement made in it although it is substantially repeated several times. The statement is this: "In all his thinking he (the insane man) has himself and his own advantage as the centre." (p.287) But is insanity always and in all respects unsocial in the thought of the person afflicted? My observation would suggest that it is not—as we shall now proceed to show.

(1) In some cases the insane man blames *himself*—possibly for deeds which he has done, and is grateful to society for searching him out and trying to redeem him—possibly in larger ways than society has done. One patient, on arriving home in a deluded condition, cried out to his family: "O love that wilt not let me go." He thought that his family had been seeking to redeem him from imagined sins all his life. It is true that even in this case the patient was thinking of his own advantage—but not in opposition to the advantage of society. Yet it is in the sense of in-opposition-to-the-advantage-of-society that Dr. Raven used the term "his own advantage." For earlier she had referred to the "anti-social tendencies which mark all persons of abnormal psychology."

(2) In some cases the chief comfort that the insane man has in his terrors is that no other human being has ever been called upon to go through worse tortures than he is experiencing. He identifies himself with all the most unfortunate of his fellow men—

"even these least." Life in a hospital is helpful to him because here he can most easily make such an identification.

(3) In some cases the insane man is interested in himself to an unusual degree only as a servant of a real truth which society needs but will not accept. Even when his truth is an obvious delusion, his attitude is not anti-social. Jesus thought of himself as a martyr for truth. Would the author say that therefore he was anti-social? Dr. J. H. Jowett once declared that Jesus was either God-man or mad-man. Would Dr. Raven insist upon the latter alternative?

(4) And in some cases a man remains amid circumstances of great stress for those who will not compromise, with the purpose of serving society, and so goes insane, with the more or less conscious realization that thus he will reveal to society that it is not giving a square deal even to its devoted members. And any society which allows some members—perhaps through the mere fact of having inherited a fortune—to live in wanton luxury while it refuses work to many eager to work at anything at all equal to their intelligence and training *is* essentially unjust. The ten percent of the people who control ninety percent of the wealth of the country, do not possess ninety percent of the ability. Even when perfectly adventitious causes do not determine the financial status of a man, and when no unfair control of the means of wealth has been resorted to, men are rewarded for their special commercial ability, not absolutely, but geometrically. A slight initial superiority, because of the way modern society is organized, receives a constantly increasing reward. There is no essential justice in such a society. It is true that a man in need can generally get some help from charity, but he may be too *socially* sensitive to seek it—till after he has gone insane and so cannot help himself.

Or perhaps the work offered a man would prevent his carrying out a purpose which *he*, at least, thinks of as valuable for society. Or prospective employers may encourage a man to wait, and still wait, for the position in which he can serve society as he desires—but never actually offer him the position. In any of these cases a man may let his mind fall to pieces to get the help of society to get a proper position and to reveal to society its essential injustice and so aid it to reform. If the gentleness of the little child of Biblical vision cannot lead society to the place of redemption, perhaps the expense and terror of the growing multitude of the insane will.

But perhaps it may be replied that a man can live *utterly* true to his ideals in the service of society without having to pay the price of insanity—simply by remaining level-headed. But he cannot. Perhaps the modern Calvinist, to take one extreme, thinks that he does so, strong in his faith in the final triumph of his God. But with all his consistency, no Calvanist has ever dared to think through the question of God's decrees, and all of them after assigning an untold section of mankind to eternal torment, are quite ready to go home and eat tenderloin beefsteak smothered in onions. Or, to take the other extreme, the modern socialist. The socialist candidate for president, Norman Thomas, said in a public speech on a hot summer day that increasingly he realized the compromises that he made, and so increasingly was tolerant of those that others made. It is the insane alone who have been utterly sincere in devotion to some truth which, in some aspect at least, they believe might be of service to society. The rest of us either compromise unwittingly with our holiest visions, and struggle blindly on under their waning light, and still hope; or, in the full glare of consciousness we reconstruct for our guidance philosophies which contain no absolute values unmediated by their opposites.

Even when personal complexes must share with society the responsibility for the wrecking of a man's life, these can be read as the result of the insupportable burdens which society has placed upon him. At last, as the result of his life in society, a man by a multitude of at least partly conscious mental acts may give in and gives up. He may let society have its way—but not while he is sane. Thus he is enabled to declare emphatically what society is by the very going insane and permits her to begin her own redemption by saving him.

By carrying out such a program, a man can have a profound influence upon society. All of the modern study of the mind, and the consequent construction of the true laws of happy thought (as opposed to the dogmas of religion through which formerly men hoped to find peace) may be said to have been forced upon society by those who went insane rather than give up purposes which they rightly held as worthy and wholesome. Of course it would have been better if all men had always been happy and good, and so if it had never been necessary to study the psychology of the abnormal. But at any given time, with most men miserable, the man who goes insane, and so forces society to study the nature of the human mind and discover the laws of happiness for the benefit of all men, and to correct its irrational industrial awards and moral standards, may be conceived of as a social benefactor and in his own character as profoundly social—partly unconsciously, but partly consciously, in so far as he has remained true to his ideals and would not adjust himself to life as it now is. The longest way around is sometimes the shortest way home.

An excellent illustration of how effective such laying down of one's life may be is supplied by those whose lives were ruined by the old methods of education. The observation of the ruin thus wrought has caused the introduction of the project method of instruction into many schools. Even this method will be greatly improved as *its* failures are noted. The lives ruined by the old method were, indeed, ruined. Those ruined, in turn, were cruel or unwise to others. They would not make pleasant companions. Yet in a profound sense they have served the progress of education. By the sacrifice of such lives society has been progressively redeemed. In this knowledge, when even vaguely grasped, is their peace. In this service is their atonement—the only atonement which is morally defensible.

Insanity may, we must then conclude, in very important respects be social. Therefore it is not necessary to tell a patient—as the whole truth—that his failures have been due to his own deficiencies, that his whole past life has been so mistaken that society has been justified in rejecting him, that his labors have had no value, his bitter sacrifices have been useless, his feeble protests against society have had no objective justification, that at best he is a victim of his infantile history, and not at all the martyr of his true ideals. Yet psychiatrists, perhaps inadvertently, sometimes condemn by implication the entire past life of the patient, when trying to tear down the patient's idea of himself and of society so that they can be rebuilt in such wise that the patient will be willing to accept life as it is.

Now, I do not believe that society has as yet so fully become the "beloved community" that such a view of the past life of a patient can be held in any case to be absolutely true. Insistence upon its truth naturally retards the reviving confidence of a patient in his doctor, and so in society, whose representative the doctor is to the patient. A patient may rightly believe that as a result of his tragic experiences, and his deep ponderings, he has come upon profound, revolutionary truths, which society is not ready to accept, and that it rejects him because he is "a voice crying in the wilderness." The possibility of all this being the case I believe that the psychiatrist can safely acknowledge, and so win the patient to reconciliation to society far more quickly than by the present denials, confusions or evasions in the matter. (For a single illustration of the uncertainty which now prevails in psychiatry about this matter, consult: *Understanding Human Nature* by Alfred Adler.) Imply that an insane person is anti-social until converted by the particular evangelist in charge, that at present there is nothing of sacrificial worth in his life ("Nothing in my hand I bring, simply to thy *word* I cling"), and he will remain unconverted for some time. But make clear that psychic health does not demand a denial of the value of devotion to individually formulated truth, and a patient will be reconciled quickly to his doctor and to society—in any respect in which he is not so already.

Freudianism, which views insanity from the standpoint of its origin in the initial experiences of those afflicted by it, and Adlerism, which views insanity from the standpoint of the efforts of the individual to master his environment, should be supplemented by a theory of insanity, and by a technique for its analysis and cure, based on its social implications—both the failures of society to meet the normal needs of the natural human being and the social ideals in the service of which the patient has assumed burdens which have crushed him. Until this has been done, our treatment of insanity will be unstable, ever defeating its own efforts, inadequate.

Any tendency on the part of a patient toward vindicative bitterness against society because of what he has endured, may be overcome by revealing all the members of society as the victims of complexes and unfavorable conditions as well as the patient, and so as worthy of the same respect (altho perhaps in varying degree) that he asks for himself. At length he will see society as a drama of conflicting forces out of which is slowly being evolved "the beloved community," which is the Kingdom of God. In this evolution his struggles have an essential place. This is the teaching of religion, for "the things that are despised did God choose." And it is the teaching of science, for in science nothing that is can be denied its place in the final ordering of experience. In the physical sciences, we must in all formulas take account (implicitly) of every quantum of matter and force. And if we are to develop a social science, we cannot permit ourselves to regard any state of consciousness of any soul as of no ultimate significance, which the totally invalid cannot have.

All detention of a patient in a hospital as too unsocial to be at large for his own good or that of society, till he renounces faith in himself and accepts the conditions prevailing in the hospital—for instance, continuous immoralities, as willingly as he would the truly necessary injustices out in the world; or until he becomes as docile to superiors as is a hundred percent American, is unjustified. No lover of mankind has ever been so. Anna Freud in the January number of *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* (p. 37) supports the former of the two points which I have just made, and so by implication the social theory of insanity which I am advocating. She seems to disapprove of insistence by authorities upon prolonged hospital life for a patient whose super-ego under the conditions of hospital life increases its demands as it would not in normal life. Therefore she seems to believe that the actual good of the patient should guide his treatment, that he is not to be a pawn in the hands of his doctors, to be made over into a creature who simply accepts his environment. She regards the patient's ideals as the factor which should determine his environment, not vice versa. Therefore she seems not to regard insanity as unsocial, as something to be rebuked, stamped out. Rather, she seems to be laying the grounds for its recognition—at least in one aspect—as social because a constituent part of a personality not essentially at war with society, and for its treatment as such. She writes:

"By the kindness of Dr. Ferenczi I have had an opportunity of seeing the notes of a mistress at one of the modern American schools, the Walden School. This mistress, who has had a psychoanalytical training, describes how neurotic children whose home-standards are strict, and who comes to her school while still in the kindergarten age, after a longer or shorter period of holding back in amazement, grow accustomed to the extraordinarily free atmosphere and gradually lose their neurotic symptoms, most of which are reactions to breaking the habit of onanism. We know that with an adult neurotic it would be impossible to produce a similar effect. The freer the environment into which he finds himself transplanted the greater is his dread of the instinct in question and, therewith, the more marked the accentuation of his neurotic defence—reactions, i.e., his symptoms. The demands made on him by his super-ego are no longer susceptible to influence from his environment. A child, on the contrary, once he begins to modify his standards, is inclined rather to go a long way in this direction and allow himself more latitude than even the freest surroundings could permit him."

But of course the outstanding author and advocate of a social interpretation of insanity is Trigant Burrow in his *The Social Basis of Consciousness.* And perhaps we shall not do justice to this aspect until we employ "group analyses"—such as he suggests. But even if we never go so far as that, we ought to give much thought to this aspect of the matter and recognize it in our treatment of patients—as some private psychiatrists are already doing largely empirically.

Yet even Freudianism approaches close to the social interpretation of insanity when it traces the origins of psychoses past the experience of the individual to that of the race. Adlerism does so likewise when it views insanity from the standpoint of the *purposes* of the individual. Perhaps these—at present inimical theories—will find their conscious reconciliation in a social theory of insanity—as thesis and antithesis in their synthesis. And perhaps thru a social theory of insanity, psychiatry will be brought into a fruitful relation to social reform—to the unlimited benefit of mankind. Perhaps in psychiatry we shall secure an exact knowledge of the places where society presses with too great a pressure upon the individual and how to reward the dreamer of dreams with reasonable means of self-expression before he turns his back upon reality in discouragement, thus at once making unnecessary the stern sacrifice of the insane for society and causing its mental health to become sound to the core.

Until we come to acknowledge that the insane are not necessarily anti-social beings, (1) we shall not deal with them wisely; (2) we shall not deal wisely with reformers who are not adjusted to society as it is, yet who have not yet broken down (for instance, John Ruskin before his break-down); and so (3) we shall not be able to induce them to turn to psychiatrists for help before a crisis has overtaken them. To induce people to turn to mental doctors for aid in carrying their purposes into effect as readily as people now turn to physical doctors for the re-establishment of their bodily health—without any sense of shame or inferiority—is the great need of our contemporary life. It should be the final aim of all psychiatrists. But, let me insist, this they cannot do until they have divorced in the public mind mental sickness and fundamentally unsocial attitudes.

PLURALISM, LIFE AND "VALUE"

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

SINCE the brilliant and often paradoxical William James startled the metaphysicians and philosophers of his day by arguing for the possibility, or probability, of a "pluralistic" universe, not a few writers have ventured to supply additional—and stronger—props for that speculation.

The latest contributor to the discussion is C. E. M. Joad, the British author and exponent of recent philosophical thought. He has published a book on *Matter, Life and Value,* and, as the title perhaps indicates, the argument throughout is an effort to demolish the basis of Monism and to prove that pluralism is, at least, more consistent with the facts we human beings are forced to face and to explain.

We cannot here consider the argument in all its details, but some of Mr. Joad's views, methods of forming and drawing conclusions, and rather curious logic will be examined and analyzed.

In the first place, he questions the right of any school of thought to make definite statements concerning the nature and complexion of the universe. We do not know, he says, the *whole* of the universe, and consequently our notion about it must necessarily be *partial, incomplete and inexact.* This is true enough, but the reason Monism has found wide acceptance is to be found in the simple fact that it gave a better account of what we did and do know of the universe than does any other theory. If new knowledge, additional data, tend to refute Monism and enthrone pluralism, the philosophical situation is undergoing a great change, and serious thinkers will have to readjust their view.

Mr. Joad says further that he has never been able to find a good reason why the universe should be reduced to one thing instead of two or more things, or principles. Yet the reason or reasons have been presented again and again, and most thinkers have found them cogent and satisfactory. It is the business of the pluralists to refute and invalidate them, and this they have scarcely succeeded in doing thus far.

The quintessence of Mr. Joad's own argument may be summarized as follows:—We are bound to conceive of or construct the mental model of the universe with the materials we possess, ignoring nothing and assuming nothing. Well, the actual materials, contends our author, include at least three independent existing "reals"—namely, Matter, Life and Value. No philosophy, it is contended, has covered and explained all reality, though some systems have furnished tolerably respectable accounts of some realities. The *physical universe* is "given." It is a fact from which the human mind cannot escape. The *Life Force* is another and distinct fact; it resists any effort of thinkers or rhetoricians to merge it with matter. The latter, indeed, seems to act as the instrument or servant of the former. Finally, there emerges the *World of Value*—distinct, self-existent, supreme. In its highest forms and reaches, according to the author, life contemplates and exalts value. Mystics, poets, prophets and idealists excel all others in their appreciation and realization of value. The goal of evolution is to be conceived as "continuous awareness of a world of objective value." When that final stage is reached, "the Life Force will come to rest in the contemplation of reality."

However, this ecstatic contemplation of reality fully revealed will never be possible to the average man. Only the happy few, the chief actors in the evolutionary drama, will catch fleeting glimpses of the infinite, the realm of pure being. Only the life force in its totality will rejoice in the apprehension of the complete reality.

Truly, a fearful-wonderful metaphysical system! Alas, it sounds better than it is. Let us reduce it to its elements and see what is left of each of them after majestic and noble words have been translated into plain terms of speech.

First of all let us ask whether it is true, and universally admitted to be true, that matter, life and value are *distinct, self-subsistent reals*. This claim is opposed to all modern physics and astrophysics. What is matter? We do not know. It is composed of atoms, and the atoms are miniature solar systems with positive and negative units of electricity as the planets. Well, what is electricity? Again, we do not know. We do not know the stuff of our material universe. Hence we have no right to call it "material." We have no right to call it spiritual, or anything else, either. We simply note its behavior in certain circumstances and describe it.

In the second place, let us ask our metaphysician if he knows where matter, no-life ends, and Life begins. He cannot tell us, and no one else can. The line is far from clear or bold. We do not know what life is, what causes it to emerge, and just what occurs when it does emerge. We know that living beings act differently from things that are not alive, but that is all. For practical purposes, to be sure, life is a distinct real, but metaphysics and philosophy are not satisfied with practical purposes. Life and matter may not be as independent of each other as they seem to be. We simply must suspend judgment upon the question of their interdependence or mutual independence.

Now, as to Value. It is to be granted, of course, that value *implies* life. Where there is no life, there can be no thought, no contemplation, no wonder and awe, and hence no conception of value or values. But—is value a human monopoly? The Life Force informs, and acts through, the lower animals and the tiniest insects as well as through evolved and "Godlike" human beings. The most marvelous thing in nature, said Darwin, is the ant's microscopic bit of matter we call its brain. Does that bit of matter generate value? If not, at what point *is* value born?

But, insists Mr. Joad, value though it implies life, is yet a distinct and self-subsistent real. Is it? Modern thought holds that value is significant *only because it enhances and exalts life,* not for its own sake, if we can think at all of value-for-its-own sake. Value is a name we give to qualities or manifestations of Life, which makes our own existence desirable, pleasant, thrilling, worthy from a certain point of view. Life, even animal life, would be impossible without value—without, that is, altruism, sympathy, mutual aid, even sacrifices. How, then, can it be maintained that value is distinct from life? And in what sense can it be called self-subsistent?

Value has always, and in all religious systems, been regarded as a condition of the good life—either on earth or in some other and better world. Mr. Joad renounces personal immortality and the whole notion of life after death so far as individuals are concerned. But he cannot deny the importance of value—of goodness, truth, beauty, wisdom—to life on earth. It is therefore, inconsistent for him to assert the independent, self-subsistent reality of value, apart from life.

He may claim, if the words convey any meaning to him, that, *in addition* to the limited, prosaic values of our sublunar existence, there is the ultimate value of the contemplation of the Infinite of Pure Being by the abstract, disembodied force of life. Frankly, to most modern thinkers such phrases must seem empty and barren. How does a life force engage in contemplation, and to what end and purpose?

Mr. Joad appears to know what the goal of evolution is. No one else knows that,—at least, no one else who thinks scientifically. The ignorant, naive fundamentalists imagine they know the goal of evolution, but who attaches the slightest significance to their childish ideas?

The simple truth is, no human mind can hope to form any hypothesis regarding the purpose or goal of evolution. The guesses and notions of the past are crude and naive, and we have nothing to substitute for them. Mr. Joad himself has only contempt for the notion that the purpose of the universe is "the preparation of a certain number of human souls for perfection." But even if we suppose that *all* human beings are to achieve perfection at some remote day, it would be rather ridiculous to assume that the universe was set developing just for the purpose of fitting the human race for what is vaguely called perfection. What larger purpose would that purpose serve?

Apparently, Mr. Joad believes that certain privileged persons—poets, mystics and prophets namely—are able to read some of the secrets of the universe, to enjoy ecstatic visions of reality. Then why have these happy few never been able to communicate their special knowledge to the rest of us? What philosopher, poet or mystic has vouchsafed to us a tolerably satisfactory account of Reality? When they try, words fail them, or rather, *ideas* fail them. They cannot describe what they feel or think they see. They talk of communion with the Whole, or with God, or with nature. Some of them say that their visions convince them that the universe is friendly to Man, and they conclude, therefore, that the alleged human craving for immortality—a sheer assumption—must be gratified somehow and somewhere, and that life must ultimately realize itself in some glorious and permanent form. Unfortunately, those who talk about their intuitions and visions are not necessarily good interpreters of these phenomena. Professor Leuba thinks that psychology and psychiatry have more prosaic and scientific explanations to give us of the alleged glimpses and fleeting contacts with the infinite.

After all, the staunch and unterrified orthodox thinker, who says he accepts God on faith and finds the commandments and injunctions of God in some book, is more rational than the mystical metaphysician. The former knows that the ways of his God are inscrutable and mysterious, and that finite minds cannot enter into any actual relation with the infinite, perfect and eternal. The latter images vain things and evolves theories out of his own inner consciousness, which he often misreads.

No, it is idle to pretend that Pluralism explains any facts left unaccounted for by Monism. On the contrary, it raises more difficulties than does Monism. The agnostic leans to the latter view because its simplicity accords with the observed unity and order of nature. It may not solve the ultimate problem, but it emerges out of the study and contemplation of the phenomena of nature, *including the human spirit.* The doctrine of relativity re-enforces Monism. The new physics, with its striking comparisons of stars and atoms, also re-enforces the Monistic conception. The modern idea that mental and physical are merely *two aspects of the same occurrence* is clearly Monistic in its implications.

To repeat, we may not know or understand the whole of nature, but we cannot build on the unknown and the unrevealed. It seems certain that what we do know points to Monism.

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STATUE OF LEIF ERIKSON

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Volume XLIV (No. 5) MAY, 1930 Number 888

MODERN ASTRONOMY AND THE NEW COSMOS

BY J. V. NASH

UNTIL the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ptolemaic system, positing a static earth round which the sun and planets revolved, dominated the mind of man. Then came the revolutionary discovery of Copernicus, who pried the earth loose from its moorings and sent it whirling through space, revolving on its own axis, in its orbit about the sun. The realization that the so-called fixed stars are distant suns followed as a natural sequence; this was one of the great conceptions of Bruno.

Finally, we grew accustomed to speaking of the *universe,* of which our solar system, as we believed, formed an important part. But now it has been revealed that not only is our sun a comparatively insignificant member of our own universe, but that the latter itself is a minor unit in a great galaxy of universes. The cosmos, in short, is not a universe but a pluriverse.

It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that Laplace, a French scientist, worked out his famous Nebular hypothesis, which held that the solar system was born of a whirling cloud of gaseous matter. This theory, attractive and plausible as it was in many respects, failed to survive modern scientific tests; it has now been superseded very widely by the Planetesimal hypothesis.

The testing of the Laplacian theory which definitely proved its untenability, and the subsequent development of the Planetesimal hypothesis, were the work of two Chicago scientists, Dr. Thomas C. Chamberlin, the eminent geologist and naturalist, and Dr. F. R. Moulton, well known as an astronomer and mathematical physicist. Chamberlin and Moulton were ideally fitted by training in two different fields to collaborate in solving the great problem of planetary genesis.

Dr. Moulton, the younger and now the surviving member of the partnership, explains the Planetesimal hypothesis as follows:

"About once in a period of a thousand times a million times a million (1,000 x 1,000,000 x 1,000,000) years, our sun will, on the average, approach near another sun. Enormous tides will be formed and a certain amount of material will be shot out, and in this way a spiral nebula will be developed. It will contain nuclei and vast quantities of scattered material. The nuclei in their circulation round the central sun will sweep up the scattered material and grow into planets.

"One such nucleus gradually grew into our present earth. The earth originally probably was too small to hold an atmosphere or water on its surface. As it grew in size, by sweeping up the scattered material in its path, its gravitation increased and eventually it became surrounded by an atmosphere and largely covered with water. The process of growth produces circularity, and so those planets that have grown the most should have the most nearly circular orbits, as Jupiter, Saturn, and the others do.

"The earth is still growing by the accretion of particles of matter. It is highly probable that in earlier times there were possibly thousands of pounds of meteoric material falling every day on every square mile of the earth's surface."

Such, in brief, is the substance of the Planetesimal hypothesis, which now seems destined to hold the field indefinitely. Conceived in its first tentative form about 1900, it has steadily made its way into general acceptance in the United States. In England, about 1919, its underlying principles were adopted by Jeans and Jeffreys as the basis of their "tidal theory," which has gained wide currency abroad.

Nevertheless, the Laplacian hypothesis will always command respect as a landmark in scientific progress. It was a truly great achievement when given to the world in 1796, and the fact that it held the field for over a century is in itself a remarkable tribute to its plausibility. It was a beautiful theory, appealing strongly to the imagination. Dr. Moulton himself speaks kindly of it. He believes that it rendered a priceless service by accustoming mankind to the idea of a natural evolution of the earth, involving a time element of millions of years in place of the six thousand years of Biblical chronology. The Planetesimal hypothesis pushes back the ultimate origin of the earth—and, incidentally, of the life thereon—to an immensely greater distance still. A hundred years ago the world was not ready for such daring conceptions as are involved in the Planetesimal hypothesis.

Dr. Moulton believes that life began on the earth at least two billions of years ago. "Life did not begin," he says, "until our earth had reached approximately its present size, and this was probably two billion—two thousand million—years ago. It is likely that life began first on the seashore, where the air and the soil and the water unite.

"The water dissolved from the rocks various elements, such as sodium, potassium, calcium, iron, and so forth, and carried them in solution into the sea. On the seashore there was an infinite variety of concentration of these various elements. There was also the rhythmic succession of day and night, and the pulsing tides and the lapping waves, which gave a variety so great that it is impossible now to match it artificially.

"Somehow, in a manner unknown, the first steps in the great life sequence upon the earth were taken. Of course, the first forms of life were very low. The smallest micro-organism which we have to-day may be comparatively high in the scale, containing at least 100,000 molecules. Most of the life history of the earth was past before the vertebrates came on.

"During all that period the sun has radiated light and heat upon the earth almost exactly at its present rate, and during all that time the earth has never been visited by any great cataclysm which destroyed all life."

But the earth, important as it is to mankind, is merely one member, and not a particularly significant one, of a large planetary family circling about the sun. Besides the eight principal planets,[1] there are about a thousand smaller ones. The eight major planets are divided into two groups. The four nearest to the sun are called the terrestrial or earthlike planets, and are similar in many ways to the earth. Mercury is less than one-half the size of the earth, and is too small to hold an atmosphere. Mars is one-third smaller than the earth, and has only a very thin atmosphere. Venus is almost exactly the same size as the earth; it is, indeed, often called the earth's twin. It is about 25,000,000 miles nearer the sun, and has so dense an atmosphere that its surface is entirely obscured; hence we are not acquainted with the markings on it.

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[1] The discovery, early in 1930, at the Flagstaff Observatory, of a transneptunian planet increases this planetary group to nine. Professor Chamberlin had forecast the discovery of planetary bodies beyond Neptune. See *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children*, pp. 154-156.

The question of life on Mars has for long baffled investigation. Mars is about 50,000,000 miles farther from the sun than is the earth; its temperature, according to Dr. Moulton, is on the average about that of the poles on the earth, although during the Martian summer the temperature in the equatorial belt probably rises above freezing.

Some observers have reported curious markings on the surface of Mars, which they thought to be artificial canals constructed for the purpose of irrigating the arid surface of the planet from the melting ice-caps in the Martian polar regions. These ice-caps are clearly visible through our large telescopes. The "canals" of Mars were first reported by Schiaparelli, the Italian astronomer, in the 1870's. In recent years the late Percival Lowell at Flagstaff Observatory, in Arizona, has drawn elaborate maps showing an intricate network of these "canals." Other experts maintain that these markings are an optical illusion; at any rate, no actual photographs of them have ever been secured.

In view of the scarcity of atmosphere and of water, together with the very low temperature and the small size of the planet, Mars does not seem very attractive as a place of residence. In this it differs notably from Venus, where, because of the greater proximity to the sun, the average temperature is, as Dr. Moulton believes, about 150 degrees. In the course of millions of years, however, the planet will slowly cool, so that when the earth becomes too cold to support life in comfort and its natural resources are exhausted Venus may offer a refuge for mankind, if man can in the meantime perfect a means of crossing the gulf of space which separates the two planets. The British scientist, J. B. S. Haldane, has published some fascinating speculations on the subject of the colonization of Venus from the earth.

The other group of planets consists of four globes of tremendous size in comparison with the earth. Jupiter is a thousand times larger. Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune, the outermost planet, complete the group. All four are probably entirely gaseous in composition and, owing to their immense distance from the sun, they receive a negligible amount of light and heat. The quantity of heat received by Jupiter, for instance, is only one-tenth of that at the North Pole of the earth.

In the space between Mars, the most outlying of the terrestrial planets, and Jupiter, the nearest of the giants, about a thousand planetoids, or little planets, have their orbits. They are of varying sizes, some not more than twenty-five miles in diameter and scarcely visible through the most powerful telescopes, while others attain a diameter of between 200 and 500 miles.

All of the principal planets, except Uranus and Neptune, have been familiar to man since the earliest times, for they are brilliant objects in the sky. Uranus, however, is just beyond the reach of the unaided eye; it was discovered by William Herschel in 1781, and was for a time known by his surname. The orbit of Uranus was soon calculated and the movements of the planet noted for a considerable number of years. This led to one of the most astonishing and dramatic discoveries in the history of astronomy. One of the most impressive characteristics of the universe, as Dr. Moulton likes to emphasize, is its orderliness. Astronomers, therefore, were puzzled because the movements of Uranus, as observed from year to year, did not agree with the mathematical predictions. In the course of time the variation became intolerable to scientists. It was just as perplexing as if every time one added up a given column of figures, and knew that no error had been made, a different total resulted.

Finally, it was suggested that the irregularities in the motion of Uranus might be caused by the disturbing effect of an undiscovered planet. But how should one know where to look for this elusive, unknown planet, invisible to the unaided eye, in the immensity of space? It would first be necessary to work out, by higher mathematics, the supposed orbit of a planet which human eye had never seen, basing the calculations on the accumulated effects of its attraction upon Uranus over a period of sixty years. A young English scientist named Adams and a young Frenchman named LeVerrier, working independently and by different methods, determined the spot where the mysterious planet should be, in the depths of space three billions of miles away. Then a young German named Galle pointed a telescope at the spot indicated by LeVerrier and found the planet now known as Neptune, in almost the exact location where it was believed, on theoretical evidence, to be. This was one of the most memorable discoveries in the history of science.

Strange, erratic members of our solar system are the comets—attenuated gaseous bodies, with brilliantly glowing heads and fanlike

THE GREAT SPIRAL NEBULA IN TRIANGULUM.
(Yerkes Observatory)

tails often extending for a distance of 100,000,000 miles into space. The tail always points away from the sun, regardless of whether the comet is coming or going. In receding from the sun, a comet's appearance suggests the headlight of a locomotive on a misty night.

Comets have singular, elongated orbits. They approach the sun from regions far beyond the orbit of Neptune, dash around the solar disc, and retreat again into the outlying regions of space. Occasionally a comet head is disintegrated by collision with a planet or by too closely approaching the sun.

The distances which comets traverse are so enormous that in some cases the periods of their visits to the vicinity of the earth are separated by more than a human lifetime. In 1680, Newton calculated the orbit of a great comet visible at that time and found its periodicity to be 600 years. Its next visit to this part of space is therefore still several centuries distant.

Halley's comet was named for the man who, after the comet's visit in 1682, first worked out its orbit, proving that it was the same comet as those which had aroused excitement in 1607, 1531, 1456, and so on back to 1066, the year in which William the Conqueror landed in England. He predicted its next return in 1759. In other words, its visits are approximately seventy-five years apart. Its next visit was in 1835. Mark Twain, born in that year, had a whimsical belief that he would leave the earth when the comet called again; and as it happened, the comet found him on his deathbed when it blazed into the sky in the spring of 1910. The new-born baby of 1835 had become a white-haired old man of seventy-five years.

The best and most recent explanation of the origin of comets—two complex for discussion here—is that given by the late Dr. T. C. Chamberlin in his last book, *The Two Solar Families: The Sun's Children.*

From the earthly point of view, the sun is first among the heavenly bodies. It is, always has been, and always will be, the ultimate source of all life—vegetable, animal, and human—on the earth. It pours out upon our planet every day the light and heat without which any kind of life would be impossible.

The amount of energy which is thrown into space by the sun is so immense as to be far beyond ordinary comprehension. It has been calculated that the energy radiated per square yard from the sun's surface is equivalent to 70,000 horse power. This represents an amount of heat which would melt a globe of ice as large as the earth in two hours and forty minutes. The earth is constantly receiving energy from the sun at the rate of 160 horse power per inhabitant; yet less than one two-billionth of the energy thrown out by the sun is intercepted by the earth.



MAP OF MARS, BY LOWELL, SHOWING "CANALS."

(Many leading astronomers question the existence of the "canals." Actual photographs do not disclose these strange markings.)

Again, it is not generally realized that the sun is the cause of all our wind and rain. The sun warms the air over the equatorial regions of the earth more than that over the higher latitudes; the resulting currents that are set up produce our winds. The sun's heat evaporates the water of the ocean and raises it into the air a half-mile or more, the winds carry a part of this water vapor in over the land, where it falls as rain or snow, and in descending again to the ocean it plunges down steep grades and energy is released, which is increasingly being harnessed by man and converted into electric power. The amount of work that the sun does in raising water which falls again as rain may be realized when it is shown that in the eastern half of the United States, where the annual rainfall is about 35 inches, 2,000,000 tons of water fall on each square mile from a height of half a mile or more.

The titanic storms that rage on the surface of the sun are among the most extraordinary of celestial phenomena. They occur with greater intensity and frequency about every eleven years. The spots produced by sun storms range in diameter from the limits of visibility up to more than a hundred thousand miles across. In these storms huge masses of vaprous heated substances, sometimes hundreds of times larger than our earth, are driven hither and thither, with a speed ranging into hundreds of miles a minute. They are sometimes thrown aloft to a height above the sun's surface twice as great as the distance from the earth to the moon; in other words, to a distance of half a million miles. If the earth were lashed by one of these terrific whips of flame, life would be annihilated.

Looked at from the sun, our earth, at a distance of nearly 93,000,000 miles, would appear as a tiny speck. The size of the sun in comparison with the earth may be illustrated by imagining the earth placed at its center and the moon revolving round it as at present. We should find that the moon's orbit would be not only wholly within the sun, but hardly more than half way from the sun's center.

Of the moon, little need be said here. As the heavenly body nearest the earth, it has from the earliest times been a source of lively curiosity to man. Many superstitions have grown up about it; the word *lunatic,* meaning literally "moon-struck," is a reminiscence of one of these superstitions. Others had to do with the supposed effect of the moon on vegetation and crops. The moon was the basis of the first calendar; it gave mankind the *month.*

Many primitive races regarded the moon, like the sun, as a divinity; the moon deity, especially, occupied an important place in their mythologies. The marks on the face of the moon, clearly visible without a glass on a bright night, gave rise to the legend of "the man in the moon." Widely separated tribes, from the Eskimos of the Arctic to the South Sea Islanders, have their stories about "the man in the moon." An eclipse of the moon was regarded with consternation as an evil portent.

The moon is a dead world, airless and waterless, wandering in its orbit about the earth, and turning on its axis in the same period that it revolves round our planet, so that the same side is forever facing us. Its face is deeply pitted and scarred. There are mountain ranges on the moon, and some 30,000 so-called craters have been mapped. The great lunar crater Theophilus is 64 miles in diameter and 19,000 feet deep. In its center rises a peak 11,00 feet above the plain on which it rests.

Though the moon is devoid of life, it figures largely in human sentiment. When at its full, glowing softly with a tender radiance on summer nights, it has inspired poets and lovers alike. Romance and literature would be poorer without the moon.

Conditions on the moon are widely different from those on earth. A lunar day, for instance, lasts about fifteen of our days, and a lunar night is of the same duration. The surface is heated to probably above the boiling point during the long day, while in the lunar night it falls to at least 100 degrees below zero. A human body on the moon would weigh only about one-sixth as much as on the earth.

But our entire solar system is itself only a relatively insignificant unit in the cosmos. The starry heavens, the contemplation of which so deeply stirred the mind of the philosopher Kant, offer on a cloudless night the most glorious of spectacles. The vast dome of the sky is, as it were, spangled with brilliant jewels—diamonds, emeralds, sapphires, topazes, turquoises, and rubies. Some of them are arranged in curious and intricate patterns, such as the Big Dipper in Ursus Major, the semi-circle in Corona Borealis, the diamond in Delphinus, the cross in Cygnus, and so on.

Each of the innumerable stars is an immense sun, many almost inconceivably larger than our own. Betelgeuse, for instance, measured by the interferometer, has been found to be twenty-seven million times as great in volume as our sun, which itself is a million times larger than the earth. The star known as Red Antares is even larger than Betelgeuze. It is conceivable that these other suns may have families of planets circling round them; but in any case, they would be invisible with the most powerful telescopes.

The story of stellar evolution is told in the colors of the stars, which range from a dull red, through yellow and bluish-white and back again to red. Our own sun is in the yellow stage; it is well along in life, but still far from old. Doubtless there are many black, burnt-out suns drifting dead and cold in the abysses of space. Occasionally such a dead sun will collide with another sun, either living or dead, and the terrific impact will turn the colliding bodies into an incandescent state, to begin another life cycle. From time to time astronomers witness a conflagration suddenly blaze up where no star was observed before. The new star may have been born thousands of years ago, and its light, traversing the gulfs of space at the rate of 186,000 miles a second, is just reaching us.[2]



VENUS, AS SEEN BY E. E. BARNARD, LICK OBSERVATORY.
(Note resemblance to new moon.)

About 5,000 stars are visible with the unaided eye. But powerful telescopes reveal myriads more. At least 500,000,000 stars are now known to astronomers. A photograph of some parts of the sky, as seen through a large telescope, will show innumerable points of light packed so closely together that they form an almost solid mass; yet each of the little dots is actually millions times millions of miles distant from its nearest neighbor.

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[2] Some stars are of such almost incredible density that a cupful of their material, according to a recent statement by Professor Frost, would weigh many tons.

To form an idea of the distance between the stars, let us imagine a sphere with the earth as its center, the sphere having a radius of 200,000 times 100,000,000 miles in all directions. There would be no star within that sphere except our own sun.

One of the latest triumphs of astronomy is the mapping of the position of our solar system. "Our sun," says Dr. Moulton, "lies deep in a galaxy shaped like a lens or a watch. This galaxy consists of at least a thousand million suns comparable to our own. About half of them are in most respects very much like our own sun, but some of them radiate thousands of times as much light, and and some of them are millions of times as great in volume.

"The thickness of this galaxy is the distance that light travels in twenty or thirty thousand years. Its distance through, from edge to edge, is approximately ten times this distance, or that which light travels in 200,000 or 300,000 years.

"Outside of our galaxy are other galaxies in enormous numbers. Only recently have we been able to measure the distance to them. The nearest, which has been known as the Andromeda Nebula, was found by Hubble to be distant about 1,000,000 light years. Most of them are much farther from us than the Andromeda Nebula. We photograph some that are so far away that light has been on its way to us millions of years, and we see them as they were at that long ago epoch.

"It may be that these galazies in great numbers together form a super-galaxy, just as myriads of stars together constitute our galaxy, and it is quite possible that many super-galaxies make up a larger cosmic unit which may be called a super-galaxy of the second order. Even then we probably have not reached the limit, for super-galaxies of higher and higher orders may exist without end."

Dr. Moulton, when discussing astronomy, warms up to his subject in a contagious way. "I used to think, when a boy," he said reminiscently, "that the days of adventure and discovery were over, and I felt sorry for it, as there seemed to be nothing left for the explorer to do. But when I became an astronomer I found that

Columbus never had such an adventure as a person gets when he explores the depths of the universe. Now I am glad that I did not live any earlier, because of the marvelous riches that science has brought to us in our own day, which make life really worth living.

"With our powerful telescopes," he continued, "we sweep the heavens, and millions of stars are revealed to us which the naked eye never sees. Many stars, indeed, are so distant that they can be detected only by long exposure of delicate photographic plates.



VIEWS OF MARS, BY BARNARD, AT LICK OBSERVATORY.

"Every star, of course, is a sun. We have called the stars fixed, just as we used to speak of *the eternal hills;* but only poets now speak of the eternal hills, for we know that to-morrow, geologically speaking, they will disappear. So the stars are moving, but they are moving so slowly from our point of view that it takes a long time to detect the movement even with the most powerful telescopes. But we know from their distribution, from the forces operating on them, and from the underlying laws controlling them, that they are moving around among each other like bees in a swarm, or people on State Street on a busy afternoon.

"If we watch these suns for only two hundred years, we find that they seem to be moving in straight lines, but if we could watch them for 20.000 or perhaps 200,000 years, we should observe a curvature in their paths. Our sun moves, with respect to other stars, about 400,000,000 miles per year. The distance of the stars from us is so vast that it is best expressed in light-years, which

THE FULL MOON
Yerkes Observatory

means the time that it takes their light, traveling at nearly 200,000 miles per second, to reach the earth. Many of the stars are millions of light-years distant.

"One naturally recoils from these bewildering figures. The thing seems unreal because it is unfamiliar. But to those of us who are familiar with it and are mathematicians the difficulties are not serious. There are more mental difficulties in comprehending an atom than there are in these great stellar galaxies. I might say that there is as much mystery in the radio. Is it not hard to conceive of the marvellous amplification by the audion of those feeble impulses that go through the ether?"

We know not only the distances, the sizes, and the ages of the stars, but also of what elements they are composed. A great philosopher once declared that the latter was one of the few things which mankind would never know.

"Every kind of substance," Dr. Moulton pointed out, in explaining the operation of spectrum analysis, "gives forth a certain kind of light. Iron, sodium, calcium, and so on, each gives its own special light. If there is a certain character of light that travels twenty feet in the laboratory, it will be the same if it comes millions of miles from the sun. So from the character of light that comes from the sun, as registered by the lines in the spectrum, we can determine what is in the sun. We know that there are iron, nickel, and cobalt in the sun, and in fact most of the common elements. The gas called *helium,* now known to exist on the earth and produced commercially, was first discovered in the sun. The sun and the earth are composed of the same things, though perhaps not in the same proportions. That is not so startling, however, for all the elements are made of electrons, and it may be that all the elements we have are all that can exist."

Our solar system, the earth, and man himself are reduced to insignificance, from a quantitative standpoint, when we go with an astronomer like Dr. Moulton on a mental exploration trip through the vast reaches of the universe, passing on the way myriads of flaming suns which could swallow our own, and glimpse far beyond our own universe the boundaries of other universes of whose existence a few years ago we were unaware. But then one thinks of the human intelligence which measures these distant suns and charts the depths of cosmic space. The study of astronomy humbles man, but paradoxically it gives one a new sense of human dignity and worth.

LEIF ERIKSON OF THE SAGAS

BY CORNELIA STEKETEE HULST

III. Leif Erikson's Vinland

WHEN men of New England came to realize vividly that Leif Erikson had discovered their country, had built a house on their soil and spent a winter there, followed by members of his family immediately and by members of his race for centuries, that he was ours as Columbus was, they were deeply moved and proceeded to express their enthusiasm for this heroic past in such a way that the world and future generations might know. Their first interest had been enlisted some forty years before and had died down for lack of nourishing, but in 1876 it was revived and brought to fruition in the Monument which they erected to Leif Erikson in Boston, on Commonwealth Avenue, by public subscription. At just that time the enthusiasm for Ole Bull, the great Norwegian violinist, was at its height, and the two enthusiasms were so closely united and related that it would be hard to decide whether the great Discoverer or the great Violinist of the North were the more honored in that observance. Even in the heroic statue which crowns the shaft this question rises, for the sculptor used Ole Bull as the model of the statue of Leif Erikson.

Be the answer what it may to these questions, that relation between the two is another story, a very beautiful story in which Boston, and New England, are revealed in one of the highest and happiest moods and a circle of their distinguished men are seen to great advantage—Longfellow, more than any other in the locality, had opened the way for the adventure, and Edward Everett Hale had moved the formation of the Committee, the Norsemen Memorial Committee of New England, to take the raising of funds in charge for the erection of a fit Monument.

It was a very distinguished Committee, but that, also, belongs to the other story, except the fact that one of its members was Professor Eben Norton Horsford, who is the hero of this particular story because he undertook the search for Leif Erikson's Vinland and made some most interesting discoveries, which will be recounted here.

When Professor Horsford served on the Norsemen Memorial Committee in 1876, he became so thoroughly interested in evidences that the Norsemen had been in New England that he took up this subject as a Quest and spared no effort or expense in following trails in his study to the end. A chemist by profession, the Professor of Chemistry in Harvard University, he became expert in the history of the Norsemen both before and after they discovered America, and in his search for Leif Erikson's Vinland he developed into a keen archaeologist.

In preparation for his investigations, Professor Horsford studied the Sagas and all other literature that he could obtain bearing on the subject of the Northmen, their history, their habits, their customs, their architecture, and the like, as well as what pertained to the American past, including accounts of the French Voyageurs who used to visit the New England Coast. Nothing that might have a bearing on the subject was foreign to him, and he even went to the length of engaging a scholar from Iceland to come to this country and assist him in translations and in covering the whole ground. Then he applied this knowledge in his search for the spot where Leif Erikson and his men made their landing, built their house, had spent the winter of 1000-1001, taking the whole field into consideration.

In addition to this expert knowledge of the Norse facts relating to his subject, Professor Horsford had for his equipment an uncommon knowledge of the Indian language, life, and affairs, for his father had been a missionary among the Indians and had known their language so well that he translated a part of the Bible into the Indian tongue. It was his knowledge of the Indian language which enabled him, as will be seen, to solve incidentally one of the questions that had long vexed historians, the question of Norumbega, which had been considered previously only in connection with the Voyageurs but now proved to be related to the Norsemen also. As used by the French Voyageurs in the 16th Century, the name *Norumbega* applied to a place that they visited at the head waters of a river, which river they also called the Norumbega. Early historians had been agreed that the Norumbega was the Penobscot River, in Maine, and later historians had come to believe that it was the Hudson River.

Professor Horsford proceeded to investigate the head waters of all of the larger rivers that enter the Atlantic Ocean, trying to identify the physical features that were mentioned in the Saga, where it is told that Leif Erikson (1) sailed into a Bay, (2) then entered a River, (3) crossed a Lake, (4) again entered the River above, and navigated it as far as it would float his ship, to its head waters. At that spot he beached his boat and built his house, to shelter his thirty-five men for the winter.

Going over the ground very carefully, Professor Horsford concluded that all of these physical features, (1) Bay, (2) River, (3) Lake, (4) River to head waters, were not found in any of the other rivers entering the Atlantic, but were found in the Charles River, which showed exactly the physical features mentioned, these being identified as (1) Boston Bay, (2) the Charles River between Boston and Cambridge, (3) the Back Bay, (4) and the Charles River up to Gerry's Landing. These were many and distinctive points which corresponded, and there was not one point which failed to correspond with those mentioned in the Saga, therefore the location of Vinland seemed to have been discovered.

But could this be verified by any other process, making assurance doubly sure? Professor Horsford proceeded to investigate a piece of land that he knew of, which lies at the junction of Stony Brook with the Charles River near Waltham, a few miles above Cambridge. At this point there had been, from time immemorial, and before the arrival of the English settlers, a cobblestone pavement of considerable extent, and, on the upper bank of Stony Brook, a stone wall which extended up the stream for a considerable distance. From the first, it had been supposed that these were of Indian origin.

But Professor Horsford knew that Indians had never been known to do such work as this cobblestone pavement and this stone wall showed, and he knew that the Norse people made stone pavements like this to dry their fish on and also that they built stone walls. The Norsemen had valued Vinland for its timber, and this wall was such as they would need in lumbering, to keep the debries from filling Stony Brook when logs were being floated down it into the Charles River, after which there would be no difficulty in floating them. Here, then, were two excellent pieces of objective evidence locating Leif Erikson's Vinland, and here was the very spot where the Norsemen had dried their fish and obtained their supplies of timber.

And now he could unlock the mystery of Norumbega, also, which place had lain at the head waters of a river, as had Leif Erikson's camp. His knowledge of the old Norse language of the Saga and his knowledge of the Indian language enabled him to see that *Norumbega* was an Indian rendering of the name, derived from the Norse form, *Norvegr,* which was the name of *Norway* as spelled in the ancient Sagas. He also saw that this change in form had occurred because the Indians had no *v* in their language and could not pronounce that letter, but would have to substitute a *b* for it. Introducing this *b* with their characteristic mumbling sound, *um,* they would make the name of their visitors *Norumbegr,* the name of the camp and the river becoming *Norumbega.*

Professor Horsford might well have exclaimed, "Eureka!", "I have found it!", for he had solved the double problem of the location of the camp of the Northmen and the stopping place of the Voyageurs, while the name *Norumbega,* as the Voyageurs used it, supplied added proof that the Norsemen's camp had been at this spot. It also supplied an additional fact, that so late as the 16th Century it had been known among the French by the Norsemen's name.

The large tract of land at the mouth of Stony Brook, including the pavement and the stone wall, were now purchased by Professor Horsford and presented as a Park to the people of the State of Massachussetts, the most significant spot being marked with a lofty stone tower, which bears an elaborate inscription telling of the relation of the Norsemen to this place from 1000 to 1347. Inside the tower, a winding stairway leads to the top, where visitors may climb up and look out upon the Vinland of Leif Erikson.

Could any further proof be found, to put seal of finality upon these theories and conclusions? Could the spot where Leif Erikson's house had stood be located? With the instinct of a Schliemann locating a buried Troy, Professor Horsford turned to Gerry's Landing, where there was a treeless Commons that had been used as a Commons in that condition from the arrival of the first English settlers. The spot had never had trees, and no house had ever been built on it within the memory of living men. It was a very significant fact that it had had no trees *though in a wooded country;* that no house had ever been built on it had not been fully proved.

Here was a case for a Sherlock Holmes, and a Sherlock Holmes Professor Horsford now proved himself to be. First, he engaged experts to examine all records of the locality, to find out whether a house had ever been built on this land since English colonists had settled there. The result was negative. Now he was certain that if investigation brought the foundation of a house to light, it would be that of Leif Erikson, for Indians did not build houses with foundations. He made the investigation. In the sod which overgrew the place he found a raised ridge of land, rectangular in shape, and large enough to provide floorspace for the thirty-five men in Leif Erikson's company. Again, he must have exclaimed, "Eureka!"

Could any other possible test be applied, of an objective nature, to put seal upon seal to his conclusions? Yes; one. From his study of ancient Norse houses, Professor Horsford knew that Leif Erikson's house would have no chimney and no windows, but that it would have an opening in the center of the roof to let in the air and let out the smoke, and that the place for the fire would be located just under this opening, in the central spot of the floor, where diagonal lines from the corners crossed. He therefore reasoned that excavation at this central spot within the raised ridges which marked the foundation wall would bring to light the fireplace built by Leif Erikson for his house, and possibly even traces of his fires. He made ready to excavate.

Professor Horsford was a man of sentiment and deep feeling as well as of penetration and logic, and he decided that the moment of this final test should be heightened by a fitting ceremony. His daughter, Miss Cornelia Horsford, had given him tireless assistance and the keenest sympathy in his former investigations, so he chose her to preside at this discovery, for he had no doubt that it would be a crowning discovery. Accordingly, Miss Cornelia Horsford occupied the seat of honor on the appointed day and directed the workmen where to put in their picks and shovels. In the central spot in the floor, where diagonals crossed, placed in such a way as to hold a fire, they unearthed a cluster of stones. And, among the stones there were still traces of the fires that had been built there . . .

It will be observed that Professor Horsford's discoveries presented a perfect sequence:

(1) The physical features of the Charles River, including Boston Bay, Charles River, Back Bay, and Gerry's Landing satisfied the features mentioned in the Saga exactly, as the features of no other locality did;

(2) The stone pavement and wall at Stony Brook, at a spot that corresponded to that which the Saga told of, were evidence that fish and timber had been cared for in the Norwegian way in that place;

(3) The name *Norumbega,* derived from *Norvegr,* gave evidence from the Indian and the French language of what race had been there;

(4) The raised ridge of sod surrounded by the treeless Commons presented exactly such conditions as would have been shown by the foundation of Leif Erikson's house and the clearing around it, the floorspace being large enough to accommodate Leif Erikson's men;

(5) The fireplace was found in the center of the floorspace and the stones were arranged as the ancient Norsemen would have arranged them, but as later settlers would not.

Professor Horsford wrote out an account of what he had discovered and presented copies of his book to libraries in this country and abroad, thus contributing a worthy chapter to the story of the Norsemen in America. His work was finished about 1890, and to him it had been a great joy.

One of Professor Horsford's days that was particularly happy may serve as an end to this story of his achievements, a day spent in company with a kindred spirit, a day that brought a new confirmation of his conclusion as to the location of Leif Erikson's house. It was that on which Professor Rasmus B. Anderson, of Madison, Wisconsin, visited him, the author of the book *America Not Discovered by Columbus,* in which Leif Erikson was shown as the earlier Discoverer, a fact that had been known, but was not appreciated. This book had aroused great interest in the Seventies, following a course of lectures which Professor Anderson had given in the Sixties, when he had had the great success of winning Ole Bull to an enthusiasm for Leif Erikson. This was an enthusiasm which was soon to be awakened in Longfellow, a reverent friend of Ole Bull's, and in the other members of the New England Memorial Committee of 1876, including Professor Horsford, who was to take upon himself the work that has been recounted.

It was Professor Anderson, thus, who had given the initial impulse that ended in the studies of Professor Horsford and the discoveries that these had led to, and it was a Red Letter Day for both when they walked together over the ground of Leif Erikson's Vinland—for they had no doubt that what Professor Horsford had found was Leif Erikson's Vinland. As they stood on the Commons at Gerry's Landing, Professor Horsford said, "Now I will not point out to you just where the house of Leif Erikson stood, but you may make the discovery for yourself." It was not a hard thing to do, for out of the level sod of the Commons rose the well defined rectangular ridge, also grass-grown.

This Commons at Gerry's Landing was public property, owned by Cambridge, so Professor Horsford could not buy it and present it as another State Park, as he had bought the land at Stony Brook and presented it to the people of Massachussetts, but he obtained permission from the authorities to mark the spot suitably, protected it properly by fencing it in, and placed a marker there to tell its history.

HOW CAN YOU HELP BELIEVING?

BY T. SWANN HARDING

IT was my pleasure but recently to hear a lecture by a Scottish gentleman who was a Vice President of the American Society for Psychical Research. He seemed to be the hard-headed sort, difficult to convince, slow to believe, and he was distinctly above average in intelligence and education. Yet his ready capacity for belief almost made me feel that he might say any minute—"Tell me something preposterous—no matter what—and I'll believe it right away!" Given his premises, he built up an extremely logical and convincing case for the existence in the "invisible parts of this world" of disembodied spirits of the departed who could, with proper human cooperation, communicate with those of us who have not yet passed on into dematerialization. Fraud he brushed aside with a mere gesture, telling us that any alert investigator could easily detect fraud after two or three sittings. The "facts" he presented were those of Home and of Piper, of aerial guitars and violins being played without human contact but at human command and, finally, the case of deceased brother Walter who worked through sister Marjorie in Boston.

Walter was proved by experiment to breathe carbon dioxide—when he desired to respire; he whistled while the mouths of his audience were proven closed by a method that seemed convincing in the telling; he sang and told jokes and finally produced his finger prints in suitable wax. The finger prints were certified to be Walter's, and not those of any present at the seance, by a "government expert," and experts at various police headquarters. This sounded imposing and, though irrelevant to the basic matter at issue, seemed to prove "scientifically" convincing.

Eventually the lecturer summarized. He concluded from these facts, attested to be such by eminent scientific men, that disembodied spirits do exist, that they do communicate with living human beings under proper conditions, that immortality is an undeniable scientific fact, and that the persistence of the personality after death is scientifically established. Naturally he adduced such men as Crooks, Wallace, James, Hyslop, Flammarion, Lodge and Meyers as pure scientists who were convinced of these things, and the authority of their unassailable scientific achievements was expected to convince us, the lecturer's hearers, about matters remote from their specialized field. Yet the scientist's normal problems and training perhaps render him even more gullible by magical or psychic sharpers than the ordinary man of intelligence who has not so rigorously concentrated his attention upon material reality.

I was left with a perfectly overwhelming astonishment at the ability of people to believe. Belief remains unregulated as yet in civilized society. All tribes everywhere have found it necessary to restrict the powerful sex urge by some means or other, and civilized men have built thereupon a very ideal and almost ethereal structure of romantic love. Most men have erected about the pure hunger urge limitations which have finally produced an edifice that is almost esthetic regarding what is basically a very ordinary and slightly repulsive physiological act. But about this equally powerful urge to believe we have done almost nothing, and even scientists tend over and over again merely to find facts to support their personal prejudices, or bad reasons for believing what they believe on instinct anyway. The urge to believe badly needs regulation, restriction and scientific management.

It became quite plain to me as the lecturer spoke that he neither knew scientists nor did he have any practical experience with scientific method. Eighteen years in laboratories of chemical research have all but convinced me that it is quite possible for a man to take any belief whatever and find more than adequate facts and reasons to support it—right at the same time that other scientists believe the opposite and find facts and reasons apparently just as adequate to support them. Secondly I have discovered that scientists are not—even the greatest of them—competent critics of all things. They are usually quite narrow specialists who, while alert and highly critical in restricted segments of experience, may readily be imposed upon elsewhere, while their views about matters remote from their specialty are usually no more profound or wise than those of a chiropractor on economics or of a dentist or a motorman on the Einstein theory.

Thirdly—and what is so frequently neglected by laymen—a research investigator does not attain gigantic and gargantuan conclusions from groups of startling but essentially uncorrelated phenomena even after he has encountered such phenomena for thirty or forty years. He is not impelled to brush aside objections, assume fraud is impossible (i. e. that his shrewdness is matchless) and reach positive conclusions of tremendous import in the face of curious facts which elude his comprehension. In short even I, with my modest laboratory experience, known too well how easily inanimate things can completely baffle or deceive the investigator in physical science to permit me to believe psychic hypotheses very readily. The lecturer spoke on "scientific proofs of immortality;" he presumed to be following scientific method; he made it plain that he had no accurate conception of scientific method at all.

Returning to the lecture: There were adduced certain events and certain people certainly saw certain mysterious things. These events were the effects of causes unknown. Yet from the effects the lecturer hypothecated the cause; he then at once hypothecated from the hypothetical cause an entire system of broad philosophical views. This astounding procedure he presented to us as scientific. As a matter of fact it was not even a good caricature of scientific procedure, and yet it is increasingly evident to me that for some reason such procedures pass current among quite intelligent people today as thoroughly grounded in scientific method.

In the first place no true scientist casually brushes aside the possibility of fraud or error. He is very self-critical and self-analytical and realizes that even the hardest material facts repeatedly impose upon his judgment. In the second place he is very careful how he hypothecates causes when he is faced with what is a mere heterogenous collection of happenings or effects. Thirdly, he is definitely opposed to the process of drawing broad, general philosophical conclusions from his work, so much so that he at times tends to ignore the encroachments of other metaphysical systems which seriously threaten his method and the continuation of his researches.

The amazing capacity of human beings for belief, however, astounds me more than anything else. Something ought to be done about it! I repeatedly determine not to be astounded by it and yet just as repeatedly find myself astounded all over again. After eighteen years of research chemistry I found that I knew a little about a narrowly segregated field of the chemistry of the sugars and, later, a little bit about the chemistry of the endocrine glands and of nutrition. Lead me but a step or two from my narrow pasture, even though you still have me in the field of organic or biological chemistry, and you could readily fool me. As to spiritualistic phenomena, while the lecturer I heard brushed fraud aside with a mere gesture, I have read many books by apparently careful, sincere and honest investigators who declared that it was almost impossible to guard against fraud while the books that I have read on magic continually attest to the great ease with which the very wisest people, including scientists, may be so utterly fooled by shrewd magicians that they will make the most grotesque assertions as their positive beliefs.

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that science is on the wrong track. Its attempt is to be completely impersonal, objective and unprejudiced, yet a man can no more get away from his mental preconceptions than he can get away from gravitation or atmospheric pressure, while his attempt to do this tends to render science as remote from and irrelevant to life as a new system of magic. Scientists should direct their efforts rather to the attempt first to sleuth out their own human prejudices and to make allowances for them. They need to be more human. Then they need to study the reason why people believe what they do and their processes of accumulating knowledge. It is well known that no two people exposed to the same phenomena will ever believe exactly the same about them, yet science tends to proceed in an air tight compartment where the contrary assumption is made or implied.

No two scientists can read the same instrument of refined precision alike. No two can get precisely the same identical results when they perform simple chemical analyses. They know this—they distrust their senses and strive for "true" results by making allowances for innate personal errors and by averaging dozens of results secured by various investigators. Even then it is not uncommon for a scientist to write in his published paper, "It seems very strange to us that a solution of ecstatic acid should behave so differently in Dr. Blob's laboratory from the way it behaves in ours." The assumption is that Dr. Blob either does not know what he is doing, unavoidably gets wrong results, is simply careless or else too unintelligent to interpret his own data. All this—and yet how easily psychic investigators reach momentous "scientific" conclusions in a field infinitely more complex!

The question science must solve is—why do these same facts, why does this same phenomenon, result in such diverse beliefs? The greatest difficulty all of us have to face is that tendency we all have to believe before the facts justify belief, and to set up a dogma before we know half enough to attempt that. The hardest task we shall have is that of indulging in sufficient self-analysis to smoke out our own wishful desires and to see wherein and how much they motivate our beliefs. These basic human problems science should cease to ignore but attend immediately.

The lecturer I heard was operating in a sphere where I can have no beliefs. If it took me two years to ferret out only in part one very minute fact about the chemistry of milk production in a cow—only to raise more problems in the process than I could solve in ten years more—I am unwilling to believe that any committee of scientists could possibly be justified in making the conclusions the lecturer attributed to them, until they had spent at least two or three hundred years on the investigation. The lecturer remarked that all skeptics became convinced by the phenomena as the years passed and that after twenty years of investigation the most redoubtable of them became firm believers. I may counter this by remarking that after eighteen years' work in the field of a science which is child's play in simplicity compared to psychic research I believe so much less than when I began that I can merely survey the mass of my ignorance in humility and awe. Yet I was surveying a square inch with a microscope while psychic research embraces the universe as its field.

My amazement remains that this hard-headed, intelligent Scottish gentleman I heard speak could possibly believe so much and so easily. I constantly marvel at the ease with which people believe all sorts of things and declare that their beliefs are founded upon science. I certainly have had more experience with science than 90 per cent of them and yet I cannot possibly learn this trick. The more I study science, in fact, the more difficult it becomes for me to be facile in belief.

In his work on *Contemporary Sociological Theories* Sororkin emphasizes the chaotic condition of the social sciences. Odum, in *Man's Quest for Social Guidance* found—with the greatest ease—more than five hundred ideal systems of government carefully embalmed in books and quite consistently irrelevant to the actual problems of human society. So long has it been the custom for a man to believe certain things and then to pull the system out of his head and embalm it in a book as "the principles" of economics, politics or sociology, that consultation with the facts has all but ceased to occur or to be considered necessary. Such people, in common with most writers who claim to base their theories on science, merely pick out facts to support their contentions, ignore inimical facts and send their book or article to print.

Yet it is very apparent that the social sciences, which are in chaos because so many facts still need to be ascertained, are much simpler than the "science" of psychism, which is not only tremendously complex but remains in a rudimentary state. It therefore seems wisest in considering belief to approach something simpler than even the social sciences. I suggest medicine.

Every faith healer and quack produces indubitable effects. From these effects millions of people reason that the therapeutic procedure, which may have been totally irrelevant, was actually causative of renewed health. Actually the simple, unassisted processes of nature may have accomplished what was accomplished, or else the restoration of confidence by some impressive procedure, no matter what, worked organically and chemically according to known natural laws to accomplish healing.

When we enter the portals of orthodox medicine we do not leave this process behind by any means. Consider but one disease which I happen to have studied a little—rickets. In 1892 one doctor considered cod liver oil excellent for rickets, but he was absolutely positive that this was because of its highly digestible and nutritious fat content. In 1897 certain Germans cured case after case of rickets by administering phosphorus. In 1845, however, the disease was known to be caused by impure and damp air and to be cured by eating no starch and dosing up on iron, soda, quinine and port wine.

In 1819 experts declared rickets was far less prevalent than formerly because cold baths for children had become more common.

As late as 1911 rickets was pronounced by one expert to be due to an excessive secretion of the sexual glands of cows giving the milk used by its victims, and could be cured by administering the milk from castrated cows. A little before that electric treatments, medicated baths, iron tonics, the respiration of condensed air, olive oil and dog's milk had all been found remedial, and each physician could present, and did, his group of cases cured by the procedure he recommended.

About 1916 it became evident that a lack of vitamins caused rickets; by 1921 the specific vitamin was located and proven to be present in cod liver oil. About the same time it was found that sunlight, and a little later that ultra violet rays from mercury vapor lamps would cure rickets. Finally it was found that ultra violet rays would turn a certain fat in part into the vitamin required. At all times it is now assumed that calcium, phosphorus and vitamins A and D must be present in proper proportions to prevent rickets, and to insure normal bone building.

At the same time, however, reliable investigators present work which demonstrates that cod liver oil repeatedly fails in the treatment of rickets. Secondly, work is presented to show that cod liver oil often has very poisonous side effects. Thirdly, work is presented to show that the activated fat mentioned above is to be distrusted as it is so concentrated in the vitamin that it may do great harm. Fourthly, work has been presented to show that twins of the same mother on the same breast milk may in one case develop rickets and in the other case be immune. Lastly, one set of investigators has presented apparently incontrovertible evidence to show that cod liver oil in certain dosages causes all sorts of degenerative changes in mice, while another set of investigators, using the same cod liver oil in the same dosages, avers it cannot reproduce the results claimed. So it goes. Had the lecturer had much experience in science I firmly believe that his faculty of belief would have atrophied somewhat!

Bleeding was once a very effective therapeutic procedure. It must have been. All physicians used it and it "cured" their patients. Today it is scarcely ever invoked at all; we are informed that its use is unscientific. Today people become invigorated living in rooms glazed with an ultra violet ray transmitting glass which will in twenty hours of direct exposure give them less ultra violet irradiation than they would get in five minutes out of doors in direct sunlight; but they feel invigorated and believe in the glass.

Other people are cured of various diseases by the "ultra violet rays" from lamps which actually transmit no such rays at all, but the effects are produced and they believe in the lamps. I can very readily find you just as much apparently sound evidence against as in favor of the theories that autointoxication, bad teeth and infected tonsils cause all manner of diseases, but I know plenty of doctors who believe in these things. They have seen certain effects. They produce their case histories and their clinical pictures. They publish their articles. They and their patients believe. What are you going to do about it? I am sure I don't know, but isn't it interesting?

Turning to natural science, bodies once burned because they contained phlogiston. Now they burn because they contain substances that unite with the oxygen of the air at a fast and furious rate. The burning was the same in both instances but consider the difference in the belief. In the former case bodies should practically disappear when burned for the phlogiston was lost and nothing remained but a little ash. Someone thought to measure and see if everything was destroyed. He found that nothing at all was destroyed in burning and away flew phlogiston into oblivion.

The lecturer I heard told me baffling things. Then he casually explained them. Then he reached final conclusions. Many people tell me astounding things. During late 1928 many people told me perfectly amazing things about one of the candidates for the Presidency of the United States, and, in spite of the fact that their tales so conflicted that they could not possibly all have been true, they believed them implicitly. They had the evidence of their senses. As in the case of Roosevelt years ago, someone had seen someone who saw a big blue glass of what actually was milk go to his dining room and it was at once apparent and quite true that it was whiskey and that he was drunken and debauched!

I do not have to go to politics though. Perfectly astounding things constantly happened to me in the laboratory. I once mixed two sugars together. I dissolved them in water. I added a certain salt known to unite with one of them quantitatively. I then took out the precipitate I got and broke it up and found that sugar there quantitatively. But the second sugar I never did find. It was not in the original water; it was not in the precipitate. I did this experiment over and over again. I still believe that that sugar did not dematerialize into thin air, but I never found where it went. It is very hard to forestall the formation of a theory in such cases, as our lecturer demonstrated, but I have none.

Here is another case from material science. Proteins are made up of some twenty simpler compounds called amino acids. Milk proteins are so composed. Amino acids circulate in the blood of an animal and one of them is called cystine. Milk is formed in the mammary gland; its proteins are built there from amino acids the gland takes out of the blood. Hence if you could get a sample of a cow's blood before and after it perfused her mammary gland, and could measure the loss in amino acids you could easily calculate which ones, and how much, the gland used to make its proteins. All right. That was once my problem. I wanted to know if a cow used cystine from the blood in manufacturing milk in her mammary gland and, if so, how much.

First I had to have a method of determining the amino acid. I was to do this by the color it produced when mixed with certain chemicals. You clarify and filter the blood, then add a small quantity of it to a solution of four or five chemicals, let it stand and measure the amount of blue color the solution then contains against the color in a solution of known strength. That is a comparatively simple research problem. Now what could I believe?

In the first place every chemical had to be tested; then the effect of every chemical on every other chemical used in the method had to be tested. Then the effects of time of standing and the temperature had to be tested. Then the instrument used to estimate the color had to be standardized. Finally it was found that the color of the solution into which the blood filtrate went never would exactly match the color of the solution containing only the pure amino acid, cystine. Then there was the problem of clarifying that blood—did I lose some of the cystine in clarifying it? If so, how could I tell, since the only way of determining the cystine in blood involved clarification as an initial step?

Ultimately I made an actual test on a milch cow and the blood did seem to lose twenty-five per cent of this amino acid. Cystine apparently went into the gland to make milk protein. I tried a second and a third and a fourth cow and each time got lessening amounts of the amino acid disappearing from the blood. I then tried three dry cows which should have given no results at all, as they were not making milk, but they did (two of them) give positive results! And last of all I found that I was not dealing with cystine anyway but with a combination of it with two or maybe three other amino acids and that in that case—if so much disappeared from the blood in one trip through the mammary gland, it was five or six times too much to make the milk the cow was actually giving. Then I started to devise a method of preparing the unknown compound from cow's blood. I spent another year devising that method.

Precisely at that point I ceased laboratory work and began to edit the papers of other scientists for publication. It is now my pleasure to see them contradict each other. I do not for an instant impugn their sincerity. I believe they often honestly believe in their results. They calmly attack each other, show how the earlier workers erred, demonstrate how final their own results are, give their apparently irrefutable proofs and next week some other scientist comes along and contradicts them. Many of them also speak as if they were saying the final word of truth about the proposition and that no more could possibly be learned. They would make good psychic researchers, for remember—immortality is a scientifically established fact according to my lecturer.

But this is not the usual thing. Usually scientists conclude quite tentatively, saying if this and that and the other are so, we may tentatively assume so-and-so. They seem to realize that they may have been tricked by their own prejudices or by the simple recalcitrance of natural facts without deliberately tricking themselves. The difficulties of this sort of thing are not, I am convinced, realized by these careless people who are always remarking, "I will give you the facts and you can see for yourself that the theory I present is scientifically true."

The lecturer I mentioned above had adopted the very subtle method of depending rather upon the final reports of committees of scientists as to the authenticity of psychic phenomena than upon specific case histories. This was accepted by his audience as creditable scientific proof. Yet what did it mean? When a group of men who, we shall assume, have been deceived write up their conclusions in abstract and solemn terms, eliminating all personal and human qualities, the end result is more impressive than plain Bill Jones' assertion that he saw a ghost or heard a guitar played untouched by human hands. But is it really any more valuable?

For years various scientists in various lands have sought to prove that electricity favorably effects plant growth. An investigator demonstrated, for instance, that potted plants grew more rapidly if the soil in the pot was connected with the earth by a wire; but no other investigator could duplicate his results and that proved to be the case with all similar work.

Finally an investigator in the U. S. Department of Agriculture undertook to see whether weak electric currents would accelerate the growth of maize plants in wooden boxes. He got what was undeniably a positive correlation after a considerable series of experiments, provided the current was applied at night, and would have been perfectly justified in reporting his successful results couched in solemn, objective language. But he was a natural born skeptic, though he figured there was but one chance in a hundred that he was wrong.

The boxes in which he grew his plants had numbers arbitrarily stenciled on them as they were made. He then shifted them about arbitrarily, putting low and high numbered boxes together, whether the plants in them had had electrical treatment or not, and measured the growth of the plants in such groups. To his astonishment he got a still better correlation between this profoundly irrelevant factor and plant growth then between electrical currents and plant growth. He then began to examine the boxes. It ultimately proved that by pure chance the boxes which bore low stencil numbers differed from those that bore high numbers in capacity to retain moisture in the soil inside them.

The boxes were all made of the same wood at the same time, and were of exactly the same size, yet pure chance and an actual difference in the properties of the boxes operated as stated. The scientist after further trials with absolutely comparable boxes, discovered that weak currents of electricity had no accelerating effect on plant growth and so reported.[1] Compare this with the "scientific method" of a man who postulates unknown causes and from these an unknown ultimate cause for irrelevant and heterogeneous facts which, it is more than probable, are no more facts than the initial "facts" adduced tentatively by this material scientist to "prove" that weak electric currents would accelerate plant growth.

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[1] It is a curious if not a significant fact that the original English investigator whose positive conclusions on the beneficial effects of electricity on the growth of plants moved the Americans to challenge and confute the work, was none other than Sir Oliver Lodge. Sir Oliver was here plainly fooled by material phenomena, however incapable he is of being deluded by super-sensible and intangible psychic phenomena. See "Electric Stimulation of Plant Growth," G. N. Collins, L. H. Flint and J. W. McLane, *Journal of Agricultural Research,* June 1, 1929, 585-600.

I who have spent years trying to discover and accurately describe a few unimportant and very illusive little facts in a restricted field of scientific endeavor pause in almost reverential awe before the tremendous scope and power of belief exhibited by such persons as the lecturer I just heard. I think of the extreme care we used in the laboratory, of the very restricted field in which we worked, of the meticulousness with which we tried to examine every microscopic portion of it, of the slowness with which we decided anything, of our extreme reluctance to trust our senses with regard to matters the average person would consider obvious, of the tentativeness of our conclusions, and I am rendered almost aghast at the power the Scot and others show to believe the most extraordinary things and to brush aside possibilities of error with a gesture.

A plausible case could be made out for the idea that science is the process of finding bad evidence to support notions you already have in your head, just as Bradley described metaphysics as the science of finding bad reasons for what you believe on instinct anyway. Many scientists have actually refused point blank even to consider or have explained to them facts which seemed to militate against their set notions—just as Liebig refused to discuss the theory of spontaneous generation, in which he believed, with Pasteur who demolished it. But there is a real and undeniable tendency on the part of all scientists to try to catch themselves rashly believing, to try to trip their theories up, to test all things and hold fast only to that which can withstand the very harshest critical usage they or their colleagues can possibly give it. This is the tendency we need to cultivate more and more but it is extremely difficult to get even a hearing for it so long as the most ridiculously unprovable theories are calmly and casually presented to audiences as "scientifically true" beyond all peradventure.

I could conclude with a painful peroration on what scientific truth really is, but my experience forbids. I might grow facetious. I prefer only to adumbrate what it decidedly is not and to hint that whenever a person warms to his views with affection and begins to meet opposing ideas with resentment he is no longer receptive to scientific truth. Thus the fact that investigators in psychic research invariably sooner or later become convinced by the "scientific proof" of personal survival after death, as the lecturer held, is, if true, enough to demonstrate that such investigations are open to grave objection. For a scientist never becomes permanently and firmly convinced of anything except the notion that this is a complex universe open to all sorts of misinterpretations. When he makes an absolute dogma even of that notion he loses much of his usefulness, but when he forgets it he is lost to scientific truth. The lecturer asked—"How can you help believing?" I ask continually "How can you believe so much that probably isn't so anyway?" In short, since nature as mere dirt in flower boxes can be so utterly cantankerous as to delude careful investigators, I find it a hundred fold more difficult to believe the esoteric revelations of inspired mystics and their credulous devotees.

THE DEVIL-COMPACT IN TRADITION AND BELIEF

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE tradition of the devil-compact, which figures as an important factor in demonology, is of great antiquity.[1] This notion of a bargain with Beelzebub is of Oriental origin, and is traceable as far back as the Persian sacred writings. In the Zend-Avesta, Ahriman fails in his efforts to tempt Zoroaster. But Iblis has greater success in this direction. In the *Shah-Nameh* of Firdusi,[2] this demon promises the Arabian prince Zohak to place him higher than the sun if he will sign a pact with him. The offer is accepted without much hesitation, and Iblis consecrates the pact by a kiss on both of Zohak's shoulders, from which spring forth two black serpents that no man can destroy. At last, the demon himself appears in the guise of a learned physician, and recommends that the serpents be given human brains to eat. Zohak kills his father and succeeds him on the throne, but he finally pays the penalty for the evil deeds committed by him with the demon's aid.

This Persian belief in a devil-compact forced its way into the religion of the Jews during the period of their Babylonian captivity under Zoroastrian rulers, and was transmitted by the Jews to the Christians.

The devil-compact is clearly mentioned in the book of Enoch, the Talmud and the Kabbala and is besides evident from a number of biblical passages. The temptation of Eve in Eden may perhaps be regarded as the first germ of this idea.[3] It is evident that the account of the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness is based upon a belief in the possibility of an agreement of reciprocal obligations or relations between man and the Devil and upon the recognition of the Devil's great power in this world.[4] This idea is particularly noted in the words which Satan addresses to Jesus in showing him all the kingdoms of the world: "All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me" (Matt. iv. 9; cf. Luke iv. 6-7).

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[1] The first attempt to treat this subject critically is J. A. Rinneberg's study *De pactis hominum cum diabolo* (17th century).

[2] Aboul-Casem or Abul Kasim Mansur, called also Ferdoussi, Ferdausi or Ferdusi, celebrated Persian epic poet, author of the *Shah-Nameh* or *Book of Kings* (c. 941 - c. 1021).

[3] Cf. E. G. Holland: "Who was the first Faust?" *Appleton's Journal,* XIV (1875), 80-81.

The term "New Testament," which meant to the early Christians and still means, in the original Greek, the "New Contract" or the "New Covenant," furnished he theologians with additional scriptural support for the belief in the possibility of man entering into a formal contract or covenant with the Devil, who was represented by the Church fathers as the replica of the Deity. The Adversary, wishing in every respect to counterfeit the acts of the Almighty, naturally also attempts to form a compact with men.

St. Jerome accepted this belief in a devil-compact to explain the expressions "a covenant with death" and "an agreement with hell" used by the prophet Isaiah in reproaching the rulers of Jerusalem for their unconcern about the impending peril for their city. The passage runs as follows:

> "Wherefore hear the word of the Lord, ye scornful men, that rule this people which is in Jerusalem. Because ye have said, We have made a covenant with death, and with hell are we at agreement; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through, it shall not come unto us: for we have made lies our refuge, and under falsehood have we hid ourselves. Therefore saith the Lord God, Behold . . . the hail shall sweep away the refuge of lies, and the waters shall overflow the hiding place. And your covenant with death shall be disannulled, and your agreement with hell shall not stand; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through, then ye shall be trodden down by it" (Is. xxviii. 14-18).

The belief in a devil-compact was supported by many other prominent Church fathers. St. Augustine treats the notion at great length. St. Basil the Great, bishop of Cæsaria (370-379), tells in his *Dialogues* of a compact which his own servant Proterius closed with the Fiend. According to the account of this legend given in the *Alphabet of Tales,* written in fifteenth-century English, this young man sold himself to the Devil for the love of a woman.

Naturally enough, the diabolical pacts of the first centuries of our era must be taken not in the apocalyptic but in the Hellenic sense. It was purely a question of conversion to the old pagan divinities, whom the Christians had reduced to devils. Even the famous devil-compact of St. Theophilus, of the sixth century, must have differed considerably from the medieval diabolical pacts by which Diabolus won everything and his human partner nothing but the prospect of the rack or the stake.

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[4] Cf. [Gustav] Georg Roskoff: *Geschichte des Teufels* (Leipzig, 1869), I, 201, note 9.

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The idea of the devil-compact penetrated from Asia into Europe through the intermediary of Byzantium, and was merged with beliefs that were similar and perhaps originally related. The old Northern demon, according to Jacob Grimm, also formed a pact with men, although he did not exact a written agreement.[5] In fact, the agreement in writing can only have originated in a period during which Roman legal forms had arrived to the peoples of the West.

It is not always possible for us to detect in folk-lore what is indigenous and what belongs to foreign nationalities. The identity of the beliefs and practices of primitive peoples the world over can be explained in two ways: If we assume that they were of independent origin, we must explain their identity by the uniformity of the human mind; but if, on the other hand, we hold to the belief of their common origin and beginnings from a common geographic center, it follows that their dissemination throughout the world must have come about through migration or mixture of races.[6]

* * *

The idea of the devil-compact among the Northern peoples included various elements. First of all, it was derived from the manner in which men negotiated in heathen times with the hearth-spirits of the most varied character. The Nords in ancient days dealt with sprites just as the farmers now treat their hired help. Terms of service were arranged by our ancestors with Cobolds as with human beings. They were hired and "fired" as the need presented itself or ceased to exist. When the demons of hell assumed the heritage of the ancient household-spirits among the Northern peoples, they also negotiated with men agreements of mutual service and promise. They, too, served their masters for stipulated periods in return for certain rewards, chief among which were human souls. The services exacted from the demons of hell by our ancestors increased, however, in proportion to the increase of their power. When the Devil was given unlimited sway over the world, the demands placed upon him and his underlings knew no limitations.

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[5] Cf. Jacob Grimm: *Deutsche Mythologie.* 4. Aufl. Berlin 1875-78. Translated from the German (*Teutonic Mythology*) by J. S. Stallybrass. 4 vols. London, 1882-88.

[6] M. Gaster in his paper, "Folk-Lore in the Old Testament," *Folk-Lore,* XXX (1919), 75, believes that the latter view is now being more and more recognized.

The conception of the devil-compact can also be explained as a survival of the old blood-bond with the titular deity.[7] It was believed in ancient days that a bond by blood-transfusion could be formed with spiritual as well as with human beings. This will account for the part which the red vital fluid plays in the diabolical pact. The writing or signing by man of the required document with blood drawn from his own veins as earnest-money of future full payment—his soul—is an addition which grew out of a misconception of the original meaning of this covenant with the trusted divinity. The use of blood in the devil-compact to bind man's promise to the powers of hell may also be explained by the idea found in the Old Testament that strength and feeling dwelt in the blood, which was considered the seat of all life.[8] In fact, blood already played a part in the evocations of the evil spirits practised by the Jews of the post-exilic period.

The idea of the blood-signed devil-compact may also have derived a few points from the Odin cult, in which men signed acts of self-dedication to the deity by marking their arms with the spear-point. This custom was traditionally derived from the conduct of the god himself, who is said to have marked himself with a javelin point, as he neared his end while he was envisaged as a king ruling over Sweden.

The selling of a man's soul to Satan is, furthermore, of cannibalistic inception. It is vestigially of the old sacrificial cult. The divinity with whom man covenanted was supposed to absorb the soul of his human ally when he devoured his body. The psychical was a part of the physical nutrition. Man's soul was transferred to the divinity together with his flesh. This will account for the medieval belief that the demons devoured the souls of the damned in hell. This idea probably is of Oriental origin. The seven Assyrian evil spirits had a predilection for human flesh and blood. Ghouls and vampires belong to this class of demons. Edgar Allan Poe, in his story "Bon-Bon" (1835), represents the demons as preparing in hell all sorts of fancy dishes made of human souls. When the original idea of cannibalism disappeared, the pledging of the human soul to the spirit was understood to mean the extension of his kingdom. It was reserved for Christianity to interpret the dedication by man of his soul to his titular divinity as the loss of his salvation.[9]

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[7] Concerning the idea of the old blood-bond, see H. C. Trumbull: *The Blood Covenant*. Philadelphia, 1893.

[8] Cf. Georg Roskoff, *op. cit.*, I, 347.

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Although the Christian belief in devil-compacts goes back, as has been shown, to the fourth century, it was not prevalent until the Middle Ages when it took a great hold on the minds of men. For three hundred years the idea was universal throughout the civilized world. Pope Innocent VIII, in his famous bull, "Summis desiderantes," issued on December 5, 1484, officially recognized the possibility for man to form of his own free will a pact with the powers of hell. The Reformation, which was a movement of progress in so many respects, still increased the popular belief that man could covenant with the demons of hell. In fact, the century of the Reformation even brought the belief in demonology and witchcraft to its height. According to Jean Bodin, author of *la Démonomanie des sorciers* (1580), a Paris lawyer was hanged in 1571 for having signed a bond with the Devil. In Germany, an edict of the Elector Augustus of Saxony of the year 1572 proclaimed the penalty of death by fire against whomsoever "in forgetfulness of his Christian faith shall have entered into a compact, or hold converse or intercourse, with the Devil. . . ." In England, as late as 1643, a certain Thomas Browne was indicted before a Middlesex jury for selling his soul to an evil spirit for an annuity of £1000 but was acquitted. This belief was also carried over to the New World. Increase Mather, the New England preacher, likewise affirmed that many men made "cursed covenants with the Prince of Darkness."

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[9] Cf. Julius Lippert: *Christentum, Volksglaube und Volksbrauch* (Berlin, 1882), p. 563.

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The belief as it prevailed among our medieval ancestors was to the effect that man could enter with the Devil into a compact by which he obtained from hell whatever he desired for a certain period —later fixed at twenty-four years—at the expiration of which term he was to deliver his soul to the Devil. It was supposed that Diabolus, wishing to draw man away from the Deity, assured for himself by this means man's soul while its owner was still living—*vivente corpore,* as it is related in Edgar Allan Poe's story "Bon-Bon" already mentioned. In his anxiety to obtain human souls, the Fiend felt no hesitancy in paying even hard cash for them, as it is expressed by Victor Hugo in his novel *Han d'Islande* (1822). The deed of transfer had to be written or at least signed by man with blood drawn from his own veins.

The man who wished to enter into business relations with the Devil generally applied to a Jew to act as intermediary. It was believed that only Jews could enter into communication with the Devil through the arts of magic. In the Theophilus-legend, the Jew who acts as a go-between is a sort of sorcerer who is disloyal to his own religion. When Chateaubriand, in his novel *les Martyrs* (1809), employs a Jew as an agent of hell, he also represents him as a Jew who has renounced the faith of his fathers. The zealot in one religion prefers a zealot to a liberal even in an opposing religion. In later legends, the sorcerer or sorceress, who brings about the meeting between man and the emissary of hell, is not always descended from the seed of Abraham.

In many literary works wherein is employed the tradition of a man selling his soul to Satan, the shadow, regarded as an emanation, an extension, so to say a "part," of the personality, is symbolically used for the soul. In Chamisso's *Peter Schlemihl* (1814), the title-character sells his shadow to the Devil for the purse of Fortunatus, and then, putting on the seven-leagued boots, diverts his mind from unpleasant thoughts by running about the world. Edgar Allan Poe offers an example of the identification of the shadow with the soul in "Bon-Bon." Oscar Wilde, in his tale "The Fisherman and his Soul" (1891), likewise considers the shadow of the body as the body of the soul.

Man could even sell to Satan a part of his body. Alphonse Karr, in "la Main du diable" (1855), narrates the suffering of a man who offered his right hand to the Devil in exchange for his brother's life. His brother recovered from his illness, and to fulfill his part of the agreement, he cut his right hand off and paid with his own life for the remission of his brother's.

It is further known that man could surrender to Satan not only his own soul, but also that of a person over whom he had authority. The medieval legend of the knight who sold his wife to the Devil is well known.[10]

Satan entered into the possession of man's soul when the term ran out by killing man's body. Man thus paid the penalty for his bargain with Beelzebub with violent death. The Devil usually inflicted death upon his victim by tearing his flesh with his sharp claws and teeth. It must be observed, however, that the Devil has no interest whatever in man's body. If he kills the man, it is only to obtain his soul. "When the term [of the devil-pact] is over," Victor Hugo tells us in his novel *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831), "the Devil destroys the body in taking the soul, just as a monkey cracks the shell to eat the nut."

The Devil, notwithstanding the great power he possesses over the bodies and minds of mortals, is, however, not potent enough to put a man to death, unless his victim has blasphemed or renounced the Lord.[11] This idea probably sprang out of the limitation imposed by the Almighty upon the power of Satan during the temptation of Job and out of the advice given the great sufferer by his well-meaning wife: "Curse God, and die" (Job ii. 9). It is only in such cases that the Devil has over men "the power of death" (Hebr. ii. 14; 1 Cor. v. 5). In view of this limitation of his power over the body of man, Diabolus exacted from his partner in the bond, which assigned the victim's soul to hell, a formal denial of the Christian faith, a rejection of Christian symbols and a renunciation of the Lord and his saints. The Devil was particularly anxious about his partner's repudiation of his baptism, the first sacrament which wipes away the original stain, which sacrament is man's safeguard against Satan. The man not only was expected to deny his baptism, but he had to accept another sacrament of baptism from hell. He also was forced to express a hatred for all Christians and a promise to resist all attempts to convert him.

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[10] This medieval legend of the knight and his wife has been retold by W. Carew Hazlitt in his collection *Tales and Legends of National Origin* (London: Macmillan, 1899).

[11] In Bürgers ballad "Lenore" (1774), a young girl curses God for having robbed her of her lover William, who had fought at the side of King Frederick at the battle of Prague and died on that occasion. She is then carried off by the Devil, who appears on horseback at midnight beneath Lenore's window in the form of her lover and calls her to ride with him to their wedding-bed. Another illustration of the Devil's power over a man, who has cursed God, is furnished in Victor Hugo's ballad "les Deux archers" (1825), in which two archers, who blasphemed God, are immediately killed and carried off to hell by the Devil.

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The contract-stories differ as to the objects which the human party to the agreement designed to derive from it. Position, power, protection, and pleasure were for the most part the objects for which man sold his soul to Satan. Wealth and learning, which figured so frequently in the contracts formed by man with the Fiend, were intended to provide man with the power for which he craved. Man aimed often to obtain, through contact or contract with the spirits of hell, such powers as would put him in a position to accomplish things beyond the ordinary conditions of humanity. He wished to batter down the walls of natural limitations imposed upon all mortals, and thus gain mastery of the world.

As prince of this world, the Devil could without any difficulty grant even the most extravagant wishes of man. He often even promised to place his magic powers at the service of the contracting party. "It was usually by means of contracts with the Devil," says Professor Ward, "that in a number of medieval legends men were said to have obtained a full command over the objects of those passions which it was the task of the Christian religion to repress or repel. Thus they were thought to have been enabled to drink to the dregs the cup of sensual indulgence, to satisfy the cravings of earthly ambition, to glut the accursed hunger for gold and for all that gold can buy, and to gratify the desire for knowledge of all things good and evil and for the power which knowledge insures."[12]

* * *

Generally a pact with the Devil cost man his eternal salvation. But Diabolus often found a man who was clever enough to outwit the purchaser of his soul.[13] Although Satan is called the archdeceiver, he can easily be deceived and hoodwinked. Popular belief, in fact, often represents the Devil as a trusting fool who is outwitted by the shallowest forms of trickery and dishonesty. Man has no scruples about his breach of contract with Beelzebub. He feels no hesitancy whatever in avoiding his part of the obligations mutually incurred by the two contracting parties. In violation of the written pact, he often cheats the Devil out of his legal due by technical squibbles. Man considers the legal document signed with his own blood as "a scrap of paper." "But still the pact is with the Enemy," says Henry Osborne Taylor; "the man is not bound beyond the letter, and may escape by any trick. It still is the ethics of war; we are very close to the principle that a man by strategem or narrow observance of the letter may escape the eternal retribution which God decrees conditionally and the Devil delights in."[14]

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[12] Cf. A. W. Ward: *Old English Drama* (4th ed., Oxford, 1901), pp. xiii-xiv.

The Devil, on the other hand, is never known to have tried evading the fulfilment of his share of the agreement. Although he is said to be a liar, Satan has never attempted to cheat his stipulators.[15] In regard to the fulfilment of his word, the father of lies has always set an example in honesty to his Christian negotiators.[16] There is a universal belief that the Fiend invariably fulfils his part of the obligations. It is a fact well worth noting that, although the Devil insists that his human negotiator sign the deed with his blood, he himself never has been required to sign it even in ink. The human party to the transaction has always had full confidence in the Devil's word. "It is peculiar to the German tradition," says Gustav Freytag, "that the Devil, in the compacts which he makes with men, endeavors to fulfill zealously and honestly the terms of agreement to the letter; the defaulter is man."[17] But the Germans have no monopoly to this belief. Already in the *Golden Legend*,[18] we find it reported that Satan once bitterly complained of the manner in which men try to evade their obligations towards him, whereas he always faithfully fulfils his part of the pact. "The Christians," he complained, "are cheats; they make all sorts of promises so long as they want me, and then leave me in the lurch, and reconcile themselves with Christ as soon as, by my help, they have got what they want."

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[13] The Gascon, who always has had a reputation for shrewdness in France, may, in the opinion of Anatole France, safely make a pact with the Devil, "for you may be sure that it is the Devil who will be duped" (*la Rôtisserie de la*

[14] Henry Osborne Taylor: *The Mediæval Mind* (2 vols., London, 1911), I, 489.

[15] The German writer, Grabbe, in *Don Juan und Faust* (1822), runs counter to popular tradition when he says, "Wer mit dem Teufel dingt, der wird betrogen" (He who negociates with the Devil is cheated).

[16] Bret Harte, in his poem "A Legend of Cologne," assures us that it has never been heard that the "Father of Lies" ever broke his word, and that the Devil has left "this position in every tradition to be taken by the 'truth-loving' Christian."

Reine Pédauque, 1893).

[17] Cf. Gustav Freytag: *The Devil in Germany During the Sixteenth Century.* Transl. from the German by Wm. A. Hervey (New Hork, 1893), p. 12.

We can now understand why in Eugene Field's story, "Daniel and the Devil" (1893), it seems so strange to Satan that he should be asked for a written guarantee that he would fulfil his part of the contract. Evidently this was the first time that the Devil had any transaction with an American businessman, who has not even faith in Old Nick.

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The medieval Church itself provided man with the means of evading the terms of his contract with the Devil. The bold contractor knew full well that he could count upon the Church to save him from the jaws of hell and force the Devil to surrender his rights to man's soul. In fact, prior to the Reformation, the Devil was nearly always cheated of his bargain through the instrumentalities of the Church.

The surest way for medieval man to avoid paying the penalty of his rash action in compacting with the powers of hell was to appeal to the Holy Virgin, who was always ready to fight the Fiend. The votary of the Virgin could especially count upon the Mother of all Mercies to help him break the contract with the Enemy if he omitted her in his general renunciation of the saints of Heaven.

The Virgin had in the Middle Ages almost as much power as the Trinity. As has well been remarked by Karl Pearson, she was the vindication of the right of the common folk to a goddess of their own kind.[19] In the medieval drama, Christ gives his mother, upon her assumption to heaven, a crown and scepter with full power over the Devil.[20] It is the Queen of Heaven rather than her Son who breaks the bolts and bonds of hell and binds the Enemy with all his crew. The Blessed Virgin was a sort of valkyr or amazon, always at war with the demons to snatch the pacts and the souls of the repentant sinners from them. The medieval poets call her for this reason Noah's Ark which carries mankind over the hell-flood.[21] The stories of the pitying interposition of the Mother of Christ on behalf of the repentant sinners are, according to Henry Osborne Taylor, among "the fragrant flowers of the mediæval spirit."[22] The Polish writer, Ignace Matuszewski, explains the rôle which is assigned to the Virgin in Catholic legend as a psychological atavism, a heritage of the mystic faith of the primitive peoples in the influence of the woman over the demon.[23] In pagan times the woman already possessed power over the evil spirits. In Hindu mythology, Kali or Durga interceded in the fight between her husband Siva and the demon Darida. The mother of all men was told by the Lord that she could crush the serpent's head. The predominance of drollery, however, soon altered this poetic conception of woman. It is then the old toothless hag, spindle in hand, the very sight of whom puts the Devil in flight. The woman appears in this rôle in the medieval *fabliaux* and farces.[24]

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[18] The *Golden Legend* (*Legenda aurea sive historia Lombardica*), a collection of stories of the saints taken partly from books partly from verbal accounts, was compiled about 1275 by Jacobus de Voragine, a Dominican archbishop of Genoa. Longfellow has chosen this title for the second part of his *Christus: A Mystery* (1873).

[19] Cf. Karl Pearson: *The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution* (London, 1897), II, 351.

[20] In Ostendorfer's woodcut, the Virgin carries the keys of heaven and hell.

The Blessed Virgin snatched from the jaws of hell Merlin,[25] Theophilus,[26] and Robert the Devil.[27] In the medieval story of the knight who sold his spouse to Satan, the Mother of God, to whom the victim addressed herself on her way to the Devil, assumed her form and accompanied the knight in her stead to the Devil and forced him to return the deed to the knight. Many later works also represent the woman as victor over the demons of hell. Cyprian in Calderón's play, *El Mágico prodigioso* (1663), is saved through the instrumentality of a woman, whose spirit of innocence defies and defeats the Devil's power. Goethe, in *Faust* (1808-32), has woman, not a particular woman, but the Eternal Womanly—*das Ewig Weibliche*—draw Faust onward and upward in the end and redeem him from hell.[28]

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[21] In a Spanish play *Mascaron* of the thirteenth century, the Holy Virgin appears in defence of the human race against the charges brought by the demon Mascaron.

[22] Cf. Henry Osborne Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, 490.

[23] Cf. Ignace Matuszewski: *Dyabel w poezyi* (2nd ed., Warsaw, 1899), p. 105.

[24] Read in this connection the ballad "The Devil and the Scold" in the collection *English and Scottish Ballads* (Boston: Houghton, 1858), VIII, 257-8.

[25] Merlin, a legendary diviner, plays a very important part in the Celtic legends and the medieval tales of chivalry as the friend of King Arthur, who was, according to Cæsarius of Heisterbach, the son of a demon and a nun. Through the intervention of the Virgin, he did not follow in his father's footsteps and was finally saved from perdition.

[26] The Theophilus-legend will be treated in the next paper.

[27] Robert the Devil, the son of a duke and duchess of Normandy, was counted among the great progeny of Satan. He was born, according to the confession of his own mother, in answer to prayers addressed to the Devil. According to another version of this legend, the Devil was Robert's physical father. However, when Robert learned of his diabolical descent, he turned from his father to God. After he had repented of his misdeeds, the Blessed Virgin took pity on him, secured his pardon and had him married to the daughter of the emperor of Sicily, with whom he was in love. During his courageous defense of Rome against the besieging Saracens, an angel bestowed upon this penitent celestial weapons with which he was given power to rout his enemies. The medieval legend of Robert the Devil has been retold by W. Carew Hazlitt in the book already mentioned.

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The Devil, notwithstanding all the disappointments these commercial transactions have brought him, evidently has up to this day not renounced this poorly paying business of purchasing human souls. The shrewd dealer should realize that he possesses the human soul without any contract or any special document and without paying a penny for it. In fact, a man can surrender his soul to Satan under no necessity of signing a document. Thus Don Joan lost himself to the Devil through his bad deeds, without entering into any special contract. When a man commits a sin, he falls into the power of the Enemy. Each evil deed is an act of acquiescence to Satan's will, which is equivalent to an alliance with him. "Give up your soul to Satan's darling sins," it has been said by a clergyman, "and he will help you for a season until he has his claims carefully wound around you. When his links are carefully closed, he seizes his victim, who has no longer any power to resist." Carlyle has also said: "Follow the Devil faithfully, you are sure enough to go to the Devil; whither else can you go?"

[28] A very interesting modern version of this idea of woman's victory over the Devil will be found in Frederick Beecher Perkins's story, *Devil-Puzzlers* (1871). which has been reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (New York: Knopf, 1921).

SUGGESTIONS FOR A THEORY OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT*

BY PROF. A. K. SHARMA

PERHAPS the greatest want, under which the Science of Religion labours at the present day is that of a theory of development. Archaeology, Ethnology, and Anthropology have collected a large quantity of materials for the study of religion; these have been sifted, compared, and arranged; religious origins have been determined in some measure; beliefs have been classified into varying degrees of higher and lower; but the law according to which a belief, lower in the scale, grows into a higher one, is yet to be discovered. The Historical School, ever shy of speculation, is nearly satisfied with the description of facts, and the Theoretical School, unencumbered by inconvenient facts, offers conclusions which are over-weighted by *a priori* assumptions. It would appear that the former has no theories to offer, and that those advanced by the latter are abstract, empty, *jejune*. And the human mind is so constituted that it would accept any theory rather than none.

Properly to estimate the value of a true theory is indeed difficult. That a theory, if true, adds to our knowledge, and has value as such, is obvious enough. Apart from this, it has a certain practical importance. Wherever a thing is the result of a process, its full significance is understood only when the process itself is understood. In such a case the present interpenetrates with the past, nay, it is the transmutation of the past: its significance is derived from the process of which it is the culmination, and can be made clear only in reference to its context. A religious belief is no more an exception to this than a biological organism or a political institution. Who can understand, for instance, the Christian sacrament of the Lord's Supper, without any knowledge of its origin? The pious "Pagan" in the old story, who visited the church on the day set apart for the Holy Communion, came out with the idea that the worshippers were a set of cannibals trying to eat the flesh and drink the blood of their very Lord. What a different significance the Sacrament would have to him, if he had only known how it came to be instituted!

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* A paper read at the World's Oriental Conference, Oxford, August, 1928, by Prof. A. K. Sharma, M. A., Patiala, India.

It is however in connection with current theological problems that the need for a theory of development is keenly felt. If the intellectual form, which belief in God has taken at the present day, could be characterised by one word, that word would be "immanence." Philosophers spin theories about it, theologians dogmatise on it, but very few tell us the full import of the term. Is God present in the whole world of experience? If so, how are we to decide the question of freedom, moral initiative, and the origin of evil? If He is present only in a part of the world, which is that part? Nature, says one; moral life, says another; reason, says the third. Whatever it be, how are we to reconcile the part where He is present with the part where He is not ? Again, is immanence true in fact as well as in meaning? What, then, becomes of personality, divine and human? These questions are answered in diverse ways, and in the confusion of tongues, no voice is distinctly heard.

But in the light of a true theory, these and other problems can be seen in proper perspectives. In the first place, it will acquaint us with the Socio-psychological conditions of the origin of particular beliefs; and the knowledge of these conditions will enable us to formulate our questions precisely, and to see whether our answers are adequate enough. In the second place, it will disclose the principle underlying new formations; and when once this is grasped the application will not be difficult. In the third place, it will show that spiritual evolution has been going on in two divergent channels, the Moral and the Intellectual, the one culminating in the conception of Transcendence and the other in that Immanence. And as an important Corollary, it will place at our disposal the spiritual experiences of our ancestors. It will be surprising to many a mind, whose vision has been limited, hitherto, by huge racial, national, or religious blinkers, to be told that Immanence is not a new idea, peculiar to our age, that some of our fore-fathers had hopes and fears, aspirations and fulfilments, similiar to ours, and that ours is the same old question only presented in modern settings. Certainly it will be of advantage, if we can know how these questions were once asked and what answers were then given.

II.

The failure to discover a law of development is due, in part to the limitation imposed by facts themselves. The data hitherto collected—or one may be permitted to remark—attended to, consist of beliefs scattered in various communities, in different places, and in diverse periods. There is no continuity observable among these disparate elements. The task would be easier indeed, if we could catch beliefs in transitions and in an order of succession, in the life of one and the same community. Are these conditions fulfilled anywhere? "No country can be compared to India as offering opportunities for a real study of the genesis and growth of religion. . . What we can catch and study in India better than anywhere else, is, how religious thought and language arise, how they gain force, how from mind to mind, yet always retaining some point of contiguity they spread, changing their forms as they pass from mouth to mouth, with the springs from which they rose at first. I do not think therefore that I am exaggerating when I say that the sacred books of India offer for a study of religion in general, and particularly for the study of the origin and growth of religion, the same peculiar and unexpected advantages which the language of India, Sanskrit, has offered for the study of the origin and growth of human speech."[1]

Not the sacred books alone. Religious practices which originated in prehistoric times are still lingering in the outskirts of Indian Civilisation, and the observations of them will verify, and to some extent supplement, what is found in ancient books. "For whereas primitive paganism . . . has been utterly extinguished many centuries ago in Europe and through-out Western Asia, yet wherever and whenever we cross the border, or land on the shore of India, we may find going on before our very eyes things of which we read in ancient books. We seem to step suddenly out of the modern world of formal definite creeds back into the disorderly super-naturalism of pre-christian ages . . . we may still fancy that in looking over India we catch a reflection of classic polytheism."[2]

[1] Max Muller: *Origin of Religion,* p. 135.

[2] Lyall: *Asiatic Studies.* Part I., p. 303.

III.

To yield fruitful results our investigation should be pursured by a method altogether different from the usual ones. In the Science of Religion there are two methods in vogue, the Historical and the *a priori*. The former is confined to the discovery of facts as they are, and is not concerned with any theory about them. The latter starts with an initial assumption and proceeds to squeeze facts into a ready made frame-work; recalcitrant facts are either mutilated beyond recognition, or discarded altogether as useless. To enter into a criticism of either is not relevant to the purpose of the present enquiry, but it is necessary to point out that both are vitiated by one common defect. The advocates of these methods seem to be inspired by the belief that the only data necessary for the study of the origin and growth of religion is a set of religious ideas, to be critically collected by the one, and to be rationally connected by the other. It does not seem to have occurred to them that ideas do not explain themselves. A living mind casts the object of its religious experience in the intellectual mould, so to say, and the product is a religious idea; a ritual is the practical expression of the emotional attitude of the same mind towards the same object; both are subject to modifications in the course of spiritual experience; and relatively speaking they are more or less inert. To know how they arise and under what circumstances they become changed, it is necessary to go to the root of the experience itself, and to explore the mind to which they belong. And as religion is essentially a socio-psychological phenomenon, a theory of its development should be based on the nature of the Socio-psyche in its continuous evolution. If this is so, the method most adequate to the purpose is the Socio-psychological method.

This method is essentially scientific in character. It starts with the discovery of certain facts, and proceeds to extract from them their psychic significance. Out of the elements so extracted, it attempts to reconstruct the nature and the evolution of the Socio-psyche. Lastly, from the nature of the Socio-psyche, it makes the further attempt to discover the law of the genesis and growth of religious ideas. The resemblance between the Historical method, and the first part of our method is merely superficial, for the Historical method is interested in facts for their own sake, while the

Socio-psychological method is interested only in such facts as have a psychical significance.

The Socio-psyche is revealed only through its expressions. For the sake of clearness, these may be roughly distinguished as external and internal. The external expression consists of migration and settlement, of war and conquest, of agriculture, industry, and trade, of social, legal, and political organisations, in short of all those activities which are economical in character. The internal expression consists of language, of literature of various kinds, of religious and moral ideas and institutions, of arts, plastic and decorative, of music, of painting, of dancing. To collect the records of these facts should be our first task.

At this point we may be told that the ancient literature of India contains very little of history, and that, therefore, neither the changing forms assumed by the Socio-psyche in the course of its development, can be described clearly, nor its activities arranged in an order necessary for the reconstruction of an evolutionary process out of them. Granted, that the genius of India has so masked herself in mythological symbols, that it is difficult to read the lineaments of her features at any stage of her life; granted, further, that, in spite of all the questionings of historians, she has preserved a silence, inscrutable, puzzling, nay, oppressive; yet one may hold that the difficulty is only plausible, at any rate not insuperable. The sort of composite picture of ancient life which this literature portrays, should be sufficient for our purpose. It is not through facts, which can be collected exhaustively and dated with precision, but through those which are typical and illustrative of life in different periods, that we should attempt to lift the veil of mystery, by which the genius of India has shrouded her early life.

Our next task is to describe the nature of the Socio-psyche by the aid of its expressions. These expressions will reveal certain psychical characteristics. These would be nearly the same as might be arrived at by the analysis of the socio-psyche, if such a process were originally possible. Some of these characteristics will be of the same kind; for this reason they can be considered as forming one group; and in like manner, all of them can be disposed of in various groups. When two groups contain common or similar characteristics, they are to be placed side by side, as indicating an order of succession in the series; and it is in terms of these characteristics that the transitional stage between one group and another is to be described. Each group, then, when the characteristics contained in it are synthesised, will give us a picture of the socio-psyche at one stage of the development, and by means of the series we can visualise the process of its growth. But in each group there will be one characteristic standing pre-eminently over others, a ruling quality, if it be so, which is foundational to the rest. In other words, the socio-psyche assumes, at every stage, a new phase, and there emerges also a fresh *dominant*. Any particular phase, its peculiar tone, its unique look, the motif immanent in it, and the fountain-spring of all its changes can be characterised only in terms of this *dominant*. All this would give us not only snapshots of the physiognomy of the socio-psyche as it changes from stage to stage, not only a clue to the principle of its structure, but also a general view of the process as a whole.

The method so far outlined, that is to say, so far as the first two stages are concerned, is not altogether new. Karl Lamprecht employed it for the first time; and though he has not given a systematic exposition of it, he has applied it, with great success, in his study of the growth of the German Nation. In the view of this Savant, the history of the German Nation, considered as a socio-psychological process, comprises five distinct stages, viz, the Symbolic, the Typical, the Conventional, the Individualistic, and the Subjectivistic.

Human nature, whether it be in the Teuton, or in the Anglo-Saxon, or in the Semite, or in the Indo-Aryan, remains the same in fundamentals; therefore the general psychological laws deduced from the life of one typical nation should hold good in other cases as well. So far, the method, as worked out by the German Historian, is adequate enough. But when it is applied to the Historian, of Religious thought, it requires amplification, by the inclusion in it of a further consideration of the experience of the Socio-psyche.

IV.

We should therefore try to discover, if possible, the genetic relation between the experience of the Socio-psyche and its religious ideas. On ultimate analysis, this experience is resolvable into two terms—contact with environments, and reaction on them. In normal conditions this process of stimulus-response goes on as a matter of course; and when it is interfered with, there arises an emotion. It may be that of fear, or that of anger, or that of any other kind according as the interference is felt as a hindrance or as a help. In this case the object of the emotion is more or less a familiar one, and it is therefore apprehended very definitely. Such an experience is an every-day affair. But something extra-ordinary might happen. Suppose that the course of this usual life of the psyche is thwarted by something never experienced before, that is to say, by some agency, power, or force, which is as yet mysterious and unknown, what would happen? The Socio-psyche would double on itself, and its attention would be diverted from the object of the original activity to the new mysterious power. Not knowing whence or what this power is, it would wonder; not being able to control it, it would feel helpless; if the interference is unfriendly, it would fear; in this manner the complex emotion of awe would stir it to the very depths. If, on the other hand, the interference is felt as friendly, wonder and helplessness would be combined with gratitude, and there would arise the complex emotion of reverence. At a much later stage in the development of the Socio-psyche, the emotive agent might become an object of even adoration and love. The distinction between the old experience and the new lies in the fact that, while the first is directed towards the natural, the habitual, and the work-a-day object of the world, the second is directed towards something mysterious and super-natural. With the emergence of the experience of the psychically felt presence of the super-natural, the Socio-psyche has entered the path of religion. Religious experience then, is the result of the dissociation of normal experience, and it is distinguished by a deep emotion and the awareness of the presence of a mysterious power.

What is this power? It cannot be seen, nor is it tangible; it is elusive, and yet it is very real. Since it has been experienced along with natural objects, could it be behind them or within them? The problem is intriguing. Natural objects are envisaged with a view to get into touch with the elusive power, and this gives rise to what is miscalled Nature-religion. Meanwhile the Socio-psyche is impelled from within, and an attempt is made to get some notion of this hidden power. The only way open is to bring all normal experiences to bear on the problem, and thus to read the unknown in terms of the known. Among the known there is one object which occupies a pre-eminent position; it takes initiative, at times it thwarts normal activity, and it is also capable of becoming a friend or a foe; and this object is the human self. No wonder that from the earliest times, God has been interpreted in terms of the self. There is much psychological truth in the formula that the idea of God, in any community, is the reflex of the idea of the self, prevalent in that community.

The form given to the idea, whether it be the idea of self or that of God, depends upon the organ of apprehension with which the psyche is endowed. At the Symbolic stage, it possesses only perceptual organs and self or God is understood only in physical terms; strictly speaking there is no idea at all at this stage. At the Typal Stage intellect is envolved and real ideation begins. There is no fresh organ involved at the Conventional and the Individualistic stages, the new experiences being apprehended only by the intellect. At the Subjectivistic stage the capacity for intuition is evolved, and along with it comes a different way of apprehending objects. In this manner the idea of God is seen to be the function of experience and of the organ by which experience is apprehended.

V.

In the preceding sections we gave a brief sketch of the Socio-Psychological method. Before applying it to investigate the religion of Ancient Aryans, it is necessary, in order to avoid all possible confusion and misunderstandings, to point out the limitations of this paper. Religion, considered as an objective matter of study, includes a conception of God as its most important element; further, it includes certainly, an idea of future life, probably some notion of the relation between God and man, possibly a view of human society, and perhaps also a theodicy. In addition to all this, some religions contain a belief in pre-existence, and some others an idea of incarnation. This paper is confined to the attempt to trace the origin and development of the idea of God, as contained in the sacred literature of India. This idea occupies the Central place in religion and it is the pivot on which all other religious ideas hang. The knowledge of the evolution of this idea is bound to throw light not only on the evolution of religion in general, but also on the growth of allied religious ideas.

The second limitation pertains to the choice between diverging lines of evolution. It was indicated, in a previous section that religious evolution has been going on in two divergent lines, the intellectual and the moral. At present our attempt is to trace the process, from its very beginning up to the point at which it diverges in two directions, and then to go along the line which leads to the idea of immanence. The Psychological laws underlying this branch of religious evolution are the same as those underlying the moral branch which leads to the idea of transcendence. The culmination of the intellectual line would give us only an aspect of God; and if our idea should be concrete and complete, if such were possible, the idea of immanence should be reconciled, and, if necessary, synthesised with that of transcendence. But with this task we are not concerned for the present.

VI.

The Indo-European life of the Aryan People is lost in obscurity. Where they lived, whether it was in the North of Europe, or on the steppes of Southern Russia or in the fertile fields to the west of the Carpathians, is a question on which there does not seem to be any measure of unanimity among historians. But it is safe to infer, from certain known facts, that they formed a homogenous Community, just hovering on the borderland between the nomadic life and the agricultural. They tended the ox and the cow, they also raised corn; the patriarchal system was in vogue in their families; and their religion consisted in the worship of two nebulous objects the Earth and the Sky.

Exigencies of circumstances or the spirit of adventure, drove them gradually to the plateau of Iran; and after hard fights with the local inhabitants, they settled down to peaceful avocations. That there was a cultural relation between the ancient people of Mesopotamia and those who composed the Vedas, was evidenced by the German excavations at Boghaz-Koi and the famous letters from Tel elamarna.[3] It was left to Dr. Waddel to make the astounding discovery that the list of kings and seers mentioned in Sumerian inscriptions, is exactly the same as recorded in the Vedas, and that therefore, the Sumerians "were the long lost early Aryans in race speech and script."[4] The recent discovery of Sumerian seals on the banks of the Indus has placed the cope-stone on the theory so ably advocated by Dr. Waddel. The Sumerians were also known as the Phoenicians, and they called themselves by various other names—the Amorite, the Goth, and the Scyth.[5]

In their new Asiatic home they did not show any advance over their earlier life. From the socio-psychological point of view, the Indo-European stage and the early Iranian stage should be taken together as constituting one stage in development, for the whole period is essentially one of symbolism. The Community remained homogenous; agriculture had slightly improved, trade had just commenced in the shape of barter; and the medium of exchange was still the corn. The most powerful man was elected king, and he represented the various activities of the community; in war he led the army, in time of peace he functioned as magistrate; and on ceremonial occasions he officiated as priest. The planning of houses and villages was based on symbolism,[6] and this is continued even to-day in India. Land belonged indirectly to the community; no man could retain it except when he happened to be a patriarch, and it could not be alienated either by gift or by sale. During festivals they drank hard; their favourite sports were hunting and chariot-racing; and their chief game was gambling, in which they would wager anything, even their children, their wives, and if necessary themselves.

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[3] Cambridge *History of Ancient India,* pp. 72 and 76.

[4] Waddel. *Sumerian Seals Deciphered,* p. i.

[5] Waddel. *Sumerian Seals Deciphered,* p. vii.

The same psychic quality was revealed in their inner life. Marriage was the symbolic union between Soma (Moon) and the daughter of Surya (Sun). A legalistic symbolism took the place of morality; and the chief crimes were theft and robbery. There was no reasoning from premise to conclusion, but only analogical inference based on physical resemblances. There was neither precision, nor balance, nor proportion in the working of the mind; and no wonder prose was unknown. Poetry, the language of imagination, was the only medium of expression, and its metre was the symbolism of the rhythm of Physical movement. Alphabet was nonexistent, and teaching was carried on from mouth to mouth.

Energy, adventure, and imagination glutted life; but there was no sense of personal worth, the individual being lost and merged in the community. Lamprecht's description of the psychic condition of the Germanic tribe in the last centuries before the birth of Christ, applies equally well to the Aryans on the Euphrates valley. That the former took a long time to develop the same quality as was present in the latter at a much earlier age, may be accounted for by the fact that, while these acquired new experiences due to migration, the other tribe remained home-keeping youths with their wits very much retarded in growth. "Their imagination, to begin with this most symptomatic of all psychic functions, rich in accordance with the output of their strength, does not show itself in any poem, any drama, any musical composition, any piece of sculpture or painting. And yet it is active in the highest degree. It includes, at bottom, all the above-named kinds of imaginative activity at one and the same time; there was no song that was not accompanied by gesticulation and plastic pose of the body, as by a musical handling of the language; no solemn function that did not take a poetically musical form, no creation of plastic art in which mimic motives suggesting speech and modulation had not made themselves felt. . . . To them the world was not yet something conceivable, capable of portrayal, but only such as they saw before them, and hence the image of it in their mind was simple, palpable. No matter what important affair of life was dealt with psychically, it was not described in definite terms and made fast by convictions. It was reproduced allegorically, and its meaning repeated in psychic functions which expressed it externally by means of symbols."[7]

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[6] Havel. *History of Aryan Rule in India,* pp. 22 to 32.

Our chief interest is in their religion. At the Indo-European stage, religion must have consisted, as we suggested already, in the feeling of a cosmic power, vague, nebulous, an all-enveloping mystery, a "blooming, buzzing, confusion."

This vague feeling differentiated itself into two, Deus and Nerthus. The former developed into the idea of Zeus in Greece, of Jupiter in Rome, and of Dyauspitar in India; and the latter pervaded the thought of all Indo-European tribes and became Prithvi in Hindustan. Nerthus-worship, as described by Tacitus, bears a genetic relation to the worship of Durga in India.[8]

These names are retained in language; but at the Iranic stage the experiences signified by them were further differentiated into what Max Muller called the semi-tangible and the intangible objects, —like rivers, mountains, trees, the earth, the wind and the storm on the one hand, and the Sun, the Moon, the stars, and the lightning, on the other. "The Gods were not personifications of light, or of the phenomena of nature, but the worship was directed towards primeval forces and potencies, behind which more or less vague personalities were seen. . . . Everywhere man had to reckon with such forces, everywhere he might be confronted with uncontrollable mystic power."[9] This is not animism for animism presupposes the distinction between spirit and matter, and there was no such distinction at the stage we are considering.

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[7] Lamprecht; *What is History?* pp. 41 and 43.

[8] Sten Kenow; Article in Viswabharati Quarterly, July, 1925, p. iii.

[9] Sten Kenow; Article in Viswabharati Quarterly, July, 1925, p. 3.

These objects were called Devas (The bright ones). A deva is not a deity, as most orientalists suppose; it is the stuff out of which a deity is manufactured at a later stage; and at best it can be translated only as a proto-deity. The History of the idea of God in the religion of the Indo-Aryans is but the history of the attempt to determine the real meaning of the term Deva.

Agni (fire) and Indra (rain) were the chief Devas. The attitude towards the Devas was rather strange; they could be propitiated by sacrifice, they could be coaxed into friendship, and they might even be coerced into submission.

Since the only organ of apprehension with which the psyche was endowed at this stage, was perception, two consequences were bound to follow. In the first place the Devas could be described only in physical terms. Indra was just rain, Marut was just the storm as felt, Surya was just the shining object, and so on with the rest. The force behind these exactly coincided with their physical appearances. Secondly, these objects could not be unified in any way. Perception has not the capacity to unify itself; perceptual experience is essentially pluralistic; and therefore perceived objects as such, remain loose, unconnected, unsynthesised. Hence the belief prevalent in certain quarters, that a Deva is a consciously conceived manifestation of the Absolute, does not accord with facts, and can be explained only as due to a confusion of thought. In this connection we may note the surprising fact that there is no fetish-worship in Indo-Aryan religion. This is easily explained. Perception being the test of the reality of the mystic power, the more precise and definite a perceived object is, the less the impulse to consider it as the home of mystery, and the more the tendency to discard it in favour of semi-perceived objects. What turn this process of elimination took and what it ultimately led to, we shall see in the sections that are to follow.

(To Be Continued.)

THE LIVERY OF PROTEUS

BY LLOYD MORRIS

ON a Scandinavian promontory fretted by a gray sea whose waters are never utterly tranquil, stands a forgotten stimulus, and the crudely set architecture of a cyclopean memorial.

Sometimes the girdling ocean heaves slowly in long swells, and out of the white mists that wrap about its breast comes a low moan, as if a multitudinous dead lying within its sombre depths was stirring restlessly, and complaining through a heavy sleep. Rarely its surface shimmers into quick ripples; often the storm-wind tramples over its wrinkled face, and towering walls of dark water crested with white, come roaring in wild succession to burst upon the shore and, sweeping far up the strand, hiss among the dune-grass and smite with javelins of spray, the dumb witness of dead men signalling down the clangorous years of change.

All the magic of ancient legend and shadowy history lingers about the solitary mounds and tumbled menhirs, many an one such as this, to be seen arching up against the sky-line from the bare fell-sides of the countries of northern Europe: eastward from Ireland to the Baltic strand.

Love and devotion built them; and before the driven brine was launched against them in aerial attack, salt tears had fallen upon them; and from their freshly heaped sides were tossed back upon the night, wild farewells and the flaring lights of failing torches.

In fear and defiance their runic characters were graven; that memory of the dead might not pass from time; nor knowledge of their hardly-won faiths, which upheld them above the brute-beast, from succour of the generation of men—devoured by the laughing mystery of the ocean; and the travailing of deep with deep as some shuddering purpose went forth to unfold.

How great an interment was here: something more than warrior, something stranger than skald; and to mark the decease, but the green mound and some waving grasses.

Here in these tumuli the warrior sleeps with dinted helm and blunted spear. Here the aged skald is laid, his pagan rhyme muted in dust that was once his lips. Snowed over by snows, beaten with rains, they lie within sound of the strife of wind and ocean; and the brine-laden gale whistles over them the music to which they sang with a great pagan joy of life; to which they tugged at the long sweeps of their leaping ships; and to which they slept on the unsleeping waters.

Here, too, in these barrows was borne to sepulture a colossal mythology. Together in the adventure of life, pagan and paganism were exposed to the final hazard: every hurtling arrow menaced the gods; the circling axe shattered a heaven; and with every warrior borne from stricken field to his tomb, were carried his gods, his jotuns and his hereafter, already sepultured in a lifeless brain.

There are none now that call upon Odin; the altars of Thor are shattered—and the peaceful peasant wends his way to the Lutheran church on the hill.

There are none that see the elves tripping lightly in the moonlight, nor the nixies rise from the translucent water and, with fair breasts gleaming in the light of the moon, sing their seductive song and comb their blonde hairs with pink shells. There are none who stare through the night affrighted at the ruddy light of Thor's red beard flaring across the sky, and the tumult of his chariot wheels rolling down the west. None see the Valkmeyjar, the battle-maids whose riding is as the riding of gods and heroes, ride out on the tempest: their helms of gold, and a red dew dripping from the tossing manes of their steeds as they summon the warrior fiercely exultant to his last mortal combat, and happy entry into the hall of Odin lit with shields and wainscoted with spears; where dead men rise up ever, and all the airs that blow, are shouts of joyous battle and wassail that know no satiety nor end.

All, all, that titanic imagery wherein the primitive Scandinavian mind expressed so earnestly its ideas of good and evil is become as the music of a pleasing tale—and the peasant plodding a lonely way to market, hears nothing in the wind but the wind; sees only a storm-wrack sweeping across the sky, and a ripple on the water.

Here indeed were matter for the moralist; from which to recite brave tales on the superior altitude of present human understanding. Here, too, might the cynic point a disturbing finger and say that History repeats itself. Here might the pensive traveller stay his step and wonder over the fashion of some morrow leashing its little moment beside the shapes of today and, in ironic little tributes to the antique fantasies of us dead and gone, pronounce the doom of its own faiths; and all the cherishments of an infinite generation of men foetal in eternity.

Can no thought be so fine but that Time shall respect its fairness; no belief so earnest but for all the days it shall be true? The wonder of eras becomes an era's sport; the dearest hopes of nations at last by peoples are despised; and the agonies and tumults of aspiring epochs recede to senseless symbols recording an effluxion of dimensioned time.

The possibilities of Time crowd us down; vociferous modernities in an infinity of repetition deride the elder days for that they muttered and shouted and lo, there was only foolishness; they clutched and behold nothing was in their futile hands.

Goes there not, also, some pilgrim through eternity, telling above the sweeping crescendo of life's vast integrations, that the finalities nourished in yesterdays shone in their hour as steadfastly and true upon the unknown, as do in their turn the effulgencies of futurity's more sumptuous years. Sounds there, also, no far utterance calling from epoch to epoch over sundering oblivions of finite disquietudes that the ignorance of humanity is habitual; that there is in the slightest weed wherewith the hedgerow is green a secret that is the tyranny of time; that in the wind is more than the wind; and on the face of the waters a going forth that has no wap nor wan.

Though the things that we wrought, the hands that shaped, and the brain that directed be resolved again into constituent parts beneath mounded earth; yet the abyssal intention that projected them has no solemn funerals there. Though ever for ever to-morrow's shapes of splendour dim the lustre of today's accomplishment till they be but faded rustling wreaths garlanding Time's greedy adornment; yet the thread upon which they are strung remains impalpable, irrefragable, infinite.

For the virtue of creation does not lie at the point of the biologist's knife, nor is sealed in any test tube. It is superior to any combination of pigments laid upon canvas; and all our cabbala holds no incantation potent enough to conjure it into terms of sensual perception.

The poem has yet to be written, the harmony evolved, the marble chipped, the theorem erected and ethic or philosophy enunciated which shall incarnate that profound in all things and ever unbeheld; which speaking all tongues informs no ear; is fugitive to the understanding and known to the lad whistling along the furrow—the elusive residuum of research and vivifying principle gliding through History.

We are conscious of it nodding from you to itself in me; manifesting itself subjectively in the happy ideals of happy hours before sorrow laid its first harsh stricture upon our boyish days; in our crescive arrogancies before the certitudes of our prime crumbled in the crucible of experience; in the bland sagacities of our mellowed autumn, before age imposed its tyranny upon an humbleness that asks at last but that the sun's bright rays, and delicate warm airs may fall gently, and the food be soft to mumble in the mouths of poor Harlequin and Pantaloon.

From swaddling band to winding sheet, a litter of discarded spiritual clothing marks the passage of the individual human entity. Objectively, also, we gaze with pensive eye of wonderment or dilated stare of the apalled trembling upon the giddy verge of ecstacy, at the already unrolled tapestry of Time's expression, and at the stupendous adumbration of things yet to be as the ineffable outfolds through gross animalism to mental abstraction; and returns again unto itself in ratiocinations too remote for perception.

The hues of physical glory, the deliquescence of disgustful rottenness; tiny splotch of protoplasm, human brain; the riot of material abandon, the austerities of spiritual extremities, are but the sport and play of its circumstantial masquerades.

Fetish, totem, runic stave; pictograph, Tintoretto; Elgin Marbles, Pauline Epistles; Buddhist dagops, Christian shrine; pagan altar and shrieking sacrifice, stately cathedral, solemn chaunt and the reverential ear inclined to the worshipful mass as sunbeams slanting through glowing windows stain with borrowed tints heads bowed to prayer; the Unkulunkulu of the Amazulu, Brahman Veda, Zorastorian Avesta, Buddhist Tripitaka, Alcoran, the Kings of Confucius—these, and such as these are its liveries.

Here, too, in this northern land where over the grave of skald and warrior and mythology, stars glint like frosted sword-blades in the deep blue dome of Odin's halls; here was a Livery of Proteus—not a mean and dishonored habiliment, but a tapestry whose fashion once of gold, now is silver warp in today's tailorings; and yet shall be sober thread in the woof of imperfect shadows of gigantic happenings in a realm beyond the present mind; wherein the Supernal weaves and weaves and weaves.

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

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THE DEVIL-COMPACT IN LEGEND AND LITERATURE

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE tradition of the devil-compact took deep roots in popular fancy as well as in Catholic belief. It loomed up in the tenth century as the vital point of a legend and gathered around itself an enormous material. In the form of the Theophilus-legend, which, in the sixteenth century, merged into the Faust-myth, it entered the literatures of all European countries and formed the subject of poem and play, novel and short story, throughout the civilized world for full thousand years.

The story of the compact closed by Theophilus with the Devil is briefly as follows: Theophilus was a bishop's seneschal or vicedominus, living in the sixth century, at Adana in Cilicia, Asia Minor. He was so highly esteemed by the priesthood and by the community that, upon the death of his bishop, he was considered worthy of the bishopric. But, through modesty, he declined the proferred dignity. The new bishop, to whom Theophilus was calumniated, resenting the fact that he was second choice, was only too glad to deprive him of his position in the church. In order to recover his post, he enlisted the services of a Jewish magician, who secured for him an appointment with the Devil. Diabolus demanded of Theophilus a document signed and sealed with his own hand, in which the deposed priest promised to deliver to the Devil his own soul and in addition agreed to deny Christ and the Virgin. The day following the conclusion of the contract, the bishop honorably reinstated Theophilus in his former position. But after seven years of riotous living, realizing that his end was near, he repented of his act. For forty days and forty nights he fasted and prayed to the Blessed Virgin for pardon of his sins. She, however, first turned a deaf ear to his prayers because he had broken faith with her. But finally the Mother of all Mercies took pity on the repentant sinner. As he prostrated himself in his church at the foot of her altar at midnight, she descended from heaven, bent over him, stroked his burning brow, and assured him of pardon if he would deny the Devil and return to Christ. Mother Mary then interceded with her Son to show indulgence toward the penitent sinner. She demanded from the Devil the parchment and placed it upon the breast of Theophilus as he lay asleep in the Church. Upon awakening, the repentant priest found the fatal contract, by which he had pawned his soul to Satan, and cast the document into the flames. Three days later, after having publicly proclaimed before the congregation his penitence and the miracle of his preservation, Theophilus passed gently away in blessed peace, and the Church inscribed his name on the roll of her saints as Theophilus the Penitent.[1]

The story of Theophilus was purported to have been told by his pupil, Eutychianus, as a living witness. It was translated in the ninth century from the original Greek into Latin by Paulus Diaconus, spread in a variety of versions through Eastern and Western Christendom, and became one of the treasures of saintly legend in the Western Catholic Church. This story was a stock item in medieval collections of miracles and exampla. Vincent of Beauvais inserted it in his *Speculum Historiale* and Jacobus de Voragine introduced it into his *Legenda aurea* (both manuscripts of the thirteenth century).

The first poetical treatment given the Theophilus legend was the play in Latin hexameters *Lapsus et conversio Theophili vicedomini* written in the tenth century by the first original German woman poet and dramatist, Hroswitha or Roswitha, the learned abbess of the Benedictine convent of Gandersheim. Brun von Schönbecke incorporated this legend in his poem, *Die Ehre der Maria,* composed about 1276. In this quaint poem, the contract was sealed not with blood, but with a ring, a *motif* which frequently occurs in medieval literature. Three low German and two Icelandic dramatic versions of this legend date from the fourteenth century.[2]

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[1] On the Theophilus legend, see E. Sommer's Latin thesis *De Theophili cum Diabolo foedere* (Halle, 1844).

[2] For the bibliography on the low German versions of the Theophilus play, see the present writer's book, *A Historical and Bibliographical Survey of the German Religious Drama* (Pittsburgh, 1924), pp. 65-67.

The first poetic treatment of this legend in France is the early thirteenth-century poem of Gautier de Coincy, *le Miracle de Théophile.* It was given dramatic form in France toward the end of that century by a *trouvère* named Rutebeuf in his *Miracle de Théophile.*[3] There are also five renderings of the Theophilus legend in Spanish.

The Theophilus legend made its appearance in English about the year 1000, when Ælfric, in a *Homily on the Assumption of the Blessed Mary,* summarized it briefly with full mention of the written compact. Poetic versions of this legend are included in both the *South English Legendary* (thirteenth century) and in the *North English Homilies* (fourteenth century). There is still a third poetic version extant in Middle English. The story also appears in the *Alphabet of Tales* written in fifteenth-century English. In 1572 the priest Wiliam Forrest rhymed the legend afresh in a poem, which forms part of his work, *Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary with other Poems* and which was intended as a kind of apology for the Roman Catholic religion. A prose version of it occurs also in Thomas Heywood's *Hierarchie of the Blessed Angells* (1635).

Among the recent dramatizations of this story may be mentioned Mr. B. C. Greene's *Théophile* (1903), and A. Kingsley Porter's *The Virgin and the Clerk* (1929). The latter play is a clever work of satire, philosophy, and religion. According to Porter's interpretation of the old legend, Canon Theophilus refuses the bishopric of Adana in order to dedicate himself to the writing of a hymn to the Virgin. Unable to accomplish this task, he sells his soul in exchange for success. The roots of the soul, however, are deep, and the song to the Virgin is, after all, heard—and answered.[4]

[3] This play will be found in the first complete edition of the works of Rutebeuf prepared by Achille Jubinal in 1874, t. II, p. 231 sqq. A critical edition of Rutebeuf's *Théophile* was prepared in 1925 by an American woman, Mrs. Grace Frank. Léon Clédat has put this medieval text into a modern French version.—This interesting play also attracted the latter-day diabolist, Remy de Gourmont, who, in 1896, brought out a modern version accompanied by an excellent introductory essay.

[4] On the legend of Theophilus in medieval poetry, consult K. Plenzat's thesis, *Die Theophiluslegende in den Dichtungen des Mittelalters.* Berlin, 1926. (Germanische Studien, XLIII).—The items on the Theophilus legend in England have been drawn from Professor George Lyman Kittredge's thorough work, *Witchcraft in Old and New England* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), p. 239. A critical edition of the later English version of the Theophilus legend, accompanied by an introduction, was published by Eugen Kölbing in the *Englische Studien,* I (1877), 16-57.

The legend of Militarius is an adaptation of that of Theophilus. It is the story of a soldier who, in order to prolong a life of pleasure, forms a bond with Beelzebub, but is finally saved and restored to salvation through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin, whom he has not named among the saints of heaven he has renounced.[5]

⁂

The idea of the devil-compact was also introduced into the medieval legend of St. Cyprian, which Calderón, the greatest of Spanish dramatists, took, in the seventeenth century, for the subject of his lyrical play, *El Mágico prodigioso.* In this version, Cyprian, of Antioch, a great philosopher and a very expert magician, is in love with Justina, a damsel living in his native city. She is of high birth and great beauty, and, moreover, is an ardent Christian. He tries in many ways to win her love, and she, in just as many ways, resists his every effort. As a last resort, Cyprian sells his soul to the Devil, who promises to put Justina in his possession. But finding that the Devil has no power over the fair Christian, who renders all his temptations impotent by calling on God, Cyprian will no longer have anything to do with a weak devil, is converted to the stronger power, received into the Church, and dies the death of a martyr with Justina, in the reign of the Roman Emperor Diocletian (284-305).

The contract between the Devil and Cyprian is first mentioned in the *Golden Legend,* where the agreement is verbal. In Calderón's drama, however, the pact between the Devil and Cyprian is signed with blood. Comparing Goethe's play with that of Calderón, we find that the two have in common the point that the demon is not in a position to perform his exact engagements, and consequently loses out in the end. The two plays differ in the fact that Cyprian gives himself to the Devil to have and to hold with a definite desire as the incentive, but Faust closes a contract with the Devil in order to obtain such general objects as strength, self-development and enjoyment.[6]

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[5] The legend of Militarius was treated by Gotefridus Thenesis (Gottfried von Thienen) in a narrative written in leonine hexameters, of which a specimen is given by Professor Karl Alexander von Reichlin-Meldegg in his study on the subject.

[6] Concerning the parallels between the Cyprian-legend and the Faust-saga, consult Sánchez Antonio Moguel: *Memoria acerca de "El Mágico prodigioso" de Caldéron y en especial sobre las relaciones de este drama con el "Fausto" de Goethe,* Madrid, 1881. This work was translated into French by J. G. Magnabel (Paris, 1883), and into German by Johannes Fastenrath (Leipzig, 1882). See also Zahn: *Cyprian von Antiochien und die deutsche Faustsage,* Erlangen, 1882.

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Many other legends of devil-compacts will be found in medieval writings. Among the good deeds of St. Wulfric, the hermit of Haselbury in Dorset, who died in 1154, we find that on a certain occasion he forced the return of a contract signed with the Devil by a Northern man who, under stress of poverty, had formed an alliance with hell, but who later repented and appealed for help to the pious hermit. Walter Map, writing in the same country, tells of Eudo, a rich young baron, who, after having been reduced to poverty by extravagance, closed a pact with the Devil and grew rich by robbery and murder. But he at last repented of his rash act, and sought out the Bishop of Beauvais, whom he found beyond the walls of the city near a great pyre that had been kindled to burn a witch. The wrathful bishop imposed upon him the penance of leaping upon this pyre. Eudo straightway obeyed and was burned to death.[7]

Among the legendary figures believed to have closed a compact with the Devil we may also mention Zythe, who lived in Bohemia in the fifteenth century, and Twardowski, the Polish equivalent of the German Faust, who is said to have been a contemporary of the wizard of Wittenberg. Twardowski made rather unusual demands upon the Devil, requiring the latter to build a house for him out of poppy-seeds and to cover it with a roof composed of the beards of Jews. It should be added that he had his specifications fulfilled and was finally carried off to hell through the chimney of his curiously constructed house.[8]

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The legend of the devil-compact attaches itself also to a great number of historic personages. Among philosophers and scientists

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Professor James Geddes has recently brought out an excellent critical edition of Calderón's play for American classes. The influence of Calderôn's drama is evident in Jules Lemaître's story, "la Vierge sarrasine" (1889), in which, by the purity of a young and innocent girl, the Devil is driven out of a statue of the Black Virgin, which he inhabited.

[7] These two instances of medieval pacts have been taken from Professor Kittredge's book already mentioned.

[8] Mr. Sutherland-Edwards has interpreted the legend of Twardowski for English readers in his article "The Faust Legend," *Macmillan Magazine*, XXXIV (1876), 268-75. Among the poetical versions of this legend, Mickiewicz's *Pan Twardowski* (1828) is best known. Other Polish poets, who treated this subject, are Korsak, Zielinski, Grosza, Szujski, Kaminski, Kraszewski and Urchlicky.

who were said to have sold their souls to Satan, for one consideration or another, are included Socrates, Apollonius of Tyana, Apuleius, Roger Bacon, Raymond Lulle, Lully or Lullus, Scaliger, Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, Nostradamus, Servetus, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo. Of the theologians and religious reformers reputed to have entered into a pact with hell, we may mention Trithemius, Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin. Among the magicians and thaumaturgists believed to have leagued themselves with Lucifer, Simon Magus of biblical times and Jean de Fontenelle of the fifteenth century are best known. Among the men of the eighteenth century who were suspected of traffic with the infernal powers, we may include Cagliostro, a clever Italian student of the occult and magician, and the Duke of Luxembourg, the famous general of the imperial army and Marshal of France, the companion and successor of Condé and the opponent of William of Orange. The compact, which the Duke was believed to have concluded with the Devil, was given to the public full and complete in every paragraph.

Even the popes were not free from the suspicion of dealing with the Devil. An English poem of the fourteenth century ascribed the signing of a Satanic pact to Pope Cælestinus, who died in 432. The story of Gerbert (Sylvester II) and his pact with the Devil, by means of which the eminent medieval *savant* attained to the summit of earthly ambition at the cost of his immortal soul, is familiar to all who may be acquainted with medieval writings. It will be found in the *Gesta Regum* (twelfth century) of William of Malmesbury, from whom both Robert Holkot and Vincent of Beauvais borrowed it. This story also appears in the vernacular in the fifteenth-century *Alphabet of Tales* already mentioned, and is repeated by Bishop Pilkington, who lived in the following century. In Walter Map's account of Gerbert's ascension to the seat of Peter, Gerbert's supernatural protector is Meridiana, a fairy, in whom Professor Kittredge recognizes a feminine form of the *dæmonium meridianum* or Midday Demon.[9] Others thought that Gerbert had sold his soul to Satan not in return for the papacy, but in order to obtain from the Devil a knowledge of physics, arithmetic and music. Gerbert, as well as two distinguished Englishmen, Roger Bacon and Bishop Grosseteste, was popularly credited with the invention of a magical speaking head of brass.[10] Another illustrious occupant of St. Peter's Chair, Gregory VII, was also believed to have sold himself to the Devil, and to have paid the last penalty for his familiarity with the Fiend. The Popes Paul II and the notorious Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia),[11] were likewise supposed to have held commerce with the powers of hell.

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[9] George Lyman Kittredge, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

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The story of Dr. Faustus is the most famous version of the legend of the devil-compact. Johannes Faustus, a laborious student, has drained dry the sources of intellectual satisfaction to be found in the various ordinary departments of human knowledge. Wearied and worried, but unsated, the voracious student turns to magic, and finally conjures up the demon Mephistopheles. With this demon Faust enters into a contract, binding Faust to surrender his body and soul to Mephistopheles at the end of twenty-four years and reciprocally binding Mephistopheles to be at Faust's command during that period, providing for him during that quarter-century his fill of miraculous exploits and sensual delights.

The legend of Dr. Faustus, as compared with that of Theophilus, shows the contrast between Protestantism and Catholicism with regard to the devil-compact. The arch-deacon of Adana, as we have seen, succeeded, through the intervention of the Blessed Virgin, in escaping his punishment for daring to deal with the Devil. But the wizard of Wittenberg was duly carried off to Hell by way of payment at the expiration of the bond. The Church, which forfeited its power at the Reformation, could not aid the man who had mortgaged his soul to Mephistopheles. Faust had to meet with the traditional doom. He was irrevocably damned, lost and fallen into the power of the Devil. The friend of the Fiend belonged to Hell.[12]

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[10] The legend of Sylvester II will be found in J. von Döllinger's book, *Die Papstfabeln des Mittelalters,* Stuttgart, 1863, second edition, 1890, English translation (*Fables Respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages*), London 1871. A brief account of this legend will also be found in Paul Carus's interesting book, *The History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil* (Chicago, 1900).

[11] A good biography of this pope is F. L. Glaser's book, *Pope Alexander VI.* The infernal pact of this pontifical Faust has been treated by Barnabe Barnes in his play, *The Devil's Charter, or a Tragedy Contaning the Life and Death of Pope Alexander VI* (1607). This play is the first attempt, after Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus,* to make a devil-motif the basis of a serious drama.

[12] A very interesting Protestant version of the devil-compact is the play, "The Bottomless Sack," written by Hans Sachs, a friend of Luther, on October 15, 1563. An English translation of this farce will be found in William Leighton's *Merry Tales and Shrovetide Plays by Hans Sachs* (London, 1910), pp. 210-15.

It should be added, however, that in the Faust legend the devil-compact is not the *root* but the *fruit* of Faust's sin, which consists in the abandonment of sacred for secular learning. The Faust legend is the creation of orthodox Protestantism, which, through it, expresses disapproval of the humanistic movement of its day. In fact, Faust had that interest in secular learning and that love of the beauty of the ancients which was common to all men of the Renaissance. He shared with the humanists of his day the wish to know all things, to do all things and to enjoy all things. Faust pays, by the forfeit of his soul, not so much for the foul pact with the Enemy of Mankind as for his revolt against the Word of God. The oldest Faust-book represents its hero as selling his soul to Satan solely in order to augment his learning and to comprehend that which cannot be known by the natural faculties of man. It is said of Faust in this book that he resolved "to search into all the deep things of heaven and of earth." Marlowe's play, *Dr. Faustus,* based on this account of Faust's life, also has its protagonist consign himself to the Devil in order to obtain from him a deeper understanding of the mysterious operations or secrets of natural laws. It was G. R. Widmann, in his Faust-book, who added the search for sensuous enjoyments to the conditions of the contract drawn up between Faust and the Fiend.

Faust may be considered a counterpart of Luther. Both Luther and Faust broke away from Rome. Luther drew nearer to the Lord; Faust looked to Lucifer for aid. Both Luther and Faust had dealings with the Devil. Luther warded off the Devil in the Wartburg by throwing an inkstand at his head; Faust summoned the Devil and admitted him into his cell. Both Luther and Faust had a thirst for knowledge. Luther loved sacred lore; Faust preferred secular learning. Both Luther and Faust disapproved of the celibacy of the clergy. Luther married; Faust sought sensual delights out of wedlock. Luther was victorious over the Devil; Faust finally fell into the Devil's clutches.

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The historicity of Faust has long been doubted. So much legend has been woven about his stark figure that historians have been hard put to arrive at the truth. On the strength of the testimony of a few contemporaries, however, it is now generally accepted that Faust was an historical person, having lived during the first half of the sixteenth century. He was born in Kundling (Knittlingen) near Bretten, the birth place of Melanchthon, between 1480 and 1490, studied at the University of Cracow, and died, about the year 1549, in Staufen (Breisgau).

Faust appeared to his contemporaries as a doubtful wizard and a charlatan. According to their testimony, he was an eccentric fellow who supported himself by going about the country and passing himself off on the credulous folk as a great sorcerer and necromancer. He either hinted mysteriously or boasted openly of his knowledge of the occult, and the common folk of his day readily accepted his stories. Faust styled himself Magus Secundus Magister Georgius Sabellicus Faustus Junior and even assumed the title of Philosophus Philosophorum. He was accompanied by a younger man named Wagner, whom he called his famulus, and by a black dog trained to fetch him food, also called a famulus. Since both—his assistant and his dog—bore the same enigmatical name, might they not be one and the same—an embodied demon contrived by this master of Schwarzkunst or black magic?

When Faust met with a violent death toward the middle of the sixteenth century, it was believed that the wicked wizard had been carried off by the Devil, with whom he had concluded a compact, and who had helped him to perform the supernatural acts. Legend later elaborated the details of Faust's magic deeds and sad end. It was said that he had studied at the University of Wittenberg and come in contact with Martin Luther. It was reported that in 1525 he had incurred opprobrium by bestriding a barrel in Auerbach's wine-cellar at Leipzig. Rumor had it also that, when the period of the fatal contract between Faust and the Fiend was ended, the demons appeared at midnight and beckoned Faust to follow them. The next morning his body, torn limb from limb, was found lying on a dunghill in the village of Rimlich, near the town of Wittenberg. A number of his contemporaries, among them Melanchthon and Johann Wier, believed that the Devil had wrung Faust's neck. Johann Gast affirmed that Faust had been strangled by the Devil. This Protestant minister of Basel also recorded that Faust's "corpse lay face downward on the bier all the time, though it was turned over five times."[13]

About forty years after Faust's death, his story was first told in a popular chap-book entitled *Historia von D. Johann Fausten* and printed by Johann Spiess in the year 1587 at Frankfort-on-the-Main. This work was the basis of a long series of popular books on Faust, chief among which figures Widmann's account published in 1599.

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Christopher Marlowe, a predecessor of Shakespeare, is the first great dramatist who was attracted to the Faust legend. His powerful drama, *The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus* (c. 1589), is founded on an English translation, which appeared within less than two years after the publication of the original Frankfort Faust-book and which was entitled *History of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Dr. John Faustus.*[14]

Marlowe's play follows in spirit and in details the popular account of Faust's character and career. The devil-compact is its central point and chief motive. Marlowe took the legend as he found it and turned it into a grim tragedy of sin and damnation. He did not give his play any philosophical interpretation, but it is pregnant with the old warning: "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" (Mark viii. 36). If Calderón's *El Mágico prodigioso* already mentioned can be considered an apotheosis of the Catholic dogma of free-will, Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* is the poetic illustration of Protestant fatalism. Marlowe makes the Devil finally victorious. Faust has his period of power and pleasure by the Devil's aid, but the Devil must have his pay, and his pay is the soul of his ally. Faust technically repents, but not until his lease of enjoyment is run out, and Hell stands pyrotechnically agape. The sincerity of this kind of repentance, caused by the necessity of discharging a poignantly unpleasant debt, may well be questioned. There is actually no trace of regret for entering the infernal compact until punishment is impending; and then, by a stupendous touch of irony, Faust is dragged away to Hell just as his parched lips twist to shriek, in terror-stricken babblement, that sugared and langorous verse which Ovid whispered in Corinna's arms at the summit of life's felicity: "O lente, lente, currite noctis equi!"

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[13] On the Faust legend, see H. Düntzer: Die *Faustsage* (1846); Peter: *Literatur der Faustsage* (1851); K. Engel: *Literatur der Faustsage von 1510-1873* (1874); Karl Kiesewetter: *Faust in der Geschichte und Tradition* (1893); P. Ristelhuber: *Faust dans l'histoire et dans la légende; essai sur l'humanisme superstitieu du XVIe siècle et les récits du pacte diabolique* (1863); E. Faligan: *Histoire de la légende de Faust* (1888); P. Saintyves: *la Légende du Docteur Faust in Collection d'Epopées et Légendes* (1926); V. Errati: *il Mito di Faust dal personaggio al poema di Goethe* (Bologna, 1924); "The Devil and Dr. Faustus," *Cornhill Magazine*, XIV (1866), 687-701; J. Oxenford: "*Faust, Dramatic and Legendary*" *Belgravia* I (1867), 188-90; Henry Schütz Wilson: "Facts and Fancies about Faust" (in his *Studies in History, Legend and Literature,* 1884); Henry Sutherland Edwards: *The Faust Legend; its Origin and Development from the Living Faustus of the First Century to the Faust of Goethe* (1886); James Hain Friswell: "Dr. John Faustus" (in his *Varia; Readings from Rare Books,* 1886); and Gabriel W. Gilbert: "The Legend of Faust and Mephistopheles," *The Mentor,* XVII, (1929), 1-14. R. A. Redford draws an interesting parallel between Faust and Prospero in his article. "Shakespeare and the Faust Legend," *Gentleman's Magazine,* CCLXXXV (1898), 547-66.

[14] A modernized edition of this Faust-book has been brought out by William Rose and published, in 1925, in the Broadway Translations. See W. E. P. Pantin's article "The Sources of Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus,*" *Academy,* XXXI (1887), 449.

Marlowe is at his unrivalled best in rehandling the legend of Faust. The scene of Faust's soliloquy as he awaits the stroke of midnight, which shall end the twenty-four years and bring his self-imposed doom, is impressive in its intensity and deservedly ranks among the finest specimens of poetic composition in any language.

Soon after its appearance, Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus,* together with other English plays, was brought over to Germany by strolling bands of English comedians, who performed it early in the seventeenth century in various German cities. The subject was soon taken up by companies of German actors, who followed Marlowe's play on broad lines. In this way, the dramatic form of the Faust legend was shaped in Germany for almost two hundred years. The Faust play, in a great variety of forms, continued as a popular item in the repertoires of the theatrical companies of Germany, until it was crowded off the stage by the French classical drama, which was considered the epitome of all excellence. The Faust-theme fell into the hands of travelling showmen, who amused the young with their marionettes. In this way, through a long procession of puppet-plays, handed down by tradition through generations of showmen, the Faust-story retained its popularity until almost to our own

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[15] As we shall see later, Goethe first became acquainted with the Faust subject in the form of a puppet-play. On the popular Faust drama, see K. Engel: *Das Volksschauspiel von Doktor Johann Faust,* 2. Aufl., Oldenburg, 1882. This author has also published several volumes of old puppet-plays, among which will be found texts of Faust marionette-plays, Otto Schade's edition of the Faust puppet-play, first published in 1856, has been reprinted in the Insel-Bücherei No. 125.

days.[15] The following is the plot of a Faust puppet-play as summarized by Bielschowsky in his *Life of Goethe:*

> "An investigator, unsatisfied by all his learning and deep meditation, consigns himself to the Devil, in order, through him, to acquire all sciences and arts, all treasures and enjoyments of the world, and for a period of time to feel like God. This he does, so far as lies within the Devil's power. Faust travels with the Devil through the world, becomes a magician, who has power over the living and dead, and tastes every kind of pleasure, even that of living at a ducal court, where he calls up the dead and wins the heart of the princess, until finally, sated with everything, though not satisfied, he repents and turns in earnest prayer to God. At this critical moment the Devil brings him Helena.[16] Captivated by her beauty, Faust gives up all pious thoughts of repentance, rushes toward her and embraces her. In his arms she is transformed into a Fury, and, robbed of earthly enjoyment and heavenly bliss, he is dragged away to Hell."[17]

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Lessing was the first to point out the poetic possibilities of the Faust legend. In his opposition to the vapid imitations of the French tragedies, and with the aim of showing what power lay in the old German popular plays, he essayed the subject of Faust in 1759 but never finished it. Lessing wished to turn the conclusion of his play to Faust's salvation. He would not permit his hero to fall into the power of the Devil. In the century of enlightenment, in which Lessing lived, love of secular learning, even error and heresy, were no longer considered crimes. Referring to the desire of knowledge and the love of truth which, in the century of the Reformation, constituted Faust's sin, Lessing wrote: "God has not given man the noblest of impulses to make him unhappy." The story of Faust's condemnation to hell was, in Lessing's opinion, immoral and hence untrue. In his proposed Faust play, the devils, in anger at losing their prey, were to be beaten back by the angels with the words: "Ye shall not prevail!"

The subject of Faust was essayed by many other German writers in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The new interest and new attraction that the Faust legend had for those men Bielschowsky explains by the striking similarity of that period to the Renaissance epoch. The poet-painter Friedrich Müller, known in Germany as

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[16] Helena was the wife of Menelaus, a woman of surpassing beauty, who was carried off to Troy by Paris and thus became the cause of the Trojan Wars (*Iliad* iii. 165).

[17] Albert Bielschowsky: *Life of Goethe.* Translated from the German by William A. Cooper (3 vols., New York, 1905-08), III, 251-2.

Maler Müller and also as *Teufelsmaler* Müller, who worked on this material in 1776 to 1778, wished in his *Fausts Leben dramatisiert* to employ the Faust legend as a satirical portrait of the age. The Faust dramas by Julius Graf von Soden and Johann Friedrich Schink also merit attention.

Friedrich Maximilian Klinger's philosophical work, *Fausts Leben, Taten und Höllenfahrt* (1791), is less a novel than a political pamphlet.[18] It may aptly be called a devil's-eye view of human history. In his novel, Klinger follows that version of the Faust legend which identified the famous magician Johannes Faust of the chap-books with Hans Fust or Johannes Faust, a goldsmith and member of a rich burgher-family of Mayence, who was the financial backer and partner of Gutenberg, the inventor of the art of printing. The two partners were suspected of meddling with forbidden books of magic, and of performing evil witchery. They were also accused of plunging into sorcerous formulæ in a quest for the magic stone of the old philosophers and for their lost secret of transforming cheap metals into gold. Faust, who later obtained the machinery from Gutenberg and set up a printing press in Paris, was especially considered a magician and a servant of Satan. The red letters, which he used in the colophons at the close of his earliest printed volumes, were interpreted by his contemporaries as proof of the black art which originated the works so easily produced by him. The multiplication of the Bible considered especially dangerous and sinful by the Catholics also contributed to the diabolical reputation of the Paris printer.

In Klinger's novel, Faust is a superman superb in his spirit of rebellion against "all the old-established customs of society." He is the incarnation of the Romantic revolt against all social and moral laws that hold men in chains. Faust sells himself to Satan not to obtain from him wealth or physical enjoyment but in order to learn from him "the secrets of human destiny and the reason for moral evil in the world." And for Faust the Devil can invent no greater agony than to keep him ignorant of the very problems that torment him. Faust's own personal sufferings concern him less than man's moral misery. He has great faith in the goodness of man. "You will avow to me," he says to the Devil, "that man is the apple of the eye of him whom I now no longer must name." But the Demon replies: "Then I will return to hell a convicted liar, and give thee back the bond which thou wilt presently sign with thy blood." Thereupon the Devil makes a wager with Faust to prove to him the utter corruption of man; and to his end drags him into an endless course across Europe at the dawn of the Renaissance. Faust visits the Germany of Frederick III, the France of Louis XI and the Italy of the Borgias. The Devil has no difficulty in proving to his companion that man, far from needing a Devil to tempt him to evil, puts the very Devil to blush by his evil deeds. He shows Faust that, in this God-governed world, "evil arises from good," predicts that the art of printing, with which its inventor intended to benefit mankind, would turn out to be an instrument of evil, by converting the small stream, which had previously poisoned the human mind, into a tremendous flood. Faust, who considered himself to be the benefactor of mankind by his discovery of printing, later destined to become the right handmaiden of our civilization, is disappointed and disillusioned, seeing the seeds of good he tried to sow among men already turned into disasters, and proudly accepts eternal damnation. He feels no regret in quitting the earth after having found that it surpasses Hell in wickedness.

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[18] On this work consult G. J. Pfeiffer's study, *F. Klinger's "Faust." Eine literarhistorische Untersuchung*. Würzburg, 1890. Klinger's *Faust* was translated by George Borrow and published in London in 1825. A later issue of this translation was published by Kent in 1864. The translator took considerable liberties with the text.

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Goethe, the greatest son of that century and the stoutest champion of its new ideas, next took hold of the Faust myth. In his hands, it has become the most poetical expression of the eternal combat between good and evil in the heart of man. The impression of the Faust legend gained from a puppet-play seen when a boy in Frankfort remained with him to the day of his death. He began working on the material in 1772 and finished the first draft in 1775. His Faust-fragment appeared in 1790, the First Part of the poem in 1808, and the Second Part posthumously in 1832.

Goethe follows the first Faust-book in ascribing to his hero the thirst for knowledge as the primary motive of his compact with Hell. The Goethean Faust, "recognizing the vanity of abstract learning and intuition, but eager to the point of frenzy to understand and possess the world, makes a pact with the Spirit of Negation, so as to throw himself into the experimental forms of learning." Goethe deviates from the legend, however, on two important points. First he substitutes for a fixed period—the traditional quarter-century—the agreement that Faust is to be the Devil's property at any moment whatsoever, when Faust shall be brought to the point of saying to the ecstatic moment, "Bleibe doch; du bist so schön." The moment of complete and forgetful self-satisfaction is the price of his damnation.[19] Secondly, following the lead of Lessing, Goethe represents his hero in the end as saved from perdition by Gretchen and triumphantly borne aloft by angels, leaving Mephistopheles crestfallen and defeated.[20] The Devil thought to lure Faust with the woman, but he lost him through her influence. Thus Mephistopheles becomes the power which e'er designs the bad and e'er accomplishes the good.

Through Goethe's poem, the Faust legend has obtained a place second to no other in the poetic literature of the world. The diabolical parts of Goethe's poem influenced the imagination of the poets and playwrights in all European countries. Among his German imitators may be mentioned E. A. F. Klingemann, who wrote a tragedy (1815), Nikolaus Lenau, also a tragedy (1838), and Heinrich Heine, a ballet (1851). Christian Grabbe brought together Don Juan and Faust in his drama written in 1824.

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The tradition of the original Don Juan Teñorio, who lived in the fourteenth century and who is said to have been the associate of King Pedro the Cruel of Castille, contains, notwithstanding what has been said in the previous paper, the element of a diabolical pact.[21] But the Devil is absent in the earlier versions of the legend. As all know, who are acquainted with Don Juan in play and opera, it is the Dead Guest, the Commander, who is the executor of the divine sentence against the arch-seducer and mocker. In later versions, however, this character is represented as the Devil in disguise, who helps Don Juan in his numberless conquests of women and who accepts the invitation to the banquet to put an end to his career of seduction. Thus in the play, *The Rest of Don Juan,* by Henry Morford (1848), a continuation of Byron's *Don Juan* (1819-24), we find the following ending: One night, at a banquet, a tall dark stranger enters the room and beckons Don Juan away. The two depart together while the lights burn blue and the guests smell brimstone. On the morrow, Don Juan's body is found in a cemetery.

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[19] Cf. Alexander R. Hohlfeld's very interesting article, "Pact and Wager in Goethe's *Faust*," *Modern Philology*, XVIII (1920-21), 1513-36. Read also Ludwig Nader: "Zum Pakt in Goethes *Faust*," *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde*, XXXVII (1923), No. 3.

[20] The question as to whether or not Goethe was indebted to Lessing for the "happy" ending of his poem has recently been revived by Ernst Bergmann in his article "Ist die 'Rettung' des Goetheschen *Faust* auf Lessings Faust-Fragmente zurückzuführen?" *Jarbuch des Braunschweigischen Geschichtsvereins*, 2. Folge, Bd. 2 (1929).

[21] The first definite appearance of Don Juan Teñorio in literary fiction dates back to the *Burlador de Sevilla y Convidado de Piedra*, by Gabriel Tellez (1571-1648), better known under the name of Tirso do Molina, first published at Barcelona in 1630. The typical seducer appears in the folk-lore of many countries, but the Spaniard presented the character so masterfully that it is accepted as a Spanish conception. Don Juan is also the hero of Molière and Mozart, of Byron and Shaw. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* (1905) contains an interlude in the form of a dream on the theme of Don Juan and the Devil.

In Rostand's last play *la Dernière nuit de Don Juan* (written in 1911), the Devil, having appeared at Don Juan's banquet to drag the arch-seducer to the bottomless pit, grants his request to return to earth and live ten years longer. When this period has passed, the Devil again appears as a showman with a Punch and Judy box, and summons the shades of the one thousand and three ladies of Don Juan's traditional affairs in order to confuse and confound the host. He asks Don Juan to name the women he has seduced, but this most hardened of rakes has truly known none of them. The cynical lover seduced them when they were ready, and was accepted because he offered himself most frequently. He has had all the women but never possessed one single woman. Then the Devil at last discloses the punishment which he has reserved for him. Not for such as Don Juan exists the flaming pit, to which sinners of the type of Nero and Heliogabalus are condemned! There is another hell for such a sorry and trivial fool. Don Juan shall be a Pulchinello for all eternity. The proud Spaniard begs mercy and asks for the eternal fire. But the Devil inexorably replies that he has reserved the eternal theater for him. At the Devil's behest, Don Juan, he who believed himself to be the irresistible lover, the wickedest sinner, appears, bowing, and scraping and grimacing absurdly, as a puppet, on the Punch and Judy stage, which the Devil, in the guise of the showman, brought with him at the beginning of the play.[22]

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[22] The definitive study on the Don Juan legend is the Paris thesis by Georges Gendarme de Bévotte, *la Légende de Don Juan; son évolution dans la littérature; des origines au Romantisme* (1906). For further study of this subject, particularly in the post-Romantic period, the reader is referred to the following books and articles: Francisco Augustin: *Don Juan en el teatro, en la novela y en la vida;* con un estudio preliminar sobre la vejez de Don Juan, por el Dr. Gregorio Marañon, Madrid, 1928; S. M. Waxman: "The Don Juan

Karl Immermann's *Merlin* (1832) is perhaps the greatest German attempt to write a Faust in imitation of Goethe. This play is a kind of appendage to the Second Part of the Goethean poem, replacing Mephistopheles by Merlin.[23]

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The influence of Goethe's *Faust* did not make itself sufficiently felt in France until this poem found a worthy translator in the person of Gérard de Nerval, who, in 1828, when he was hardly out of his teens, brought out a French version of the Goethean poem that surprised and enchanted the great German himself. Gérard de Nerval has the great merit of winning the French public for this great German poem, which passed unnoticed among his countrymen in previous translations. Gérard de Nerval's version enjoyed the enthusiastic admiration of the French public and became the Gospel of the French Romantics.[24]

Gérard de Nerval's translation of Goethe's *Faust* gave the impetus to a very great number of adaptations of this poem on the French stage. Among the numerous dramatic adaptations, we will point out the following plays: *l'Amour et la mort,* a play first presented at the Variétés theater on September 6, 1828. This drama contains a witch-scene, in which the Devil is evoked by a sorceress. In another play, *Une nuit de Paris,* given in March, 1829, at the Vaudeville theater, a naive young man, son of a retired court-recorder, on the point of getting married and ready to pay his bachelor's debts, permits himself to be dragged into all sorts of debaucheries by a Mephistopheles in human form. The play, *le Cousin de Faust,* presented the same month at the Gaîté theater, shows by its very title, the influence of the Goethean poem. It need scarcely be said that this statement also holds good with regard to

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Legend in Literature," *The Journal of American Folk-Lore,* vol. XXI, April-September, 1908. An interesting article on this subject, written from the psychoanalytic point of view, appeared in the magazine, *Psyche and Eros,* vol. II (1929), No. 2. On Russian versions of the Don Juan tradition, see C. A. Manning's article in the *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America,* vol. XXXVIII (1923), No. 3, especially pp. 485-91.

[23] Concerning Immermann's debt to Goethe, consult Otto Volkart's article, "Immermanns *Merlin* and Goethes *Faust,*" *Westfälisches Magazin,* N. F., 2. Jg. (1910). On this play, see also Ottakar Fischer: *Zu Immermanns "Merlin"* (1909); Herman Hamann: "Das Rätsel in Immermanns *Merlin,*" *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung,* Bd. I (1925); Karl Schultze-Jahde; "Zu Immermanns *Merlin,*" *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde* (1925).

[24] On Goethe's influence in France, cf. F. Baldensperger: *Goethe en France; étude de littérature comparée* (Paris, 1904; second edition, 1920); and Pierre Lasserre: *Faust en France* (1929).

Jean Lesguillon's drama, *Méphistophélès, ou le Diable et la jeune Fille,* played at the Panthéon theater in 1832, in which the Devil is caught in his own traps.

Among the other imitations of Goethe's *Faust,* we may mention Emmanuel Arago's Faust-play, produced about 1832, which contains a cohort of demons and witches presided over by Mephistopheles, reminiscent of the Walpurgis-Night in the German poem, and Eugène Robin's dramatic poem, *Livia* (1835), in which the title-character loves Faust for a short time previous to the expiration of his compact. Mephisto puts Livia's love to test by offering her Faust's love in return for the salvation of her soul. Livia loves Faust sufficiently to sign the pact of perdition in her turn. But when Mephistopheles appears to seize her, he finds her dead, with the angel Emmanuel watching by her side.

A rather interesting French adaptation of Goethe's *Faust* is the play by Eugène Scribe and de Saint-Georges, *la Nuit de Walpurgis,* with its subtitle "comédie politique du temps présent," which was presented at the Gymnase theater in 1850. In this comedy, Mephistopheles takes by the hand the Faust of the rue Saint-Denis, the politician Morin, and leads him into the midst of the Witches' Sabbath of 1848.[25]

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What attracted Gérard de Nerval so powerfully to *Faust* was its devil-myth. The character that appealed to him in this drama was not the wizard of Wittenberg, but his *spiritus familiaris.* In Gérard de Nerval's opinion, which he expresses in the preface to the first edition of his translation of *Faust,* the real hero of this poem was not Faust but Mephistopheles. Gérard de Nerval was discerning enough to discover the fact that Goethe did not conceive of the Devil in the form of a hideous phantom, as he is usually represented to children; but that, on the contrary, he has portrayed him as the Evil Being par excellence, before whom all other poetic personifications of Evil were only novices, hardly worthy to be the minions of Mephistopheles.

The scene in *Faust* that drew its best French translator so irresistibly to Germany was the narration of the prank that the Devil played on the students in Auerbach's Cellar. Gérard de

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[25] On this play, see the *Journal des Débats* of June 17, 1850. Mephistopheles plays a rôle also in Edouard Grenier's *Jacqueline Bonhomme,* with its subtitle "tragédie moderne" (1879).

Nerval longed to visit the spot that had witnessed this famous feat, and, as soon as his means permitted him, hurried to Leipzig so that he might lean his elbow on the table from which Mephistopheles had the glowing wine gush forth amidst flaming jets to the utter amazement of the revellers. *"Plus heureux que nous,"* wrote Théophile Gautier in 1867 in his recollections of his poor friend, who had hanged himself twelve years previously, *"il s'est assis accoudé sur la table d'oū Méphistophélès faisait jailir avec une forêt des fusées de vin incendiaires."* [26]

When Gérard later sought inspiration in Goethe's *Faust* for his own works, he imitated only the diabolical parts of the play, such as the conjuration of the Devil, the devil-compact, and the evocation by the Devil of the beauties of antiquity.

The first play which Gérard de Nerval planned already showed the influence of Goethe's *Faust.* The pseudo-medieval mystery-play, *le Prince des sots* (1830), with its blazing mouth of Hell surmounted by a Paradise of starry azure, reveals reminiscences of the Prologue in the Goethean poem. This French play has for its subject the arrival of a company of jugglers at a feudal castle under the pretext of giving a performance, but in reality for the purpose of rescuing a fair lady held in durance vile by a tyrannical husband or father.

The minor plot, which is a play within a play, tells of an angel, who descends from the azure sphere and throws dice with the Devil, with human souls as the stakes. The angel cheats, through excess of zeal, with the object of taking back as many of his friends as possible into Paradise. The Devil in the end loses his temper, calls the angel "great gawky fellow, sly fool," and threatens, if he catches him again at his tricks, to pull every feather out of his wings, so that he would be unable to fly back to his Master. The quarrel grows bitter, and leads to a row, under cover of which the lover, protected by the Prince of Fools, succeeds in carrying off his lady fair.[27]

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[26] Théophile Gautier: *Portraits et souvenirs littéraires.* Paris, 1875.

[27] The synopsis of this play has been given after Gautier's account of it in his *Histoire du Romantisme* (1874). M. Aristide Marie in his study, *Gérard de Nerval, le poete et l'homme* (Paris, 1914), p. 368, n. 22, maintains that Gautier's memory failed him in his account of the plot of this play. It is not with the Devil but with a juggler placed at the entrance to Hell-mouth that the angel plays the game of dice. Gérard de Nerval, who could not have the play performed, changed it later into a novel, which was published after the original manuscript by L. Ulbach in *la Nouvelle Revue* for 1887.

Gérard de Nerval's second play, *Nicolas Flamel,* written the same year, bears a still stronger impression of Goethe's *Faust.* The scene in which Satan appears to Flamel on the tower of the Church of Saint-Jacques is an evident imitation of the apparition of Mephistopheles in Faust's study.[28]

Nicolas Flamel, a man of genius, has been ruined by his alchemistic researches. In his "despair of never attaining," he takes the decision to sell his soul to Satan. Ambition drives him to enter into a pact with the powers of hell. Having been unsuccessful in soaring to the heights, he now contemplates plunging himself to the depths. His decision, however, is actuated not by his material misery so much as by his thirst for learning. He is anxious to be freed from the chains which bind the human mind. He expects from the Devil not material rewards so much as the ability to know all and to comprehend all. He summons Satan and offers to sign away his soul. But the Devil is not content with the scholar's soul. He demands the inclusion of Flamel's wife in the pact for fear that, through her piety, she may in the end obtain her husband's pardon from Heaven and thus snatch his soul from Hell. Flamel, as a good husband, balks at this condition. He is willing to forfeit his own soul as payment for services received, but he will not jeopardize his spouse's soul in the bargain. Satan, however, is stubborn on this point. He will have both or none at all. In the end, as Flamel is hard pressed by his creditors, he expresses his willingness to hand over his beloved wife as well as himself to the Devil.

The long drawn-out negotiations furnish several occasions for the Devil to expound his philosophy. Satan shows himself in this play as a thorough-going dualist. He expresses the idea of two co-equal and co-eternal powers continually engaged in a war for the mastery of the world. The two antagonists—Deus and Diabolus—he maintains, are equal in glory and grandeur, but man, standing between them, is inferior to either of them. The Mighty Abyss, he tells Flamel, has as much beauty as the High Mountain. The ugly, he claims, is that which has neither height nor depth. The bad lies not at the ends, but in the middle. Men should prefer Hell or Heaven rather than earth for a sojourn.

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[28] The substitution of the tower of the Church of St. Jacques de la Boucherie for the scholar's laboratory of alchemy is due to the fact that the name of the protagonist of this play is historically linked with this church. Nicolas Flamel, a member of the University of Paris and a librarian, who died in 1417, is one of the most famous persons buried in the Church of St. Jacques. He left a great sum of money to this church, and his effigy, together with that of his wife, used to be seen kneeling at the Virgin's feet in the tympanum of the porch. Nicolas Flamel was venerated by the alchemists as their patron for having, as it was believed, discovered the philosopher's stone. His house in the Rue des Ecrivains was searched several times in order to find some indication of his secret. In the selection of the church tower as the place of temptation we may perhaps also see a reminiscence of the temptation of Christ on a high mountain.

Nicolas Flamel finally becomes conscious of Satan's sophistry. In the end, the specious arguments advanced by the Devil open his victim's eyes. Flamel realizes that true happiness lies not on the heights nor in the depths, but mid-way, amidst the sacred and familiar things of the earth. He finally decides to act in the spirit of Aristotle's "Golden Mean" and according to the Latin proverb: *"Medio tutissimus ibis,"* refuses to sign the pact, abandons his ambitions, and returns to his desk to earn his living with his pen.[29]

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[29] This "drame chronique" was left unfinished by its author. Two small fragments of this play appeared in the *Mercure de France au XIXe siècle* for 1831. The conclusion is given in the résumé after a recent English translation, which appeared in the *Dublin Magazine,* I (1923-24), 503-512. Its author, Seumas O'Sullivan, has added a final scene.

(To Be Continued)

THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MAN

BY LEWIS SPENCE

THE question of human origins presents a perennial interest, but at no time, perhaps, has it been the subject of so much popular curiosity and debate as at the present. Africa, with its recently found anthropoid skull and early simian crania, may hold the anthropological stage for the moment. But, sooner or later, America, the enthnological history of which has aroused the keenest controversy since the Discovery, must once more reappear as one of the great central issues in the age-long discussion of man's provenance and distribution. Few topics, indeed, connected with the science of man possess a romance so permanent and enthralling, for if American Ethnology has no immediate connection with the origin and evolution of our species, it cannot but illuminate our still darkling notions of human development and upward progress when isolated and cut off from the region of its inception.

The majority of American official anthropologists—though markedly disinclined to pronounce conclusively on a question so bewildering—now seem disposed to accept the theory of an Asiatic affinity for the Red Man. But it is not disputed that in the course of ages immigrants from other sources may have landed on American soil. According to the more conservative view, America furnishes no tangible evidence of an antiquity so great as to support the theory of an independent origin for the Red race, nor has it so far afforded satisfactory evidence of human arrivals on its shores in remote geologic times. All American aboriginal culture, indeed, is now classed by trustworthy authorities as Neolithic, and the protagonists of its Old Stone Age origins are in a rather discredited minority.

Assuming a place of origin for man in some part of the Old

World, America would naturally be the last of the great areas to be reached. If man arrived in the American continent by way of Bering Strait, it must have been at a comparatively recent period, geologically speaking, for the ice-sheet persisted in these regions until an epoch which is variously estimated at from seven to twenty thousand years ago, and, indeed, still persists there. Man's arrival in North-Western America may perhaps be referred to one of the recurring intervals of climatic mildness which intervened during the long and rigorous conditions imposed by the Ice Age. Tribes acclimatised in Siberia would readily adapt themselves to the conditions of life in the Yukon Valley, but ice, mountain ranges, and other intervening obstacles must have made it difficult for them to find their way to the valley of the Columbia or the banks of the St. Lawrence for many centuries. But migration southward would present no such difficulties, and their spread over the Mississippi Valley to the south would be quickly accomplished, nor would the passage from North to South America present any insuperable obstacles.

In all probability the first settlement of America did not begin until the peoples of Northern Asia had acquired a degree of cultural development somewhat analagous to the more primitive hunting, fishing, and fire-using tribes of the Far North in recent times. Arriving in small groups, the movement would be hesitating and slow. The pioneers would camp along the ocean shores and river courses, and only after a considerable lapse of time would they negotiate the mountain ranges and ice-clad areas. The culture of those who went southward would alter insensibly according to needs and environment, and in time far-reaching changes would be initiated.

After carefully weighing the evidence collected by him in Alaska, Mr. W. H. Dall reached the conclusion that the earliest shell-midden deposits on the Aleutian Islands, by which route man may have entered America, are probably about three thousand years old. Indeed, the testimony of racial and cultural phenomena, when studied apart from geological evidence, does not seem to indicate clearly an antiquity for the presence of man in America beyond a few thousand years. On the other hand, the geological evidence of his presence there would seem to point to occupation towards the close of the last glacial period in Middle North America. This geological evidence is extensive, but by no means satisfactory, and in the present state of knowledge it is impossible to accept it as final. Everything points, then, to the conclusion that in all probability America was first peopled by way of Bering Strait at an epoch not less than seven thousand and not more than twenty thousand years ago.

Since geologic observations were first set on foot, a vast body of testimony has been collected regarding the early presence of man in the Western continent, and here it is only possible to summarize this rather scantily. South America claims to furnish the most primitive data, and Señor Ameghino and other authorities have sought to push man's antiquity on that sub-continent back to the early Tertiary period of the Eocene, a time when as yet even the anthropoids were probably not developed. An exhaustive review of the claims of the South American School, by Dr. Ales Hrdlička of the United States National Museum and Dr. Bailey Willis of the United States Geological Survey, left little doubt as to the true character of is assumptions, which were found to be based on 'very imperfect and incorrectly interpreted data, and in many cases of false premises.' The geologic determinations, no less than the faulty consideration of the circumstances relating to the human remains discovered in South America, particularly as to the possibility of their accidental introduction into older strata, and the lack of anatomical knowledge displayed by the finders, made it clear that even the best authenticated of their discoveries must be classed as 'doubtful.' As Mr. W. H. Holmes of the United States Bureau of Ethnology remarks, 'There appears to be no very cogent reason for assigning any of the cultural traces to sources other than tribes occupying the region in comparatively recent times.'

In North America, from 1830 onwards, a most imposing body of evidence was gathered to substantiate the claim for the presence of Tertiary Man, especially in California, where mining operations resulted in numerous discoveries. But practically the same disabilities attach to it as to the South American data. Most of the discoveries in question were made by inexpert observers, and it has been demonstrated that the antiquity claimed for them 'required a human race older by at least one-half than the *Pithecanthropus erectus* of Java.' Moreover, they were associated with artifacts which could certainly not be assigned to the Tertiary Period, and the knowledge that the western half of the North American coast has been completely re-modelled, geologically speaking, twice or three times since that period, at once disabuses such claims of all authenticity. Still, as Holmes admits, "certain portions of the deep gravels appear to have yielded traces of human occupancy of the region during the formation of these deposits." This partial admission does not, however, extend to such imagined relics of the Tertiary Period as the famous Calaveras skull, the Lansing skull, or the Nampa image, a terra-cotta figurine in human form taken from early Quaternary deposits in Idaho. The crania in question exhibit such striking analogies with those of the historic Indians as to render their ethnological association with these a matter of no dubiety.

The greater number of observations relating to the geological antiquity of man in America are associated with the closing stages of the Glacial Period in the northern United States. This period in America did not come to an end until the retreat of the main body of the ice-sheet beyond the Arctic shores. That retreat was necessarily gradual, so that the terms 'Glacial' and 'Post-glacial' apply to different epochs in different American localities. Thus the former nomenclature may be applied to a period in the Ohio or Delaware Valleys estimated at some twenty thousand years ago, whilst in the region of the Great Lakes it refers to an antiquity only half as extensive. The confused and unconsolidated nature of Post-glacial deposits in North America adds enormously to the difficulties attending an estimate of their age. Human and animal disturbance and the forces of nature have been continuously active in altering the superficial strata, nor can the geological chronology of the Old World be accepted as a trustworthy guide in any estimate of American geology. In the case of the Tertiary gravels in the Delaware Valley it was proved that the Lenni Lenape Indians had worked certain sites as lately as 1700 A. D. This notwithstanding, there can be no question that men have dwelt in the region probably from the closing period of the American Ice Age, but the collection of evidence of their presence there is sadly hampered by the recent existence of the Stone Age in America.

"Thus far," remarks Holmes, "the testimony brought forward is scattered, disconnected and contradictory, and tells no consistent story." He adds that in his view man did not reach American soil "until after the first retreat of the glacial ice from middle North America." So far, no definite evidence has been gathered which seriously militates against the conclusion, and until archaeological data of a trustworthy nature are forthcoming, it must serve as a basis for all estimates of the first presence of man in America. These views have naturally been combated by the less conservative school of Americanists, especially by Mr. Franz Boas, who formulated the dissenting opinion that man reached the American North-West during one of the inter-glacial periods of the Ice Age rather than at the close of that epoch. The ten or twenty thousand years which Holmes permits appeared to him sufficient for the growth of American aboriginal culture, but he pointed out that the ice retreated very gradually from the connecting bridge across the Bering Sea. In fact, it still lingers there, so that a much more recent date must be found for the opening of communication by that route. This leaves a very narrow margin for the development of aboriginal culture, and Boas and his supporters assume that the peopling of the New World was contemporaneous with that of Western Europe, and that the subsequent return of the ice practically isolated the two hemispheres, leaving each to develop as it might. They point to a certain parallelism between Western Europe and Eastern North America, and to the fact that the Crô-Magnon type of man, an Old Stone Age man, who entered Europe about twenty thousand years ago, had a strong skeletal and facial resemblance to the American Red Man.

"More than once," says Mr. Clark Wissler, the Curator of Anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History, "attention has been called to certain vague similarities between certain Palaeolithic races and the Eskimo, and in the New World certain old skulls from the remoter parts of South America are not far removed from this same Eskimo type. Incidentally, we may note that the Chancelade skeleton in Western Europe, belonging to Magdalenian time, is quite similar to the modern Eskimo. The earlier races appearing in Europe tend to be long-headed, and we have noted a less marked but still noticeable tendency for the long-heads in the New World to cluster in the extreme margins. That this is rather fundamental appears when we regard mammals as a whole."

If we regard the parallel series of European and North American life-forms where these are sufficiently complete, they appear to have been periodically recruited by more progressive stages, apparently from a common centre of dispersal. The relations are like those of one side and the other of a branching tree whose trunk-region is unknown to us.

Still other writers and searchers believe that future archaeological research in Asia will provide grounds for the assumption that Crô-Magnon Man and contemporaneous New World peoples were collateral branches springing from a Central Asian type. Mr. Wissler sums up by inferring that: "suggestive parallels between earlier types of Western Europe and America arise in a much earlier period of man's history. That the New World native is a direct descendant of the Asiatic Mongolian is not to be inferred, for the differentiation is evidently remote; what is implied, is that somewhere in the distant past the Asiatic wing of the generalised type diverged into strains, one of which we know as Mongolian and another as American."

On the other hand, some of the younger American anthropologists have sought to treat the whole matter independently and *de novo*. Mr. N. B. Nelson, working in the Mammoth Cave district of Kentucky, found two cultures, the earlier of which is without pottery, and with very little polished stone. Mr. Leslie Spier, making an independent study of conditions at Trenton, New Jersey, found conclusive evidence of the existence of an earlier culture, also without pottery or polished stone. Both of these sites are east of the Mississippi River, and it may therefore be concluded that the existence of two cultural periods in the Eastern United States is extremely probable.

According to Holmes, archaeological evidence for early European penetration is not lacking. In New England and farther North is found a highly specialised form of the stone adze known as the gouge, which is abundant in the region mentioned, but disappears as we approach the Carolinas and the Ohio Valley. It is to be found in Northern Europe where the Atlantic is narrowest and most nearly bridged by the intervening islands. Within the same area in North-East America, and thinning out, as does the gouge, is to be found an object of rare and highly specialised form, an axe-like implement known as the hammer-stone, with a perforation for hafting, and wing-like blades. In Northern Europe is found a drilled axe of similar type. It is, says Mr. Sven Nilsson, exactly like the axe which the Amazons of classical mythology are represented as carrying in many friezes and statues, and resembles the

Amazonia securis of Horace, which is also mentioned by Xenophon in the 'Anabasis.' Its American homologue, says Holmes, had no other than sacred and ceremonial functions.

"It may not be amiss to suggest," he remarks, "that possibly in prehistoric times examples of that type of implement were carried by some voyager across the intervening seas. . . . Who will venture to say that these greatly varied, beautifully finished, and widely distributed objects may not have come into existence among the tribes during the 620 years separating the discovery of Vineland and the arrival of the English Pilgrims?"

Holmes also ventures to indicate Mediterranean cultural affinities in America.

"Along the middle Atlantic shores of America," he says, "certain forms of artifact are found which resemble more closely the corresponding fabrications of the Mediterranean region than do those of other parts of America. The round-sectioned, petaloid polished celt is found in highest perfection in Western Europe, and in the West Indies and neighbouring American areas. It is absent or rare on the opposite shores of the Pacific. In the Isthmian region we find works in gold and silver and their alloys which display technical skill of exceptional, even remarkable, kind, and it is noteworthy that the method of manufacture employed, as well as some of the forms produced, suggest strongly the wonderful metal-craft of the Nigerian tribes of Old Benin; and, as possibly bearing on this occurrence, we observe that the trade winds and currents of the Atlantic are ever ready to carry voyagers from the African shores in the direction of the Caribbean Sea."

Again, the close resemblance between the architectural and sculptural remains of Middle America and South-Eastern Asia invites comparison. In both regions the salient structures are pyramids ascended by four steep stairways of stone, bordered by serpent balustrades, and surmounted by temples. The walls of temples are embellished with a profusion of ornaments, and surmounted by roof-combs of a very similar design, and the caryatid is common to both environments. It does not seem impossible that the energetic builders of Cambodia and Java of two thousand years ago should have had sea-going craft capable of the voyage to America. That they had in the sixth century of our era we know. But by that time Central American civilization was already on the wane.

After more than four centuries we are still much in the dark concerning the wonderful civilization of the Maya Indian tribes of Guatemala, Chiapas, and Yucatan. The United States Bureau of Ethnology has heroically striven to achieve results in Central American archaeology comparable with those arrived at by workers in the lore of the ancient East. But although the effort has been admirably organised, it has been, to some extent, devoid of imagination, and the gaps in our knowledge of the Maya and Mexican past are still so great as to arouse the feeling that as yet we are only at the beginning of a quest of extraordinary difficulty and complexity. For example, although the symbols employed in Maya arithmetical computation and dating have been unriddled, the hieroglyphs accompanying them, which probably relate to the details of religious festivals, still baffle the ingenuity of investigators. Again, the several epochs in the history of the Maya race can only be estimated broadly by a comparative study of the development of their art-forms. But one arresting fact emerges from the welter of evidence and theory. The earliest known forms of Maya art and carven inscription differ so slightly from the latest examples as to induce the belief that this civilization did not develop upon American soil, but had its inception elsewhere.

Authorities are slightly at variance regarding the best method of collating Maya chronology, as expressed in the dates sculptured on the walls of the temples of Guatemala, with our own system of reckoning time. But there is a general agreement that the earliest of these nearly coincide with the beginning of the Christian era. If this be granted, and we lean toward the notion of an Asiatic origin for an art and architecture which first appear on American soil as almost fully developed, we must look for signs of their introduction at some time shortly before the commencement of our present chronological era—in a word, at a period when Buddhist missionary enterprise was in its hey-day.

As is well known, evidence of a kind is not wanting that Buddhist monks from Kabul reached America at some time in the fifth century of our era. This is contained in certain Chinese annals, the antiquity and reliability of which is doubtful. After a close examination of this evidence, the present writer is of the opinion that the theory that these missionaries reached America is 'not proven.' The most satisfactory proof of the early Asiatic penetration of America must surely be sought for on Amercan soil.

It is, perhaps, in the worship of the god known in Mexico as Quetzalcoatl, and in Central America as Gucumatz and Kukulkan (all of which mean 'Feathered Snake'), that perhaps the strongest proof of psychological contact with Asia is to be found. At the period of the Conquest he had developed into a god connected with the trade wind, and therefore with the fertilization of the crops, but in an earlier day he possessed a very different significance. There are several versions of his myth, some of which state that he came from the East, while others give the impression that he entered the country by the way of the west coast. However that may be, he is, in his earlier forms, decidedly Buddhistic in aspect and insignia, as well as in the traditions which relate to him. His was a religion of pious contemplation and penance. His priests rose several times in the watches of the night to indulge in prayer and penance, they drew blood from their ears, noses, and thighs by means of sharp thorns; they bathed in the early watches of the dawn. They had their religious adepts and recluses, precisely as among the Buddhist fraternities, and the personal piety of Quetzalcoatl himself and his strenuous passive resistance to the horrid rites of human sacrifice, of which the lower Aztec religion was so prolific, lend colour to the theory of his Buddhist origin.

Nor is this weakened by the sculptured and other representations of Quetzalcoatl which have come down to us. In these he is shown, not as squatting with knees drawn up to chin, as in the native manner, but as sitting cross-legged, often in a shrine, in the most approved manner of the Buddhist saint, wearing necklaces of beads and other hierophantic insignia, and a head-dress which recalls those of numerous Buddhist personages. But there are other and still more disconcerting evidences of contact with Asia. At Copan is a stela of considerable proportions, which exhibits two strange supporters resembling elephants. These animals have coiled and elongated trunks, but are without tusks. The authorities of the United States Bureau of Ethnology are of the opinion that these are exaggerated representations of the macaw bird. But Prof. Elliot Smith of London University, who has experience in mythology and symbolism as well as in comparative anatomy and zoology, assures us that these sculptures represent "undoubted elephants," a statement which he clinches by saying that the auditory meatus observable is not that of the macaw, but of the elephant. Commenting on this theory, Mr. Clark Wissler observes: "In this case we may doubt the reality of the similarity between these figures and southern Asiatic drawings of elephants, because those who have studied the Maya sculptures themselves, instead of the pencil sketches made by earlier observers, find proof that another creature was in the artist's mind. In cases of this kind when we are dealing with the conventionalised drawings of the New World and the Old, it can scarcely be expected that the mere objective similarity between a few of these drawings is to be taken as proof of their identity in origin. Other check data must be appealed to before even a useful working hypothesis can be formulated." The whole question of Asiatic influence in America can scarcely be taken seriously until reinforced by a much larger body of evidence than is at present forthcoming.

That American civilization owed its inception to or received impetus from Polynesian immigration is a theory which recommends itself to a growing number of adherents. Perhaps its most direct advocate is Prof. J. Macmillan Brown, Principal of Christchurch University, New Zealand, who sees in the architectural and other manifestations of the Incan culture of Peru a close resemblance to the megalithic culture of Easter Island, and this, again, he connects with Polynesia, seeing in the hermit isle of the Pacific a stepping-stone by way of which Polynesian arts and beliefs were introduced to American soil. He indicates that the Cyclopean work of some of the burial platforms in Easter Island is precisely the same in character as that to be found at Cuzco in Peru. On the brick-building civilization of the ancient Andeans of Peru, Prof. Brown believes, a stone-building culture borrowed from the Pacific was superimposed by the Incas, who improved and refined upon it. He shows that certain plants which had been acclimatised in Polynesia, the banana and the plantain, the leaves of which are found in old Peruvian graves flourished in South America, and from the presence of the sweet potato he assumed Polynesian influence on the Pacific coast of South America, where the tuber flourished exceedingly.

In certain South American customs and forms of artistic endeavour, too, Professor Brown discerns evidences of Polynesian influence. The *tiputa* or *poncho,* the mantle with a single hole for the head, which is so generally worn from Mexico to the Argentine, he believes to be of western insular origin. The salivary ferments common to both areas, *chicha* and *kava,* he compares as having a unity of origin in Polynesian practice, and the chewing of the Andean coca with lime he likens to the practice of masticating the areca nut, which, in the Pacific, is also chewed with lime. Moreover, the Peruvian quipus, or system of knotted cords, the purpose of which was to serve as a mnemonic register for facts and numbers, and even to supply the first words of songs and chants, he compares with the mnemonic sticks in use in Tahiti and among the Maori, who also possessed knotted cords somewhat resembling those in use in Peru. The *umu* or earth-oven of the Pacific, associated with the cult of cannibalism, also penetrated South America by way of the west coast, and the stone axe or adze of the western insular area was also adopted in the Pacific regions of South America.

Lastly, he infers the arrival of a considerable body of Polynesians on South American soil. Assisted by the Humboldt current, these adventurers landed on the coast near the site of Truxillo, and founded the now ruined city of Grand Chimu, where still stand three double-walled enclosures, each covering more than a hundred acres. Within that nearest to the coast are the foundations of many large edifices in front of hundreds of small cubicles, entered only from the roof. These, he believes, were barracks for the soldiery of the conquering intruders, who reserved them as a fortified retreat in the last resort. From the gateway there stretches into the sea, about a mile off, a weir, containing in the middle a dock large enough to accommodate an ocean-going craft, by the aid of which the garrison could, if necessary, make its escape. But the evidence by which he chiefly identifies the invader's as of Polynesian race is to be found in the cemetery outside the northern wall, in which not a single shard of pottery has been found—for of all the Pacific peoples, the Polynesians alone made no pottery, while the native Peruvians lavishly furnished the graves of their dead with ceramic mementoes. A tradition from Lambayeque, an ancient city farther to the north, has it that across the sea came a band of naked warriors who worshipped a god of green stone, and who ruled for a time in the neighbourhood and later disappeared.

From what part of Polynesia did these conquering immigrants come? Professor Brown believes that the settlers in Grand Chimu were no mere haphazard adventurers, but came to Peru as the result of a definite quest for a new home. Searching for other land more or less known, they got into the track of the trade winds, and were unavoidably blown on to the Pacific coast of South America. He thinks it not improbable that these voyagers came from the Marquesas, where alone in the Pacific area is to be found the combination of megalithic work and statuary reproduced in Incan Peru.

Setting aside the indirect character of much of Professor Brown's evidence, it is obvious that such incursions as he describes could have had but a slight influence on American race and culture. The evidences of Polynesian influence in America are slender, and probably arose out of sporadic visitations, which, by reason of the very hostility of the race which made them—and the Polynesians were nowhere friendly disposed—could leave but little traces upon native art and custom. At the same time it is only fair to admit that salient striking customs and artifacts, once introduced, are usually persistent in character, and to find a highly involved and elaborate form of architectural science, such as the megalithic, in Peru, certainly justifies a respectful consideration of the assumption that it emanated from one or another of the Pacific regions where it is to be found.

The argument that America was not only peopled from Polynesia but also drew the seeds of her culture from that region is ably summarized by Mr. Clark Wissler, who says:—

"Repeated efforts have been made to show that all the higher culture complexes of the New World were brought over from the Old, particularly from China or the Pacific Islands. Most of these writings are merely speculative or may be ignored, but some of the facts we have cited for correspondences to Pacific Island culture have not been satisfactorily explained. Dixon has carefully reviewed this subject, asserting in general that among such traits as blowguns, plank canoes, lime-chewing, head-hunting cults, the man's house, and certain masked dances common to the New World and the Pacific Islands, there appears a tendency to mass upon the Pacific side of the New World. This gives these traits a semblance of continuous distribution with the Island culture. Yet it should be noted that these traits, as enumerated above, have in reality a sporadic distribution in the New World, and that there are exceptions. On the other hand, there is no great *a priori* improbability that some of these traits did reach the New World from the Pacific Islands."

The several routes possible to immigrants are the Bering approach, that by way of the Atlantic currents, setting from the African coast to the shores of South America, the Middle and South Pacific currents traversing the ocean which separates Polynesia from South America, the Japan currents setting to the North-East, and the chain of islands connecting Europe with Labrador. The majority of these are certainly not very practicable for primitive voyagers, but there are numerous instances on record of Polynesian canoes drifting for six or eight hundred miles from their point of departure. Such voyagers as there carried, however, can scarcely have affected blood and culture to any great extent in regions already occupied, though there seems to be good evidence that they did so slightly.

Although artifacts of European character have been found in North America, and these perhaps antedate the well-ascertained settlements of the Norsemen there, no data sufficiently embracive or accurate have yet been gathered to permit us to say that early European man actually found his way to America by drift or land-bridge. That numerous traditions of a Western continent existed in the British Isles from an early period is, however, now generally admitted. In some cases these were probably mere echoes of the Norse discoveries, like the Venetian tale of the discoveries of the brothers Zeno, but those of them associated with Irish and Welsh legend are now receiving a greater measure of credence than formerly. Of late years much has been done to show that many regions which our grandfathers firmly believed to be traditional were actually known to European geographers long before the date generally accepted as that of their discovery. During the 19th century the venerable legend of St. Brandan was believed to enshrine quite as much of the essence of legend as any other of the Irish sagas of seafaring. The Norse tales of discovery in America and elsewhere were credible enough, but this Celtic epic of an earthly paradise was, of course, much too rich in matter of faery to carry conviction. Perhaps its most acceptable version is that to be found in the fifteenth century Book of Lismore, compiled from much older materials, from which we learn that St. Brandan, founder of the monastery of Clonfert, who flourished in the seventh century, prayed strenuously that a secret and hidden land might be shown to him where he could dwell in hermitage secure from men. We are told that the saint "travelled up and down the coast of Kerry, inquiring as he went for traditions of the Western continent." At first he set sail in search of it in a ship made from the hides of beasts, but later in a large wooden vessel built in Connaught, which required a crew of sixty monks to navigate her. Success crowned his quest, and he came at last to an island 'under the lee of Mount Atlas,' a balmy and delectable region, where he dwelt in peace and security for many years.

The first appearance of St. Brandan's Isle in cartography is in the Hereford map of 1275, where it occupies the latitude of the Canary group. Indeed in the Canary Isles a tradition still survives that St. Brandan and his companions spent several years in the archipelago. Even as late as the eighteenth century an expedition sailed from the Canaries in search of an island believed to be outside of those already known in the group, and to be that in which the saint had finally settled. "It appears likely," says Mr. W. H. Babcock, "that St. Brandan in the sixth century wandered widely over the seas in quest of some warm island concerning which wonderful accounts had been brought to him, and found several such isles."

But Mr. Babcock, no venturesome authority, it may be said, is of the opinion that early Irish voyagers may actually have settled in Newfoundland. He thinks that the legendary island of Brazil, once thought of as lying in the Atlantic, may have been the present Newfoundland, which seems to have been visited by Irish-speaking people. The name Brazil is probably composed of two Celtic syllables, 'breas' and 'ail,' each highly commendatory in implication, and that the geographical term Brazil or O'Brasil, is of Irish origin cannot be doubted. In all probability the Irish monks whom early Norse settlers found in Iceland formed part of a great Celtic religious and missionary 'push,' or forward movement, which was pressing northward and eastward in the latter part of the eighth century, and the Irish who reached Newfoundland may have formed its western wing. Irish vessels of that period were of a tonnage sufficiently large to negotiate such a voyage with success. Indeed, they were much better equipped for long-distance sailing than the vessels of Columbus. It is well known that the Norse discoverers of America conferred the name of Mikla Irlant, or Great Ireland, on a region not far distant from one of the coasts where they settled. The territory which has Cape Race for its apex, and which includes Newfoundland and Cape Breton Island, occupies the precise latitude of the Island of Brazil in many of the ancient maps. The name Brazil was given to the South American country now so called in almost a haphazard manner, and in the vague belief that the legendary locality of that name had been rediscovered after the lapse of centuries.

But Wales has also a claim to traditional honours in the discovery and even in the settlement of America, which, should she care to take it seriously, is at least as strong as that of Ireland. On the death of Owen Gwynedd, Prince of North Wales, in 1170 A. D., tradition says that his sons became embroiled in civil strife, and one of them, Madoc, a man experienced in seamanship, disgusted with the unstable condition of the country, resolved to lead a colony to those Western lands of which he had heard his seafaring acquaintances speak. Accordingly he collected several hundreds of his followers, steered westwards, and eventually established a colony 'in a fertile land.' Leaving here a hundred and twenty persons, he returned to Wales, and fitted out a larger expedition of ten ships, with which he once more put to sea, this time passing completely out of human ken.

The evidence in support of this story is that it is mentioned in early Welsh annals, and that numerous travellers have discovered traces of the Welsh tongue among the lighter coloured tribes of American Indians. Meredith, a Welsh bard, seems to have celebrated the voyage in some verses composed, according to Hakluyt, in 1477, or fifteen years before the Columbian discovery, but the original printed source of the legend is Humphrey Lloyd's 'History of Cambria, now called Wales,' which was published at London in 1584. But the '*Nieuwe en Onbekende Weereld*' of Montanus, published at Amsterdam in 1671, made the story more universally familiar. It necessarily entered into the discussions of the learned men who in the seventeenth century were busying themselves with the question of the origin of the American races, and among these De Laet and Hornius gave credit to its reality.

The linguistic evidences of Madoc's settlements in the New

World, however, were not brought into prominence until after one, Morgan Jones, a Welsh missionary, had fallen among the Tuscarora Indians in 1660, and found, as he asserted, that they could understand his Welsh. He is most explicit regarding the ability of his Indian captors to speak the purest Welsh, and states that they perfectly understood those passages of Scripture which he read to them from his Welsh Bible. It is impossible to enumerate the extraordinary stream of books and papers dealing with this fascinating question which saw the light towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The renewed interest in the subject seems to have prompted Southey to the composition of his poem 'Madoc.' Meanwhile persistent reports were published of the discovery of tribes of Indians who spoke Welsh. Some years later the publication of Catlin's *American Indians* probably gave more conviction than had previously been felt as regards the actuality of the tradition because of his statements of positive linguistic correspondences in the language of the so-called white Mandans of the Missouri, the similarity of their boats to the old Welsh coracles, and other parallels of customs. The discovery, too, that there was actually a tribe of Indians in Oregon calling themselves Modocs, seemed to many to clinch the matter. "It seems hardly necessary to state," writes Mr. James Mooney of the United States Bureau of Ethnology, "that there is not a provable trace of Welsh, Gaelic, or any other European language in any native American language, excepting for a few words of recent introduction." But it is noticeable that nowhere in the publications of the Bureau are definite facts adduced for the final discomfiture of this extraordinarily vital and persistent tradition.

The anthropological evidence and the very considerable mass of tradition which has accumulated around the question of the origin of the American race seem to unite in affording proof that the New World, so far from having been populated by any one race or at any given period, received its human stock from Asia, Polynesia, and even from Europe, at intervals widely removed. Probably, also, there were many immigrations from these several sources in the course of ages. It seems, however, reasonable to infer that the most numerous contribution came from Northern Asia at a period when the eastern portions of that continent had developed only a slender degree of culture. Polynesian influence must naturally have been of a more slight and intermittent character, and if European (other than early Norse) immigrants entered America, it must have been during some phase when communication by land or short sea passage was possible. It may yet be proved that Magdalenian men of the Upper Old Stone Age actually did drift or wander to America from the shores of Europe. But if they did, they assuredly did not leave many of their bodily remains in the Western continent, and, so far as is at present known, none of the works of their hands.

Evidence in support of the gradual development of the American race in complete isolation is adduced by many well-equipped scholars, who point to the distinctive character of American agriculture, with its cultivation of plants peculiar to the soil—tobacco, maize, manioc, and others—to the absence of draught and milk-giving animals, to the fact that the wheel and other mechanical devices were unknown in America, in support of their theory. But to maintain a thesis so confined in the face of well-founded proofs for the penetration of America by alien influences seems as unscientific as to adopt the opposite view and to refer the origin of American culture in its entirety to a handful of castaways. Moderately employed, both theories are capable of acceptance, but it is impossible to entertain either, when pushed to extremes, with seriousness. This is as much as to say that America, although it underwent no intentional or specific colonisation in pre-Columbian times by races or adventurers equipped for settlement, was, as all the evidence seems to show, reached by bands or units of seafarers carried thither by the ever-ready agency of the trade winds, who brought with them the knowledge, and perhaps the artifacts, of a distant and alien culture, which only partially affected and modified that of the older settlers from North-Eastern Asia.

THE PLEASANT PAINS OF MARTYRDOM

BY LEO MARKUN

IT is probable that men started to worship the gods because they feared and wished to propitiate them. Along with many other human traits, they endowed the gods with cruelty. If, as men came to believe, the earth was ruled by one or many divine beings, then earthquakes, storms, pestilences, and famines might well represent the cruel amusements of the ruling powers. This thought is expressed by the unfortunate Earl of Gloster in *King Lear:*

> As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods;
> They kill us for their sport.

In various anthropomorphic systems of theology, the gods are also represented as self-cruel. The supposed suffering of divinity has at times served as a model for voluntary self-tormenting on the part of men.

Among the followers of those religions that describe two contending gods, one of good and one of evil, there is a tendency to be particularly scrupulous about the prayers and offerings due to the malignant deity. Cruel gods as well as evil demons and spirits must have their wrath constantly appeased.

Whenever good and evil are supposed to be creations of the same deity, his ire and his mercy are variously emphasized according to the theologian's training and the nature of his algohedonia, or ability to derive pleasure from pain. In the popular Christianity of today, God is usually pictured as beneficent and quick to forgive evil. Yet we often find clergymen dwelling in their sermons upon divine bloodthirstiness. This is, of course, the chief stock in trade of the sensational evangelists. Consciously or not, they are actuated by the principle that an evil divinity receives more spontaneous sacrifice than a good one does.

To Jonathan Edwards, God appeared one "that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider or some other loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; His wrath toward you burns like fire." It is Gloster's figure: the divinity holding man in a cruel grip, as a boy holds a helpless insect. "To justify God's ways to man," some teachers of cruel theologies find themselves forced to say that mankind is inherently sinful.

The question why the omnipotent deity has put evil into the hearts of the men and women he has created is not easily answered. Its difficulty explains the origin of such dualistic religions as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. These teach that the benevolent deity is not all-powerful, but is constantly engaged in a struggle with a rival malefic god. A vague dualism is often to be found in contemporary Christian preaching.

The notion that God loves pain has preserved some of its old importance among us. The priests of ancient Phoenicia taught that at one time the god El himself, in a time of great peril, had taken his only son, dressed him in noble garments, set him upon an altar and with his own hands put him to death. A similar story is set forth in the Christian holy books.

Paul's doctrine of atonement still influences Catholic and Protestant theologies. This dogma, as ecclesiastical scholars have recently pointed out, appears to be based on the same theory that inspired the Phoenician priests to insist on human sacrifices. That is, a divinity needs to be appeased. According to the early Christian writers, "God so loved the world that he sent his only-begotten son" to perish in order that human sinfulness might be forgiven. As among the Phoenicians, a benevolent god seeks out his own pain —for of course he shares that of his son—in order that his worshipers shall not be tormented, but shall have prosperity in this world or at least everlasting life in the next.

The most curious thing about the Pauline theology is that it appears to postulate an evil god whom Jehovah must thwart. This god or being appears in Christian writings as the Anti-Christ or the Devil. Marcion of Pontus, a Christian theologian and religious leader of the second century, taught that Jehovah is a bloodthirsty god against whom Jesus was sent by a higher deity.

The Old Testament furnishes several instances of parents willing to slay their children when called upon by God to do so. Abraham does not hesitate when ordered to immolate Isaac. To be sure, a suitable substitute appears, making Isaac's death unnecessary. Jephtha, having conquered the Ammonites, fulfils his vow to burn for the Lord the first creature coming out of his house to greet him at his return. It chances to be his only daughter. Jephtha grants her a respite of two months "to bewail her virginity" in the mountains, then sacrificing her to Jehovah.

Primitive men, because their imagination is limited and their nervous system perhaps somewhat blunt, do not fully appreciate the sufferings of others. But the men who lived in Phoenicia and Palestine two or three thousand years ago were not primitive, and it is impossible to deny the algohedonic elements in their human sacrifices.

At least as late as the second Christian century, the women of Phoenicia continued to worship their gods by delivering their first-born sons to the flames. Thus especially was Baal-Moloch honored, and his worship occasionally gained recruits from the favored children of Jehovah. Sexual excesses, acts of cruelty and of self-cruelty, were mingled in the rites of Moloch.

The Egyptians, too, turned away divine wrath by destroying human life. They honored fifty or sixty varieties of sacred animals, and above all the cat, the ibis, and the beetle. Whatever man killed one of the holy animals, even accidentally, was put to death.

Human sacrifices sometimes took place in Greece when commanded by an oracle. In Homeric days, prisoners of war were often put to death for religious reasons. Homer represents Achilles as sacrificing twelve Trojans upon the funeral pyre of Patroclus, first slaying them with the sword.

The Druid priests of ancient Britain and Gaul habitually sacrificed human beings to their gods. They preferred criminals or prisoners taken in battle, but at times they burnt innocent men belonging to their own tribes. On rare occasions, their noblemen, hoping to avert some great evil, offered themselves for the sacrifice. The Scandinavians celebrated similar rites every ninth year at Upsala in Sweden. The nine sacrifices were ordinarily slaves or prisoners, but in time of danger men of rank might, as with the Druids, be among the victims. We are told that a certain Earl Hakon of Norway, wishing to obtain a victory over a band of pirates, offered his son as a sacrifice.

When the great Mohammedan conqueror, Mahmoud of Ghizni, overran India, a similar propitiation of the gods failed to stop his iconoclastic procession. Jypaul, finding himself unable to defend his dominions by natural means, resolved to offer up his own life. He was burnt to death upon a funeral pyre.

There are many algohedonic elements in Christianity. The injunction to love one's enemy and, when struck, to turn the other cheek is clearly self-cruel. Militant Christianity, in the name of the Cross, has nevertheless spread death and desolation before it, even as Islam and other religions aspiring to conquer the world. According to the tenth chapter of Matthew, Jesus said:

"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I come not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man's foes shall they be of his own household. . . And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth not after me, is not worthy of me. He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

Although Christian teachers have dwelt much upon the crucifixion of Jesus and the vicarious atonement, they have not to this day entirely abandoned the doctrine of actual punishment in the next world. Apparently, human beings are so cruel that they do not feel the utmost penalties endurable on earth to be sufficient for those whom they fear or hate; therefore they threaten them with additional penalties beyond the grave.

Jonathan Edwards and other clergymen of his time took extreme pleasure in watching the weaker members of their congregations writhe and fall into hysterics over their descriptions of endless pains. Calvinism taught that very few would be so fortunate as to escape the wrath of the Almighty. The self-cruelty underlying such a doctrine is obvious.

A cruel and gloomy religion always postualtes a cruel divinity or divinities; it is for this reason that many Christians now find the theological doctrine that emphasizes the atonement on the cross insupportable. But, to the Christian martyrs, it was a great source of joy to consider that they were following in the path of the Master. Perhaps they too were helping to win salvation for many by means of their sufferings. Bliss shone in their eyes despite the tortures to which they were subjected.

The very religions which furnish many willing martyrs are usually those which are ready to put non-believers to death if the occasion presents itself. This is but to say that cruelty and self-cruelty always go together and are to a certain extent interchangeable.

The sons of Islam were long distinguished by their willingness to give their lives for Allah and his prophet Mohammed. They felt assured that those who died fighting for their religion entered quickly into the delights of Paradise. They seemed anxious to send infidel dogs at once to Hell, though the payment of tribute sometimes lessened their ardor.

The fact that people have believed sufficiently in a cause to die for it has usually helped a great deal in gaining converts. The blood of the martyrs, it has been said, is the seed of the Church; but, with regard to such religions as Christianity and Mohammedanism, many more have died in resisting than in testifying. However important algohedonia may be among human beings, it is normally weaker than the life-preserving attitudes and habits.

Perhaps the Jews are as a class especially self-cruel. Where their persecutions are relaxed, the tendency to intermarry with their Gentile neighbors and to lose their ethnic individuality asserts itself. Many, probably most, descendants of the Hebrews who lived a century before the beginning of the Christian era are no longer known as Jews. Great numbers of them became attached to Christianity or Islam, or died in religious persecutions. It seems highly probable that converts to Judaism have done much to make up the losses. In some cases, martyrdom and danger must have been among the chief attractions. Now that religious dissent has become somewhat less hazardous than it has been, there seems to lurk more than a trace of the love of martyrdom in the change from Judaism to Zionism, from creed to nationality, as a unifying influence, that is going on among those who call themselves Jews. Nations, not churches, go to war in our time; and nations are somewhat more intolerant of nonconformity than churches.

Martyrologies have always been more influential than learned books of religious doctrine. What Protestant treatise on theology has counted for half so much in comforting the weak in spirit as

Foxe's *Book of Martyrs?* As to the importance of the passion of Jesus, that is amply attested by the popularity of the legends and pageants founded upon it as well as by the symbolic importance of the crucifix. The most familiar parts of the New Testament are undoubtedly those dealing with the death at Golgotha.

In the early persecutions of the Christians, political motives counted for much. To render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's meant more than merely to respect his coinage and to pay his taxes. It meant also to acknowledge his divinity. To deny that he was brother to the gods was to strike directly at his authority. Monarchs call themselves divine in order to establish their rule on something firmer than armed force or the consent of the people.

The Christians were seldom handed over to priests to be sacrificed to the gods. In the Roman Empire, it is said that they were sometimes thrown into the arena to furnish a pleasant bit of amusement. Legend has it, too, that the women were on occasion given to the brothel patrons rather than to the lions.

The priests of God did not execute the heretics who were condemned to death by the Holy Office of the Catholic Church. The fiction that the Church shed no blood was maintained throughout, men and women who were to be thrown living into the fire being first hypocritically (or formally) commended to the mercy of the secular arm. Cupidity was usually joined with religious bigotry in the modern Inquisition, for the confiscations enriched the monarchs of Spain and the inquisitors.

The burnings at the *autos-da-fé* were, then, criminal executions rather than offerings to God. Occasionally a Jewish martyr, familiar with the burning of animals as a religious rite, thought of his death as an immolation. One who was offered a pardon if he should consent to renounce his faith said he preferred to die as a sweet savor before the Lord.

We read of martyrs who "washed their hands fearlessly in the flames" and whose terrible pain seemed dissolved in the bliss of their mystical union with God. As Krafft-Ebing and other psychologists have said, the extreme ecstatic effects of love, religion, and pain are the same. It may be that the hand-washing martyrs enjoyed voluptuous pleasure; and some form of cruel joy, possibly tinged with sexual associations, came to such inquisitors as Torquemada and Arbues.

Cruelty is still, of course, occasionally manifested as religious as well as racial or national intolerance. Whatever is strange is always suspect to most people. The pleasure of humiliating was responsible for the badges and other indignities imposed upon the Jews in medieval Europe. In the dominians of the Seljuk Turk Alp Arslan, the Christians had to wear heavy iron collars. In Cairo under Al Hakem, the Jews were distinguished by wooden bells, the Christians by heavy wooden crosses which they had to carry in the streets.

The universal impulse toward cruelty is always seeking out occasions to manifest itself. A good cause that affords excuses for robbing and killing or at least for insulting and calumniating: what more can a cruel monarch or mob desire? That the Crusaders who went forth to regain the Holy Sepulchre for Christianity should murder Moorish and Jewish children and violate unbaptized maidens was perhaps to be expected; but they were almost as willing to rob, murder, and rape Christians. Having enlisted to shed blood, whose blood they poured out was of secondary importance.

At Lisbon in 1509, two thousand or more newly-converted Jews were massacred by a mob at the instigation of a Dominican preacher. If the desire to serve Christ was at the bottom of the medieval religious butcheries, how shall we account for the fact that these new sheep in the fold were bloodily destroyed? The answer is obviously that it is the nature of the wolf to eat sheep, and an excuse—as Aesop's fable teaches—can always be found.

Perhaps Christianity is a religion of mildness, but Christian persecutors have been no less cruel than those eager to advance the interests of other faiths. The history of the Jews since the conversion of Constantine contains ample illustrations of this statement. The Jews have, indeed, had comparatively few chances to retaliate; but, in the sixth century, when they had helped to capture Jerusalem for the Persian forces, they are said to have massacred ninety thousand Christians. In the recent persecutions of the Armenian Christians by the Turks, the greater power rather than the greater desire to inflict cruelty seems to have been on the side of the Mussulmans. Sheep can play the part of wolves well enough if provided with the proper teeth and claws.

The persecutions and sufferings of the primitive Christians have been greatly exaggerated, as Gibbon was one of the first to show. The chief reason for the pious lies was, no doubt, the desire to prove a miraculous propagation; but the thrill of algohedonia was also involved. Certainly many Christians were soon found willing to risk their lives in sectarian wars, and the iota differentiating the Homoousians from the Homoiousians was responsible for much shedding of blood. Some of the theological distinctions over which battles were fought Gibbon professes himself unable to understand: we can hardly suppose that the peasants who lost their lives to prove that the two persons of the one substance of the godhead had one or two wills could have argued the matter very intelligibly by word of mouth.

An incident which took place in thirteenth-century France well illustrates the fact that religious persecutors care more to shed blood than to serve religion. The city of Beziers was captured in the crusade against the heretical Albigenses. There were many good Catholics among the inhabitants, and it was not easy to tell them apart from the accursed heretics. The Abbot of Ciseaux, leader of the expedition, was asked how the true believers might be recognized. "Kill all!" cried the zealous man of God. "The Almighty will know which belong to him." Accordingly, the massacre was complete. In other cities, too, there were joyous burnings; and heretical ladies were thrown into the wells of their own castles while the soldiery applauded.

It is not necessary to assemble here the statistics of the Inquisition, variously stated as they are according to the bias of historians. There is no doubt that many thousands of human beings were solemnly handed over to the mercy of the civil authorities and just as solemnly burnt alive. Thousands more were otherwise put to death or flogged, left to rot in the prisons of the Church, ruinously fined, or otherwise forcibly taught that heresy is obnoxious to God and his representatives on earth.

"In the love of Christ and his maid-mother," said the zealous Queen Isabella of Castile, "I have caused great misery, and have depopulated towns and districts, provinces and kingdoms." If such was the effect of love, we may easily believe that love and hate produce similar results.

The Protestants of the Reformation period were no more tolerant and no less cruel than the Catholics, though their attacks on papists were less picturesque and in general less organized than those directed against heretics in the countries that adhered to the Roman Church.

Many martyrs have gone to their tortures joyfully because of their belief that they were thus entering into eternal bliss. This is not ordinarily the case with atheists, agnostics, and even deists who suffer for their opinions. Bacon, in his essay "Of Atheism," interprets this fact with strange logic to mean that their very martyrdom indicates a lack of sincerity in their professions of belief. He asks, "If they did truly think that there was no such thing as a God, why should they trouble themselves?" He does not explain why they should be willing to die for denying a divinity in whom they actually believe. The atheist martyrs have made a god of truth (truth as they saw it, naturally). They have shared with other martyrs strong passive algohedonia.

Giordano Bruno, whose sole religion was the love of mankind, said, "The wise man fears not death; there may even be times when he seeks death, or at least goes peacefully forth to meet it." Like some other doubters of his time, Bruno was a monk. Believing in a pantheistic philosophy, he boldly proclaimed his belief. He persistently preserved the self-cruel courage of his convictions. Imprisoned and tortured for years, he refused to recant; and he did not wince from the flames when he was burnt at the stake in 1600.

There are men now living in North America who would gladly incarcerate or burn alive all persons whose views of infant baptism, Papal infallibility, the tariff, or Prohibition do not coincide with their own. We should permit Roger Bacon to proclaim freely that Aristotle made some mistakes—the crime, it seems, for which he was imprisoned by his superiors of the Franciscan order—because our views are not those of the thirteenth century, but we have inviolable taboos of our own. Woe unto him who neglects to honor them!

Bold inquirers are cruelly mocked, even physically abused. The churchmen are not the only persecutors. There are little men of science, unable to adjust their minds (or their habit-tracks) to new ideas, who are always ready to pounce upon original thinkers. The innovators in literature and the other arts, who open up new fields and therefore possess merit beyond the intrinsic worth of their own creations, are seldom sympathetically received.

Men of original genius must have a strong capacity for self-cruelty if they are to be successful. They must delight in the very attacks made upon them. Else they are liable to die heartbroken. Every age is one of persecution, because all the generations of man have been cruel. To the gods men and women make in their own images they are ever ready to sacrifice the heretics, the followers of other deities.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A THEORY OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT

BY A. K. SHARMA.

VII.

(Concluded)

THE period of symbolism was immediately followed by that of Typism. That, before migrating to India, the Aryans had reached

The period of symbolism was immediately followed by that of Typism. That, before migrating to India, the Aryans had reached

a degree of culture higher than that revealed by the early hymns of the Vedas, and that, when they reached the valley of the Indus, they actually possessed some of the important characteristics of the Typal stage, are propositions which have been arrived at on socio-psychological considerations alone; and they cannot be discussed in details, in a paper like this. We realise, however that Historians are against us. According to them, the Aryans first came to India by the same North Western Route, which was taken by Alexander at a later date; then they settled down in the Punjab, composed the Vedic hymns, developed their culture, and gradually penetrated into the Gangetic valley. But lo; there they came face to face with their own cousins. How could it be? To meet this difficulty historians propound the theory of the Second Aryan "invasion." We are to suppose that certain Aryan Tribes came to India via Chitral and Gilgit, and that they marched further east, and settled down on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges. We are not competent enough to argue the pro and con of these historical issues, much less to decide them. But it should be pointed out that the position of the historians has of late been seriously disputed. For instance, Dr. Waddel holds that the Aryan settlers in India came first as a sea-faring people to colonise at the mouth of the Indus. "The first settlement and colonization of the Indus valley by these Aryan-Phoenicians is proved by the record of Uruas in regard to his having built Edin; and by the seal of Lord Mudgala as the "Capturer" and "minister" there, holding the Edin state as a captured colonly of the Sumerian Empire of Mesopotamia."[10] Referring to the so-called "Aryan Invasion" Dr. Waddel adds, "this latter event with its permanent occupation and systematic civilization of the heart of India, the Ganges valley or Hindustan, I find from a mass of new evidence, took place no earlier than the beginning of the seventh century B. C. and not by sea, but overland by Asia Minor and across the lower Indus, by a remnant of the Hittite and Aryan Syrio-Pheonician people seeking new settlements after their calamitous defeat by the Assyrian Sargon II. at Carchemish in 718 B. C."[11]

During this period the socio-psyche underwent a further dissociation; it ceased to be symbolic and entered into the typal stage. The community, which was homogeneous, broke up into various tribes, agriculture showed marked improvement; industry arose; trade advanced; an ornament called Nishka came to be the medium of exchange; and a certain berry *Labus Precatorious* was used as the unit of weight, Villages were reorganised with a view to accomodate the centers of new activities. The king shed off his religous functions, and confined himself to military, political and legal affairs. Immorality was recognised as crime, and punished as such; the business of administering punishment was taken away from the injured person and vested in the king or the magistrate; and a new set of people arose who specialized in dective work. Sons were granted the right, as sons, to a share of the ancestral property; and the head of the family was allowed to adopt some one to function as son, in case he happened to have none. The daughter-in-law of the house was entrusted with the duty of managing the house-hold, in case her mother-in-law was too old for work; and in this capacity she was to be the sole mistress. Though alphabets were still unknown an ideo-graphic system was introduced. Prose was still non-existent, but poetry developed in various metrical forms.

The most important feature of the age was the rise of caste distinctions. The sacrificial rites became complex; and since the king could not attend to them in person, he had to delegate his spiritual functions to a set of priests; hence arose the Brahaman Class. Owing to the constant friction going on either among the tribes themselves, or between the tribes on the one hand and the neighbouring people on the other, it became necessary not only to organise a standing army but also to relieve the soldiers of all extraneous duties; and this led to the formation of a fighting class called Kshatryas. The rise of industry and the expansion of trade required men with special training and experience; and the result was the formation of the Vaisya class. These three classes were supposed to do work of a noble nature; and to discharge the multifarious menial services in regard to them, it was necessary to set apart a class of slaves, so made either by conquest or by purchase; and in this manner the Sudras came into existence. At first the Brahmans, the Kshatryas, and the Vaisyas enjoyed equality in status, but in course of time the status of the Brahmans and the Vaisyas came to be regulated by the position they occupied in relation to the warriors.

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[10] Waddel; *Sumerian Seals deciphered,* p. 115.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

It was an age of types. The inner dynamic force that brought about this change was the intellect, incipient, no doubt, but still intellect. The first work of the intellect is to unify; so we find that an attempt was made to unite objects which were discrete and disconnected, and this attempt culminated in the formation of different types. To his end the old way of describing objects in terms of size, shape, colour, and other characteristics, gave place to the new method, first, of penetrating into physical appearances to discover important functions; and secondly, of describing objects in terms of them. Whenever a new object came into view, it was assimilated and placed at once within a known type. The lion, for instance, came to be called a strange dog. Every man in the community regarded himself as belonging to a particular class, with corresponding privileges and obligations; and he had a nascent sense of individuality in respect both of himself and of others. Between the utter lack of personality on the one hand, and extreme individuality on the other, the conception of the type served as the mediating link. The typal idea was so pronounced that it was taken for granted that one Brahaman was as good as another, and that any Kshatrya could function as well as any other; and if a Tacitus had observed them he would have concluded, as he did in the case of the Germans, that all members of a class looked more or less alike. These experiences reacted powerfully on the construction of the notions of deities. The proto-deities of the symbolic period were just the physical appearances themselves. In the next age they became shadowy personalities with certain important functions attached to them. For example, while Indra was just the rain in the earlier period, he became rain-maker in the new period. Another interesting change was in the way in which the new functions were used to describe the deities. Whenever more functions than one were discovered in respect of a deity, they were not combined together in one idea; instead they were used simply to form different names; and the deity in question came to be known by as many names as the number of functions discovered in respect of him. Indra came to be known as the rain-maker, the thunder, the wielder of lightning, the cloud, and lastly the sky itself. Similarly, the Sun became the illuminator, the life-giver, the nourisher, the traveller on the sky, and also the sky. Though we have been using the word deities, we should not forget that in this period the deities had not assumed any clear-cut shapes: they still remained proto-deities of a higher quality.

In addition to the older deities, which were developed into some sort of personalities, certain new ones came to be recognised. The chief amongst them was Aditi (the boundless, the infinite). This is the first time in the life of the Indo-Aryans that a female deity came into being. This must have been the reflex of the important position accorded in the household and in the community to mothers and daughters. In contradistinction with the ordinary deities, the new ones had not to pass through physical stages, but were conceived straight away as personalities with proper functions. The real test whether a deity was Indian in origin is the way in which it was conceived: if it was described in mere physical terms, it belonged to the Iranian period; if, on the other hand, it was conceived as a person, it must have belonged to a later age; at any rate, must have been brought into existence while the Aryans were about to come to India.

The most interesting discovery of the age is yet to be mentioned. Apart from the deities, old and new, apart from the developement in their forms; there came into view a new reality, not indeed an agency but something through which the agencies worked; and this was Rtam (path). In its primary meaning it was the path of the Sun. Later on it assumed a secondary meaning and became the path of Rectitude, Truth, Goodness, and Law in general. The discovery was pregnant with possibilities. It served to modify the notion of personality in the moral direction; and it served also as the basis of the idea of transmigration.

VIII.

Human nature gravitates towards the habitual. There is a tendency in man, not merely to form habits, but under certain circumstances to fall back upon them and to let his life be governed accordingly. The habit-forming period commences almost from his very birth, and may continue even till old age. When he becomes senescent, he looses the power of adaptation and remains helpless in new situations. In his earlier days his muscle was supple and mind alert, but now the limbs are tired and the spirit weary, with the result that the old indomitable will is replaced by an utter lack of energy. Life is essentially ruled either by the future or by the past. When the capacity for vision is gone, anticipation is replaced by reminiscence, and expectation by memory. Apart from this usual phenomenon, special circumstances arise, in which a return to habit becomes almost natural. The pioneer who wants to settle down in Africa, or in the wild west of America, struggles hard against the forces of nature, and clears a certain area of land; but before proceeding further he takes care to secure what he has already won. It is a commonplace in Military affairs that a good general should consolidate his ground before he makes a further advance. From the psychical standpoint, the act of consolidation is the same, in principle, as that of fixing a habit; for in both cases the processes involve memory, recollection, and repetition.

As with the individual, so with society. To meet an exigency the socio-psyche invents a method, and by suggestion, imitation and repetition it gradually assumes the shape of custom. But when the psyche loses its capacity for reflection and organisation, by long continued subjection to authority, or what amounts to the same, when in an epicurean forgetfulness, it abandons itself to a plethora of comfort and luxury, it loses vitality, becomes effeminate, and begins to live on its own inheritance, physical and mental. Such a society is on the road to decay. The Roman Empire during the period of the Caesars was in such a condition, and so it fell to the first stroke of a barbarian. Even in the case of a vigorous society, it is necessary at times to cry a halt in the course of activities. A nation enters into a war of conquest, be it the conquest of land or that of trade, and after much difficulty gains an advantage; but before extending the sphere of operation, it has to pause, and take stock of the situation; and then employ its previous experiences to consolidate, to stabilise, to make permanent what was only a temporary achievement.

It was an attempt like this that was made by the Indo-Aryans after they passed the Typal stage. Originally caste was based on functional suitability, and any one could change caste if he was only functionally fit. It is to this condition of affairs that Manu referred, when he observed that every man was born a Sudra, but became a Brahman, a Kshatrya, or a Vaisya, according to his function. Gradually however, the situation changed. The constant association of a function with an individual created the belief that it was only that individual who could discharge that particular function. It was only the Brahman who could officiate as priest, it was only the Kshatrya who could take up arms, and to enter into a trade was the special prerogative of the Vaisya. In this manner the mobility of the previous order vanished, and in its place a certain rigidity set in. Not only this. Function receded in the background, and memory and heredity did the rest.

Owing partly to the complexities of social life, and partly to the memory associated with certain individuals and families, privileges were conserved, and status became a matter of heredity.

But *noblesse oblige!* The men, who thus consolidated the power and priveleges, were not after all so selfish as at first sight they might appear; on the other hand, they were inspired by noble motives of social service. They evolved for each caste a code of duties and a code of honour, known by that protean term, *dharma.* The rules of the game were strictly observed, and lapses were punished by outright ex-communication. It was an altogether interesting period, it was an age of conventions, of religiousness, of chivalry, of bourgeois.

Gods followed in the wake of men. They also were caught up in the same psychic movement which brought about a change in human personalities. In this case, too, function, as the principle of determination, was replaced by memory and association; but there was this difference, that while in regard to caste the new principles were capable of direct application to their objects, they could be applied to Gods only indirectly, that is to say, to the ideas of them in human minds. Gods could not consolidate their positions; man had to do it for them. To take a typical illustration, Indra was originally conceived as a shadowy personality which could be described only in terms of certain functions. In the new period his functions become secondary; the qualities, by means of which he came to be known, were those which were associated in people's minds with power, strength, capacity to protect and to save; these, though not sufficiently recognised hitherto, were brought in the foreground; and Indra was conceived by means of them. The result was that his personality was neatly rounded off, his physiognomy was clearly outlined, and he attained the status of a full-fledged deity, a deity *per se,* irrespective of his functions. What happened to Indra happened to other deities also, and their number was legion.

For deepening the personality of a deity, two concepts were exploited. We saw that the Indo-Aryans, like the German Philosopher Kant, were struck by two things, ADITI (Infinite) and RTAM (Law). These appealed to them in a peculiar manner, and they felt that Gods had something to do with these. The relations were expressed in rather picturesque language; Indra lived near the Infinite, Mitra was her son, and Dawn was her face; similarly Indra was the originator and preserver of law, Mitra too was its guardian, and Varuna had the same relation to it. Intellectually the deities were conceived as infinite, boundless, omnipresent, and morally they were the sources of law, truth, and goodness, and they also sat as judges on those who transgressed. Gods were thus jostling against one another, their qualities and powers overlapped, and no one had a higher status than the rest. A growing intellect would not be satisfied with the situation. How it was met, we shall see in the next section.

IX.

Hitherto the evolution of religious ideas was going on in a linear direction. After the period of conventionalism, it began to canalise itself in two branches, the moral and the intellectual. The former, if pursued, would lead to the idea of a transcendental God and the latter to that of an immanent one. If we could visualise the religious histories of various communities, we should be able to see that, up to a certain point, development everywhere involved the same principles and was going on in the same direction. After the construction of a divine personality, half moral, half intellectual, and not wholly perfect, that is to say, a personality like the one sketched in the preceding section, religious progress everywhere took one of the two lines mentioned above. Hence the maturest idea of God in any community could only be that of a transcendental God of love or that of an immanent God of existence. This classification has been brilliantly described by Edmund Holmes. He opens his book on *"The Creed of Buddha"* with the following observations:

"The religions of the civilized world may be divided in two great groups—those of which the paramount deity is the Jewish Jehova, and those of which the paramount deity is the Indian Brahma. Jehovah reigns supreme, under the title of God the Father, over Europe and the Continents which Europe has colonised, and under the title of Allah, over Western Asia and Northern Africa. Brahma reigns in the Far East, India being under his direct rule, while Indo-China, China, and Japan belong to his "Sphere of influence". . . . . The Western mind had conceived of a natural order of things which is real because God has made it so, and of a super-natural order of things which is the dwelling place of God. . . . In the Eastern cosmology there is one world, and one centre of reality—the world of our experience seen as it is." How the idea of Jehovah was reached is not to be explained in this paper. We shall attempt on the other hand to trace the line of development which culminated in the idea of Brahman.

This further development occupied two stages, the Individualistic and the Subjectivistic. When we read the literature of the Individualistic age—the books called the Brahmanas and the Sutras—we are struck at once by the luxuriance of an intellectual growth, and dazzled by the splendour of achievements. During this period, the Aryans completed their migration into the Gangetic Valley; the tribes were regrouped; they came in contact with strange folks, fought, subdued, and civilised them. They saw new rivers, perenially flowing, and new mountains, cloud-capped and sky-kissing. They got acquainted, also, with new kinds of animals, and fresh plants and trees. All this gave them a fresh geographical outlook. Industry and agriculture were developed in details; towns and cities were founded; and the urban classes arose. The king become an emperor; law was developed; and the police and the magistracy came into existence. Alphabets were freely used, though at the end of the period; prose which began to be the medium of expression at the end of the Conventional age, was refined and used more and more for literary purposes. "Reason's aweful power gave thought a bolder range." Knowledge increased all round: Phonetics, Etymology, Grammar, Poetics, Astronomy, Geometry, and other studies were organised and taught in various schools.

Intellect which was just emerging in the Typal age, reached the acme of progress in the age of Individualism. It was an age of enlightenment, and its *dominant* was reason; the world as it was experienced then was thoroughly analysed, examined, described, interpreted, and defined; and nothing was left out. This intellectual ferment gave a new orientation to the conceptions of men and Gods. The restless enquiry into the nature of things, and the intense efforts to reach the very foundations, coupled with fresh achievements made men conscious of themselves, as living, free, individuals.

On the religious side, also, there was a tremendous change. We saw how the deities were personified in the previous age, and how they came to be regarded as more or less alike. The situation raised important questions. Are all these deities real existences; if so, wherein lies their individuality? If God is supreme, could there be more Gods than one? Is the supremacy of one God consistent with that of the rest? Who is the real God? These questions led to what Max Muller called Heno-theism. The predicates of the supreme were successively applied to each deity; Indra, Surya, Mitra, Varuna, and the rest, were tried with a view to find out if any would satisfy the conditions of the supreme; and all of them were finally rejected. Some times this process of comparing them was graphically described as a struggle in which God vanquished God. After each deity, taken singly, failed to satisfy the test, a combination of two deities was tried. After this, too, failed, attempts were made to define the real God as a unity in plurality; that is to say, as the "all-gods." This too proved unsatisfactory. In all this the governing motives were purely intellectual. Simplicity, clearness, distinctness, and consistency were the tests.

The new God was given all the divine attributes which the Human could discover, and He was known as Visvakarman, Prajapati, Hiranyagarbha, and even Brahma. A peculiar importance attaches to these names, and it is worth while to explain it. Both in India and in Europe, thinkers have arrived at certain conclusions regarding their experiences of the world. Some of these are; that the world is an effect of some cause, that it was evolved from a primal stuff, that it involves a purpose, that it presupposes the source of moral law; and that existence is implied in thought.

These were applied in Europe "to prove" the existence of God, and they came to be known as the Cosmological, the Evolutionary, the Theological, the Moral, and the Ontological arguments. In India the same experiences were used for a different purpose. Here philosophy arose out of religion, and there was no doubting the existence of God. God was felt as being somewhere from the very beginning, His life being bound up with that of the world. From the nature of the world it should be possible, therefore, to determine, not indeed the existence, but the nature of God. He must be Viswa-Karman (the forger of the world), Praja-pathi (the Lord of creatures), Hiranya-Garbha (the golden egg), and Brahma (life and power). The name that ultimately found favour with the people was Brahma—used in the masculine gender; and it meant the Supreme Person, the Heavenly Father, the Creator, the Sustainer and the Destroyer.

Such a God most admirably suited a people, who were conscious of individuality, power, and strength; and whose ruler was not a mere king, but an Emperor, a King of Kings.

X.

The Vedic Literature, properly speaking, ends with the discovery of the Supreme God. When we turn to the Literature immediately following, i. e. to the Upanishads, we are startled by a dramatic change. Instead of being instructed further about the Father in Heaven, we are told that Brahman is Atman. What this statement means we shall consider in the next section. For the present, our interest is in the word Brahman. Originally it meant God, conceived as masculine in gender and personal in nature; but in the new formula the same word signifies the supreme, conceived as impersonal and neuter. How came this change? Search as we may all the ancient books, we shall not find the answer. None seems to have raised this question, much less given any suggestion to discover the missing links.

It is true, no doubt, that Max Muller noticed one of the questions, viz, the change in gender; but his answer is that "in choosing the neuter, the ancient sages tried to express something that should be neither male or female, that should be in fact as far removed from human nature as weak human language could well express it; something that should be higher than Masculine or Feminine."[12] But the question remains: why did the sages want the change? For answer we should go back to the previous age. The very attempt to subject the ideas of deities to a thorough-going criticism should lead naturally to the change we are discussing. Efforts were made to remove all limitations from the idea of the Supreme. To think of God as a male is to limit him by a sexual principle; He should, therefore, be lifted above sex, as being the source of sex; and this could be expressed in language only as neuter. Neuter in this context really means "above-sex" as contrasted with its meaning in popular tongue.

It is the same intellectual attempt that is responsible for the depersonalising of God. To conceive God as personal is to make Him an object to a knowing mind; and in this sense He is limited by something outside Himself. If He should be the all-embracing Absolute He should cease to be a person, that is to say, He should not be an object to any mind. But intellect can work only with the object-subject relation. If it is true to itself it should conclude that this relation does not apply to Absolute Existence, and that, for this reason, it is unable, by its very nature, to form any adequate conception. It is this honest self-confession that is responsible for the second change in the meaning of the word Brahman. How else to conceive Brahman, is a problem which is incapable of solution by the intellect itself.

XI.

The transition to the age of Subjectivism was effected in a peculiar manner. In the age immediately preceding, elaborate rules and laws were laid down to regulate even the minute details of life. This bred a sense of a lack of freedom, the young were impatient of restraints and began to harbour inner rebellion; the old who lived through all the stages of Sacerdotalism, found that life was vapid. This state of affairs was potent with danger to society. But the genius of the people was equal to the task. A way was discovered to provide a safety-valve for the feelings of the malcontents, without in the least disturbing the stability of the social order. In the latter part of the age, a Brahmanical canon was promulgated dividing the life of a man into four distinct periods. The first period was devoted to his discipline and study; after this, he married, reared a family, attended to sacrifical and other duties, as became a man of the world; when his hair grew grey he abdicated his worldly functions, and retired to the seclusion of the forests, and lastly, after a period of probation, he became an ascetic, and died as such.

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[12] Max Muller. *Origin of Religion,* p. 319.

This permissive law led to an important result. To be able to appreciate it, we should leave those feverish activities, those castes, and sub-castes, those rules and regulations on which we stumbled in every page of the Brahmanas and the Sutras, and transport ourselves to the strange atmosphere of the forest life. Kings who flung away principalities as if they were but glittering toys, Kshatryas, who sought a safe retreat from the allurements of the pomp and and glory of war, Brahmins, who, realising that ceremonials and laws had no abiding meaning, longed to spend their remaining days in quest of the Unknown; all those, resorted to the forests and formed scattered colonies. They lived in huts, improvised with grass twigs and leaves; and the Southern slope of the Himalayas was strewn with such hermitages. They subsisted on roots, berries, and fruits, and drank at the purest of fountains. They spent their time in learning from each other, in the practice of meditation, and if possible in teaching the incoming novices. Their life was ruled by sincerity. They taught nothing which they did not practise, nor practise anything in which they did not believe. They had no fear, no anxiety, no ambition; no public to please, no critic to appease; on the other hand they were as free as the air they breathed, as joyous as the birds that warbled above their heads, and as pure as the water which bubbled up from under the Himalayan glacier. And there was a sweetness, a peace, and serenity in their atmosphere.

These men had large sympathies. No grass could sprout but did not strike a chord in their bosoms, and no bird could sing without elevating the spirit of their human comrades. They transported themselves into the heart of the surrounding objects and felt as as these themselves felt. Consequently they gained a sympathetic insight; and came to understand these objects in terms of their own souls. In other words they learnt the secret of the subjectivistic interpretation, subjectivistic in the higher sense of the word.

These new experiences vitally affected their religious beliefs. We saw that the age of Individualism ended with the confession that God could not be grasped by the intellect. This made one sage cry in despair "my ears vanish, my eyes vanish, and the light also which dwells in my heart; my mind, with its far-off longing leaves me; what shall I say and what shall I do?" Says another, "Knowing nothing myself, I ask those who know, ignorant myself, that I may learn. He who established the six worlds, is He the one who exists in the form of the unborn being?"[13] The forests announced the answer. Intellect had committed suicide, and there was no use in resurrecting it. But there was hope in the new life. The same process, which gave a thorough insight into the lives of birds, streams, and plants, ought to enable them to comprehend the Ultimate Reality. This Reality or God, if it be so, should be grasped by a method, which would not allow the distinction between the subject and the object to arise; for the apprehension should be that of an unlimited God. The artistic contemplation which they practised every day—and may we add, which is experienced by a man of genius like Goethe or Raphael—should satisfy the conditions. In such an intuition, there would be the experience of at-one-ment, without any subject-object distinction; this method, therefore, is the most adequate one to apprehend the all-Comprehensive God.

The new method would naturally lead to a new form of conception. If God and the soul could fuse in such a way as to leave no room for distinction, if, that is to say, God could become the soul and the soul God, in the act of knowing, then God should be of the nature of the soul.

Hence the formula, Brahman is Atman. But there is nothing, in experience, which is like the soul. The soul is something *sui-generis;* and what is like a soul should itself be the soul. This accounts for the secondary meaning of the formula that Brahman is the soul itself. Ultimate Reality, then does not admit of the subject-object distinction; and this is what our ancient sages meant when they called it "Advaitam." Thus the culmination of the development of the idea of God in the life of evolution which we named as the intellectual.

[13] Max Muller; *Origin of Religion,* p. 322.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW MORALITY

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

IS there such a thing as a new, modern morality? If there is, what are its sanctions, and what its scientific or philosophic foundation? Is it possible to dispense with all morals, as hosts of men and women are dispensing with all religion, or with what they *call* religion? Has there been a revolt against moral standards and principles, and, if so, what are the insurgents fighting for an inscribing on their own banners?

These and other new-old questions are discussed ably and lucidly by Walter Lippmann, a disciple of William James and Graham Wallas, in a new book entitled *A Preface to Morals.* Mr. Lippmann is a social radical, or at least an advanced or "leftist" liberal, and his views are symptomatic and significant. He arrives at no startling conclusions, it is true; but the younger generation respect him and will condescend to read and digest his ideas. To the conservatives he may be recommended as a thoughtful interpreter of ethical and sociological modernism. He puts things, moreover, in a fresh, original way even if the substance and matter of his observations possess very little originality. His book should be pondered and welcomed as a notable contribution to the social sciences.

According to Mr. Lippmann, the present generation is distinguished not by "its rebellion against the religion and moral code of its parents, but *by its disillusion with its own rebellion."* The rebels are not happy or triumphant; they are completely emancipated, but they do not know how to use and what to do with their freedom. They profess contempt for authority, but they feel that the ousted authority has left a void that must be filled somehow. In Mr. Lippmann's words: "It is impossible to reconstruct an enduring orthodoxy, and impossible to live well without the satisfactions which an orthodoxy would provide." Hence the unrest, the discontent, the secret quest for a new morality. Even the loudest of the rebels talk of the good life, recognizing the necessity of certain virtues and qualities in human conduct and human relations, but what *is* the good life? It is not necessary to exhort the young to be good, but it is necessary to show them what the good is and just why it is deemed good. They are profoundly skeptical, but not perverse, not unwilling to learn and to accept proof when offered what they regard as proof.

And Mr Lippmann essays to sketch or forecast the new morality, the morality that may become orthodox and serve as a dependable guide to life and conduct. He is not entirely successful in this hazardous attempt indeed, he seems at times quite arbitrary and to generalize on the slender basis of his own tentative sentiments and opinions. But, even when plainly subjective, he stimulates thought and challenges attention.

Mr. Lippmann has no patience with the shallow neo-Hedonists. He does not believe in the gospel of yielding to natural impulses and desires. He is a rationalist, not a mystic, of course, and he does not agree with those who think we are born to be miserable, or that there is some virtue in unhappiness. He is a combination of Stoic humanist and Puritan. He says, for example:

"To be able, as Confucius indicates, to follow what the heart desires without coming into collision with the stubborn facts of life is the privilege of the utterly innocent and the utterly wise. It is the privilege of the infant and the sage who stand at the two poles of experience; of the infant, because the world ministers to his heart a desire, and of the sage because he has learned what to desire."

The crux of the human problem is expressed in the last several words. We cannot, and we know we cannot, indulge our appetites and follow our instincts—for that way anarchy and madness lie. We must get understanding and acquire wisdom; we must consider others as well as ourselves; we must discipline and reconstruct ourselves to achieve the power to sublimate and harness our instincts and desires. We must become masters of our natures and learn to desire the right and good ingredients of life. And what *are* those ingredients? According to Mr. Lippmann, science and freedom of experimentation have not revised in any substantial way the cardinal precepts of the old morality or the old wisdom. To quote the author again:

"What the sages have prophesied as high religion, what psychologists delineate as matured personality, and the disinterestedness which the Great Society requires for its practical fulfillment, are all of a piece and are the basic elements of the modern morality."

The saying that all educated and cultivated men have the same religion, may not be strictly true. But Mr. Lippmann contends that all enlightened and earnest men tacitly accept the same morality, a morality based on need and genuine expediency, on reason and the fitness of things. Not, perhaps, fitness in a cosmic sense; we are less dogmatic or confident than were past generations about harmony with nature or with God; but we are incurably pragmatic, and we find that the new-old morality, when sincerely and intelligently applied, makes for the sort of values and satisfactions which we desire when we are most mature and worthy of our best selves.

Mr. Lippmann is more optimistic than most of his present or former colleagues in liberal journalism and politico-social reform. He finds much encouragement in current tendencies—in the increasing moralization of business, for example, in the rising standards of advertising, in the socialization of public utilities, in the acceptance by corporations of the principles of service in lieu of that of profit. Some of his notions seem naive and crude. But he is emphatically right in holding that the new-old morality will be judged mainly by its fruits. The spirit of inquiry and criticism can never be imprisoned again. It has been liberated for all time, and the effects of that liberation must be accepted and as far as possible be converted into goodness and beauty.

Mr. Lippmann is more instructive and helpful as an interpreter of negative phenomena than he is of the manifestations of the new, pragmatic morality. He seems to evade certain profound issues, or not to be aware of their existence. He virtually ignores the element of mysticism. He refuses to face the fact that essentially human life is tragic, unless science is radically and utterly wrong. To many Bertrand Russell's ideas of the good life, of the worship of the free man, of the future of the family and of the state, if not also of industry and economic relations generally, will seem more enlightened and better-grounded than those of Mr. Lippmann. Even so, the latter's book is to be heartily recommended for its admirable qualities.

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THOMAS W. GOODSPEED: "A YANKEE SAINT"

BY J. V. NASH

IN 1886 the old University of Chicago, buffeted by the blows of the Civil War, the Chicago Fire, and widespread financial depressions during its troubled lifetime of thirty years, passed out of existence through the foreclosure of a mortgage on its property at Thirty-Fifth street and Cottage Grove avenue. The institution was dead beyond hope of resuscitation in its original form, and to many it seemed that the cause of higher education in Chicago had come to a permanent and inglorious end.

There was just one man who, surveying the ruins, refused to consider the failure final. He believed that, even as Chicago had, phoenixlike, risen from the ashes of its dead self after the conflagration of 1871, so the University must and should be reborn, in a finer form, to fulfill an infinitely greater destiny.

This man was a quiet, unassuming clergyman named Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed. Born at Glens Falls, New York, September 4, 1842, he had moved at an early age with his parents to Illinois. Entering Knox College at Galesburg in 1857, he was one of those who heard Abraham Lincoln debate with Stephen A. Douglas in the memorable political discussions of 1858. Lincoln seemed to him the tallest man he had ever seen, and he remarked how the "rail-splitter's" voice, though he spoke calmly, carried far out to the limits of the crowd, whereas the short and stocky Douglas, gesticulating violently, could not be heard at all at a distance.

In 1859 Goodspeed became a student at the old University of Chicago, which had been established through the munificence of Douglas. He roomed in Jones Hall, the windows of which, as he recalled in old age, commanded an inspiring view out over the great Lake. He left Chicago to complete his college course at the University of Rochester, whence he was graduated in 1863, and then entered the Rochester Theological Seminary, receiving his degree in divinity in 1866. Already, in 1865, he had been ordained and had begun to preach. In the final year of the war, he enrolled among President Lincoln's last draft of recruits, but the conflict ended before he could see service.

Marrying, September 4, 1866, Miss Mary Ellen Ten Broeke, Goodspeed returned to Illinois to assume the pastorate of a Baptist church in Quincy; in 1871—just before the Great Fire, of which he long retained vivid recollections—he joined his brother, the Rev. Edgar J. Goodspeed, as associate pastor of the old Second Baptist Church in Chicago.

Meanwhile, in 1867, the Baptist Union Theological Seminary had begun its career. It was a separate institution, but for some time held its classes at the University, later acquiring property and buildings of its own at Morgan Park. It, therefore, was not involved in the disasters which fell upon the University; however, it was itself hard pressed for funds.

In 1876 Dr. Goodspeed accepted a call to become Secretary of this seminary, for the purpose of leading a campaign to raise money for endowment. This was a difficult task, because of the financial depression existing at that time, and the second destructive fire which two years before had swept Chicago. In answering this call, Dr. Goodspeed surrendered the assured income of his pastorate to take up a work with a highly uncertain future. But, under his able management, the seminary forged ahead into smoother waters.

Two years later, in 1878, the professorship of Hebrew at Morgan Park being vacant, there came as a highly recommended applicant for the position a sturdy, bespectacled young man of twenty-two, named William Rainey Harper, already a Doctor of Philosophy from Yale, with several years of teaching experience behind him. It fell to Dr. Goodspeed to interview this young man. Notwithstanding his extreme youth, and the fact that the theological students whom he would be called upon to teach would mostly be older than himself, young Harper, on Dr. Goodspeed's recommendation, was appointed.

As professor of Hebrew at Morgan Park, Dr. Harper began his extraordinary work of popularizing the study of Hebrew; this attracted such widespread interest and Harper's reputation assumed such extraordinary proportions that in 1886—the year that the old University closed its doors—he was called to one of the most distinguished professorships at Yale.

As early as 1882, Dr. Goodspeed had succeeded in interesting John D. Rockefeller in the work of the Morgan Park Seminary. By this time Rockefeller was already the wealthiest Baptist layman in the country. What might not ultimately be expected from his interest and support?

When Professor Harper left Morgan Park for New Haven, Dr. Goodspeed, in bidding him good-bye, added a significant suggestion that he should keep himself in readiness for a call to return to Chicago. For Dr. Goodspeed had dreamed a dream which, in the four years between 1886 and 1890, he was to labor incessantly to bring to realization.

As Dr. Soares observed at the funeral service for Dr. Goodspeed, in December, 1927, the new University of Chicago in those days was merely a hope in the mind of one man—and that man was Dr. Goodspeed.

The University of Chicago was born of the constructive imagination of Dr. Goodspeed. He knew Mr. Rockefeller and he knew Dr. Harper, but these two men were largely unaware of each other. Dr. Goodspeed, as he sat thinking over the educational situation in Chicago, saw in a flash of inspiration the possibilities for the cause of higher learning which must inevitably spring from the wedding of Rockefeller's millions to Harper's genius. His task, then, was to bring the two factors together, foster the courtship, and preside at the marriage ceremony. All this he eventually did, with consummate skill.

The debt of higher education in Chicago to Dr. Goodspeed is freely admitted by all those who are acquainted with the facts. It has been put on official record by the late Mr. F. T. Gates, who was for many years Rockefeller's representative in educational and benevolent affairs. He has written:

"To Dr. Thomas W. Goodspeed belongs the honor of first calling Mr. John D. Rockefeller's attention effectively to the unique educational needs and opportunities at Chicago. This Dr. Goodspeed did with fervor and power, in season and out of season, in letters and in visits covering at least two years, 1886-88. There can be no question that these labors of Dr. Goodspeed were the effective agency that convinced Mr. Rockefeller of the need of an institution of higher learning in that city, and led him to believe that he had an important duty to perform in conjunction therewith . . . No history of the University of Chicago will be an adequate history which does not begin with the correspondence of Dr. Goodspeed with Mr. Rockefeller in 1886 and trace that correspondence to its culmination."

During all the years of complicated negotiations—financial, administrative, and educational—which resulted finally in the incorporation of the new University, Mr. Rockefeller's great initial endowments, supplemented by large funds raised in Chicago, and Professor Harper's acceptance of the presidency, it was in Dr. Goodspeed's hands that all the lines centered. From headquarters in a downtown office building he directed the campaign.

Dr. Goodspeed was one of the six incorporators of the University of Chicago, and served as Secretary of the Board from 1890 until 1913. He also held the position of Registrar of the University, 1897-1913. In the latter year he retired. He was still hale and vigorous, but he had passed the age of seventy; he thought his resignation was right, and a worthy example to others, in order that younger blood might have its chance in positions of responsibility.

In 1892, when the University opened its doors to the first classes of incoming students, Dr. Goodspeed was fifty years old. It seemed to him that his principal life-work was then completed. But the thirty-five years which still lay ahead of him proved, if possible, even richer in achievement. Indeed, after his retirement in 1913, a chapter of his life in many respects the most extraordinary of all was still to be unfolded.

During his long service as Secretary of the Board of Trustees, it was he who acted as mediator between President Harper and the Board; it was he who kept a firm hand on the financial affairs of the University, which again and again were brought to the brink of catastrophe through the impetuosity of President Harper who, brilliant educational genius that he was, lacked a practical grasp of financial mangement. As Dr. Soares put it:

"To Dr. Harper a deficit was only the temporary failure of the supply train to keep up with the advancing army; to Mr. Rockefeller a deficit was the collapse of the whole campaign."

In the painful misunderstanding which ensued between President Harper and Mr. Rockefeller, Dr. Goodspeed, with infinite tact and fine loyalty, stood at his post and was a tower of strength to the troubled University. In a conversation that I had with Dr. Goodspeed in the last days of his life, he spoke with gentleness and sympathy of the temptations to over-expansion which continually beset President Harper and which he sometimes was unable to resist.

President Harper's tragic and premature death in 1906 brought to the president's chair a highly conservative administrator in the person of President Judson. By 1913, the affairs of the University were in such a prosperous condition and its future so well assured, that Dr. Goodspeed could retire, with every confidence that his guiding hand was now no longer needed.

But he was not to be idle in his retirement. He was immediately elected Corresponding Secretary of the Board, and assigned by President Judson the task of preparing an official *History of the University of Chicago.* This work, which is an illuminating, amply documented, and withal entertaining story of the first twenty-five years of the University's existence, was published in connection with the Quarter-Centennial celebration in 1916.

In the Preface, Dr. Goodspeed apologized, with charming humor, for what he called "breaking into literature" at the age of seventy-four years. It was indeed extraordinary that a man whose life had been spent first in preaching, and then for many years in laborious administrative work, could, when past three score and ten, take up a new profession, and with such success that further contributions from his pen were called for, with a frequency that kept him constantly busy as an author during the remaining decade of his life.

In succeeding years he published, in *The University Record,* a long series of biographical sketches of benefactors of the University; selections from the series were published later in two large volumes of *University of Chicago Biographical Sketches.* In 1924 there appeared *A History of the Hyde Park Baptist Church,* the church having appointed him its official historian. In 1925 his University title was changed to that of Historian. In that year he brought out his popular *Story of the University of Chicago,* and in the following year a biography of his friend, the late President E. D. Burton.

Early in 1927 Dr. Goodspeed was commissioned by the President of the University to write the life of William Rainey Harper, a work for which he was peculiarly well fitted.* Although premonitions of illness had warned him that his time was short, he undertook the work with much of his old-time enthusiasm. He was by now well advanced in his eighty-fifth year.

For many years Dr. Goodspeed had spent his summers at his rustic retreat on Paradise island in Plum lake, among the woods of northern Wisconsin, where he felled trees, rowed boats, and took long hikes, displaying a vigor that roused the astonishment and admiration of many men his juniors.

There was, indeed, nothing of the professional ecclesiastic about Dr. Goodspeed. He could play a round of golf or a game of billiards with zest; he could fire with enthusiasm a crowd of undergraduates at a football "pep" session—and this when he was past seventy! At football games he followed with lively interest the movements of individual players, often with shrewd comments. When, in 1925, the great Development Campaign was started, for the purpose of raising some seventeen millions of dollars for the future expansion of the University, Dr. Goodspeed was a conspicuous figure at the meetings. To generations of students he was a familiar personality as, with sturdy, swinging step, he daily passed to and fro on the University grounds. Everybody knew him at least by sight.

One day in June, 1927, at reunion time, just before Dr. Goodspeed left for his summer home in Wisconsin, I chanced to meet him crossing the quadrangles. As I happened to have my kodak with me, I asked him to pose for a snapshot. He cheerfully consented. The result was such a characteristic likeness that I sent him a print. From Paradise Island came this delightful letter, dated June 21, 1927:

> "My dear Mr. Nash:
>
> "I was as much surprised as pleased to receive the photograph from you yesterday. It seems to me about the

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*In the February number of *The University of Chicago Magazine,* Mr. F. J. Gurney had published some reminiscences of President Harper. A little later I expressed to Mr. Gurney the hope that a biography of President Harper might soon be written—possibly by Dr. Goodspeed. Mr. Gurney conferred with the Harper family as well as with President Mason, with the result that I have indicated.

> best photograph ever made of me, and it pleases my son Charles as much as it does me. I haven't had a picture made of me in 15 years or more, never having been proud of my beauty. This is likely to be the last ever made of me. I shall be 85 in two months and a half, and my son suggests that I ask you to have half a dozen copies made and sent to me. If you will send me a bill for them at the same time, I would very much like to have you do this.
>
> "I am at my home in the country. I feel greatly obliged to you. I suppose you are doing some writing this year?
>
> "Gratefully yours,
> "T. W. Goodspeed."

I gladly sent the additional copies of the photograph, including an enlargement. Under date of July 2, Dr. Goodspeed wrote me in acknowledgment:

> "The photographs, including the enlargement, are at hand, and I am greatly obliged to you. One of our ladies has put the enlargement into a fine birch bark frame and it graces our mantel. But you have failed to send me the bill. I would not have asked for the photos if I had not wished and expected to pay for them and I trust you will allow me to do so.
>
> "My son and I greatly enjoyed the article on old Fort Dearborn. We found it most interesting, and I am preserving it.
>
> "I am at work on a biographical sketch of Pres. Harper and find the wilderness a good place to work in. I have a study about 100 feet from our cottage and here I can work in perfect quiet, the only noises being the occasional passing of launches and motor boats. I am on an island."

It so happened that Dr. Goodspeed, on his return to Chicago in September, found himself in need of someone to examine the voluminous files of President Harper's correspondence and to abstract the material which might be found useful for biographical purposes. My name was suggested to him by Professor C. F. Castle, and, in the following letter, dated September 28, Dr. Goodspeed approached me on the subject:

> "I am, in connection with writing a somewhat extended biographical sketch of President Harper, having the correspondence files of the President's office from 1890 to 1906 examined. I engaged two Divinity students to do this for me four months ago, but one of them was called away and the other married a wife and has become a missionary, and they were able to do little more than start and organize the work.
>
> "I am wondering whether your other engagements would permit you to help me in this work, devoting from 3 to 5 hours a day to it, for the next two or three months. I regret that the pay is small, . . and I shall not blame you if you think this is too little to bother with. But if, by any chance, your engagements are such that you could give a few hours a day to this work, I should be very glad to see you. The files are all ready to begin on in a room in the Theology Building."

As I considered it a pleasure as well as an honor to be associated with Dr. Goodspeed in this highly interesting work, we speedily reached an agreement, it being understood that I was to devote to the work such hours of the day or evening as I found most convenient for the purpose.

I immediately began the examination of the files, taking out letters of biographical value, attaching brief explanatory memoranda to the selected letters, and sorting the correspondence in chronological order. Dr. Goodspeed, meanwhile, was pushing on with the writing in his private study at home. Some ideas having occurred to me in connection with the further prosecution of the task, I embodied them in a letter to Dr. Goodspeed. A few days later I found on my desk a pencil note, written on October 10, when he dropped into the office during my absence. As it was my last letter from him, I quote it below:

> "Dear Mr. Nash:
>
> "Thank you for your letter. I am thinking and conferring about your suggestions, which commend themselves to me.

"I shall want, in a few days, to confer with you about them.

"Very truly yours,
"T. W. Goodspeed.

"Monday, 3:40 P. M."

Dr. Goodspeed had begun to suffer from a complication of ailments before his return to Chicago from the country, and I noticed with distress that his condition did not improve. He underwent a minor operation, as a local hospital, for a facial infection. This afforded some temporary relief, and he continued up and about, with much of his old-time vigor. He attended the dedication of the new medical buildings on October 31, and at least one of the football games of the season.

From time to time I brought editorial material over to his house and had short conferences with him and with his son, Mr. Charles T. B. Goodspeed, who was rendering invaluable assistance by helping his father to organize the data and by reading documents to him in the evening, thus conserving Dr. Goodspeed's eyesight for the indispensable work of writing. So conscientious was he in his literary work that he would never resort to dictation. A "daily stint," as Dr. Goodspeed called it, consisting of three pages of writing a day, was allowed him by his physician. Though I think he would have liked to write more, he cheerfully observed the limitation.

In addition to my work on the correspondence, with the approval of Dr. Goodspeed I interviewed several former faculty members who had known President Harper, taking down their recollections of him in shorthand notes. Some of this material he incorporated in his manuscript.

All of these men were greatly interested in Dr. Goodspeed's undertaking and gladly contributed whatever information they could. One of them expressed the hope that Dr. Goodspeed might eventually expand the sketch into a "full-length picture" of President Harper. I reported this to Dr. Goodspeed, suggesting that the book be made a companion volume to his *History of the University of Chicago*. He liked the idea, but did not consider it practicable. "I shall not have the time," he said, simply. I pointed out that it could probably be done in six months. "But," he replied, in the same quiet tone, "I can't count on six months—I can't count on three months."

At about this time he made another significant remark to me as we stood in the doorway of his home. Speaking very soberly, he said, "I know so many on the other side, that I look forward with pleasure to beginning the after-life." I mentioned a letter that I had run across, from Mr. F. T. Gates, in which he said that if it had not been for Dr. Goodspeed there would have been no University of Chicago. His modest comment was: "There would have been no University if it had not been for a number of men: there would have been no University without Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Gates, and Dr. Harper." As we looked up Fifty-Eighth street toward the University quadrangles, visible from his doorway, I told him that in any event he would leave a great monument to his labors.

A few days after Thanksgiving I received a note from Professor E. J. Goodspeed, Dr. Goodspeed's second son, telling me that his father had suffered a serious attack of illness on Saturday, November 26, and that grave apprehensions were felt concerning him. I immediately called up the house and was much relieved to learn that Dr. Goodspeed was greatly improved; so much so, that he came to the telephone personally and talked to me.

On December 1, when I was calling at the house, certain members of the family suggested that I come over every day and bring my work with me, for as long a time as I could stay, in order to help relieve the family, who were taking turns in attending upon Dr. Goodspeed. He needed no special attention, but it was desired to have someone constantly near him in case of another sudden seizure.

Those were extremely interesting days for me. Dr. Goodspeed was apparently fairly well and evidently enjoying his work. He was pushing ahead with the work on the manuscript, hoping that he might finish it, at least in the first draft. He lived over again with President Harper the great days when the latter was at the apex of his power and achievement; for the story now had been carried down past the turn of the century and the shadows of the coming catastrophe had not yet begun to fall across the President's path.

Dr. Goodspeed's aesthetic appreciation was evidenced in a remark he made one day when we were listening to a victrola record of a lullaby on the piano by Paderewski. "I suppose he could represent a storm, too," commented Dr. Goodspeed. An illustration of the modesty of his faith in immortality occurred when some hymn records that I had brought over were being played. Among others was the old revival hymn with the refrain, "When the roll is called up yonder, I'll be there." Dr. Goodspeed rather unexpectedly said that he was not familiar with this hymn, and added: "There is a line in it that I would change. Instead of 'I'll be there,' I would say, 'May I be there.' "

His contact with world progress was shown by his reference one day to the work of Mr. S. O. Levinson, father of the "outlawry of war" idea.

Along with other papers from the files, I had brought over President Harper's correspondence with Mr. F. T. Gates; in connection therewith we discussed the *impasse* that developed because of the heavy deficits in which the President's ambitious plans involved the University. After repeated warnings, Mr. Rockefeller had withdrawn his financial support from the University until the deficits should be discontinued and a drastic change of policy inaugurated. It was not until after President Harper's death that Mr. Rockefeller resumed his heavy contributions to the University.

Dr. Goodspeed explained to me that Mr. Gates was the active medium between the University and Mr. Rockefeller, and that at this time there was a feeling on the part of some people that he was not doing as much as he might to help the University to retain Mr. Rockefeller's favor. He reported Mr. Gates as saying to him at the time, "I went down on my knees to that man," on behalf of the University. President Harper, Dr. Goodspeed continued, had great visions of the University's future, and could not resist the alluring opportunities that he saw opening out for its expansion, nor could he deny the appeals from various departments for increased appropriations. Dr. Goodspeed spoke of these painful matters very quietly, with no word of criticism for either Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Gates on the one hand or President Harper on the other.

One day, when looking over a copy of the University year-book for 1906, I called Dr. Goodspeed's attention to a photograph of the funeral of President Harper, at which he and Dr. Judson were the chief pallbearers. "That was a sad day," he observed.

On Thursday, the last day on which we worked together through the forenoon, he seemed to be in a very happy frame of mind. "My son Edgar," he told me, "is coming over at three o'clock to read to me." Before I left, I asked him how he felt. "Oh, very well," he replied cheerfully. On my way out, I met Mrs. George S. Goodspeed, his niece, on the stairs. "Dr. Goodspeed says he feels very well," I remarked, optimistically. "That's just what he said before the first attack," she replied seriously.

The second attack came the next morning, before my arrival. He had gone up to his study and was about to begin his morning's work. The manuscript had reached the point where he must cover the distressing topic of the Harper-Rockefeller misunderstanding. His writing of the day before had led up to it, and, curiously enough, the last words he had written were, "This could not continue."

He had felt the oncoming of the attack soon enough to hurry down to his chamber. He was lying on the bed when members of the family found him. Paralysis was creeping over the entire right side of his body. He remained fully conscious, however, and as cheerful as the circumstances permitted. The best medical aid quickly reached the house, but it was immediately realized that the case was practically hopeless.

Nevertheless, during the next few days he insisted upon being allowed to sit up in an arm-chair for limited periods, and even to enjoy a cigar. His indomitable spirit was evidenced by his actually wanting to practise writing with his left hand. On Sunday evening, when I called, he was enjoying the radio. Marvellous singing filled the house; I believe it was the Vatican Choir, which happened to be visiting Chicago at that time.

Over the week-end he rallied slightly; and on Monday night, when I called, Mr. Charles Goodspeed and I ventured to speak to him about the book on which he was working. We suggested to him that we might begin to have typed for him the first chapter of his manuscript. But he would not hear of it. "I want to revise it," he articulated with difficulty, for the stroke had seriously crippled his voice. He was not satisfied with anything less than his best, and even in his desperate condition he was thinking of revising his manuscript. I shook his hand gently—the left hand, which he could still control—as I said Good-bye.

On Tuesday it was evident that he was sinking fast. "How do you feel, Dr. Goodspeed?" I inquired cheerfully on entering the room that evening. He was lying in bed, very weak. The nurse remarked that she feared he did not know who I was. But he moved his head in vigorous dissent and murmured, "Yes, I do." His eyes were unusually bright, and had their customary shrewd, alert look as he gazed up from the pillow. "There are no flies on Dr. Goodspeed," I said to the nurse. He smiled, and returned my Good-bye.

Pneumonia was now setting in, and by Thursday he was unconscious. His heart action had been good, but the difficulty in breathing was putting an increasing strain upon the heart and gradually wearing it down. The end came at half past ten o'clock on Friday morning, December 16, just a week from the time he was stricken.

Dr. Goodspeed never impressed me as an old man, even during those last few days at his desk, when he was eighty-five years and three months old. He walked about the room with a quick step; his eye was keen, and he spoke alertly. When, on leaving at about noon, I bade him Good-bye, he replied with a courtly grace, "Good morning." I thought of him as a cultivated elderly gentleman, of no particular age. Least of all was there anything ecclesiastical about him, Doctor of Divinity though he was; or pedantic, though he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. It was hard to realize that he had seen Lincoln and Douglas in the flesh, before the Civil War, so completely in tune with the present generation he seemed to be, and indeed was.

Work, I think, was Dr. Goodspeed's greatest joy in life—vigorous, joyous work, of head and heart and hand. That and his love of Nature were doubtless the secret of his perennial youth. A young man, now a student at the University, whose family had a summer home near Dr. Goodspeed's camp in northern Wisconsin, tells how the old gentleman used to take him on fishing trips. And in Chicago it was said that after a hard day's work at the office he could beat a much younger man at a game of billiards. When the Rev. Charles W. Gilkey came to Chicago as pastor of the Hyde Park Baptist Church, one of Dr. Goodspeed's first concerns was to initiate him into some of the mysteries of the billiard table.

His youthful and progressive spirit was perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in his religious outlook. Though his theological training dated back to the days of old-fashioned, rock-ribbed orthodoxy (Fundamentalism, as we should now call it), he kept abreast with the progress of enlightened religious thought, for he was an omnivorous reader. In his later years he was very clearly a thorough Modernist in his sympathies. One of his last acts was to send out a ringing challenge on the liberal side of the question of "open membership," which had become an issue in the Baptist church of which he had been for many years a deacon and trustee.

At the funeral service, before an audience which packed the church auditorium, Professor Soares spoke as a University colleague and Dr. Gilkey as the great leader's pastor. It was Dr. Gilkey who, in dwelling upon the rare combination of shrewd business sense, personal virtue, and active benevolence which distinguished Dr. Goodspeed, summed up his character in the quaint and happy phrase, "a Yankee saint."

SCIENCE AND FREEDOM

BY JAKOB KUNZ

THE fundamental assumption of the natural sciences is the determination of the phenomena of nature. All phenomena of heat, sound, light, electricity and magnetism are reduced to motion of small particles. Every motion is determined by previous conditions of material systems. This is the law of thinking, the guiding principle of science through the blossoming confusion of the phenomena. It applies in all physical sciences: physics, astronomy chemistry, mineralogy, geology. It is used as a hypothesis or guiding principle in the biological sciences and in psychology. The life phenomena of plants, animals and men are also determined by the given conditions; so are the physiological processes of the brain. Neurology claims to be as truly a science as physics is. If, in psychology, it is further assumed that our ideas are necessarily connected with material processes in the brain, then even all our thoughts, feelings, will powers, aspirations are determined by the motions of the atoms of the brain. Thus we arrive at the conception of the universal machine of nature. Nature, including human life without rest, is a machine or mechanism, in which every motion is necessarily determined by the previous conditions and by the surroundings. That in such a machine there is no room for freedom, is self evident, each part of the machine doing what it has to do.

But the question arises, how in such a machine the illusion of freedom could arise. Even if freedom in some form should not exist, the illusion of freedom would still have to be explained on the basis of a mechanistic conception of the universe.

We shall begin our thesis by considering the thinking process. I can think only if I am free to think. The brain does not think, but I think. I understand the expression; it thunders, but I do not understand the expression; it thinks. This seems to be absurd, or nonsense. If the brain were thinking, then the thoughts would move typsy turvy through each other just like the processes in the brain, which are subject to diffusion. We would have a general chaos of ideas without distinction or definition, a wild dispersion and distraction; but it is a fact of fundamental importance that we are able to concentrate and direct our attention and create order and system in the thoughts which otherwise would move hither and thither in a haphazard stream of consciousness. We are free to control our thoughts. And we control them according to a very special ideal, the ideal of truth, which cannot have its origin in the mechanism of nature. Indeed there is not only no room for freedom in a mechanism; there is also no room for truth.

This statement requires a definition of truth, which I do not intend to give. I wish only to refuse any pragmatic definition of truth. Surely in some sense a machine, which runs without any deviation in accordance with the physical laws, is the expression of truth; some computing machines may ring a bell automatically when a mistake is made, an electric substation may automatically give a sign to another station, indicating that all transformers and other machines operate perfectly, electro-optical automatic signalling on railroads may control the perfect course of the trains, preventing collisions, eventually better than man. In mathematics, truth only means logical consistency; in the physical sciences we used to say a theory is true if it corresponds to the external physical reality. But as we do not know beforehand, what that physical reality consists of, this definition of correspondence is untenable. Yet I do not know of any other definition. And yet truth is the aim of all natural sciences, and truth at any cost, even with the sacrifice of the dearest impulses of the heart, even at the cost of all moral principles. The conviction of truth involves consciousness and possibly freedom. A machine has no consciousness and is often man's slave. A machine never errs.

Our thinking presupposes freedom to look at given phenomena and various problems in different ways. This is especially clear in mathematics and in all mathematical sciences like celestial mechanics and theoretical physics. The mathematician considers a problem from different points of view, and finds eventually by different methods exactly the same solution. A given machine however can obtain a given result only in one way. If the brain were thinking itself, it would have to consider itself, its own mechanism in different ways, and find a solution of itself in mathematical form, which is absurd. And wherefrom should this mechanism, the brain, have its ideal of truth? Indeed, in the Darwinian theory of biology there is no ideal of truth. Ideas are only useful or harmful, in the struggle for existence of a given living being, but never true or false. This thought applies also to that strange continuation of Darwin's thoughts in philosophy, called pragmatism, which has no room for truth. In the struggle for existence a lie may be far more useful than truth. Lies and propaganda may win battles and decide the destinies of nations.

Just as in mathematics, so freedom of thinking is necessary in the physical sciences. The genius who creates a new theory of a certain field of phenomena is independent of the processes of the brain, which is only determined by the previous conditions, but the previous conditions in this case lead only to the old theory and a mechanism can never produce anything new. It may change a pattern, but it can not give rise to something new which fills us with surprise and admiration. That thinker must even be free of all traditions in his science; old knowledge for him is prejudice; he looks at nature in a new way, as nobody did before; and so he discovers new laws of nature.

Mathematics is not based on facts of observation or experiments, but on assumptions, in the choice of which we are free to a large extent. But when the assumptions are chosen, then by mere logical deduction one conclusion is drawn after another until a whole structure of theorems is built up of unshakable firmness and marvelous consistency. So mathematics is a free creation of the human spirit; and it serves as model for all other sciences. For the fundamental theoretical progress in the physical sciences, mathematics has to be developed first. First mathematics, then physics. The Greeks developed the geometry of conic sections, which was applied by Kepler to the motion of the planets. Lobatchevski, Riemann and others developed the non-Euclidean geometry which was applied by Einstein in the new theory of gravitation. Physics does not determine mathematics but mathematics is the lamp for the progress of physics. There is no "natural history" of mathematics, but there is a mathematical theory of natural phenomena. It is not a material system of the brain which thinks, but something non-material, which we will call mind or spirit. Then we can express the facts in the following way: The human mind creates by free thinking systems of mathematics which are the most important tool for the physical sciences.

In thinking, I feel directly, intuitively, a creative activity of my own being, which I call mind, soul, or spirit, a reality different from the material realities. My soul is filled with sensations, feelings, will impulses, imaginations, memories of the past, ideals of the future, daily and religious experiences. The spirit of man is consciously or semi-consciously creative, his life is a creative evolution; science, ethics, art, philosophy and religion are the free creations of man's spirit. Culture in the highest sense is the birthright of the free genius of man, Soul is the realm of freedom, material nature the realm of necessity.

The contrast between spirit and matter appears deeper and deeper with progressing physical sciences. The redness of the rose in my consciousness enters nowhere into the mechanism of nature, neither out there in the rose nor in the nerves of the brain. Nor can culture be deduced from the mechanism of nature.

Naturalistic and materialistic philosophies maintain: *"nihil quod in intellectu quod non in sensu,* nothing is in our mind or intellect except that which entered through the doors of the senses." But the existence of mathematics proves this statement to be wrong. It is more nearly true to say: mathematics begins where our sensations cease. A function for instance which is continuous in every point, would be expected to have a derivative, according to our sense experience, even to our intuition. But this is not so. The mathematical thinking power of the spirit is far more powerful than sense perception and even intuition. Mathematics uses, for instance, conceptions like convergence to which there corresponds no sensation, and for which there exists not even a symbol. Finally, all the complicated operations of mathematics cannot be learned from nature, as can for instance, the plant species in Linne's system.

If the naturalistic philosophy were true, we might hope to learn mathematics by investigating the physico-chemical processes of the brain, but conversely, we can only study these material processes by means of mathematical tools. That a system of theorems like that of mathematics built over a period of two thousand years can exist, that sciences like astronomy and physics may live and grow from generation to generation in spite of the continuous changes of the human brain, with all its instabilities, in spite of the instability of the scientific, social and political institutions of the human race, this invariable rock in the stream of the phenomena is due to the human spirit, its free creative power, and its invariable laws of thinking. As the waves of the ocean cross and interfere with each other, so the ideas in the tempest of excitement, in the tumult of the revolutions may cross each other in a wild dance, giving rise apparently to endless confusion; yet man can make use of his sovereign power in controlling that storm of ideas, and correct his mistakes. A machine, however, makes no mistakes and can never examine itself with respect to truth or falsehood. Mathematics is not based on sense experience, Nevertheless physical phenomena may make suggestions for new mathematical problems; but the solution of these problems also is not found by observation, but by thinking. As a matter of observation one and one is not always two.

Thinking is a free act of our mind, yet thinking is not arbitrary; it follows definite rules of logic. It looks as if the thinking spirit itself were determined by its own laws. But in thinking I feel no tyranny of logic; while, in hunger, I feel the tyranny of the body. I use logic; logic does not use me. I obey the principles of logic freely. Free obedience is an act of my own choice. Finally, though there is logic with its principles, yet there is no logical theory of thinking in the sense that if a new question or problem arises, I might go to an expert of logic who would tell me how to think in order to solve the given problem. A mathematician who has a problem to solve does not seek help from a pure logician. Each problem requires its own specific thinking, which in each case is an act of freedom, yet requires determination.

In my consciousness I find apparently two conflicting categories: *thinking* which demands necessity, determination, and *the moral voice,* which demands freedom of choice. Character, personality, ethical independence, presuppose freedom. A projectile fired from a gun follows its course determined by inexorable law. There is no moral virtue or crime in it. Its course is completely determined and expressed by differential equations in physics. On the other hand, we blame and punish the gunman who fires the shot at another man, because we feel that some element of choice or free will was involved in his conduct. But do we not praise a patriotic soldier in war who shoots an enemy? This question we will consider in a further study. We are convinced that ethics is possible if there are numerous points of experience, in which a genuine choice is possible. That a person in many ways is subject to natural law, is not inconsistent with the development of character. That our body is subject to the law of gravity, does not interfere with ethical character, nor does the fact that light is refracted in our eyes according to the principles of geometric optics. Indeed law and order in the body and its environment is necessary for the stability and reliability of character. But it is equally necessary that man shall not be subject to a complete determination. There must be room for real choice. We seem to have arrived at contradictory conclusions: Science and logic demand necessity, the law of nature; ethics, on the other hand, freedom of choice. And my conscience and consciousness do not allow me to sacrifice one at the cost of the other. I seem to be forced by myself and against myself to live in this world of duality. A duality, resisting all efforts at unification seems to run throughout all nature. Positive and negative electricity, which play such an assymmetrical role in the heart of the atoms, acids and bases in chemistry, male and female individuals in the living world, mind and matter, rationalism and irrationalism in philosophy, are examples of this dualism.

Dualism may be unsurmountable, but in the dilemna of freedom and necessity, modern science itself, the fortress of necessity opens the doors of freedom.

Science requires the existence of comprehensive natural laws and ethics demands a significant measure of freedom of choice for the development of character. Both requirements may be met, without interference of the other, if a certain range of phenomena is determined by inexorable law, the laws of nature, while under other significant circumstances natural phenomena are amendable to direction by the mind, so that the course of events is not subject throughout to a mechanistic determination. The existence of science and moral character in our world shows indeed that the phenomena of the world are in some way consistent with both necessity and freedom.

The laws of nature appear mostly in the form of differential equations, the solutions of which are not determined by the differential equations alone. We have to add to these equations certain information about the state of phenomena at a certain instance or about the states at a certain succession of instances. Now if the initial condition of the system is given and we follow up the successive states of the system, then two sorts of events are logically and physically possible; either the successive states are uniquely determined by means of the equations and the initial conditions, or we reach a certain state of indetermination where the previous states leave the next states undetermined. Here the laws of mechanics alone are insufficient to determine the following course of events. Some directive agency, the will or the mind, seems to be necessary to give rise to further activity, and the next course of events is determined by this directive agency.

As a first argument in favor of freedom we consider the case of unstable equilibirum, which occurs over and over again in the physical sciences. A mathematical or physical pendulum is allowed to carry out oscillations in a vertical plane under the influence of the gravity of the earth alone. Let us suppose that it has received sufficient kinetic energy to enable it to reach the highest point so that the center of gravity is exactly vertically above the axis of rotation. It will arrive in the highest point with zero velocity. There it will stand still. An immeasurably small impulse will make it fall toward one side or the other. The necessary impulse is so small that it can not be detected or measured by physical instruments. And the differential equation of motion tells us nothing of what will happen after this unstable equilibrium is reached. Symbolically we may represent the known evolution of the earth by an arc of the pendulum motion. If, then, we know the laws of the phenomena in this limited region, we can draw no conclusion as to the future history of the earth. A famous mathematician said: "Give me the differential equations and the initial conditions of the world, and I will tell you the future history from moment to moment." This claim is not justified by modern science. Whenever an unstable equilibrium is reached, the differential equations cease to describe the future course of events. Moreover, we can never know the initial conditions of the world by the empirical methods of natural sciences. Therefore, the statement of the French mathematician, Laplace, is meaningless. Again, a complete description of the phenomena of the world require a very large if not an infinite number of differential equations, which could not be solved. Finally, if we consider the universe as finite, then it is in its totality not determined by external conditions; all its phenomena are only determined by internal conditions or it is the expression of free action. If the material universe is infinite in space and time, then the question of its determination becomes meaningless. Instabilities occur everywhere. In the problem of three bodies, there are positions of unstable equilibrium for one body; and, with increasing number of particles, the number of unstable positions increases. There are unstable rotations also. If a particle moves in a channel which branches into two or more arms, its motion at the branch point may become indeterminate. If a sphere falls along the axis of a cylinder filled with water, the motion is indeterminate; the sphere may in any point leave the axis and move toward the wall of the cylinder. Very small particles even in air do not fall in a straight line, but along a zig zag path. In all cases of unstable equilibrium the differential equations of motion cease to determine the next course of events, the principle of conservation of energy is satisfied, even if an immaterial agency, the will or the mind, gives direction to the future course of events.

The second argument in favor of freedom is given by the theory of heat. All phenomena connected with changes of temperature take place in a certain direction. Just as water under the influence of gravity alone flows always downward, so heat by itself sinks from a higher to a lower temperature. At the same time, a certain quantity, the entropy, increases; and the theory shows that this quantity is proportional to the probability of the state of the heat system. All heat phenomena are, except for limiting theoretical cases, irreversible and the phenomena of the known material universe take place only in the direction of increasing probability. Now let us, with Maxwell, consider a vessel filled with a gas of a given temperature and having a partition with two doors, one opening into the first chamber, the other into the second chamber. If a demon opens one door when a fast moving molecule arrives and if another demon opens the other door when a slowly moving molecule arrives, then by and by all the fast molecules will be in one chamber, the slowly moving molecules in the other. Then the temperature, which in the beginning was the same in both chambers, will be higher in one chamber and lower in the other. This process contradicts the fundamental law of thermodynamics, or the second law of heat phenomena. If the doors are in neutral equilibrium no work will be required for the demons to open and close the doors. In other words, microscopic agencies doing no work, are able to reverse the general course of those natural phenomena, which are not necessarily determined, but only probable.

From time to time, unexpected and unexplained explosions occur in stores of high explosives. The theory of probability as well as the Brownian movement show that in rare instants molecular movements of an amplitude may occur, so large that a local chemical reaction of unstable compounds takes place. Once started in ever so small a region, the reaction will spread rapidly and the whole powder magazine explodes without any assignable external cause. Such spontaneous reactions resemble the submicroscopic events in the living cell which, though of immeasurable size, are able to control microscopic and macroscopic events. And, just as stores of explosives explode every now and then without an external cause, so the living powder magazines, the armies and navies of the world, explode from time to time without any external cause and with any internal excuse. Then a couple of men, in strategic positions, may lead millions of men to death and whole countries to ruin. But here the voice of freedom of mankind demands the abolition of the powder magazines living and non-living.

Necessity excludes freedom, probability leaves room for freedom. And probability enters not only in the molecular phenomena of heat and chemistry, but also in the atom itself,—for instance, in the spontaneous radioactive transformations. It is even thinkable that all laws of nature can finally be reduced to probability. The smaller and more numerous the bricks of the material universe become, the wider the reign of probability and the greater the chance for freedom. The creator has perhaps given to matter such a fine structure that the living creatures, especially man, may enjoy a high degree of freedom.

The next argument I take again from mechanics and the quantum theory. In our human life we act for the realization of certain purposes. We try to realize certain ideals, we work and live "sub-specie eternitatis," we try to bring about a better human society, we try to abolish old traditions, and create new and better conditions of life. We are not slaves of the past, but dreamers and workers for a better future. We act, not only driven by causes of the past, but also driving toward the realization of purposes which lie in the future. Our will power becomes a cause itself. This action into the future is called teleology. It points in the direction opposite to that of causality. Teleology appeals to our free will. In spite of the causes of the past, in spite of tradition and environment we are about to realize a different and better future. Now it is very interesting to find that even the laws of nature, especially Newtons laws of mechanics, can be expressed in teleological form. Indeed, the principle of least action seems to reach as far as all reversible phenomena of mechanics, electricity and heat. Every motion takes place with a minimum expenditure of work. The material particles themselves seem to move under the influence of the future. In the principle of least action it is shown that the motion of a particle in a given moment is governed by the past as well as by the future, and whether the past or the future has more weight depends entirely on the time limits, which we can choose arbitrarily. Either the past or the future may have the dominating influence.

In the quantum theory of the atomic structure, this teleological viewpoint has been expressed even stronger. An electron, jumping from one orbit to another, must know beforehand where it is going to land, in order to emit the amount of light required by the theory. But this theory is so fragmentary, temptative and changing, that we will not further insist on it.

To this last argument we shall add a general remark on causality which, if not a new argument in favor of freedom, shows at least that we are not slaves of causality. We have seen that we can look at the laws of nature from the point of view of the past as well as of the future. The law of causality is of our own making. In the history of physics we see clearly two different aspects of causality. From Newton down to the time of Faraday, the natural scientists considered the energies of material and electrical systems as residing in the particles themselves, which were acting at a distance, being imbedded in empty space. But Faraday and Maxwell, being repelled by the incomprehensible idea of action at a distance, considered the ether between the particles as the seat of the energies of the electric and magnetic systems. Matter, i. e., electric charges and magnets were only sources and sinks of lines of forces, or else empty spaces in the universal ocean of the ether. The causes of the electromagnetic action have been transferred from the material bodies in the ether, or the space between the bodies. Moreover, this field action has been transformed into a pure space action in the modern theory of relativity of Einstein. Here again the idea of physical causality has been changed, as well as the idea of physical reality itself, which seems to become meaningless without an observer. If thirty years ago scientists would have asserted that masses change in motion itself, they would have looked for the change in chemical or heat processes. But now we declare that a mass changes for some observer only because the velocity of light is constant and because we can detect and measure only the relative velocity. Again, in general relativity the idea of force has disappeared, and dynamics becomes mere kinematics, in which merely the uniqueness of temperal succession of phenomena is the expression of physical causality. So we see that the idea of physical causality changes in the course of time, with our changing theories; but the idea of physical determination we maintain as the law of thinking.

Action at a distance is incomprehensible. But just as incomprehensible and nonintuitive is the field action. Indeed, how does a particle change the space-time of its neighborhood? One riddle is replaced by another one. The mathematical forms of the laws of nature are merely rules of calculation, which give no insight whatever into the mechanism between the particles. Necessity in nature remains a mystery or a riddle. If in my free will I move the finger and the pen, wishing to express freedom, the action of my will on my body is not more or less a mystery than the effect of gravitation.

No matter how far the natural sciences have succeeded in demonstrating in some realm of phenomena the rule of necessity, we could always imagine a determination to exist which is stronger than that really observed. For instance, let us suppose that the sun sends out shafts or darts of light at random in all directions of space; then most of the energy radiated would be lost, while only a small part strikes the earth and the other planets, where it may be absorbed or reflected. Now suppose that the atoms of the sun know beforehand all the particles of the planets and that they send out the light particles, at such moments and in such direction that an atom of a planet can just catch them. In this case we would have a physical predetermination which is stronger than the physical determination so far used in our theories. Thinking is of a finer order than observation, and mathematics begins about where sense observation ceases.

The arguments here advanced in favor of freedom do not prove absolute freedom; but I hope they show that even science, especially theoretical physics and chemistry, the old fortresses of necessity, leave the door open to freedom.

SOCRATES TRIES CITY MANAGEMENT

BY WM. S. BAILEY

FROM a sample of mud to the spirit of Socrates seems a far cry, yet seventy-five years ago the mud and the scholarly ghost of the ancient philosopher led to the founding of a wondrous city in the western end of New York State. The city was to have been of unimaginable splendor and was to have ushered in a new civilization. Today its site is marked by a few circles of half-buried stones, and its memory is forgotten.

Harmonia was the name of the dream city, and its cathedrals and stately halls were to have towered heavenward from the valley of the Kiantone, a small stream that rambles through a region of pastoral beauty but a few miles from Lake Chautauqua.

Hither came, in 1852, a Milwaukee physician who, while in New York City, had heard of a spring of miraculous healing power on the bank of Kiantone Creek and who "turned aside from my homeward journey to examine the whole matter for myself," as he says. This Dr. Greaves was vastly impressed by what he saw and more particularly by what he was told. He learned that the curative value of the waters in the valley was known to the white settlers as far back as 1795 and to the Indians of a far earlier day.

It was but a few years before the coming of Dr. Greaves that the two little Fox sisters at Hydesville, near Rochester, New York, after becoming a village wonder with their rappings, had developed into the founders of modern Spiritualism, and during his visit to the Kiantone, Dr. Greaves learned that the latest and most marvelous spring had been located by a "good clairvoyant" and that the entire well-digging enterprise had been under spirit direction. And so Greaves reported that the results from the water and the use of an ointment made from its sediment were "truly remarkable." The waters were found to be "highly valuable for remedial and cosmetic as well as ordinary purposes."

And now comes into view the dominating figure of the fantastic colony that at once came into existence on the banks of the quiet stream.

John Murray Spear, christened by and named for the founder of the Unitarian faith, after all but losing his life at the hands of a Portland anti-Abolition mob, had devoted years to the outcasts and prison inmates of Boston. His biographer records that in his humanitarian work he was counseled and assisted by Wendell Phillips, Longfellow, Edward Everett, Horace Mann, and others of this group.

A sample of the sediment or mud obtained from the spring was sent to Spear at Boston, who had become a convert to Spiritualism, for "psychometrical examination." So remarkable was the effect upon Spear of what he divined from the mere contact with the muddy sediment from Kiantone that he straightway, with a group of followers, hastened to the scene of the wonder in the obscure little valley, 600 miles away.

Distinguished as had been his earthly associates, these were now outshown by his heavenly cohorts, for Spear soon became the earthly representative of the heavenly "Association of Beneficents." This association was no mean group for around its ethereal directors' table sat the shades of Socrates, Seneca, Emanuel Swedenborg, Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, Thomas Jefferson, Lafayette, John Hancock, John Adams, Daniel Webster, Martin Luther, John Quincy Adams, Roger Williams, and others of a famous heavenly host.

Spear's hand had been involuntarily moved to write a document, bearing the true and life-time signatures of this noble band, and in it he had been given the charter for the heaven-born city of Harmonia and his commission as the earthly mouthpiece of its ghostly founders and exalted aldermen.

For with Spear's visit to the little creek in Western New York, the site of the naive "government of love with innocence as its only protector" was settled beyond the peradventure of doubt. The spirit members by this time announced that they had chosen the little valley "because it combined greater advantages than appertained to any other spot on this globe, for the inauguration of a model social state, to be preferred above all other territories, locations and nations." The incomparable advantages were "peculiarly favorable electrical emanations, producing salubrious and spiritualizing atmosphere; a soil rich in mineral and agricultural resources; highly valuable waters; and a topography admirably adapted to ornamental arrangements."

His association with the shades of the immortal departed must have seemed to Spear like contact with holy fire and he lost no time in ushering in the new and better era. Under the constant and voluminous revelations he received from the spirit directorate of the "association" the wonders began to unfold.

Life in the new city of Harmonia was not to be as life elsewhere. The benign spirits who wrote its city charter set out to show the world something new. So they started with a new school of architecture. Harmonia's noble temples, its great universities and halls of art and "every apartment to all possible extent constructed for habitable purposes" were to be circular. The circle, signifying the perfection of life in the dream city, was to be the dominant motive of the new art. With naive frankness it was stated that the invisible architect for the elaboration of this work was, in life, an individual "who had previously enjoyed no culture in this direction." The monument to this unknown was but shortlived. Harmonia's architecture never got beyond a group of eight or ten octagonal wooden shacks. Of these the seventy-five years that have passed have left but their foundations of flat stones.

The new city of light was to put an end to all competition in commerce. This reform was sponsored by the shade of Benjamin Franklin who delivered himself of the opinion that trade "now influences all the nations of the earth. It controls the pulpit; it muzzles the press; it fetters the freeborn mind. It declares war or it commands peace; and the powers that be obey its commands."

The attempt was actually made, through an "Association of Philanthropic Commercialists," under a "grand organizer," a man with "a grand, leading, harmonious, quiet, cultivated mind," to carry the new economic system into effect. Profits were to be limited. There was to be no such thing either as credit or bank paper and all transactions were to be upon a cash basis, and the "buyer must come with the precious metals." The working day was to be limited to eight hours.

But the world of 1850 was not ready for philanthropic commercialism and the new system of commerce appears to have had a short life, although Socrates and the other heavenly guides promised Spear individually and collectively to watch the growth and expansion of the new enterprise with paternal care and to "render it such aids as from time to time may be deemed requisite to promote its advancement and general good."

Here in Harmonia "the soil was to be free as the light of the sun and held in common." And education likewise. The new social order contemplated that "the rights, cares, affinities and attractions of man should be left to act with unlimited freedom."

There was to be a new science of agriculture, with practical revelations from the heavenly farmers; there was to be "perfect equality and balance of the sexes." Even government itself was to be but a temporary expedient to be outgrown with greatest possible speed, for a spirit communique assured Spear that "each person is a distinct individual, a sovereign, having a perfect right to do as he or she pleases, in respect to his or her person, his or her property, to follow his or her pursuits, to seek his or her happiness in his or her own individual way."

Crime was a disease to be regarded and treated. While Spear received the prophetic announcement that "nations holding important and highly influential positions on your earth will soon be engaged in most sanguinary strife from which the American nation will not be excepted," war in Harmonia was to be done away with, although the formula of the process does not appear to have been handed down. A "union of the United States with Canada and the neighboring provinces" was also foretold.

Of all the strange vagaries of the Harmonia world reformers none was more fantastic than their excursions into the realm of applied science. Under the tutelage of a spirit sub-group calling itself the "Association of Electric-Izers," of which the late B. Franklin was also the head, Spear was assured that perpetual motion was a reality and was given directions for the construction of a machine that was "to draw upon the great reservoir of the magnetic life of nature." The machine was constructed near Lynn, Mass. The new motive power, like the human body, with which it was compared by its founders, was to be a living organism, quickened by an indwelling spiritual principle.

Although the machine was made the center of a Spiritualist ceremony symbolic of the virgin birth, an observer of the affair, himself a famous Spiritualist, wrote that the thing had not moved, "obviously could not move and if it did move it couldn't so much as turn a coffee mill."

Still faithful to his spirit guides, Spear moved the machine to the locality of Harmonia, "that it might have the advantage of more terrestrial electricity." But the incredulous and unsympathetic neighbors looked askance at the invention as of unholy origin. One night the doubters formed a mob, broke into the shed, and smashed the device. After the tragedy Spear found comfort in the thought that "Garrison was mobbed and Birney's printing press was thrown into the river."

The Harmonian scientists also planned to harmonize the nations of the earth through a universal method of conveying thought. This international telegraphic scheme was to be a wireless system of long-distance mental communication. The beneficent scientists of the other world designated a nearby eminence as "a place highly suitable, on account of its peculiar electric character, for a central telegraphic station on this continent." We have no record of any success with the pre-radio wireless.

Woman was to come into her own in every sphere in Harmonia. "What reason can be assigned," the spiritual revelator asks, "why woman should not appear in the banking house and take charge of large sums of money or other property." The female of the species is also adapted to shine in agriculture and architecture. Speaking of the greater activity of man the spirit exclaims, "The wonder is that the world has hobbled along on one leg as well as it has."

Marriage was to be idealized in the new city of light. The sexes were to be so united—thus wrote the unseen hands—that love was to be universal. But their prescribed "Prayer for a Marriage Occasion" pleaded that "should they, from any cause, come to feel that they are no longer husband and wife, amicably may they withdraw from one another." And here was the flaw that later brought the downfall of the heaven-inspired city.

None of the spirit-directed enterprises of this strange community was the cause of as much ridicule as the cave or shaft the residents sank into the side of the valley in their search for buried treasure. Into the earth they burrowed to the depth of 270 feet. For what? No one knows. Writing at the time, the correspondent of the New York Tribune tells the most plausible story of the treasure hunt. The newspaper man of that day found that the spirit informant had revealed to Spear and the elect of Harmonia the existence, in prehistoric time, in the Kiantone Valley of "a refined and cultivated people." The site of Harmonia had been the metropolis of this marvelous civilization. This metropolis had been a city magnificent beyond all earthly comparison. Reform had done its perfect work and evil and even disease were unknown. Every building had a circular ground plan with blue and vaulted domes illumed day and night by gorgeous and dazzling solar lights. The wondrous city was profusely adorned with these lofty domes and innumerable turrets, spires, colonnades, and battlements.

But by some ill wind the seeds of evil were finally blown into the valley. Wickedness and bloodshed led to a war with a northern race of semi-barbarians and the inhabitants were driven off to Mexico to be slaughtered by Cortez and other Spanish adventurers. "A remnant of the Kiantones remained in their native valleys and became the slaves of their conquerors. But full vengeance was not yet executed. It came at last. The earth rocked to and fro, palaces and temples fell, the multitude uttered piteous wailings, a deep dark chasm yawned like the jaws of a hideous monster, then closed again, and silence reigned throughout all the Kiantonian Valley. And the city—was gone! The Magnetic Springs were swallowed up. Thousands of people were buried deep in the bowels of the earth!"

And it was in search of the buried treasure—buried in the fearful prehistoric cataclysm—that the credulous souls of the spirit-led community dug for months into the valley hillside.

One profane writer of the time found the ceremonial at the completion—and also the abandonment—of the cave a subject for a satirical account of the proceedings. As the shaft neared the promised treasure, he writes, the spirit guides stopped the work where the next thrust into the earth was to penetrate the store house of wealth. At midnight the elect, in white robes, carrying flaming torches and bearing a receptacle for the find of treasure, entered the cave. When all was ready for the climax, pickaxes were driven into the earth wall—but only clay fell out. The failure was accounted for by the spirit directors of the treasure hunt who communicated the news that an error had been made—the shaft was to go ten feet further into the earth. According to the skeptical historian of the time, the excavators twice more sank their shaft an additional ten weary feet under the same explanation—and abandoned the cave as a dry hole so far as treasure was concerned, although the shaft was soon full of water, as it has ever since remained, a monument to the credulity of these sincere believers in their occult guides.

Harmonia was dedicated in 1853, the spirit minds having "prepared a consecration of the spot with great deliberation and exactness." Five years later it appears to have become the nation's Spiritualistic center, for in 1857 the dwellers in the spirit world decreed that a year later a national Spiritualist convention should be held "in the pleasant vale, not henceforth to be desecrated with the footprints of the profane."

In September, 1858, practically all of the distinguished Spiritualists of the United States responded to the call from the silent land and gathered in the "pleasant vale" for the three-day session. The attendance was variously reported to have been from 5,000 to 20,000 notwithstanding the obscure Kiantone Valley was forty miles from the nearest railroad. The New York papers had their correspondents in the valley and for its little day Harmonia held the front page.

The great Sunday of the gathering of terrestrial souls and ethereal spirits dawned fair in Kiantone Valley. The "Domain," as the floor of the valley was called, was early filled with the throngs and all was ready for the inspired speaking in the grove of ancient trees. But all was not well in Harmonia. The exhortations of those possessed of speaking spirits had not been long continued when "a pale haggard looking woman who announced she was not afraid of man, woman, God or the devil" began a tirade upon freedom of the affections. The sturdy countryside, as well as the nation at large, seems to have been well represented in the attendance and these honest yeomen looked askance upon the already reputed free-love doctrines of the Harmonians. The natives, by this time a mob of 500, stormed the speaker's stand and pandemomium broke loose in the peaceful valley. The speakers of the day were powerless to control the mob. Lewis G. Clark, an escaped slave then living nearby and who Mrs. Stowe certifies was the original of the character of George Harris in *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* tried to restore order. Clark, at the time a famous anti-abolitionist orator, was a forcible speaker but the mob would not listen to him. Matters were in a bad way for the convention, when a slip of a woman from St. Louis climbed on a lumber wagon and getting the attention of the crowd lectured it on its bad manners. She succeeded where the men failed. The confusion ceased, silence reigned, and the great address of the national convention was the speech delivered by this little woman from the lumber wagon.

The national convention was the high water mark of Spiritualism in the valley of the Kiantone. Although the plans of the new harmonial city of light were announced and the multitude was told of the costly temple to be reared, of the colleges, seminaries, and churches to be erected, of the commodious dwellings that were to house the favored inhabitants of Harmonia, the communistic scheme died with its telling.

Although founded upon the lofty idealism of Spear and his Boston group the city had a sorry end. The most able historian of the Kiantone movement was Emma Hardinge, an ardent Spiritualist, who visited the vale of the Kiantone during the existence of the strange community. Mrs. Hardinge found that "some of the inspired party who had assembled at Kiantone Springs, claimed to be the organs or human mouthpieces not only for spirits of an adventurous and scientific turn of mind, but also for others who proposed to establish a new social order upon earth, in which the marriage obligations were not treated with any great amount of reverence or conventional respect.

"It would be unfit to assert that all the Spiritualists who were there assembled, professed, or even favored these opinions, but it would be equally false to truth and the cause of Spiritualism to deny, that from this place, and at the time of the settlement narrated above, the propagandism of these opinions became most mischievously associated with Spiritualism, bringing a scandal and reproach on the heads of thousands of innocent persons, who loathed and repudiated the doctrine, and causing thousands of others to shrink back from the investigation of a belief which was so strangely associated with the most repulsive features of communism."

The city which was to have become the world center of the newborn religion and its idealized communism was soon a thing of the past—brought to its untimely end by the mutual recrimination of its promoters. Today the only occupants of its pleasant vale and the ancient grove that was its only temple are the peaceful cattle that graze on its domain and seek repose under its lofty trees.

THE DEVIL-COMPACT IN LEGEND AND LITERATURE

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE Faust legend occupied the mind of Gérard de Nerval during a long period of his literary activity. In Germany he explored all popular traditions in regard to Faust, even down to the puppet-

The Faust legend occupied the mind of Gérard de Nerval during a long period of his literary activity. In Germany he explored all popular traditions in regard to Faust, even down to the puppet-plays. The oldest Faust-book of 1587, which he read in connection with his translation of the First Part of Goethe's *Faust,* is printed at the end of his translation of the Second Part of this poem (1840).

Gérard de Nerval cherished for many years the project of a French adaptation of the Faust legend. He left behind a manuscript fragment of a Faust play, containing the first act and the beginning of the second act. The manuscript is interrupted at the point where Mephistopheles counsels Faust to forget Margaret for the beautiful courtesans of antiquity, Helena,[30] Cleopatra[31] and Aspasia.[32]

Gérard de Nerval abandoned the project of finishing this play of Faust when a copy of Klinger's work already mentioned finally fell into his hands. This philosophical novel was well known to the French public. It was translated into French six years after its first publication and again in 1808 and 1823. Among the dramatizations of this novel in France may be mentioned *les Aventures de Faust et sa descente aux enfers* by de Saur and de Saint-Génies, which was produced for the first time in 1825, and M. E. Théaulon's lyrical play *Faust,* first produced on October 27, 1827.

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[30] On Helena, see note 16.

[31] Cleopatra was the last queen of Egypt. Her beauty fascinated Cæsar and Antony.

[32] Aspasia, the famous courtesan of antiquity, was the mistress of Pericles and the friend of all the writers and philosophers of her time, especially of Socrates. See "Pericles and Artaxerxes" in Plutarch's *Lives.*

The story of the latter play is as follows: The protagonist, a young and melancholy *savant,* inventor of the art of printing, sells himself to the Devil because the father of the beautiful Marguerite hesitates to give him his daughter in marriage. Fortunately the girl is protected by the statue of a woman saint, endowed with miraculous powers. With her iron arm, she forces Mephistopheles to return the infernal pact.

The *Faust* of Klinger deeply impressed Gérard de Nerval when, as a school-boy, he caught sight of it on a bookstall along the banks of the Seine. He turned its leaves, but could not purchase it for lack of sufficient pocket-money. When he returned the following day, he found that it had been sold. He searched for a copy of this book for almost thirty years, and when he finally discovered it in the library of his friend Monselet, his joy knew no bounds. He forthwith set out to employ this novel as a model for the long contemplated play on the old Faust legend, leaving the play based on the first Faust chap-book unfinished, and published it in 1851, under the following title: *l'Imagier de Harlem ou la Découverte de l'imprimerie.*

Though principally an adaptation of Klinger's novel, this play also contains several reminiscences from the Second Part of Goethe's *Faust.* The similarity of the plots in the works of Klinger and Gérard de Nerval is very striking. Both Klinger's hero and Gérard de Nerval's protagonist discovered the art of printing, but this discovery plays a much smaller part in the German novel than in the French play based upon it. Why Gérard de Nerval replaced Johann Faust by Laurens Coster of Harlem, Holland, one of the reputed inventors of printing, is difficult to explain. Did he wish to return the credit for the discovery of printing to the Dutchman, for whom his counrymen had long claimed the glory of the invention of this art?[33] Or did he simply wish to bring an element of originality into a work which is otherwise merely a mosaic of borrowings? The question is not easy to answer.

Gérard de Nerval's play of the printer of Harlem has for its principal plot the invention of printing, and its central idea is the fact that the Devil takes hold of this discovery and makes of it one of his tools to ruin mankind. Satan, assuming the form and language of a Machiavelli who is more Machiavellian than his prototype, enlightens Coster on the lamentable consequences of his invention. He takes him on a tour of the European capitals to show him how the tyrants of the earth turn his invention into a tool for the oppression of the masses. He also evokes for his companion a panorama of history to show him the fatal fruits of his discovery. At the court of Frederick III at Aix-la-Chapelle, Satan applies Coster's invention to the printing of paper money.[34]

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[33] On the question as to who really was the inventor of printing, see Aloys Bömer: "Noch eimmal: Coster und Gutenberg oder nur Gutenberg?" *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen,* Bd. XLVI (1929), nos. 1-2.

Gérard de Nerval's principal originality consists in the creation of his diabolical personages. Klinger's Leviathan, as well as Goethe's Mephistopheles, is effaced in this play behind a Satan with several avatars. The Devil does not show himself here in *propia persona.* He tempts, perverts, and leads men astray under endless incarnations. The chamberlain of the Archduke of Austria, who answers to the name of Blocksberg,[35] is the first of Satan's seven avatars. The most original diabolical personage in this play is a sort of phantom of beauty named Alilah, who appears under various and ambiguous forms. She shows herself to Coster as Aspasia,[36] as the Imperia,[37] as the Lady of Beaujeu,[38] and finally as a Muse. Coster permits himself to be held under the spell of this phantasmal woman for a dozen years, but in the end this ally of the Devil is herself instrumental in his salvation.

The *motif* of the devil-pact also appears in two stories generally attributed to Gérard de Nerval. In "les Deux notes" (1831), Satan appears to propose an insidious pact to Paganini, the famous Italian violinist, and in "Ugolino" (1833), we meet a lunatic virtuoso, who sells his own soul and that of his young child in order to obtain from Satan a miraculous violin.

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As in Gérard de Nerval's case, what all other French Romantics seized upon in Goethe's great poem was its medieval sorcery. Its philosophical and symbolical contents escaped them as they did its best translator. What interested them most in *Faust* were its fantastic parts. Thus George Sand counted *Faust* among the great fantastic plays in her "Essai sur le drame fantastique: Goethe, Byron, Mickiewicz" (1839).

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[34] Those of us who lived in Europe after the Great War, during the currency-inflation period, will heartily agree that paper money was the Devil's own invention.

[35] Blocksberg is the popular name for the Brocken, which is the German mount of witches.

[36] On Aspasia, see note 32.

[37] The Imperia (1455-1511) was an Italian courtesan, who enjoyed great celebrity during the pontificates of Julius II and Leon X.

[38] The Lady of Beaujeu (1460-1522), is Anne of France, daughter of Louis XI, and wife of Pierre de Bourbon, who was lord of Beaujeu when he married her. She was very famous for her beauty and wit.

Faust, especially in its diabolical aspects, strongly influenced French imagination during the Romantic period. Mephistopheles with his *rictus infernal* was the rage of the Romantics. These children of the Revolution, with their strong swayings toward Satanism, went wild over the wit of this Mocker of Mankind. They almost deified the Devil and actually swore by Mephistopheles and the Walpurgis Night. Painters devoted their talents to transferring this "Satanism" to their canvases. Delacroix painted the Walpurgis Night, and Louis Boulanger the Witches' Sabbath. The great Romantic composer, Berlioz, in his *Damnation* de Faust (1846), based on Gérard de Nerval's version, knew how to bring out the diabolical element in the Goethean poem, the appeal of which its French translator rendered so well into French. This opera is the full expression of Romantic music. It contains, as Gautier has well remarked, what Gounod's lacks—the diabolical irony of negation, which is the chief trait of Mephistopheles's character.

The influence of Goethe's *Faust,* insofar as its devil-compact is concerned, is evident in many poems, novels and short stories not only of the Romantic period but also in later times. We will refer to a few of the French works of the last century which particularly show reminiscences of the Goethean poem.[39]

Théophile Gautier's poem *Albertus* (1830) is a sort of sardonic burlesque upon *Faust* and certain Romantic works which were tinged with medievalism. This poem has been called by its author "half diabolical, half fashionable." It certainly is semi-supernatural and semi-sensual, fantastic and funereal, impertinent and indecent. This "theological legend," as its subtitle runs, was written completely in the spirit of a period which was revelling in everything connected with metamorphoses, black arts, devil-compacts and Witches' Sabbaths.

Albertus, a young Italian painter, offers his soul to Satan for the possession of Veronica, a wicked woman and hideous hag, who, by means of magic, has succeeded in transforming herself into a marvelously beautiful young girl, but who in his very arms changes again to her original form. At this sight Albertus is seized with terror. The blood in his veins runs cold. He wishes to escape, but he cannot free himself from her cold and clammy arms. He belongs to her through a rash word uttered in the madness of delirium.

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[39] The *Légendes françaises* (1829) and the *Nouvelles légendes* (1833) by Edouard d'Anglemont contain several legends figuring a devil-compact.

Albertus is forced to accompany Veronica to the Witches' Sabbath. They mount two broomsticks, bridled and saddled, which carry them through the air to the infernal tryst. Now they reach their destination.

> "The place was lighted by a flame, casting a blue light like that of a blazing punch. It was an open spot within the forest's depths. Wizards in their gowns and witches nude astride upon their goats adown the four corners of the world arrived at once. Investigators into sciences occult, Fausts of every land, magi of every rite, dark-faced gypsies, and rabbis red-haired, cabalists, diviners, hermeceutists black as ink and asthmatically gasping—not one of them failed to appear at the meeting place" (XI).[40]

All wait for Satan who is to preside *in propia persona* over the ceremonies.

> "At last he came; but no devil of sulphur and of aspect terrific; no devil old-fashioned, but the dandiest of fiends, wearing imperial and slight moustache, twirling his cane as well as could have done a boulevard swell. You could have sworn he's just come from a performance of *Robert the Devil* or *The Temptation,* or had been attending some assembly fashionable. He limped like Byron (but no worse than he), and with his haughty mien, his aristocratic looks, and his exquisite talent for tying his cravat, in every drawing-room a sensation he would have made" (CXIV).

Gautier now amuses himself by composing the grand symphony of the adepts of Satan. When the concert is finished, the dancing begins. Poor Albertus is the unwilling spectator of the most monstrous diabolical diversions. In the midst of the ceremonies, the Devil sneezes. The odor of the company is too strong for his fashionable nostrils. "God bless you," Albertus says courteously. No sooner has he uttered these words when the whole frightful pageant disappears. Devil, demons, wizards, witches, all vanish into the air. Albertus feels sharp claws and teeth tear his flesh. His shrieks avail him not. The next morning, peasants find on the Appian road, near Rome, a man's body, with broken thighs and twisted neck.[41]

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[40] Quotations taken from the subscription set, in 24 volumes, of the works of Théophile Gautier in English, edited by F. C. Sumichrast and published by C. T. Brainard Publ. Co., Boston and New York, 1903.

[41] Reminescences of *Albertus* will be found in the description of the Black Mass in Oscar Wilde's story, "The Fisherman and his Soul" (1891).

The story, *l'Amour et le Grimoire,* originally called *le Nouveau Faust et la Nouvelle Marguerite, ou Comment je me suis donné au Diable* (1832), by Charles Nodier, is likewise a burlesque of *Faust.* In it, Nodier brings down Goethe's lofty poem to the level of a very ordinary *bourgeois* affair.

Maxime, who tells the story in the first person, summons Satan and offers his soul to the Devil on condition that the latter bring to his room at midnight a certain Marguerite, to whom the young man has taken a passing fancy. Satan, however, turns a deaf ear and refuses to submit to the beck and call of a mere school-boy who has by chance got hold of a grimoire (book of conjurations). By a curious coincidence, the girl appears in his room without the aid of the Devil. A friend of the young man, who has succeeded in persuading Marguerite to elope with him, has sent her up to the room of her would-be seducer there, in hiding, to await the morning coach. Maxime's anxiety not to betray a trusting friend shows that he is too good a man to sell his soul to Satan.

Charles Nodier's story, "la Combe de l'homme mort" (1833), based on a sixteenth century legend of a bargain with Beelzebub, shows many reminiscences of the Faust story. On the eve of All Saints' Day in the year fifteen hundred and sixty-one, the Devil seized a man riding along the road and bore him off thirty leagues to a narrow valley in the Jura mountains. Many years ago this man had murdered an old hermit in order to obtain his wealth, after having won his confidence through hypocritical piety; and when trapped by the villagers and threatened with death, he had sold his soul to Satan in exchange for a thirty years' respite. The contract was written in Satan's scrawl on a slip of paper stained with blood and marked with five black finger-nails like a royal seal.

The man was as eager for knowledge as he was for wealth. After having escaped punishment through the aid of the Devil, he studied at the Universities of Metz and Strasbourg, sat at the feet of the famous Cornelius Agrippa,[42] and obtained his doctorate in four faculties. His reputation as a scholar spread far and wide, and he was finally called to fill a chair at the University of Heidelberg. Men and women came from the four corners of the continent to study under this professor. Satan himself, attracted by this scholar's reputation, enrolled as one of his students. The professor, by dint of his great scholarship, was soon elected rector of the celebrated German university. He possessed fame and fortune and never thought of his pact with the Devil. But Satan had a better memory than even the rector of the University of Heidelberg. At the expiration of the term, the Devil was at hand to claim fulfillment of the terms of the compact. As the rector rode one day along the highway, pleased with himself and the world, the Devil appeared, snatched him up, and brought him to the spot of the murder. When the rector ascertained his whereabouts, he was assailed by unpleasant memories. An old woman, urged on by the Evil One, helped along the poor prefessor's memory by a full and detailed recital of the events which had occurred thirty years before and which gave the valley its name—the Valley of the Dead Man. As he finally rushed out, anxious to disappear in the dark of the night, the Devil followed him and wrung his neck.[43]

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[42] Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim (born in Cologne 1486, died in France 1535) was a sceptic philosopher and student of alchemy and magic, who was considered by his contemporaries a great magician and necromancer. He was also supposed to have formed a pact with the Devil, who attended him in the shape of a black dog. In the French mysteries, he himself has even been transformed into a devil. Some of his necromantic feats are recorded in Thomas Nashe's *Unfortunate Traveller* (1594). Read also Southey's ballad "Cornelius Agrippa" (1799). The best biography of Cornelius Agrippa is Henry Morley's *The Life of Cornelius Agrippa, doctor and knight, commonly called magician.* 2 vols., London, 1856.

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The idea of a devil-compact occurred frequently in the literatures of the various European countries, during the first half of the last century, even in works which cannot be traced to Goethe's influence. Medievalism, which formed an important part of Romanticism in all European countries, also implied diabolism. The Devil, as is well known, occupied a position of paramount importance in medieval arts and letters. He was a prominent and popular character in the mystery-plays. The interest which Romanticism showed in medieval legend and history brought into literature magic potions, Witches' Sabbaths, devil-compacts and all other sorts of Satanism.[44] In England, the Gothic School of fiction brought diabolism into vogue as far back as the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

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[43] It is not within the scope of this paper to treat of Goethe's influence in works which do not contain the devil-compact. We will, however, refer to George Sand and Flaubert, who composed many of their works under the inspiration of the Goethean poem. George Sand's fantastic drama, *les Sept cordes de la lyre* (1839), is copied from *Faust*. Its principal character Albertus is a replica of the German philosopher. He, too, is tempted by Mephistopheles in his ambition to know and comprehend all. The Witches' Sabbath in her novel, le *Château des Déserts* (1847), is a clear imitation of the Walpurgis Night in *Faust*. Flaubert's juvenilia as well as his *Tentation de saint Antoine* (1874) likewise show many reminiscences of the Goethean poem. Louis Ménard's story, "le Diable au café" (1876), which contains a philosophical discussion between the Devil and the author, shows Goethe's conception of Mephistopheles.

Horace Walpole, author of *The Castle of Otranto* (1764), was the first of a group of writers who took supernatural terrors as the principal subject of interest. He may be regarded as the founder of the Gothic and ghost-haunted fiction in England. Of greater influence on her contemporaries was Mrs. Ann Radcliffe, "the mighty magician of the *Mysteries of Udolpho*" (1794), who introduced into the popular novel deep dungeons and haunted houses, spirits and spooks.

The leader in this field of fiction, however, was Matthew Gregory Lewis, author of *Ambrosio the Monk* (1795 or 1796). In contrast to Ann Radcliffe, this novelist employed a supernaturalism which disdains all rational explanation. He introduced diabolical machinery into the popular novel, and created the so-called diabolical supernaturalism. His novel just mentioned is the final word in the English School of Terror. Lewis may be given the credit for having introduced the Devil into modern fiction. In *Ambrosio the Monk,* the Devil is not brought in with an allegorical or satirical aim, but is the leading character, the mainspring of the action. This novel may have been influenced by Jacques Cazotte's romance, *le Diable amoureux* (1772), but it advanced far beyond its model, although a sense of mystery and even of the supernatural is already to be found in the French romance. The novel, *Ambrosio the Monk,* tells the story of a licentious monk named Ambrosio, a superior of a monastery in Madrid, who delivers himself to the Devil in order to accomplish his infamous designs. He goes from crime to crime, from perjury to incest, and from rape to murder, until he is finally carried off by the Devil.

Not far behind Lewis was the Reverend Charles Robert Maturin, author of *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820). The central episode of this novel is also a devil-compact. The unique feature of this work is the fact that a human being solicits souls for Satan as a kind of recruiting sergeant for hell. The aim of the author, a good Irish clergyman, in writing a novel so full of horrors, was to show that any man who deals with the Devil is doomed to perdition.

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[44] Thus Victor Hugo's *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831), which is a resuscitation of medievalism, contains the medieval belief in sorcery, alchemy, the devil-compact and the Witches' Sabbath. The arch-deacon of Notre-Dame, Claude Frollo, an alchemist, if not a sorcerer, is believed to have closed a compact with the Devil. Quasimodo, the hunchbacked bell-ringer, is supposed to be a demon bound to serve the arch-deacon for a given time, at the end of which he will carry off his soul by way of payment.

The writers of these novels of wonder and terror are mostly forgotten now, but they were once famous. Walter Scott and Byron were proud to be their friends. The former praised Horace Walpole, and the latter thought *The Castle of Otranto* the most beautiful novel in the English language. Scott, Charles James Fox and Richard Sheridan likewise praised the novels of Ann Radcliffe in the warmest terms. Byron admired this woman novelist and mentioned her in *Childe Harold* (1812) together with Shakespeare, Otway and Schiller. Moore, Shelley and Keats were also under her influence. Scott called *Ambrosio the Monk* "an effort of a genius hardly ordinary." Byron likewise admired this novel, although he later satirized it in his *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809). Polidori and Shelley were so strongly impressed by this novel that they decided to try their hands at writing supernatural stories of the same sort. Mrs. Shelley was inspired by these writers to compose her *Frankenstein* (1818). Maturin also enjoyed a great reputation in his own country, even Scott and Byron exaggerating his talent.[45]

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The writers of the English School of Terror likewise left their marks on the minds of the French of the Romantic period. The novels of this school circulated all over the European continent during the first half of the past century, but took hold particularly in France. They were repeatedly translated into French and devoured by the French reading public. These romances were also redacted into dramatic and operatic form and met with great success. Berlioz furnished the music for the libretto of *Ambrosio the Monk*. Mrs. Ann Radcliffe is especially considered the literary embassadress from England to France. The horrors and terrors of these English romances had a great attraction for the French nation, which had experienced the Reign of Terror, at which time it seemed, as a writer in the *Journal des Débats* so aptly expressed it, as if "Hell had vomited its inhabitants on earth.[46]

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[45] Concerning these novelists, the reader is referred to Edith Birkhead's thesis, *The Tale of Terror; a study of the Gothic romance* (London, 1921), which is a detailed and documented account of the growth of supernatural fiction in England from Horace Walpole to Wilkie Collins. Jakob Brauchli's German thesis, *Der englische Schauerroman um 1800* (Weida i. Thür., 1928), will also be consulted with profit.

Even the leaders of the Romantic movement in France did not disdain these novels. Chateaubriand read and praised them. He speaks, in 1822, of the English "romancers af ruins and phantoms" (*Mémoires d'outre-tombe,* 1848). Nodier mentioned the English "romanesque" romances in his essay, *Du fantastique en littérature* (1832) and imitated Lewis in his story, *Iñez de las Sierras* (1837). Mérimée, in his essay on Alexander Pushkin (1868), mentions William Beckford, author of Vathek (1781), who was also a member of the English School of Terror. The influence of *Ambrosio the Monk* is evident in Mérimée's play "la Femme est un diable" (1825) and in his story *les Ames du purgatoire* (1834). Victor Hugo likewise admired the English novelists and tried to rival them in their own effects. His story *Han d'Islande* (1823) contains several quotations from Maturin's novel. The influence of *Ambrosio the Monk* is evident in Victor Hugo's ballad "la Légende de la Nonne" (1828) and in his novel *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831).

Of all French Romantics, however, Balzac was the greatest admirer and imitator of the English novelists of the School of Terror. He fairly revelled in their works "like a janitress" (to employ Théophile Gautier's expression). The great French novelist refers to these English writers in several of his works. He mentions Mrs. Radcliffe in his preface to the *Histoire des Treize* (1833-34), in the episode "la Fille aux yeux d'or," which forms a part of this book, and in *la Grande Bretèche* (1832). Traces of the influence of this woman novelist may be seen in Balzac's novel, *l'Héritière de Birague* (1822). Lewis and Maturin, however, were Balzac's first masters in the art of fiction and continued to be his inspiration to the end. In *Honorine* (1836), Balzac refers to Lewis's *Ambrosio the Monk.* The Frenchman's novel, *le Vicaire des Ardennes* (1822), is for the most part an imitation of this English novel. It was seized almost in the moment of its publication and destroyed by the government, but was later reprinted under the title *le Sorcier.* Lewis's influence can also be detected in Balzac's maturer works.

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[46] For the influence of the English School of Terror in France, consult Alice M. Killen's thesis, *le Roman "terrifiant" ou "roman noir" de Walpole à Anne Radcliffe et son influence sur la littérature française jusqu'en 1840* (1920; 2nd ed., 1924).

Of all the novels of the English School of Terror, *Melmoth the Wanderer* with its theme of a devil-compact left the deepest impression on the mind of Balzac. He held its author in high esteem and listed him among the poets who used the idea of an angel drawn by a demon to hell in order to refresh him with the dews of heaven (*l'Elixir de longue vie,* 1830). In a moment perhaps of undiscriminating enthusiasm, Balzac brackets the Melmoth of Maturin with the Don Juan of Molière, the Faust of Goethe, and the Manfred of Byron as "the great characters drawn by the greatest geniuses of Europe." Again, in his preface to the already quoted *Histoire des treize,* the French novelist speaks of Melmoth in the same breath with Faust and Manfred. Maturin's book, thanks to the honor which Balzac granted its author by borrowing his subject, continued to enjoy a high reputation among the French writers. Thus the novel *Ile de Feu* (1870) by Dumas *fils* recalls the thesis of *Melmoth the Wanderer.*

Balzac's novel, *le Centenaire ou les Deux Behringheld* (1832), is an imitation, almost a translation of *Melmoth the Wanderer.* The centenarian, named Behringheld, is a sorcerer born in the fifteenth century. He can live eternally, as a result of a compact concluded with the powers of hell, on condition that he shall always find new human victims and induce them to sell themselves to him. Like Melmoth, he always seeks his victims among the unfortunates of the earth; but while Melmoth, in exchange for the gifts he can bestow, asks only for the souls of his victims, Behringheld sacrifices them to the very last drop of their blood. In the end, the centenarian, deprived of his prey in the final moment, is condemned to death.

In *Melmoth the Wanderer,* written by Balzac thirteen years later, Maturin's novel is given a different ending. In the English work, Melmoth's efforts to hand over the infernal pact to another person are unsuccessful and, in the end, this bondman of Beelzebub is lawfully carried off by the Devil. In Balzac's story, Melmoth, after several centuries of wandering over the face of the earth, succeeds in changing destinies with another mortal. The French novelist also alters the character of the Wanderer. Maturin's Melmoth is anxious to continue living eternally, whereas Balzac's yearns for death. The hero of Balzac possesses the power of endless life, but has not the right to lay it down at will. He has obtained, under the terms of the contract, the power to know all, to comprehend all and to do all. He is the "peer of Lucifer," the Lord of life, by virtue of the indwelling demon. He has everything that makes for happiness, but still he is unhappy. He has finally realized the biblical truth that it profits no man to gain this world at the cost of his own soul.

Melmoth, in his search for a soul, is unceasingly harried across the world by the hounds of hell. He can obtain the boon of death and the bliss of heaven only if he can find another soul to deliver to the Devil in compensation for his own. He seeks his victim among the unfortunates of the earth; but no man, even in the most abject poverty and the greatest suffering, will buy health and wealth in exchange for his soul. Wherever he turns his steps, Melmoth meets with a tragic refusal—until finally he comes to Paris. In this city, he at last finds a man who is willing to sell his soul to him for cash. The man is M. Castanier, a bank-cashier, who has forged a signature and fears arrest. The Parisian enters upon the heritage of the Irishman. But he also repents of his act, and is anxious to hand over the infernal gifts to another. This cashier, who received two million francs for his soul, now buys the soul of a broker for a few hundred thousand francs. It is now the broker's turn to get rid of his bargain, and he obtains for the small sum of ten thousand francs the soul of another man. In this manner, the price of souls sinks from day to day. The poor devil is given no rest and passes through a number of bodies until he finally lands in a mere notary's clerk, whom he carries off in the end. The secret of the infernal power, brought to earth by the Irishman Melmoth, spiritual son of the old Reverend Charles Robert Maturin, is thus lost forever.[47]

Alexander Dumas's play, *Don Juan de Moraña ou la Chute d'un ange* (1836), though an imitation of Mérimée's story, *"les Ames du purgatoire,"* published two years previously, really goes back to Lewis's *Ambrosio the Monk*.[48] Don Juan, in company with his familiar demon, enters a convent, in which Martha is on the point of death. But this fact does not confound the famous sensualist nor the demon. Martha accepts the demon's proposal to lead her to her lover, Don Juan, if she will abandon her soul to hell. Immediately after signing the compact with her blood, however, she dies and escapes Don Juan's pursuits.

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[47] Robert Louis Stevenson's "The Bottle Imp" (1891) is mainly an imitation of this novel by Balzac.

[48] There are also reminiscences in this play of Goethe, Scott and Shakespeare. Cf. Loève-Veimars' criticism of the first production of this play in a *feuilleton* of the *Journal des Débats,* May 4, 1836.

Don Juan de Moraña should not be confused with the famous or rather infamous Don Juan de Teñorio. The former, in contrast to the latter, was not carried off to hell, but ascended to heaven. He too began as a sinner, but ended as a saint. This Don Juan de Moraña, a blasphemous, sacrilegious, adulterous assassin, dripping with the blood of countless victims, the enemy of the whole world, which he had filled with horrors and atrocities, finally repented, entered a monastery and died a saint, venerated, blessed and canonized, with an epitaph he had himself placed on his tombstone: "Here lies the worst man that ever lived."

Frédéric Soulié's novel, *les Mémoires du diable* (1837-38), although revealing influences from many authors, both French and foreign, is, as far as its subject-matter is concerned, a work primarily related to the blood-and-thunder school of English fiction and recalls especially Lewis's *Ambrosio the Monk* and Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer.* But, as often happens, the disciple outdoes his master. The work by Soulié in many portions is just a mass of horrors and abominations. In fact, the author reached the extreme in barbarity and monstrosity. Of his predecessors in France, Soulié is particularly indebted to LeSage, author of *le Diable boiteux* (1707), from whom he borrowed the idea of introducing into a work of satire a personage whose universal knowledge shall work out the scheme of the author and make the hero acquainted with all the vicissitudes, mysteries and hypocrisies of the human species.[49]

The idea of editing the Devil's memoirs was also not original with Frédéric Soulié. Jean Paul Richter was perhaps the first to edit *Selections from the Papers of the Devil* (1787). Wilhelm Hauff, another German Romantic author, brought out, in 1828, a series of autobiographical papers under the title *"From the Memoirs of Satan.* There were others, even after Frédéric Soulié, who claimed the honor of appointment by his Satanic Majesty to edit his "journal." In 1872, J. R. Beard, a Unitarian minister, published an *Autobiography of Satan.* Another autobiography of the Devil was found among the posthumous works of Leonid Andreev and appeared in English under the title *Satan's Diary* (1920). Our own H. L. Mencken also favored us, in his *Book of Burlesques* (1916), with selections "From the Memoirs of the Devil." The American satirist, Oliver Bainbridge, brought *The Devil's Note-Book* to light in 1908 and had it illustrated by "Vet" Anderson.

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[49] Soulié's novel, although not much read at present, was very popular in its day and frequently adapted for the stage. A phantastic drama entitled *la Sonnette du diable,* based on Soulié's novel, was written in 1849 by Bourgeois Anicet and Guerville. Paul Féval's novel, *les Mémoires du Diable* (1832), is a poor imitation of Soulié's work.

The originality of Frédéric Soulié in this novel consists in the terms demanded by the human party of the devil-compact. Armand de Luizzi sells his soul to Satan for a rather uncommon consideration. What tempts him is not wealth, which, indeed, he possesses, nor pleasure, which he probably thinks he can procure for himself without the Devil's aid. What he wants in exchange for his soul is to know the past lives, the trials and temptations, of his fellow-men and women. As Mr. George Saintsbury, in his *History of the French Novel* (1919), well remarks, this is "a thing which a person of sense and taste would do anything, short of selling himself to the Devil, *not* to know."

The plot of this novel is based upon the idea of successive bargains between the Lords of Ronquerolles and the Prince of Darkness. A fresh one is opened whenever the last inheritor of an ancestral curse has gone to close his account. The story, as given by Mr. Saintsbury, is briefly as follows:

The new Count de Luizzi summons Satan by means of a certain little silver bell at the not most usual but sufficiently witching hour of two a. m., saying at the same time, "Come!" After a slightly trivial farce-overture of apparitions in various banal forms, Luizzi compels the Devil to show himself in his proper shape. The bargain contains, as in Melmoth's case, a redemption clause, though of a different kind. If the man can say and show, after ten years, that he has been happy, he will escape from the Devil's clutches. What Luizzi demands of the Devil in exchange for his soul is to know everything about other people, and to be permitted even to reveal and print it. In certain circumstances, he can rid himself of his ally, when unwelcome, and perform other acts at the price of forfeiting a month of his life, which naturally will abridge the ten years.

Obedient to the wishes of Satan, the Baron de Luizzi goes out into the great world, and meets with numerous adventures, all containing the principles of the great moral of this novel, which is to teach us not to trust to first appearances. For instance, he sees an old lady, who is notorious for her prudish behavior, her sanctified conduct, and her religious turn of mind; and then he falls in love with a beautiful young lady, whose levity of disposition has raised the breath of scandal to such an extent, that she is at length driven from society. The Baron summons the Devil to narrate to him the history of those two women. To his astonishment, he finds that the former was stained with every crime—an adulteress, and a wretch who had poisoned her husband; and the latter was as pure and virtuous a creature as any human being can be!

The end of the novel is the usual sudden "foreclosure" by Diabolus despite the effort, to employ the words of Mr. Saintsbury, "of no less than three Gretchens who go upwards, and of a sort of inchoate repentance on Luizzi's own part before he goes downwards."

Dumas *fils* follows his father's foot-steps across the Middle Ages and brings back that astonishing novel *Tristan le Roux* (1850), which may be counted among the most jovial parodies ever written on the pseudo-historical novel. Tristan the Red-headed, son of Gilles de Retz, evokes from the dead a demon named Saracen, who, as it seems in this instance, can be dead, and forms a pact with him, through the intermediary of a Breton sorceress, in order to obtain the love of his cousin Alix. The demon Saracen has, however, been especially commissioned by hell to effect the ruin of the Maid of Orleans.[50]

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But if French Romanticism, particularly in its employment of the devil-compact as subject-matter, is indebted to England, it amply repaid its debt to that country by influencing many of the leading English Romantics. Thus Thackeray's story, "The Painter's Bargain" (1834), was written under the influence of the French Romantics, as is admitted by the author himself in the "Divertisement to the First Edition" of his *Paris Sketch Book*

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[50] Marshal Gilles de Retz or Rais (the "French Bluebeard") was a Grand Master in the medieval witch-cult and is said to have sacrificed about 150 women and children in the witch-rites. According to the theory developed by Miss Alice Murray, in *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921), he was the chief of the witch-group to which Joan of Arc belonged, but made no attempt to rescue her. Nine years after her death, he, too, was tried on the same charges and condemned.

(1840). It was Thackeray's good fortune to live in Paris during the wildest and most brilliant years of Romanticism; and while his attitude toward the movement and its leaders, as presented in the *Paris Sketch Book,* is not wholly sympathetic, he is indebted to it for his interest in the Devil. The Romanticism of Thackeray has been denied with great obstinacy and almost passion, for like Heinrich Heine, the chief of German Romantic ironists, he poked fun at this contemporary movement. But "to laugh at what you love," as Mr. Saintsbury has pointed out in his *History of the French Novel,* "is not only permissible, but a sign of love itself."

Thackeray's story, "The Painter's Bargain," is a dream-fantasy, in which the devil-compact is treated in a rather unusual way. The soliloquy of impieties of Simon Gambouge, a poor French painter, is acknowledged by an invisible devil, and his question, "Where are you?" is answered in the smallest of voices "S-q-u-e-e-z-e!" Immediately, after the nail has been pricked from a bladder of crimson lake in the hand of the artist, a little imp spirts out on the palette, a little blood-colored imp of expanding dimensions—as big at first, we are told, as a tadpole, then as a mouse, as a cat—when it jumps off the palette and turns a somersault. The Devil offers to help Simon Gambouge to all the good things of life for full seven years (seven is a sacred number even to Satan) in exchange for the poor painter's soul. The contract was already drawn up by the Devil on " a sheet as big as a double *Times,* only there was a different *stamp* in the corner.

In Thackeray's earlier and poorer story, "The Devil's Wager" (1833), which was also written under the inspiration of the French Romantics, a priest, who is under a bond to Satan, finally forfeits his body and soul by reciting a prayer contrary to the express condition of the infernal contract. But by sacrificing himself, he saves his brother's soul from "those regions of fire and flames where poor sinners fry and roast in *sæcula sæculorum."* This story is very laughable, if one can laugh at the idea of being damned.

On the other hand, Washington Irving, the first of the great American writers, seems, in his story, "The Devil and Tom Walker" (1824), to owe very little to foreign influences. Although, by his interest in popular legends, he shows his sympathy with the Romantic movement of Europe, his story is redolent of the American soil. He presents the Devil as a maker of a contract who expects his contract to be fulfilled. In this respect, Diabolus is acting according to sound American business principles. Tom Walker shows himself also a good Yankee business man in his attempt to evade payment of the contract. The Devil wins in the end, as no amount of ingenuity on the part of New England skinflints can worst him in a bargain, and Washington Irving must be put down as a realist.[51]

The redemption clause in the "Devil-Puzzlers" (1871) by the American humorist, Frederick Beecher Perkins, is rather unique. The author of this story follows an old tradition, which attaches a wager to the infernal pact. According to the terms of the contract drawn up between the "hero" of this story and the Devil, the mortal may, at the expiration of the period, be left unharmed in body and soul, provided he can put to the Devil three questions, one of which the subtle spirit cannot answer. The Devil loses because he cannot tell which is the front of a woman's bonnet. He answers the first two questions dealing with metaphysical problems, but the third, suggested by the mortal's wife, proves his undoing. This story is a specimen of the laborious methods and clumsy wit of the early American humorists.

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The old tradition of the devil-compact has continued in its appeal to this day and has not failed to attract many eminent contemporary writers in all European countries. John Masefield treats this ancient tradition in his story, "The Devil and the Old Man" (1905).

Max Beerbohm's story, "Enoch Soames" (1916), is perhaps the most recent treatment by a prominent Englishman of this old tradition. Soames, a representative of the prominent literary leaders of the eighteen nineties, styling himself a Catholic diabolist, makes an extraordinary bargain with the Devil. He is willing to forfeit his soul to Satan for the privilege of visiting the British Museum a hundred years after his death to learn what posterity thinks of him. But he cannot find his name in any catalogue or index or biography, nor anywhere at all, except under the name of Beerbohm, Max, where he is mentioned in the phonetic spelling of 1992, as an

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[51] John B. Hymer has written, in 1908, a "phantastic musical travesty" in one act on Washington Irving's story and has given it the same title.

"immajnari karrakter" in a short story by this writer. Broken-hearted, Soames then forfeits himself to his purchaser.

The French novelist, Pierre Veber, made the devil-compact the central theme of his novel *l'Homme qui vendit son âme au diable* (1918).

Maurice Magre, in his recently published work, *Lucifer* (1929), is bold enough to treat the old tradition of a devil-compact in a "modern" novel. This work is an exaltation of the pagan ideal of the enjoyment of the flesh. "The only truth is in material enjoyment," Lucifer is made to say. The novel ends, however, with the declaration that the redemption of man will come from a union, within every one of us, of Christ and Lucifer.[52]

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What first strikes the reader of all these poems and plays, novels and short stories, which employ the devil-compact, is the lack of variety in their treatment of this subject. Mr. Saintsbury, in his *History of the French Novel,* has already called attention to the monotony in the employment of this *motif* in literature. This uniformity in the literary treatment of the devil-compact, he says, is especially surprising when it is contrasted with the great variety in circumstances of the bargains with Beelzebub which are transacted daily in actual life. This fact shows us how pitiful a thing the imagination of man is after all.

What we must next gather from this mass of material, treating the *motif* of the devil-compact, is a conviction of the meanness of man. Almost invariably the Devil is represented as thwarted by trickery and treachery. In John Masefield's story already quoted, Diabolus dies in his attempt to collect his bill. Naturally, as long as mortals write the stories, the Devil is going to find it difficult to collect his debt. These literary accounts of the devil-compacts do not, as Mark Twain regrets, give Satan's side of the story. The reader cannot but admit that the Devil appears in these stories much more honest than the men with whom he has to deal. Whether Diabolus gives us ten, twenty or twenty-four years from the signing of the contract, he always keeps his part of the agreement, while we have the perennial hope of cheating him after we have done our worst and enjoyed it. If the stories had been conscientiously written, all of the characters who cheated the Devil would certainly have gone to hell solely for the methods they used in saving their souls.

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[52] See the present writer's review of this novel in *Books Abroad,* IV (1930), 40.

The Devil should be complimented at the attention given him by the best writers of all ages and languages. He should be offended perhaps at the flippant and audacious manner in which his power is flouted in this world. But he may certainly be satisfied with his influence on earth, manifested in these stories by the devilish ingenuity of the heaven-bound mortals.

But all this leads us to conclude that the Devil will cease to be our most formidable Reality and become only material for Romance as soon as we will have given up the hope of trying to cheat him.

THE INSIGHTS AND RAPTURES OF THE MYSTIC

BY RADHAKAMAL MUKERJIE

IT has been a long and historic tradition in the East to focus the meditation beyond a personal God to something above and beyond existence and being. From very ancient times the Indian mystic's endeavour to introduce harmony among his conflicting impulses and desires led him beyond heaven and hell, Gods and angels to a state achieved by introspection where all desires resolve themselves into nothingness. Thus along with a strong current of theistic thought India also showed strong pan-theistic and acosmic tendencies. These tendencies were early encouraged by the doctrine of kinship and similarity of the subjective soul with the Brahman, the unknown and Absolute supreme. In the verse Upanisads where this doctrine received a mystical expression we find that the methods of discipline and control of mind are commended strongly in the search for Brahman. The word Yoga occurs in the Taittiriya Upanisad and it seems that sometimes it was theistic, sometimes it contained no theistic element at all. The Maitreya Upanisad, a text of the Yoga philosophy, remarks: "a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave; but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief; this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this the sages quote a verse: "When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state'." From the time of the Upanisads Yoga practices have formed an indispensable part of most philosophical and religious systems in India. Buddhism borrowed from the Yoga the stages of meditation. Indologists are of opinion that exercises of contemplation for the attainment of higher states of consciousness were of great influence at the foundation of Buddhism.[1] The Yoga has its theory as well as its practice. The latter has been adopted not merely by Buddhism and Jainism but by all later schools of asceticism. Orthodox Hinduism does not recognise any restrictions for the Yogis, who receive highest honour irrespective of their caste, tradition or sect; while house-holders also initiate themselves in Yoga practice either from family teachers or from saints and ascetics. The Bhagavad Gita long ago pointed out the necessity of Yoga in addition to dialectic or analytical reasoning as a method of self-realization. The hold which the Yoga practice has upon the Indian mind depends chiefly upon the most tenacious tendency of man's nature to resolve conflict of desires and obtain sanity. The foundation of the Yoga psychology as formulated by Patanjali in the 2nd century B. C. is the elimination of hindrances which are five misconceptions, viz., ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion and desire. Man's ignorance is the propagative soil of the above hindrances. Now such hindrances are unconscious or potential as well as conscious or manifest; they are described as being "asleep, attenuated, dominant, intercepted or sustained." "In the case of those who have been resolved into entities, the hindrances are dormant; for *yogins,* attenuated; and in the case of those attached to objects hindrances are intercepted or sustained." Dormant desires remain potential in the mind towards the condition of seed, and become manifest as they come face to face with the desired object. Desires are over-powered when man ponders deliberately their opposites. For instance, when the desire to steal emerges, man should deliberate upon the consideration of giving protection to every living creature. A desire is said to be intercepted by love. When one is in love, no anger is felt in as much, when one is in love, anger does not actively move forth, and love when felt in one direction is by no means unfelt towards another object. Thus even when a desire is particularised or sustained in a given direction, it remains yet strong and dormant, the root of man's pain and *karma.* "Pain either in visible or invisible life then follows." "The roots lying there will bear fruit in the forms of pleasure and pain. All this goes on well with the psychology of the unconscious.

It is by analysis and meditation that both desires as well as the finer forms of *samaskaras* or subliminal desires can be eliminated. It is clearly recognised that the subliminal desires are most difficult to eradicate. The active desires may be attenuated by the consideration of opposite desires. Their fluctuations can be escaped by Elevated Contemplation until subtilized and made like burned seeds. An interesting simile is used in this connection. Coarse stains are removed by shaking; minute stains by washing; more minute by alkali. Hindrances which are sustained are attenuated by joga of action; the attenuated are reduced to burned seed by Elevated Contemplation; the burned seed is destroyed by inverse propagation. When the mind-stuff which is an effect, is resolved into its cause, then and then only the subliminal consciousness is eliminated. It is with the eradication of the subliminal consciousness that the Yogin perceives his true Self (Atman) which is above and beyond any fluctuations of the mental processes, conscious or unconscious.[2] Various devices are recommended. Apart from ethical conduct, reading, and the cultivation of a habit of cheerfulness, the novice is asked to acquire noble thoughts and ideals and to practise meditation with the help of breath-regulation. All the yoga texts describe how the senses may be withdrawn from the objects of sense and reduced to inactivity so that their natural tendency is reversed, and they assume altogether the character of the inner central organ, whose emanations they are; how, in the next place, the activity of the organ of thought, in which all the functions that are dependent upon the influence of the external world are suppressed, is wholly centred upon the *atman* (the self, the soul); and how, finally thought and its object completely coincide.[3] In the last stage of absorption the understanding rests on the secondless reality whose shape it has assumed, with concern as to the merging of the distinction of knower and knowledge, etc., so as to be completely identified with Him. The, just as, owing to the disappearance of salt after it has (melted and so) assumed the shape of the water (into which it was thrown), nothing appears but the water, so by the disappearance of the modification of the internal organ after it has assumed the shape of the secondless Reality, nothing appears but the latter.[4] It must not be supposed that this state and sound sleep are identical; for, though in both alike the modification of the internal organ is not perceived, there is nevertheless this one distinction between them, that it is present in the former (though unperceived), but not in the latter.[5]

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[1] For a discussion see Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy,* Chapter VII.

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[2] *The Yoga System.* Translated and edited by Woods.

[3] R. Garbe, Article on Yoga, Encyclopaedia on Religion and for The Psychology of the Yoga, see S. N. Das Gupta's *Hindu Mysticism,* Lecture III.

[4] Compare Chhandogya Upanisad, VI. 13.

According to the Vedantasara there are four obstacles to the meditation with recognition of subject and object:

1. Mental inactivity (*laya*)
2. Distraction (*vikshepa*)
3. Passion (*kashaya*), and
4. The tasting of enjoyment (*rasaswada*).

1. 'Mental inactivity' is the drowsiness of the modification of the internal organ while not resting on the Secondless Reality.

2. 'Distraction' is the resting of the modification of the internal organ on something else, instead of its abiding on the Secondless Reality.

3. 'Passion' is the not resting on the secondless Reality by reason of the impeding of the modification of the internal organ by lust or other desire, even though there be no mental inactivity or distraction.

4. 'The tasting of enjoyment' is the experience of pleasure on the part of the modification of the internal organ, in the recognition of subject and object, while it is not resting on the secondless Reality; or it is the experiencing of such pleasure when about to commence meditation without the recognition of subject and object.

When the internal organ, free from these four hindrances, and motionless as a lamp sheltered from the wind, exists as the invisible intelligence only, then is realised that which is called meditation without recognition of subject and object.

It has been said, "When the internal organ has fallen into a state of inactivity, one should arouse it—when it is distracted, one should render it quiescent (by turning away from the objects of sense, etc.)—when it is affected by passion, one should realise the fact—when quiescent one should not disturb it. One should experience no pleasure (during discriminative meditation), but become free from attachment by means of discriminative intelligence." As the Bhagavad Gita says, "As (the flame of) a lamp standing in a sheltered spot flickers not, this is regarded as an illustration of a mind—restrained yogi, who is practising concentration of mind."

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[5] *The Vedantasara,* XII.

The experience of rapture is frankly recognised in the East as a stage which has to be transcended. The Sufis, the mystic sect of Islam, draw a distinction between sobriety and intoxication. Agitation and intoxication are considered by them as marks of inexperience, while elevated agitation is transmuted into composure. The contrasted states are described as *Wajd* (rapture) and *Wujud* (existence) and the former is described as the preface to the latter. The end of the rapture is the beginning of the existence. The *wujud* of *wajd* is the cause of the *wajid's* being deprived of existence, which is the condition of the *wujud* of *maujud* (the existence of the existence of God).[6] Amongst the stages in Sufism which must be passed before man's corporeal veil can be finally removed are (1) the murid (disciple), through ardency of desire rendeth the heart's veil, and considereth the revealing of the mystery of love for God—infidelity, save under the mastery of *wajd* (ecstasy), (2) the *murid* maketh himself the slave of love and joineth himself to *tajrid* (outward separation) and to tafrid (inward solitude); (3) the *murid* keepeth the heart's mirror before God's glory, and becomes intoxicated with its wine, (4) the *murid* keepeth so engaged the tongue in *zikr* (meditation of God), the heart in *fikr* (contemplation of God) and the soul in *mushahida* (viewing God's glory) that he considereth himself non-existent.[7] In no religion, however, there has been more strenuous attempt to reach a state of serene composure than in Buddhism, which has sought the banishment of self so that no sense of union with the divine One or any one may be aimed at or felt. "Alone the Buddhist *jhayin* sat, but he did not "flee alone to the Alone" exactly as did Plotinus" writes Mrs. Rhys Davids. Nor did the Buddhist *jhayin* announce "I have known Him who is the Supreme Person," as did the Hindu *muni*. He calls himself *swambhu;* he attains the new life alone, and in his nirvanik tranquility he is alone, has neither teacher, nor God, absolute or Anything Else. This is well brought out in the Buddha's memorable reply to Upaka Ajivika's query, "Who is your Master?" "I have conquered all. I have known all. I am above all relativities. I have abjured everything. I am freed from thirst. Knowing everything who can be my reference? There is no teacher of mine. None is my equal. I have no competing being in the world of gods and men. I am, indeed, the Free Man. I have no second as a teacher. I am the only Supremely Enlightened One. My mind is tranquil. I have extinguished everything." In the Buddhist scriptures also the insight rather than the feeling of rapture in mystical meditation is clearly stressed. The standing definition in the *Dhamma Sangani of Samma-Samadhi* is as follows: "Stability, insistence, persistence of thought, absence of wavering of perplexity of intellectual distraction, serenity, the faculty of rapt composure, right rapture." The Buddha discouraged the feeling of rapture among the Bhikkhus, and emphasised the emancipation of both thought and feeling. In Majjhima, six chief disciples of the Buddha ask one another one beautiful night what is their mental quality which might add a fresh charm to the beauty of the environment. One replies, "When a Bhikkhu fights out for himself internal peace, and devoted to solitude, resisting not the feeling of rapture, becomes endowed with insight. Another says: "When a Bhikkhu has the divine eye." Others also give suitable replies. Finally Sariputta says "When a Bhikkhu rules his heart and does not let his heart rule him." The Buddha gives preference to Sariputta's answer and adds: "But hear from me what sort of Bhikkhu could on such a night add glory to the wood. It is one who sitting calm, collected, self-possessed, makes resolve "I rise not from this seat until my heart is set free from the asavas."[8]

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[6] *The Awarifu-l-Ma'arif*, translated by Clarke, p. 83.

[7] *The Awarifu-l-Ma'arif,* translated by Clarke, p. 4.

The gradual emancipation of consciousness from both image and the feeling it arouses is characteristic of the sequence of the traditional Jhana-exercises in Buddhist monasticism. In the first *jhana* sloth and torpor is inhibited by *vitakka* (initial application). Vicara (sustained application) permits the continued exercise of thought and dispels doubt. At first the interest is dull and slight, but gradually it develops into an intense interest amounting to rapture (*ubbega-piti*). This diffused rapture is invariably followed by happiness (sukha) by which distraction and worry are removed. In the second jhanic thought, the services of *vitakka* are dispensed with; in the third, both vitakka and vicara are absent; in the fourth piti is got rid of; in the fifth *sukha is replaced by upckkha* or hedonic indifference to the pleasure derived from the five grades of interest. "This hedonic indifference or neutrality of emotion is brought about by the continued voluntary exercise of the mind on the after-image

[8] See Rhys Davids: *The Yogavacara's Manual,* Introduction.

to which it has been directed. And by it ecstasic contemplation reaches its full development in the 5th stage of jhana. In attaining to it, apperception of the two great types, which are "accompanied by joy" is superseded by one of the types which are "accompanied by indifference."[9] It is a well-known mystical experience that when the active self-conscious activity of the mind disappears, the mystic can gain new knowledge which he is not easily able to reach by deliberate reasoning. It is for this reason that "the hedonic indifference becomes in the Buddhist Jhanna the starting point for fresh concentration on concepts." This signifies the arahant's entry into the fifth *jhana,* which is now termed "Jhana as base for supernormal thought" (abhinna-padaka jhana), because it is used as a basis for abhinna (super-intellectual powers).[10] The course of mental training at this stage consists of fourteen processes as described in the Vissuddhi-magga whereby the arahant's will can gain a complete ascendency over intellect and feeling. Super-normal powers of will then develop and these are classified, for instance, in the Yoga system Patanjali or in the Visuddhi-magga. All abnormal powers of the intellect and will arise only when the mystic attains what in the Buddhist Jhana is characterised as a state of "purity, indifference and mental clarity." We shall later on attempt to account for the universality of such phenomena as those of telepathy, clarvoyance and claraudience, etc., which are familiar experiences amongst the mystically minded. How the Buddha himself reached a state of consciousness in which there was concentrated attention, yet no feeling nor thought is described in a memorable conversation between the Master and one of his leading disciples, Aniruddha, who was well-known for his 'celestial vision.'

"Have you three, Anuruddha, leading this life, zealous, ardent and strenuous, experienced supernormal states, extraordinary Aryan knowledge and insight happiness?"

" 'We have perceived, Lord, both an aura and a vision of forms. But lately these have all vanished and we do not attain to the after-image'."

" 'But this is what you three must attain to. I too indeed, before I became wholly enlightened and Buddha, perceived both aura and vision of forms. And then in my case too they vanished. So

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[9] See S. Z. Aung's *Introductory Essay to Compendium of Philosophy,* p. 58.

[10] *Compendium of Philosophy,* p. 62.

I pondered over the cause of this and discerned that concentration had left me, and hence the vision. Also that my concentration had been dispersed through access of doubt, then by want of attention, then by sloth and torpor, then by dread, then by elation, then by slackness, then by trying too much, then by sluggishness of effort, then by longing, then by awareness of differences. And to me continuing zealous, ardent and strenuous, came perception of aura and vision of forms. But they soon vanished again, because I contemplated the forms too closely . . . . then I beheld the aura, but not the forms . . . . then the forms, not the aura . . . . then I beheld the one as immense, the others as small and inversely. Finally I judged that my shortcomings in concentration were varieties of vitated consciousness, and that, these being all got rid of, I would practise threefold concentration, to with, applying attention and sustaining it, sustaining attention without applying it afresh, and concentration without attention in either way. And I concentrated with rapture, and without it, with delight and with indifference. And then in me, with concentration so practised, lo! there arose the knowledge and the insight that my emancipation was sure, that this was my last life, that now here was no more rebecoming."[11]

[11] *Majjhima-Nikaya,* iii. 157 F. F. The text is condensed by Mrs. Rhys Davids; *Buddhist Psychology,* pp. 105-107.

(To be continued.)

THE LIFE ON OTHER WORLDS

BY WILLIAM ALPHONSO MURRILL

IF there are other worlds like ours, with living beings, what forms of life might be expected to occur upon them? Since the different parts of our stellar system are fundamentally alike, the same general types of organic life would probably exist on the different worlds, with almost infinite variety of detail according to varied conditions.

Plants would doubtless be present to furnish food for animals and purify the air; and animal life would be represented by lower and higher forms as on the earth; but the highest types of animal life on the different worlds might be very different and not at all resemble men. A world where there was no land above water, for example, could never produce a very high type; nor could one whose climate remained continually warm and moist. An easy life never develops much of a brain.

If Mars were inhabited, the highest types there would presumaby approach more nearly those of our earth because influenced by the same sun; but we can not now conclude, as we did under the old Nebular Hypothesis, that Mars is so much older than the earth that its "men" have all arrived by this time at the stage of "supermen." Being only one seventh the size of the earth and much farther from the sun, it may have cooled down more quickly and allowed life to begin sooner; but the process may have been too rapid to permit the development of a high type of intelligence, which as a rule required a considerable period.

Camille Flammarion, the great French astronomer, wrote a very charming imaginative book in which he described the winged creatures supposed to inhabit Mars, absorbing food from the atmosphere like plants, communicating with one another by thought transference, and leading in general an angelic life. Ferrier, who came later, declared that Mars was inhabited, and that the people there were like us; that they could not have wings because hands were so necessary in obtaining knowledge and obeying the dictates of the mind.

The nights on Mars are lighted only by the stars, because the two moons are too small to give any appreciable light. For the same reason, there could be no tides. Owing to the small size of the planet, gravitation would be much less than with us and animals correspondingly more agile and graceful. Life in the air would present more variety than life in the ocean, because of more extreme conditions.

When we cease to confine our attention to our own planetary system and let our minds wander out into space, where other suns with different kinds of light are in control, we must of necessity make allowances for the varying conditions. If the imagination is given free rein, all sorts of creatures may be conjured up, some very inferior to ourselves and others greatly superior. In case my readers will agree not to take me too literally, I will indicate briefly how this might be done.

Suppose, for example, that the natural conditions on other worlds were more favorable to certain animals than to man, enabling them to outstrip him in the upward climb. Then there might be lion-men on one planet, pig-men on another, centaurs on another, elephant-men on another, dog-men on another, and mermen and mermaids on still another, with their essential characteristics worked out in this highly developed state.

The pig-men would naturally devote their intellects to the development of an abundance of highly nutritious and palatable food, while the lion-men would eat meat only and become very fierce. In the case of the mermen, the planet would be practically covered with water, having only a few rocks where they could bask in the sun, and hands would not be as necessary as fins. In the case of the elephants, the immense body would have to be supported on at least four legs, but the trunk could take the place of the hand as it does with the elephant of our acquaintance. Of course, the architecture and the scale of everything developed by such a large creature would be immense.

Then, again, the inhabitants of a given planet might live for centuries, like some of our trees, attaining remarkable knowledge and skill, and working out mysteries that we should be only too glad to solve. They might understand alchemy; be able to rear children in incubators without the pain and inconvenience of birth; know how to produce large men or small ones by the use of glandular secretions, as we breed horses of different sizes for different kinds of work; control sex and genius; and keep their girls always young by feeding them upon certain foods. Even the synthetic production of people might be conceivably attained and the character of the product absolutely controlled.

Arcvad, an imaginary inhabitant of Mars, was supposed to have constructed a telescope two thousand feet long with a lens five hundred feet in diameter, through which he observed the inhabitants of the earth and became so displeased with their actions that he decided to petrify them with a terrible force. On his planet it was customary to kill off the weak, as in ancient times, and mercy was unknown to him. I prefer to think rather of some favored spot, somewhere in space, where knowledge is so perfect that men have no fear of the natural forces, and their religion is unmixed with superstition and dread of the unknown—a religion of love and mercy, requiring neither burnt offerings nor punishment by fire. Such a place, I think, would be very near Heaven.

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

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IN PROMOTION OF CHARACTER TRAINING

BY EDWARD L. SCHAUB

WHETHER or not our contemporary western civilization deserves the epithet of materialistic may be open to question. That it is technological in nature, however, may scarcely be doubted. Now the very term technological most commonly carries the connotation of a manipulation of physical materials. It is understood as the application of scientific knowledge, and this more especially in connection with the industrial and mechanical arts. The scientific knowledge in question is therefore essentially that of the natural sciences. In the field of these sciences man has acquired exceptional powers of prediction. Not alone this. The results have been such as to yield an almost incredible measure of control over the factors of the physical environment. Indeed man's achievements along these lines have been so rapid, and so sweeping in their consequences, that many fears have been aroused lest they prove a humanly destructive boomerang if notable advances are not made in the development of the moral outlook and in the fashioning of sound character.

On all hands, therefore, we note a growing consciousness of the imperative need for scientific investigations into the nature of character, the laws of its development and the methods of its training. This is true of parents, teachers, and citizens, in their capacity as individuals; but we find also that all manner of associations are turning their attention to the problems mentioned. Ever more numerous, for example, are coming to be the committees and other groups charged with investigating the methods of character education that are in operation in schools, churches, homes and other institutions. In general there is an acute sense of the darkness which still shrouds this field. Here, too, it is felt, there are secrets which if we could but learn them would enable us to direct activity intelligently, and to make more fully attainable the goals which upon reflection we set ourselves.

A notable incident in this development was the Morality Codes Competition arranged during 1916 through the Character Education Institution of Washington, D. C. This was designed to bring to light, with a view to subsequent dissemination, the moral ideas which should be inculcated into the appreciation and into the lives of individuals beginning with earliest childhood. In the realization that this was but the beginning of investigative work, a prize of $20,000.00 was then offered through the Executive Committee of the Character Education Institution for the best program of ways and means for imbuing children with the ideals which commend themselves to intelligent public opinion. The aim was the promotion in general of right character. It was believed that while our public education had given much effective attention to programs for intellectual education, and that while it had likewise provided to some extent for vocational and physical training, it was as yet relatively backward in the furtherance of the supremely important objective of character formation.

Typical of the questions which the competitors for the $20,000.00 prize were asked to consider were the following: "How to get children to understand and appreciate the wisdom of moral experience? How to develop personal convictions in matters of morality in the minds of the children themselves, and the will to live up to these convictions? How to correlate school and home life so as to influence character development together? What character education should be given teachers themselves as a preparation for personal influence over character development of children? How shall teachers be enlightened as to the moral ideas to be inculcated, and how trained to efficiency in the use of methods of character?"[1]

The plan which most commended itself to the judges, and which was therefore awarded the prize, was elaborated by a group of Iowa educators, working under the chairmanship of Professor Edwin D. Starbuck. This plan made fundamental the clear envisagement of definite goals and stressed the need of measurements, as accurate as possible, of progress made in their realization. It developed primarily the contentions that our ends must be personal and social; that moral persons must be productive as well as creative; that character must be practiced rather than dreamed or thought of; that conduct must be vitalized through sympathies, and the mind be richly furnished with effective imagery; that moral thoughtfulness and conscious self-control should be gradually but continuously fostered; that sheer duty must be transformed into a joyful sense of beauty; that children should be familiarized with the best of our racial tradition and be awakened to loyalty as well as stimulated to reverence. It insisted upon the necessity, in the case of the average normal child, of a three-fold recentering, described as follows: "(1) The transformation of a lower selfhood of cruder instincts and desires into 'higher' personality of refined tastes, of insight, outlook and intelligent purpose. (2) An awakening into wholesome appreciation of the interests and well-being of others and participation in their programs, customs, conventions and institutions, and loyalty to their ideals. (3) A disinterested admiration of the non-personal values in Nature and Life that glorify both the self and other-than-self and culminate in a spirit of reverence."[2]

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[1] *Character Education Methods: The Iowa Plan* $20,000. *Award*, 1922, p. V. This brochure is available from the Character Education Institution, Washington, D. C., and from the Institute of Character Research, Iowa City, Iowa.

That the numerous influences converging from various directions upon the issues of character training were powerfully reinforced through the activities of the Character Education Institution is very apparent. It was in a large measure these latter that gave impetus to the establishment, in 1923, of the Institute of Character Research in Iowa City. This Institute was legally recognized by the Iowa State Board of Education in 1927 and represents an integral part of the State University of Iowa. It includes among its objectives instruction of a sort similar to that of a department in one of our colleges of Liberal Arts. Thus, a survey course on "Character and its Development" seeks to provide the Juniors and Seniors admitted to it with some insight into the intricate problems of character, with special reference to the early formative factors and with particular emphasis upon the home and school. In fact the aim of the course is described as practical: it "looks for the preparation for family life and for teaching." A further course offered by the Institute seeks to give to more advanced students a better orientation in the field of character analysis and development, and primarily to lay the basis for research on their part. And it is, indeed, upon research that the ultimate interest of the Institute may be said to focus. It is realized that we have as yet but a very partial and unsatisfactory knowledge respecting the nature of character and personality, their elements and their laws; and it is likewise realized that there is urgent need of understanding better "the sorts of influences or training on which they depend, the bodily and mental processes conditioning them, the right content of the curriculum, the proper placement of materials, and the best methods of character training."[3]

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Thus the Institute makes its contribution to the general program of studies pursued by students, and likewise gives stimulus and equipment for the enrichment of knowledge and the perfection of the technique within its field. More than this. It also seeks to prepare its students for service in various vocations, such as deanships, directorships of personnel, specialists in character problems in public school systems, superintendencies and principalships.

Typical of the Institute's work in the genetic psychology of morals are studies now being made with respect to the origin of the moral impulses and the mental processes involved therein. Investigations are in progress as to the beginnings and the growth of the imagination in pre-school children; the development of abstract notions; the relation of delayed response to moral attitudes; and the mental and physical processes involved in self-other reactions. On a grant from the Boy Scouts of America a genetic study has been undertaken of the abstract-concrete interests and skills of children between the ages of nine and twelve. Already there has been published a doctoral dissertation relating to children's attitudes toward the law.[4]

Promising attacks have been made by the Institute upon the analysis of character and personality. These include not only more or less general essays such as that of Dr. Rachel Knight on the personality of George Fox,[b] but also more technical studies pursued by objective methods and under carefully controlled conditions. Such, for example, is the investigation by Dr. W. E. Slaght[c] into the factors conditioning truthfulness and untruthfulness in children.

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[3] This quotation and all others unless otherwise stated are taken from bulletins which the State University of Iowa has published on the work of the Institute.

[4] See item a in the list which we append to this article of publications by those connected with the research work of the Institute. References by letters in the text from this point on will refer to the same list.

By the use of three ingenious tests, a selection was effected of two groups (the truthful and the untruthful) of 70 pupils each. Intensive study led to the conclusion that the major factors conditioning untruthfulness are impulsiveness, suggestibility, lack of inhibition, inadequate moral discrimination, and unfavorable home surroundings. The factor of intelligence, in its aspects other than are involved in the factors just mentioned, seems to be relatively negligible, though the truthful children exhibited a decidedly wider range of information and a better fund of thoughtful experience. The common belief that lying is related to imaginativeness was lent some support by the investigation, though at this point the latter was incomplete and therefore urges the need for further research on the topic.

Members of the Institute have succeeded in throwing some light on certain aspects of character by use of a method of correlations in which evaluations are made, singly and severally, of the interacting elements in combinations of relations. Thus Dr. R. D. Sinclair[d] has compared mystically minded persons with those of the non-mystical type. Dr. T. H. Howells[e] selected from 542 students the 50 who had the greatest measure of belief in orthodox statements and the 50 who ranked lowest in this respect. These groups, designated as the conservatives and the radicals, were subjected to some 30 psychological tests. A variety of conclusions emerged. Thus, the radicals showed themselves more intelligent than the conservatives; religious beliefs, experiences and practices, it seemed, are conditioned by a general tendency towards suggestibility; the conservatives improved on threat of punishment while the radicals did not.

The valuable monograph by Professor Shuttleworth on "The Measurement of Character and Environmental Factors Involved in Scholastic Success"[f] is concerned directly with the problem of scholastic maladjustment; as its title indicates, however, it makes a distinct attack upon questions as to how we may measure character traits. Realizing the need for the measurement of the non-intellectual factors in scholastic success or failure, the author attempts to devise objective tests for the subtle factors of environmental background and character traits, as well as for the prediction of scholastic success.

An important feature of the Institute's activity is its attention to curriculum problems, more especially to the proper grade placement of materials within the curriculum. For example, the parables and sayings of Jesus have been studied with respect to their difficulty of comprehension and their place in a course of study adapted to the mental maturity of children.[g] Something of a similar sort has been done in connection with selections from the Old Testament prophets.[h]

A useful piece of research by Dr. P. R. Hightower[i] led to the conclusion that there is essentially a zero correlation between Biblical knowledge and moral conduct. Confirmation was found of the more general conclusion that moral conduct has its springs elsewhere than in clear idea and in reasoned judgment. The conviction reached is that direct moral instruction issues in negative rather than in positive results in respect to both conduct and attitude.

Attitudes in respect to other national groups were the object of study by Dr. James C. Manry[j]. Carefully constructed tests of information and judgment on world affairs were given to freshman, sophomore, junior and senior classes of various colleges with a view to ascertaining the degree to which the objective of world citizenship was actually being realized. Moreover, considerable information was secured about nationality, extent of travel, previous studies, place of birth, etc., in order to discover the factors that seem to favor the development of a practical sense of world citizenship. Of these factors important ones are an initiatory or orientation course, and social studies in general. An understanding of foreign nations seems to be rendered easier if there are opportunities for a sympathetic understanding of remote sections of one's own native land. Hence Dr. Manry would encourage the free movement of teachers and students about the United States. In general it might be said that the typical errors made in the tests that were given indicate that "sheer ignorance, together with the democratic impulse to entertain opinions notwithstanding, is responsible for the most part for the purely emotional and verbal thinking about international affairs."

In Dr. Searles's research[k] into the study of religion in the State Universities of the United States, we have an illustration of a piece of work involving historical orientation and present trends, as well as an examination of the State Constitutional, legislative and Supreme Court provisions relating to sectarian religious influence in the Public Schools. Nevertheless the research was motivated essentially by an interest in character development. Religion, it was felt, could function satisfactorily in the training of character only if students were provided with a greater informational and intellectual background than has in the past been provided. When religion is recognized as a fact of human experience amenable to interpretation through definite methods, its scientific study carries decided cultural and liberating influences. Hence the problem as to the place of such study in our State universities is one of significance from the standpoint of character formation. The conclusion reached by Dr. Searles is that these institutions may very properly claim "the right to carry on that aspect of religious education which involves research, investigation, and teaching in those fields where there is little difference of opinion among taxpayers." On the other hand, the churches "either singly or unitedly should be free to carry on a high grade of academic work commensurate with university standards in those fields more closely related to the practical work of the church in which it is felt they can make a significant contribution." Through this union of forces it is believed that religious motives may be made to function in the ethical lives of the students.

Very shortly there will be available in printed form the results of some research by Dr. George W. Beiswanger on "The Biblical Narratives Judged as to Their Character Value." This study employs a carefully developed technique of which a monograph by Dr. Shuttleworth[1] offered a description. The technique is one utilized by the Institute in a most comprehensive and significant enterprise which is designed to issue in a series of volumes bearing the caption "A Guide to Books for Character." These guides will aim to give to parents and teachers, as well as to librarians, effective aid in so directing the reading habits of children up to the 9th grade that very definite results may be achieved in the stimulation and correction of specific traits of personality. The importance of this undertaking is suggested by the fact that the finer features of morals cannot issue from preachment or indoctrination but are the results of contagion. Investigations have shown that one should not tamper directly with the morals of children, and that progress in character may not be secured through the action of a corps of moral drill-masters. It is spontaneous choice of values that brings grace and strength. Children and youth should be provided with desirable cultural sustenance; we should "trust literature to do its own work."

Two volumes of the above-mentioned guides have thus far appeared, those relating to "Fairy Tale, Myth, and Legend"[m] and to "Fiction."[n] Another volume grading the voluminous literature on biography is well under way, and in due course the various other realms of literature possessing value for character training will be considered. A general idea of the objectives, method and value of the project as a whole may most conveniently be given by some specific statement respecting the most recent volume, that dealing with fiction. The tremendous dynamic inherent in fiction and available for character training will be obvious to all who realize that nine-tenths of the reading of America's children would seem to consist of novels, and also to all who, in the words of Professor Moore's review of the volume on fiction, have "ever observed a girl curled up on a davenport lost to the world about her as she follows the golden threads of a fascinating story or perchance a lad stretched out on the floor so absorbed in the adventures recited between two covers of a book that even the call to dinner is unheard." In preparing the guide to the literature of fiction Professor Starbuck's collaborators selected as worthy of recommendation and report 663 from approximately 2000 volumes mentioned in lists of fiction alleged to be suitable for children. This selection was made by use of eight standards of excellence as follows: unity, right craftmanship, agreeable emotional tone (these three having to do with literary form and quality), effectiveness, artistry in appeal, truthfulness (these three relating to educational fitness), refinement of the fundamental human attitudes, and proper orientation (these last two referring more specifically to the work that literature should do in the changing of attitudes). All selected material received the independent judgment of at least three readers, on all of whom periodic statistical checks were made to determine the extent of their agreement. The readers' judgments were weighted so as to make them comparable, and special study was made of all cases of wide disagreement. Before publication there was "a final editing in the light of the whole process and range of judgments." In view of the author's clear envisagement of his problem and of the careful procedure employed in its solution, the results that are presented may be considered trustworthy in a high degree. And it should be noted that tests carried on in the Institute have shown a "reasonably high positive correlation between children's ratings and the judgments of experts as to the character and cultural value of selections."

The investigators have offered their results in the form *first* of a *book list*, grouping the 663 recommended titles according to school grade, arranging them within each group in the order of their excellence, indicating the situations and moral attitudes involved in the story, and providing short comments; *second* of a *situations list*, in which the same titles are similarly graded and ranked but are grouped according to specific situations; *third* of an *attitudes index*, which lists in alphabetical order all the attitudes exhibited toward given situations and gives reference numbers to titles in the book list; *fourth* of a *classification index*, which provides "a grouping of material according to type, subject matter, and the background, with reference by number to the complete analysis in the book list."

Worthy of note is a feature that should be of value to students of genetic psychology as well as to all who are interested in character training. We refer to a chapter touching upon numerous works of fiction that throw light on the motivations and the inner life of children and of adolescents. This literature richly supplements one's own informal observations and supplies suggestions for further observations and for verification. Thus also it bridges the gap between haphazard experiences of children and scientific studies of them.

This account of the one volume of the series "A Guide to Books for Character" should express more effectively than could mere eulogistic words the high practical importance, as well as the careful scientific basis and procedure, of the enterprise. As one of its by-products we are now shortly to have a work "The Wonder Road," which, in its three volumes, will make conveniently available more than sixty of the selections that ranked highest in the study that was made of fairy tales, myths, and legends. Thus the children's book-shelf will receive a notable addition.

The work of the Institute is supported in part by Graduate College and other funds available to the State University of Iowa. The Institute, moreover, has received valuable co-operation from the Institute of Social and Religious Research. It is, furthermore, very specially indebted to the generosity of private individuals who have recognized the high value of its aims and the promise of its further fruitfulness in a supremely important field of inquiry and of social concern. Within recent months the State University of Iowa has put at its disposal an extensive section of East Hall, and thus the Institute is at present provided with satisfactory working quarters. It now remains to be hoped that the Institute may not be crippled or restricted in its activities by a lack of funds, but that it may be enabled to build up an organization within which its gifted leader may acquire an adequate number of effective collaborators and may make satisfactory provision for the permanence of the enterprise to which he has dedicated himself.

List of publications referred to above as growing out of the Institute:

[a] Lockhart, Earl G., "The Attitudes of Children toward Law," Iowa Studies in Character, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[b] Knight, Rachel, "The Founder of Quakerism," London: Swarthmore Press, 1922.

[c] Slaght, W. E., "Untruthfulness in Children: Its Causes and Setting in Child Nature," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. I, No. 4, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[d] Sinclair, R. D., "A Comparative Study of Those who Report the Experience of the Divine Presence and those who do Not," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. II, No. 3, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[e] Howells, Thomas H., "A Comparative Study of those who Accept as against those who Reject Religious Authority," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. II, No. 2, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[f] Shuttleworth, Frank K., "The Measurement of the Character and Environmental Factors Involved in Scholastic Success," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. I, No. 2, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[g] Franklin, S. P., "An Attempt to Measure the Comprehension Difficulty of the Precepts and Parables of Jesus," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. II, No. 1, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[h] Case, Ralph T., "A Study of the Placement in the Curriculum of Selected Teachings of the Old Testament Prophets," Iowa Studies in Character, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[i] Hightower, Pleasant R., "Biblical Information in Relation to Character and Conduct," Iowa Studies in Character, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[j] Manry, James C., "World Citizenship," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. I, No. 1, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[k] Searles, H. L., "A Study of Religion in State Universities," Iowa Studies in Character, Vol. I, No. 3, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[l] Shuttleworth, Frank K., "Statistical Studies in Children's Literature," Iowa Studies in Character, Department of Publications, State University of Iowa.

[m] Starbuck, Edwin D., assisted by Shuttleworth, Frank K., and Others, "A Guide to Literature for Character Training: Vol. I, Fairy Tale, Myth, and Legend," New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929.

[n] Starbuck, Edwin D., and Others, "A Guide to Books for Character: Vol. II, Fiction," New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930.

NOTE.—After the manuscript of the above article was already in the hands of the printer, announcement was made of the transfer of Professor Starbuck to the University of Southern California. There he is to inaugurate work similar to that undertaken in Iowa City by the Institute of Character Research. The activities of this latter organization, according to present reports, are to be continued under new direction.

ASMODEUS, DANDY AMONG DEMONS

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

OF all the demons of distinction, Asmodeus has had the greatest fall in power and prestige. This Asmodeus, who has now become a laughing-stock, was in his day, on the authority of Anatole France, our great contemporary diabolist, "an important demon, more powerful than Ashtaroth, Cedon, Uriel, Beelzebub, Aborym, Azazel, Dagon, Magog, Magon, Isaacharum, Accaron, Orphaxat, or Beherith, who are nevertheless devils not to be despised."[1] Asmodeus, according to the demonologists, originally was a shining angel in heaven, and, after his fall, was counted among the most eminent personages in hell. In fact he was linked with Lucifer and the other luminaries of limbo. Medieval writers called him "Prince of Demons." In the opinion of Pope Gregory IX, Asmodi was the name under which the Devil was worshipped by the Stedingers of Friesland in the thirteenth century.

But if the demon Asmodeus is now treated by the Christians with derision, he is still in favor with the Jews, among whom he has enjoyed great popularity to this day. The sons of Israel speak of Satan with respect, but for Asmodeus they evince a warm affection. The mention of the Tempter of Job fills them with fear and trembling, but Asmodeus is their darling devil. King Ashmodaï, as this demon is popularly known among the Jewish masses, plays a prominent part in Jewish mythology. Many legends have been woven by the rabbis around this "king of the shedhim," the demons who are the offspring of fallen angels and human mothers.[2]

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[1] Anatole France: "M. Maurice Bouchor et *l'Histoire de Tobie*," *le Temps*, December 8, 1899. Reprinted in *la Vie littéraire*, 3me série (1891), pp. 218-28. Quotations in this paper are taken from the English translation, *On Life and Letters*, 3rd series (1924), pp. 214-27.

[2] The *shedhim*, according to Talmudic tradition, are the demons who came from the union of the sons of heaven and the daughters of the earth, whereas the *satanim* are the fallen angels themselves. Samaël is regarded by the Talmud as the head of the latter group of demons.

Asmodeus himself, according to one Jewish tradition, is a *shed,* being the child of Shamdon, a fallen angel, and of Naamah, the sister of Tubal-Cain.[3] According to another Jewish tradition, however, he is the son of Samaël and Lilith.

The Jews claim Asmodeus as their own. The truth of the matter is that they borrowed him from the Persians during their captivity under Zoroastrian kings. Asmodeus is no other than Æshma-dæva who, in the Persian religion, is the personification of violent wrath and carnal lust. In *Friar Rush,* a romance of the sixteenth century, this demon is called "Prince of Lechery." In popular belief, he is the prince of pleasures, the patron of passions, and the lord of luxury and lust. LeSage, in his novel, *le Diable boiteux* (1707), has Asmodeus say himself, "I am the demon of lewdness, or to put it more splendidly, the god Cupid." This devil is sensuality in person.[4] In this capacity, he is the counterpart of Lilith, the demoness with the long golden hair. Just as Lilith is dangerous to men, so is Asmodeus dangerous to women. This danger to women from Asmodeus is due to the fact that he is the greatest dandy among the devils. For the Devil is most fascinating to fastidious women when he patronizes a good tailor.

Asmodeus, in addition to the qualities already mentioned, is also the father of new fads and fashions in dress, namely, the demon of frills and finery.[5] He is so fashionable that Calmet, the French demonologist of the eighteenth century, believed that the name Asmodeus signified fine dress.[6] This demon's beautiful clothes and fine manners represent the "pride of life" in Christian symbolism.

In this connection, the story told by Henry Stubbes, in his *Anatomie of Abuses* (1583), as a warning against the fashionable folly of starched ruffs, which prevailed in his day, will be of interest. According to this tale, there lived in Antwerp in 1582 a lady with a passion for dresses, the ruffs of which her washerwomen could never succeed in starching to her satisfaction. One day in a rage she flung the starched ruffs to the ground, swearing that the Devil might take her if she wore such things again. Straightway in came the Devil himself in the guise of an elegant young man, holding out to her a beautiful ruff which he offered to adjust for her. Having done this to the great satisfaction of the lady, he wrung her neck.[7]

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[3] Cf. Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1909-25), I, 150-51.

[4] This is the reason why Marcel Barrière named his highly sensual novel, *le Sang d'Asmodée* (1924).

[5] In Jewish mythology it is Azazel who has devised the cosmetics and jewelry, with which women attract men; cf. Louis Ginzberg, *op. cit.,* I, 125.

[6] Dom Augustin Calmet: *Dissertations sur les apparitions des anges, des démons et des esprits, sur les revenants et les vampires de Hongrie, de Bohème, de Moravie et de Silésie, Paris,* 1746. English translation (*The Phantom World; or, the History and Philosophy of Spirits and Apparitions*), 2 vols., London and Philadelphia, 1850.

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Asmodeus is primarily a ladies' demon. He tempts and torments especially the members of the fair sex. When he tries to bring men to fall, he employs women as his accomplices. "It is in this," says Anatole France, in the essay on Bouchor already quoted, "that his power lies in this world, especially among the white peoples." Asmodeus is the Don Juan among the devils. The story of his love-affairs would fill volumes. To attempt only to give the names of the ladies with whom he had a *liaison* would be beyond the powers even of the Recording Angel. This demon is often called the genius of matrimonial unhappiness. He is very cosmopolitan in his love-affairs, and disregards all tribal and ecclesiastical distinctions.

Tradition has it that Asmodeus plied Noah and Solomon with wine and seduced their wives. It is further recorded in the Book of Tobit (vi. 14) that this demon loved to distraction the beautiful Sarah, daughter of Raguel, and, out of jealousy, successively slew seven men to whom she was married as soon as each had entered the nuptial chamber. Asmodeus, you must know, is a fastidious devil and will not allow the object of his passions to be exposed to the embrace of any other person, terrestrial or infernal. His menace to newlyweds is, moreover, due to the fact that he maintains for himself a kind of *jus primæ noctis*. He claims this right probably as a reward for his successful efforts in obtaining from the Church the sacramental inclusion of marriage.[8] Raphael finally smoked him out of Sarah's chamber by the smell of fish-liver so that the angel's friend Tobias, who also loved Sarah, could marry her. Asmodeus, it should be mentioned, has delicate nostrils and cannot stand bad odors. The demon fled from the "fishy fume" to Upper Egypt with Raphael hot on his heels, and was finally bound by the angel in a cavern on the Nile, where the unfortunate demon long remained (Tob. viii. 3).[9]

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[7] This story may have formed the subject of the play, *Friar Rush and the Proud Woman of Antwerp*, written by Haughton and Day and mentioned by Henslowe on July 1, 1601; cf. Robert Dodsley: *A Select Collection of Old Plays* (12 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1744-80), I, 192. Professor Schelling, in "Some Features of the Supernatural as Represented in Plays of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James," *Modern Philology*, I (1903-4), 31-47, has put erroneously Amsterdam for Antwerp. Of interest in this connection is an old Breton legend, representing the Devil as a tailor. This legend was dramatized, in 1894, by Louis Ciercelin and published with the title *le Diable couturier*.

> "For he was still there in 1707 [says Anatole France in the essay on Bouchor already quoted], when a Rouen goldsmith called Paul Lucas, going up the Nile to Fayoum, saw and spoke to him, as he assures us in the story of his voyage, which was published in 1719, and forms three volumes in 12mo with maps and drawings. Few facts are better attested. None the less, this fact is embarrassing. For it is certain, on the other hand, that he was in Loudun on the 29th day of May, 1624; as he wrote on that day, in the register of the Church of Sainte-Croix, a declaration by which he engaged himself to torment Mme de Belciel, whom, in fact, he did torment. The document is preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale, in the department of manuscripts, where anyone may use it. It is equally certain that in 1635, in the same town of Loudun, he possessed Sister Agnes, who was seized with convulsions in the presence of the Duke of Orleans. She refused to kiss the pyx, and twisted herself so that she formed a perfect circle, her hands touching her feet. Meanwhile she uttered horrible blasphemies.[10] At this period Asmodeus appeared before the Bishop of Poitiers; and as Paul Lucas found him in Egypt, it must be supposed that the devil left his cavern whenever he pleased, and that the angel Gabriel (*sic*) did not tie him up well. . . .
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> "After Colbert's edict forbidding devils to torment ladies, Asmodeus appeared in France only in the excellent company of LeSage, the author of *Gil Blas*. Asmodeus

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[8] Mephistopheles in Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus* (ii.1), on the other hand, is opposed to marriage.

[9] Maurice Bouchor, who, in 1889, has dramatized this story, has not taken the jealous Asmodeus very seriously.

[10] Anatole France has reference to the famous episode of the Devils of Loudun, in which the priest Urbain Grandier was accused of having handed over the Ursuline nuns to the demons. This very interesting case of diabolical possession in modern times was treated by Alfred de Vigny in his romance, *Cinq-Mars* (1826). See also [Aubin:] *Histoire des diables de Loudun, ou de la Possession des religieuses Ursulines et de la condemnation et du supplice d'Urbain Grandier, curé de la même ville* (Amsterdam, 1737). A popular essay on "The Devils of Loudun" appeared in the *National Review*, XI (1860), 70-93.

> lost his theology here, but he became a man of wit. He was then playing a rather low game, but it was at least a cheerful one."

The work to which Anatole France refers in this passage is LeSage's already quoted work, *le Diable boiteux.* In this novel, a young Spanish student from Alcala, named Don Cleophas Leandro Zambullo, for whom, on a certain evening, an ambush was laid by his perfidious mistress, escapes by jumping from roof to roof until he lands in a neighboring garret, which happens to be the laboratory of a magician. Upon entering this garret, he is besought by a voice out of a phial to deliver the speaker from durance by breaking the glass-bottle. The request is complied with, and the imprisoned sprite turns out to be Asmodeus. In gratitude, the demon bestows upon his rescuer the power to sail through the air, and brings him upon the tower of the Church of San Salvador in Madrid. From this vantage-point, by lifting the roofs of all the houses of the Spanish capital with a sign from his right hand, he shows the student the secret sights of a big city at midnight. With a cynical amusement the demon then explains to his friend the sufferings, transports and agitations thus revealed. The new confederates also journey to the different parts of Spain. The good-natured and grateful Asmodeus assists the student Cleophas in his various pranks and carries him triumphantly through a series of amusing adventures. He even takes the shape of his human companion in rescuing a young lady of high birth and thereby procures for his liberator a prosperous marriage. In the end, Asmodeus is recaptured and put back into the phial by the powerful conjurer with the help of envious demons.

In this novel, Asmodeus shows himself an excellent critic of men and morals, and a splendid satirist of the follies and foibles of the human family. As a result of this feat, he became very popular in France and even in other countries. His friends imposed upon him and had him lift the roof of every house for them so that they might see the life that went on within. He was called upon so often to perform the job of roofer, or still better, of unroofer, that, as it was said, "he was not even given the time to get dressed."

Through this novel, Asmodeus won a respectable position in French literature, and his resulting renown did much to bring about in France the friendly feeling for the Fiend which has long been a marked characteristic of the literature of that country. A great number of books, periodicals and newspapers have gained popularity through this demon's name for half a century following the publication of LeSage's novel.[11]

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Asmodeus has many other accomplishments and achievements to his credit. He is also a scholar, the most learned master of arts and the most prominent professor at his alma mater, the astrological college founded by the fallen angels Asa and Asael. Asmodeus is versed in the black arts and well known for his occult wisdom. In this quality, he is the successor to Thoth, the god of wisdom and learning in Thermopolis, who was identified by the Egyptians with Sirius, the god of occult and infernal arts.

Asmodeus is also a great philosopher, deriving his ideas from the various schools of thought. "Asmodeus is the very philosophy of all ages summed up in a caricature," says Jules Janin, the French dramatic critic.

Asmodeus also has a reputation for slyness and subtlety. In fact he is the most cunning spirit of hell (Goethe's *Faust* ii. 6961). This demon cheated Aladdin out of his ring in order to secure the magic lamp, and he also tricked Solomon out of his signet ring in order to obtain possession of the latter's harem. The Jewish monarch had great need of Asmodeus when he built the temple at Jerusalem. He wished to learn from this versatile demon the whereabouts of the worm *Shamir,* which splits and shapes stones noiselessly.[12] During their negotiations, the wisest of men and the wisest of demons fought many a duel of wits. Asmodeus propounded difficult questions which Solomon was able to answer only with the help of his ring. The demon then tempted the king to lay aside the ring. He taunted Solomon with the challenge that all his wisdom lay in his ring and that he would be but an ordinary mortal without it. Solomon, being piqued into a denial and proudly thinking that he could answer the demon's questions by his unaided intelligence, rashly removed the ring. But the demon seized it, and, having by its might metamorphosed the monarch beyond recognition and transported him four hundred miles away, he himself assumed the appearance of Solomon, and for three years resided in the royal seraglio. According to this tradition, Asmodeus was the real author of the offences which history ascribes to the Jewish king. Solomon, after a long vagrancy, became the cook of the king of Amon. One day, as he was dressing a fish for dinner, he found in it the ring which Asmodeus had thrown into the sea, and with its aid he recovered from the demon his throne and his harem. As a punishment Solomon imprisoned Asmodeus together with many other demons in a bottle of black glass, which he cast into a deep well near Babylon. But the Babylonians, hoping to find a treasure in this well, descended into it, broke the bottle, and thus liberated the demons.[13]

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[11] Among the books named after Asmodeus, mention may be made of S. Foote's farce *The Devil on Two Sticks* (1768); *Asmodeus; or, The Devil in London* (3 vols., London, 1808); William Combe: *The Devil Upon Two Sticks in England* (6 vols., London, 1817); and *Asmodeus in New York, or, Society and Manners in Gotham* (New York, 1868). Among the periodicals which bore his name, may be mentioned the following: *le Diable boiteux; journal critique et littéraire* (1810-1826); *le Diable boiteux; recueil politique et littéraire* (1818); *Asmodée,* a satirical periodical founded by the poet Louis Berthaud in Lyons in 1833; *le Diable boiteux; journal politique, véridique, charivarique,* a review started in 1848; *le diable boiteux à l'assemblée nationale,* a journal founded likewise in 1848 by Ch. Tondeur to report the deliberations of the French deputies; *le Diable boiteux,* which ran as a "feuilleton littéraire" in the *Journal des spectacles, des mœurs, des arts et des modes* from 1823 to 1825; *Asmodée à New York; revue critique des institutions politiques et civiles de l'Amérique; vie publique et privée, mœurs, coutumes, anecdotes romanesques, etc.* (Paris, 1868).

[12] Cf. Louis Ginzberg, *op. cit.,* IV. 166 ff.

Asmodeus is, moreover, the diabolic patron of letters and arts and even has literary aspirations himself. In his modesty, he refuses to publish anything under his own name, but he has helped many another writer. Among the great authors who owe their inspiration to this demon, we will mention Boccaccio, who is said to have composed his *Decameron* from the dictation of this demon, who thus wished to take his revenge on the monks, who maligned him.

But Asmodeus with all his learning has remained a play-boy. He is, in fact, an arch-Bohemian, a charlatan, a juggler and a mountebank. Asmodeus played a prominent part in the deviltry of the Middle Ages and charmed our ancestors with his tricks and antics.

Asmodeus is also addicted to gaming and card-playing. According to Johannes Wierus, the famous German demonologist, he is the banker at the *baccarat* table in the casino of hell and the superintendent of gambling houses on earth.

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[13] Cf. Moncure Daniel Conway: *Solomon and Solomonic Literature.* Chicago, 1899.

In brief, Asmodeus is the most energetic of all demons. He is, as he himself claims in the already quoted LeSage's novel, "the liveliest and the most laborious devil in hell." Asmodeus explains his profession in this book as follows: "I arrange ridiculous marriages; I unite gray-beards with minors, masters with servants, and ill-dowered girls with tender lovers who have no fortune. I am he that introduced into society extravagance, debauchery, games of chance, and chemistry. I am the inventor of tournaments, dances, music, comedy, and the new French fashions. . . ." But the foregoing list by no means exhausts the multitudinous and various tasks of our demon, who has all the world for his province.

Asmodeus is also the most sympathetic of all the demons of hell. He is the most engaging of friends, ready to lend a hand when man is at the end of his natural resources. Shakespeare was very fond of him, and called him Modo for short.

Asmodeus has a very pleasing personality and is as beautiful as Apollo. But he has one physical defect. He limps slightly with one foot. The demonologists say that he may be recognized by the fact that one of his limbs is like a cock's leg. The other is normal, but provided with claws. In LeSage's novel, Asmodeus appears walking with the aid of two sticks, which support will account for the English title of the book, *The Devil on Two Sticks*. His portrait, drawn by Collin de Plancy, was approved by the Archbishop of Paris. But Anatole France, in the essay on Bouchor already mentioned several times, with good reason, doubts whether it is a faithful likeness. Whatever his proper shape may be, it is known that, in order to appear among men, he adopts various forms, all of which are engaging. His manners are always refined, and his conduct is that of a perfect gentleman. It may well be said that, through Asmodeus, the Devil has become perilously associated with wit and wisdom, gaiety and gallantry, *finesse* and finery.

PAUL, ALIAS SIMON THE MAGICIAN

BY ROBERT P. RICHARDSON

DEVOTION to historical truth has never been the distinguishing feature of religious writings, and nowhere has its lack been more in evidence than in the orthodox works dealing with Paul, the Christian saint. Here the reverential attitude taken by modern Christians towards their canonical scriptures have made them reluctant even to listen to hostile extra-biblical accounts of Paul's career. To take this stand is obviously to stultify common sense which bids us give at least a hearing to the enemies of a historic personage and not trust solely to the *ex parte* tales of himself and his friends. Yet not satisfied with leaving entirely out of consideration the accusations that tradition says his enemies levelled against him, his modern admirers are even unwilling to accept Paul's own story when this runs counter to their preconceptions of apostolic harmony.

That controversy soon arose between Paul and the original disciples of Jesus is clearly evinced in Paul's *Epistle to the Galatians.* The Galatians, we here learn, had "quickly" fallen away from their newly acquired Christian faith as taught to them by Paul, and had harkened to certain persons who "would pervert the gospel of Christ." These perverters, it appears, were Judaizers, that is Christians who contended that no one could be saved, even though he believed in Christ, without submitting to the restrictions of the Mosaic law, which for the Gentile converts to Christianity had as prime condition circumcision. Paul, on the contrary, affirmed that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law," and warned the Gentile Christians not to become circumcised, saying: "Behold, I Paul, say unto you, that if ye receive circumcision, Christ will profit you nothing." He held that a Jew, though circumcised, by becoming a Christian released himself from all obligation to obey the

Jewish law, but contended that a Gentile who on conversion to Christianity took the first step of submitting to circumcision thereby obligated himself to the whole Mosaic code. "Yea, I testify again to every man that receiveth circumcision, that he is debtor to do the whole law." So firmly did Paul adhere to the doctrine that he had originated that he admonished the Galatians: "though we or an angel from heaven should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema." He asserted that "as touching the gospel which was preached by me . . . neither did I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came to me through revelation of Jesus Christ." What is implied here is that the Judaizing mischief-makers were trying to destroy the confidence of the Galatian Christians in Paul by showing the divergence of his teachings from those of the personal disciples of Jesus, and to obviate this difficulty Paul boldly repudiated the authority of the apostles who had known Jesus during the latter's earthly career, and contended that his own "revelations" from Christ in heaven, obtained when Paul was in a state of ecstasy, completely superseded what Christ was known to have taught while on earth.

Paul was anxious to show his followers that he had never submitted to the authority of the original apostles, and in doing this gave a resume of his career which, from a historical standpoint, is invaluable. He told how in the beginning he persecuted "the church of God, and made havoc of it; and I advanced in the Jews' religion beyond many of mine own age among my countrymen, being exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers." However, it pleased God "to reveal his son in me, that I might preach him among the Gentiles," or, in other words, he became a convert to Christianity—of a sort. This conversion, as we learn elsewhere, was occasioned, not by the exhortations of those who were Christians before him, but by a vision vouchsafed him direct from heaven as he was on his way to Damascus. And "immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood; neither went I up to Jerusalem to them that were apostles before me; but I went away into Arabia; and again I returned to Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to visit Cephas, and tarried with him fifteen days. But other of the apostles saw I none, save James, the Lord's brother. . . . Then I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia. And I was still unknown by face unto the churches of Judaea which were in Christ; but they only heard say: 'He that once persecuted us now preacheth the faith of which he once made havoc'; and they glorified God in me."

At first the Jerusalem Mother Church was content to let Paul go his own way while converting the Gentiles and made no attempt to meddle with him and his converts. "After the space of fourteen years," continues Paul, "I went up again to Jerusalem, with Barnabas, taking Titus also with me. And I went up by revelation; and I laid before them the gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but privately before them which were of repute, lest by any means I should be running or had run in vain." Conybeare[1] comments that the gospel which Paul thus laid before the Jerusalem apostles "he had evolved out of his own inner consciousness, so we are not surprised to learn . . . . that he only laid it 'privately before them who were of repute.' It was clearly so remote from the gospel with which the mass of believers were familiar in the very home and diocese of Christ himself that it was expedient not to communicate it to them. We infer that if he had broached it to them there would have been such a general outcry against him as would have deprived him of the 'liberty in Jesus Christ' which he and his converts enjoyed; and he 'would be running' in the future and 'have run' in the past 'in vain.' " Paul emerged triumphant from the ordeal, and tells us that "Not even Titus who was with me, being a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised." Evidently the trend of Paul's remarks, here and elsewhere, puts beyond the bounds of credibility the statement of *Acts* XVI, 3 that in the neighborhood of Derbe and Lystra, "because of the Jews that were in those parts," Paul circumcised a Christian offspring of a Greek father and a Jewish mother. As has been well said: "No manipulation can obliterate the fact that the St. Paul of the *Acts* differs considerably from the St. Paul of such Epistles as rightly bear his name; so that the alternative lies between believing his own words, or those of the unknown writer who describes him long after in the *Acts of the Apostles,*" and unfortunately it is still the prevalent custom to accept the latter alternative—the natural result of making apostolic harmony the criterion of Pauline biography. A rational view of the career of Paul must have taken contrary ground and in consequence recognize that the contentions of the Tuebingen School were substantially correct and that relations between Paul and the Jerusalem apostles were by no means uniformly harmonious.[2]

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[1] *Myth, Magic and Morals,* third ed. 1925, p. 15.

There were in evidence, according to Paul's account, Judaizers in the Mother Church who desired to subject Paul and his Gentile converts to the Mosaic law. He describes these as "the false brethren privily brought in, who came in privily to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus that they might bring us into bondage," but denies having yielded to them even temporarily: "to whom we gave way in the place of subjection, no not for an hour; that the truth of the gospel might continue with you." To be regarded as in any way subordinate to the original apostles was highly repugnant to Paul: "I reckon that I am not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles" (2 *Cor.* XI, 5). He assures the Galatians that he learned nothing from those whom he met in Jerusalem. "Those who were reputed to be somewhat," he says, "they . . . who were of repute imparted nothing to me; but contrariwise, when they saw that I had been intrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision as Peter with the gospel of the circumcision (for he that wrought for Peter unto the apostleship of the circumcision wrought for me also unto the Gentiles); and when they perceived the grace that had been given unto me, James and Cephas and John, they who were reputed to be pillars, gave unto me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, that we should go unto the Gentiles and they unto the circumcision; only they would that we should remember the poor; which very thing I was also zealous to do. But when Cephas came to Antioch, I resisted him to the face, because he stood condemned. For before that certain came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles; but when they came, he drew back and separated himself, fearing them that were of the circumcision. And the rest of the Jews dissembled likewise with him, insomuch that even Barnabas was carried away with their dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas, before them all: 'If thou, being a Jew livest as do the Gentiles and not as do the Jews, how compelleth thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?' "

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[2] The harmonious relation which is commonly assumed to have existed between the Apostle Paul and the Jewish Christians with the older Apostles at their head is unhistorical." F. C. Baur: *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, his life and work, his epistles and his doctrine, a contribution to a critical history of primitive Christianity,* V.I, p. V.

It would seem then that while the Mother Church had at first been willing to tolerate the ignoring of the Mosaic law by the Gentile converts, it had later taken quite another stand. And the reason for this is to be found in *Galatians* VI, 12-13 where Paul says of those who "compel you to be circumcised" that they do this "only that they may not be persecuted for the cross of Christ. For not even they who receive circumcision do themselves keep the law, but they desire to have you circumcised, that they may glory in your flesh." In other words, when Christianity merely manifested itself as a particular school of the old Judaism, the Jewish Christians were in large measure tolerated by the other Jews, notwithstanding a certain laxity in practice concerning the law which they continued nominally to accept *in toto.* But when uncircumcised Gentile Christians arose who could claim as coreligionaries the Jewish Christians, the latter began to be regarded as renegades to Jewry and suffered from the animosity of the Jews who had not accepted Christ. An attempt was being made at the time Paul wrote to avoid this persecution by forcing circumcision and the law on even the Gentiles whom Paul had converted to Christianity, so that the Jewish Christians might in face of the other Jews, glory in what Christianity had accomplished towards the spread of Judaism. The attempt was not successful; it was Paulinism, not the doctrine of the Mother Church which survived and became the progenitor of the "Christian" religion of our day.[3] For many years, however, there was conflict between two bitterly hostile factions of Christians, the one taking the point of view of Paul, and the other that of James, the brother of Jesus. The believers who adhered to the original Christianity of Jesus as transmitted to posterity by his brother and those who had followed the Prophet of Nazareth in his lifetime, and hence refused to accept the innovations of Paul, were, in post-apostolic times, known as Ebionites, that is "Poor Men," this designation being probably a sneer, directed by the more prosperous Pauline Christians at their poverty. The name Nazarene was also used to designate them, and one ancient historian, Epiphanius, draws a distinction between these two terms, under which the Nazarenes are described as less intransigeant than the Ebionites, though it is doubtful whether there were really two distinct sects known by these names.

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[3] Even the most liberal theologians are inclined to balk at full recognition of this fact, and to take the stand that by some sort of compromise there was ultimately effected a reconciliation between the Judaizers and the Paulinists. And in fact it is not surprising that a biblical critic who finds it convenient to remain a member of some modern "Christian" Church should be loath to stultify himself by admitting he belongs to a religious body whose spiritual lineage is essentially anti-Christian.

All the Judaizers held to the reputed saying of Jesus found in our present Bible: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. . . . Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." (*Matthew,* V, 17-18.) In this they differed strikingly from the Pauline Christians of their own day and the orthodox Christians of ours. The less strict Judaizers, though they themselves adhered to the law, were willing to concede that Gentile converts were not bound by the Jewish ordinances and to grant Paul the rank of an apostle—but of an apostle to the Gentiles alone. They strenuously objected however, to the Jews among the Pauline converts breaking the Mosaic law.

The more intransigeant Ebionites had a horror of Paul and all his works, and contended that the real acceptance of Christ, with Gentile as well as with Jew, necessitated circumcision and strict obedience to the Mosaic law. In the canonical Christian Scriptures there has survived what is very like an Ebionite work the so-called *Revelations of St. John the Divine.* Whatever view may be taken of the main body of the work the exhortations of the first three chapters to the "seven Churches of Asia" have plain reference to the factional disputes of the Christians of the day, and give us some interesting revelations as to the feelings of the Judaizers towards the followers of Paul. The writer was evidently a Jewish Christian who adhered to the old Jewish law and abhorred all Christians who did not submit to its yoke. He regarded the true Christians as *ipse facto* numbered among the Children of Israel, and heartily hated the brand of Christianity which disregarded the ordinances of Judaism. There can be no questions but that it is Pauline Christianity which is referred to in such passages as "the blasphemies of them which say they are Jews, and are not, but are a synagogue of Satan," "thou [the Church of Ephesus] hast tried them which say they are apostles and are not, and hast found them liars" and "thou [the Church of Pergamum] hast there some that hold the teachings of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumbling block before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed to idols, and to commit fornication." Chief among those whom the Ebionites classed as liars, falsely claiming to be Jews and apostles, was Paul. We know from his Epistles how hard pressed he was to maintain his claims to apostolic dignity, and from other sources we find that his opponents did not always admit his claims to Jewish blood. For though, according to the *Epistle to the Phillipians,* Paul was originally "of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; as touching zeal, persecuting the church; as touching the righteousness which is in the law, found blameless," we learn from Epiphanius that the Ebionites had a different tale to tell. Their tradition, which would seem to be the more congruous with the assertion in *Acts* XXII, 28 that Paul was "a Roman born," alleged that Paul was not a Jew by birth but a "Greek," born of Gentile parents. Going to Jerusalem and settling there he had aspired to marry the daughter of the High Priest. With this in view he became a proselyte to Judaism and submitting to circumcision and accepting the yoke of the Jewish law, made himself prominent as a persecutor of the followers of Jesus. He was however frustrated in his ambition and did not obtain the spouse he desired, this, declared the Ebionites, being the cause of his coming over to the side of the Christians. It was, they said, to revenge himself for the affront put upon him by the High Priest that Paul decried circumcision, the Sabbath and the whole Mosaic law.

Paul, as we know, explicitly repudiated the Jewish law, saying "All things are lawful for me." (1 *Cor.* X, 23.) He taught his followers to eat meat set before them without too closely inquiring into its origin (1 *Cor.* X, 25-27, VIII, 4-8) at a time when aside from the strictly kosher fare of the Jews practically all the meat eaten was the by-product of idolatrous sacrifices. The liberalism of Paul in this respect, though endorsed by the practice of the orthodox Christians in succeeding ages, was in flagrant disaccord even with the apostolic decision recorded in *Acts* XV, 20: that converts to Christianity must abstain "from the pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from what is strangled, and from blood." The best opinion of biblical critics is indeed that this alleged decision was never made by an apostolic council but represents merely the terms on which the author of *Acts* thought the differences between Ebionites and Paulinists might be compromised. And there is no ground for believing that the compromise thus proposed in the guise of a decree of apostolic times was ever accepted by any considerable body of Christians of either faction. Moreover, as Zeller has pointed out, if James really entertained the principles which *Acts* represents him as enunciating at this apostolic council, if when he granted Paul the field of labor claimed by the latter he was not merely yielding to the force of an accomplished fact, but was also himself convinced that the Mosaic law was not binding on the Gentiles and openly and decidedly acted on this conviction, it is quite inconceivable how he could have been the highest authority of a party which everywhere zealously opposed the freedom of the Gentile Christians and assailed Paul, who advocated this, so vehemently and malignantly. Peter, likewise, can by no means have stood as far aloof from the Judaizers as *Acts* would have us believe. On the other hand if the Pauline faction had been unanimous in approving the adhesion of the Jewish Christians to the Mosiac law, the unquenchable hatred of the Ebionites against Paul and Pauline Christianity would have been incomprehensible. Ultimately the uncompromising Paulinists became predominant in Christianity, and succeeded is stigmatising as "heretics" the Ebionites, that is the Christians who held to the line of tradition handed down from the personal disciples of Jesus. Even with such of these as had become resigned to the violation of the Mosaic ordinances by the Gentile Christians and maintained these ordinances to be binding on the Jewish Christians alone, heresy was found, as we see from the fact of the "Nazarenes" who took this stand being denominated heretics by Epiphanius. And unquestionably any Christian faction which had accepted the decree imagined by the author of *Acts* and endeavored to constrain the Gentile Christians to conform to the Noachic ordinances (as those laid down by the alleged Apostolic Council are sometimes called) would have been more remote from orthodox "Christianity" than the Nazarenes and would in the time of Epiphanius have been deemed far more heretical. The Catholic Church has done all in her power to destroy the documents giving the Judaistic side of the controversy between Paulinists and Judaizers. But modern scholarship, by a cricial survey of the data that has survived, has enabled us to read between the lines in many cases, and has shed much light on the relations between Ebionism and Pauline or "orthodox" Christianity.

The Balaam so vigorously denounced in *Revelations* is almost certainly Paul[4] and Balak is presumably one of his chief lieutenants, perhaps Barnabas, though it is possible that some particularly uncompromising Ebionite, writing this denunciation, might couple together, under the names of Balaam and Balak, Paul and Peter, blaming the latter almost as severely as the former for this casting of a stumbling block before the children of Israel. Peter, by Paul's account, was shifty and evasive, and might have appeared to some of the extreme Ebionites as a traitor to their cause, though most of them supposed him to have shared their own views and to have been an invincible opponent of Paul. According to *Galatians* Peter, at Antioch, had no scruple in following the lead of Paul and disregarding the Jewish taboo against eating with Gentiles, until he saw there was danger of the news reaching James, when he timidly took on the yoke once more, while Paul openly defied the authority of the Bishop of Jerusalem. And incidentally it is noteworthy that here we are shown the spectacle of him to whom alone—the modern Catholic Church tells us—was given the power to bind and loosen on earth and in heaven: Peter, the first Pope, upon whose right to dominion depends all the authority of the Papacy, going around in fear and trembling of another leader and recognizing the superior authority of James. The "Clementine" *Recognitions* (IV, 35) gives an endorsement of this view of the supremacy of James, Peter being here quoted as telling his audience to "believe no teacher unless he brings from Jerusalem the testimony of James, the Lord's brother, or of whosoever may come after him," there being here no hint of Petrine supremacy or of authority of the see of Rome. The words can hardly be authentic, but they are interesting as showing that those who looked upon Peter as the champion of Ebionism as well as those who claimed he sanctioned the opposing doctrine of Paul, alike accepted as a matter of course the supremacy of James.

Most of the Judaizers, as has been said, claimed Peter as one of their champions, and the heretical work which corresponded to the orthodox *Acts of the Apostles* was usually referred to as *The Circuits of Peter.* This Circuits of Peter was an Ebionite Scripture alleged to have Clement of Rome as author, and there are still extant writings purporting to be the account, sent by Clement to James, the brother of the Lord, of Clement's own conversion and his adventures as a companion of Peter. The story survives in two forms: the one in Greek, under the title of the Clementine *Homilies* and the other in a Latin translation by Rufinus, called the Clementine *Recognitions.* Both are regarded as having the Circuits of Peter as basis, though the narrative has undoubtedly been much garbled by the redactors. We notice in the "Clementine" writings passages in which ring unmistakably the voice of those early Christians who hated Paul, and these passages are in all probability part of the original tradition, since (as it has been put by Schmiedel) it is "psychologically impossible" that Paul should have been so intensely hated by Christians in later days.

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[4] For the grounds for identifying Balaam with Paul see an article by the present writer, *Jesus and Jewish Tradition,* in a future number of *The Open Court.*

That the Recognitions and Homilies which accredit themselves to Clement of Rome cannot be from his hand has long been known, but it was reserved for the brilliant critics of the Tuebingen School to discover that these works contained a bitter attack on Paul whose name is veiled under the alias of Simon the Magician. Whether the original Circuits likewise abstained from properly naming Paul in attacking him cannot be ascertained, but it is not impossible that this course may have been followed. Each of the Christian factions may have feared to make too open an attack on the other lest the scandal arising thereby should react to their own injury and excite the derision of their pagan and Jewish enemies. An expression of this fear is found in a parable which the *Gospel of Matthew* (XII, 24-30) attributes to Jesus, but which is thought to have really been an interpolation, originating at a later date during the conflict between the Ebionites and the Pauline Christians. In this Parable of the Tares among the Wheat an enemy (Paul) sows tares (false teachings) among the wheat (the original teachings of Jesus preached by the true apostles). When the growing tares make their appearance to the discomfit of the Master he cries out "An enemy hath done this" (Jesus being thus represented as emphatically condemning the work of Paul) whereupon his servants (certain over-zealous Ebionites) wish to pull the tares up by the roots. But he refuses to allow this lest the wheat too be uprooted, saying that both were to be permitted to grow until the harvest (the Judgment Day), when the reapers should first gather the tares (the Pauline Christians) and burn them, subsequently reaping the wheat (the Ebionite Christians) and putting it in his barn: that is, the Pauline Christians were foredoomed to hell, while the Ebionites alone would be granted entry into heaven.

An attack on Paul which appeared on its face to be against some one else outside the Christian fold could easily prove too subtle for Christian readers of later generations, who might take it at its face value, especially if the ultimate transcriber purposely modified what he could not suppress, and turned an unseemly attack on a fellow Christian into an edifying tale of controversy with a Samaritan magician. This, it is thought, is precisely what has happened with several passages that have found their way into the orthodox Scriptures, notably the story told in *Acts* VIII, 9-24. Here, remarks Zeller, if "we substitute the name Paul for that of Simon we have a narrative which says in a historical form what according to 2 *Cor.* XI, 4 sq., XII, 11 sq., 1 *Cor.* IX, 1 sq. the anti-Pauline Judaists affirmed as a general truth." And it is held that the redactor who gave to *Acts* its present form, perfectly aware of the true import of the story, to forestall any application of it by his readers to Paul, placed it before the latter's conversion in the narrative, thus falsifying the historical order of facts. Simon in the tale is represented as proffering money for the purchase of apostolic powers, and this seems to have been the Ebionite version of Paul's transaction with the Jerusalem Mother Church, whereby he bargained for liberty to proselytize in Christ's name as Apostle to the Gentiles, agreeing in return to contribute funds towards the support of the poor among the Jerusalem Christians. Paul, the Ebionites held, was, through his collections for the Jerusalem Saints (see 1 *Cor.* XVI, 1-3 and *Gal.* II, 10) attempting to purchase an apostleship; to bribe the Mother Church into recognizing him as a true apostle by means of the contributions of his Gentile converts to the needy Christians of Jerusalem. The feature of "Simon" offering money that he too might have the power of imparting the Holy Ghost by the laying on of hands implies the thought that the power of conferring the Holy Ghost belonged exclusively to the apostles, and this (it has been shown) is an anachronism, being an unhistorical transferrence of the ideas of a later age into the times of the primitive Church. An interesting fact is that from this passage arose the horror Christians of later days professed for "simony," i.e. the purchase and sale of offices in the Church. In *Acts* "Simon's" offer is rejected with scorn, but according to Paul's story the transaction was carried through successfully, and in his Epistles he frequently reminds his followers to keep on sending to the Mother Church the subsidies which were the consideration he had promised to pay for recognition as Apostle to the Gentiles. Now it was from Pauline Christianity, not from the Ebionite Mother Church, that the orthodox "Christian" Church took its rise, and it must hence perforce be admitted that the whole of modern "Christianity" is tainted by simony at the very root.

The Pseudo-Clementine Homolies and Recognitions are two variations of a single tale of the adventures of Clement and preachings of Peter. Clement is portrayed as accompanying the apostle in a missionary tour beginning at Caesaria Stratonia and extending northward along the coast-lands of Syria as far as Antioch. The original Circuits of Peter would thus seem to have been a sort of Ebionite Acts of the Apostles, and even orthodox tradition admits as authentic a portion of this Ebionite work, though claiming that the greater part of the Circuits was a heretical fabrication. In the Clementines Paul is doubly assailed, on the one hand under the alias of Simon, on the other under the cognomen of the Enemy, the latter referring particularly to Paul's activities before he became a Christian. The Ebionite story is that once James, the brother of the Lord, was preaching in Jerusalem and the conversion of the whole populace of that city was imminent, when "The Enemy," that is, Paul, raised a tumult in the Temple where James was preaching, and caused the brother of the Lord to be thrown headlong down the steps of the edifice. As a result, the expected conversion of Jerusalem never took place, and The Enemy proceeded to Damascus where he had been commissioned by Caiphas to carry on his deadly work.

The animus of the author is clearly shown in the preface to the Homilies, where in a letter alleged to have been written by Peter to James, we find remarks that the most conservative scholars are constrained to admit are aimed at Paul. "For some of the converts from the Gentiles have rejected the preaching through me in accord with the law, having accepted a certain lawless and babbling doctrine of The Enemy. And this some people have attempted while I am still alive, by various interpretations to transform my words, unto the overthrow of the law; as though I taught thus, but did not preach it openly, which be far from me. For to do so is to act against the law of God as spoken through Moses, the eternal duration of which is borne witness to by our Lord. Since he said thus: 'Heaven and earth shall pass away; one jot or tittle shall not pass away from the law.' Now he said this that all might be fulfilled. But they professing somehow to know my mind, attempted to expound the words they heard from me more wisely that I who spoke them, telling those who are instructed by themselves that this is my meaning, which I never thought of. But if they venture on such falsehoods while I am still alive, how much more when I am gone will those who come after me dare to do so."

The Simon of the Clementines cannot in every respect be identified with Paul, as there has been here put in the mouth of Simon doctrines which it was desired to refute but were not precisely Pauline. Especially is this noticeable as regards the Gnostic doctrines which the Ebionites probably regarded as the logical outcome of Paulinism. The "Christianity" of the Gnostics was more remote even than that of Paul from the earthly teachings of Jesus. Some Gnostics, in fact, utterly repudiated the God of the Old Testament, and represented him as the Lord of Evil, between whom and the Lord of Good: the God of the New Testament, revealed by Jesus Christ, there was an irrepressible conflict. The real Simon Magus, as depicted by such writers as do nothing towards identifying him with Paul, was indeed the reputed father of Gnosticism, being a native of Samaria, many of the people of that country having accepted his doctrines and his leadership. In giving the alias of Simon to Paul the Ebionites were able to express their contempt for the Pauline Christians by likening them to the Samaritans who had long vainly endeavored to secure their recognition as part of the chosen people. The Pauline demand that the uncircumcised be acknowledged as partakers in the Messianic salvation seemed, in fact, to the Judaizers, simply an attempt on the part of the heathen to intrude themselves into Israel. As Zeller puts it: "There was no more descriptive expression to denote the opinion of the severe Jewish Christians respecting Paulinism that to proclaim the Pauline uncircumcised Gentile Christians Samaritans." Another reason for giving Paul the alias of Simon may have been the fact that there was a Simon of ill repute connected with Felix, that Procurator of Judaea mentioned in *Acts* XXIII and XXIV and there depicted as inclined to shield Paul from his Jewish enemies. This Simon, Josephus tells us, was a Jew, claiming magical powers, who acted as a pander and go-between for Felix in the latter's amours with Drusilla, the wife of Azizus, King of Emesa.

"Simon" who taught a "Christianity" all his own, maintained (according to the seventeenth Homily) that he had a better knowledge of the doctrines of Jesus than the disciples who had seen and conversed with the Lord. As ground for this presumptious statement he alleged that visions were as superior to waking reality as the divine is superior to the human. He is quoted as saying to Peter: "You professed that you had well understood the doctrines and deeds of your teacher because you saw them before you with your own eyes, and heard them with your ears, and that it is not possible for any other to have anything similar by vision or apparition. But I shall show that this is false. He who hears anyone with his own ears, is not altogether fully assured of the truth of what is said; for his mind has to consider whether he is wrong or not inasmuch as he is a man as far as appearance goes. But apparition not merely presents an object to view, but inspires him who sees it with confidence, for it comes from God." Peter, in a crushing retort, remarks: "But can anyone be educated for teaching by visions? And if you shall say 'It is possible' why did the Teacher converse with waking men for a whole year?[5] And how can he have appeared to you seeing that your sentiments are opposed to his teaching? But if you were seen and taught by him for a single hour, and so became an apostle, then preach his words, expound his meaning, love his apostles, fight not with me who had converse with him. . . . If you call me 'condemned' you are accusing God who revealed the Christ to me, and are inveigling against him who called me blessed on the ground of the revelation. But if indeed you truly wish to work along with the truth, learn first what we learnt from him, and when you have become a disciple of truth become our fellow workman."

The insinuation here that Paul did not preach and expound the doctrines of Jesus is wholly justified by all that we know of the early Christian Church. For it is a curious fact that in the Epistles of Paul we find hardly a reference to any of the teachings of Jesus recorded in the Gospels. The Pauline Church from which modern "Christianity" has descended seems to have utterly ignored the exhortations of Jesus to his disciples and to have given ear solely to the doctrines originated by Paul. Peter in his remarks shows indignation at being called "condemned" by "Simon" and this is unquestionably a reference to Paul's criticism of him recorded in *Galatians* II, 11 where the same Greek word is used (a word which the King James version saw fit to translate by the milder periphrase "was to be blamed.") In retaliation Peter, in the Clementine and in the *Actus Petri cum Simone,* denounces "Simon" as a cheat and impostor, significantly using the very same words that were applied to Paul by his opponents.

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[5] Here is perhaps a confirmation from an independent source of the tradition of the Synoptic Gospels, fixing the public career of Jesus at the short period of one year as contrasted with the longer period of activity alleged by the fourth Gospel.

Peter, in the Clementines, reproaches "Simon" for the fact that "instead of Christ he proclaims himself." He remarks that "as the true Prophet has told us, a false prophet must first come from some deceiver; and then in like manner, after the removal of the holy place, the true gospel must be secretly sent abroad for the rectification of the heresies that shall be." And "it would be possible, following this order, to perceive to what series Simon belongs, who came before me to the Gentiles, and to which I belong who have come after him, and have come in upon him as light upon darkness, as knowledge upon ignorance, as healing upon disease"—a passage which undubitably identifies "Simon" with the inceptor of the mission to the Gentiles, i.e. Paul. "Some men" remarks Peter, "do not know who is my precursor Simon. For if he were known, he would not be believed; but now, not being known, he is improperly believed; and though his deeds are those of a hater, he is loved; and though an enemy, he is received as a friend; and though he be death, he is desired as a saviour; and though fire, he is esteemed as light; and though a deceiver, he is believed as a speaker of truth." Peter affirms that Satan, "the price of wickedness . . . . fearing lest the true religion of the one and true God should be restored, hastened straightway to send forth into this world false prophets, and false apostles, and false teachers, who should speak indeed in the name of Christ, but should accomplish the will of the demon. . . . Let neither prophet nor apostle be looked for by you at this time, besides us. For there is but one true prophet, whose words we twelve apostles preach; for he is accepted year of God, having us apostles as his twelve months."

The Clementines take the ground that genuine Christianity and the old Judaism differ only as regards whether or not Jesus was "the prophet whom Moses foretold, who is the eternal Christ. For on this point only" says Peter "does there seem to be any difference between us who believe in Jesus and the unbelieving Jews." It is rather curious however that although Judaistic ordinances are so vociferously upheld in the Clementines, there is not the slightest question of requiring circumcision of Gentile Christians. This, provided it were also the case in the original Circuits of Peter, would indicate for the latter a date at which even the Ebionites had, for the most part, given up as hopeless the attempt to force this surgical operation upon the Gentile converts. It appears indeed that circumcision must have been very soon put in the background, for although it loomed large in the controversy when Paul wrote to the Galatians, he did not need to argue about it in his subsequent Epistles, but was able to give all his attention to others of the points at issue between him and the Judaizers.

It seems to have been upon the Jewish dietary laws that the Ebionites laid the most stress, and they saw grave danger in eating meat derived from pagan sacrifices, holding that this food, which Paul deemed innocuous, might cause those who partook of it to become subject to diabolic influences. It was, they contended, with a deliberate view to this end: to putting people in subjection to his masters, the powers of evil, that Paul told his followers: "Whatsoever that is sold in the shambles eat, asking no questions. . . If one of them that believeth not biddeth you to a feast, and ye are disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you, eat, asking no questions." (1 *Cor.* X, 25-27.) "Simon" had, in fact, the Clementines tell us, successfully made use of this scheme at Tyre where he found many opponents "who attempted to prove him an impostor." Beguiling these adversaries into a reconciliation "under pretence of a banquet, having slain an ox, and given them to eat of it, he infected them with various diseases, and subjected them to demons." And from this we may quite fairly conclude that Paul actually did give a noteworthy banquet at Tyre and succeeded in inducing some of the Jewish Christians of that place to throw aside the Mosaic food ordinances, which had as ultimate result the entire abandonment of the Jewish law by his guests.

The necessity of accepting the Jewish scheme of life is emphasized in the Ebionite version of the event mentioned in *Mark*, VII, 24-30. The Clementines tell us that on this occasion a Canaanite woman whose daughter was oppressed with a grievous disease came to the Lord entreating him to heal her daughter. "But he" narrated Peter "being asked by us, said 'It is not lawful to heal the Gentiles, who are like unto dogs on account of their using meats without distinction and such practices, while the table in the kingdom has been given to the sons of Israel.' But she, hearing this, and begging to partake like a dog, of the crumbs that fall from this table, having changed from what she was by living like the sons of the kingdom, she obtained healing for her daughter, as she asked. For she being a Gentile, and remaining in the same course of life, he would not have healed her had she remained a Gentile, on account of it not being lawful to heal her as a Gentile." In other words, the woman had first to conform to the Mosaic dietary laws and other ritualistic ordinances before Jesus would heal her child.

Going beyond the demand that Christians should eat only ritually pure food, the Ebionites took the stand that eating at the same table was an admission of religious brotherhood, and that dining with an unbelieving Gentile was a grievous sin. Peter will not even allow a baptised Gentile convert to eat with his converted but as yet unbaptised father, saying to the latter: "But this also we observe, not to have a common table with Gentiles, unless they believe, and on the reception of the truth are baptised, and consecrated by a certain three-fold invocation of the blessed name; and then we eat with them. Otherwise, even if it were a father or a mother, or wife, or sons, or brothers, we cannot have a common table with them. Since, therefore, we do this for the special cause of religion, let it not seem hard to you that your son cannot eat with you, until you have the same judgment of faith that he has."

Simon Magus is represented as having a wonderful command of the necromancer's art. At his command statues walk about like men and locked doors fly open of themselves—a feature of his career that is perhaps to be correlated to the tale of Acts XVI, 26, where we are told that when Paul and Silas were imprisoned at Philippi at midnight miraculously "all the doors were opened; and everyone's bands were loosened." He promenades through blazing fires without injury, and at his will is transformed into a serpent or a goat. From town to town goes Simon, followed up by Peter, who refutes his false teachings, and expounds the true Christian doctrine. The climax comes at Antioch, precisely where *Galatians* records there took place a heated controversy between Peter and Paul in the course of which the former was denounced by the latter in no gentle terms. According to the Clementines, Peter, at Antioch, was told that Simon "doing many signs and prodigies in public, has inculcated upon the people nothing but what tends to excite hatred against you, calling you a magician, a sorcerer, a murderer." Finally Simon bewitches Faustus, the father of Clement, imposing his own personal appearance upon the latter, whereupon Peter, turning this to the advantage of the true believers, has Faustus stand in a public place and make a recantation of the Simonian aspersions upon Peter, saying "I, Simon, declare to you, and confess that all that I have said concerning Peter was false." As reason for his confession the pseudo-Simon gives out that he has been soundly scourged by angels the preceding night. "I will tell you" he says "why I now make this confession to you. This night an angel of God, rebuked me for my wickedness, and scourged me terribly, because I was an enemy to the herald of truth." And Schmiedel holds that here the author, seizing upon Paul's own words, recorded in 2 *Cor.* XII, 7. "There was given me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me" has spitefully twisted an utterance of Paul regarding himself to his own disadvantage.

While the open conflict in Palestine and Syria came to an end with this occurence, Simon, we are told, subsequently "began, though secretly, to go amongst his friends and acquaintances, and to malign Peter worse than before." Peter however, in another pseudo-Clementine work, *The Constitutions of the Holy Apostles,* after giving a summary of the struggle against the false teachings of "Simon" (recorded at greater length in the Homilies and Recognitions) boasts that "when I had overcome him by the power of the Lord, and had put him to silence, I drove him into Italy." Here, evidently, we have the Ebionite version of Paul's going to Rome. It is probable that the lost Circuits of Peter gave an account of how Peter, following "Simon" to Rome there renewed the warfare, but no record of this has been preserved in the Clementines. The missing finale is however to be found in the apocryphal *Acts of Peter,* a work of Ebionite tendencies, which seems like the Clementines to have taken the Circuits as a source. Several fragmentary versions of these Acts are now extant, these documents, in their present form, bringing Paul on the stage as well as Peter and "Simon," thus covering up the original use of the latter name as an alias for the Apostle to the Gentiles. Peter here relates that he "drove this Simon out of Judaea where he did many evils with his magical charms, lodging in Judaea with a certain woman, Eubula, who was of honorable estate in this world, having store of gold and pearls of no small price. Here did Simon enter in by stealth with two others like unto himself, and none of the household saw them two, but Simon only, and by means of a spell they took away all the woman's gold and disappeared." Eubula lamenting complained that she had received "Simon" as "a servant of God, and whatsoever he asked of me to give to the poor, I gave much by his hands, and besides I did give much unto him!" Obviously this story, in the original Circuits of Peter, may have had a geographical setting quite other than that of Judaea, so there is some ground for identifying this Eubula with one mentioned in a work of which Niphorus tells us: *The Travels* (or *Acts*) *of Paul*. The Eubula of the latter work was an "attached disciple" of Paul and the wife of an "eminent Ephesian."

Simon subsequently settled in Rome where he "with his charms of sorcery and his wickedness made all the brotherhood fall away this way and that" and Peter was warned by a vision to pursue him there. Taking ship at Caesarea, Peter sailed to Puteoli where he disembarked and received an urgent message to "go up unto Rome without delay, lest the teaching of this wicked man prevail yet further." In the imperial city Peter found his adversary lodged "in the house of Marcellus a senator, whom he had convinced by his charms." Going to the senators' house, Peter "called the porter and said to him: 'Go, say unto Simon: Peter because of whom thou fleddest out of Judeae waiteth for thee at the door.' The porter answered and said to Peter: 'Sir, whether thou be Peter, I know not; but I have a command, for he had knowledge yesterday that thou didst enter into the city, and said to me: Whether it be by day or by night, at whatsoever hour he cometh, say that I am not within.'" Peter then, seeing "a great dog bound with a strong chain, went to him and loosed him, and when he was loosed the dog received a man's voice." This beast Peter sent inside to say to Simon: 'Thou Simon, Peter the servant of Christ who standeth at the door saith unto thee: Come forth abroad, for thy sake am I come to Rome, thou most wicked one and deceiver of simple souls.' And when Simon heard it and beheld the incredible sight he lost the words wherewith he was deceiving them that stood by, and all of them were amazed."

Simon, none the less, continued his evil practices, and one day defiantly "ran unto the house where Peter lodged, even the house of Narcissus, and standing at the gate cried out: 'Lo, here am I Simon; come thou down Peter.'" On this message being brought to Peter the latter sent unto Simon "a woman which had a sucking child, saying unto her: 'Go down quickly, and thou wilt find one that seeketh me. For thee there is no need that thou answer him at all, but keep silence, and bear what the child whom thou holdest shall say unto him.' The woman therefore went down. Now the child whom she suckled was seven months old, and it received a man's voice and said unto Simon: 'O thou abhorred of God and man, and destruction of truth, and evil seed of all corruption. O fruit by nature unprofitable, but only for a short and little season shalt thou be seen, and thereafter eternal punishment is laid up for thee. Thou son of a shameless father, that never puttest forth thy roots for good but for poison, faithless generation void of all hope! Thou wast not confounded when a dog reproved thee; I a child am compelled of God to speak, and not even now art thou ashamed. But even against thy will, on the Sabbath day that cometh, another shall bring thee into the forum of Julius that it may be shown what manner of man thou art. Depart therefore from the gate wherein walk the feet of the holy; for thou shalt no more corrupt the innocent souls whom thou didst turn out of the way and make mad; in Christ, therefore, shall be shown thine evil nature, and thy devices shall be cut to pieces. And now speak I this last word unto thee: Jesus Christ saith to thee: Be thou striken dumb in my name, and depart out of Rome until the Sabbath that cometh.' And forthwith he became dumb, and his speech was bound; and he went out of Rome until the Sabbath and abode in a stable."

On the Sabbath there was duly staged in the forum a public contest between Peter and Simon in the presence of "the senators and the prefects and those in authority." The corpse of a youth named Nicostratus was brought forward, and Simon, to demonstrate his power of raising the dead, "went to the head of the dead man and stooped down and said thrice: 'Raise thyself;' and showed the people that he lifted his head and moved it and opened his eyes and bowed a little unto Simon." But when Simon was constrained to remove to some distance from the body "again the dead man lay as he was before." Peter now surpassing his rival, merely touched the side of the dead lad and said "Arise!" when "the lad arose and put off his grave clothes and sat up and loosed his jaw and asked for other raiment; and he came down from the bier."

None the less Simon, though "they that were firm in the faith derided him" continued to do "many lying wonders." "For in dining-chambers he made certain spirits enter in, which were only an appearance, and not existing in truth. And . . . he made lame men seem whole for a little space, and blind likewise, and once he appeared to make many dead to live and move as he did with Nicostratus." Finally Simon announced he would give an exhibition of his power to fly through the air. "And already on the morrow a great multitude assembled at the Sacred Way to see him flying. And Peter came unto the place to see the sight, that he might convict him in this also; for when Simon entered Rome he amazed the multitudes by flying: but Peter that convicted him was then not living at Rome; which city he thus deceived by illusion, so that some were carried away by him." "And behold when he was lifted up on high, and all beheld him raised up above all Rome and the temples thereof and the mountains, the faithful looked towards Peter. And Peter seeing the strangeness of the sight cried unto the Lord Jesus Christ: 'If thou suffer this man to accomplish that which he hath set about, now will all they that believe on thee be offended, and the signs and wonders which thou hast given them through me will not be believed; hasten thy grace, O Lord, and let him fall from the height and be disabled; and let him not die but be brought to nought, and break his leg in three places.' And he fell from the height and broke his leg in three places. Then every man cast stones at him and went away home, and thenceforth believed Peter. . . . But Simon in his affliction found some to carry him by night on a bed from Rome unto Aricia; and he abode there a space, and was brought thence unto Terracina to one Castor that was banished from Rome upon an accusation of sorcery. And there he was sorely cut by two physicians, and so Simon, the angel of Satan, came to his end."

This story and Simon's claim of special knowledge of things above the heavens have been correlated to Paul's remark about a man who had been "caught up even to the third heaven." And indeed in the Recognitions Peter reproaches Simon for thinking "there is easy access for your mind above the heavens." It is probable that in the tale of the original Circuits of Peter the fall of Simon did not bring about his death, for there is extant another account which implies that Simon ultimately recovered from his injury, telling us that subsequent to his fall "many left him, but some who worthy of perdition continued in his wicked doctrines. After this manner was the most atheistical heresy of the Simonians first established in Rome; and the devil wrought by the rest of the false apostles also." At all events we may quite safely surmise that the death of Paul, alias Simon Magus, was the occasion, not of the shedding of tears, but of grim rejoicing among the Ebionites—the Christians who took James, not Paul, as their master.

THE USE OF THE WORD TAO IN THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS

BY HUANG K'UEI YUEN AND J. K. SHRYOCK

TAO is defined by the Erh Ya, which is attributed to Tzu Hsia in the fifth century B. C., by three words; Ti, meaning progress or principle, Yiu, meaning cause or reason, and Hsun, meaning teaching or training. If Tzu Hsia really wrote the Erh Ya, this would represent the standard Confucian interpretation of the word as recorded by one of the master's own disciples.

The Hsueh Wen, which appeared in 100 A. D., says that in ancient China the character was written differently from the modern usage, and was composed of two characters, one meaning head, and the other a short distance which we translate by the word inch. Later Tao came to be written with the character for head, and a character meaning to act and stop suddenly. These component parts may be still further subdivided, but without shedding much light on the origin and meaning of the term.

Tao as a whole is defined by the Hsueh Wen in two sentences, as that which acts, and as that which is universal, or pervades. We are safe in saying that by the time of the great philosophers of the Chou period, Tao when used as an abstract noun by itself meant a principle which underlies the universe, permeating all things, the cause or reason of phenomena. This definition is not taken from Taoist works, but from recognized Confucian classics.

A recent source book of words and phrases, called the *Tsu Yuen,* published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1917, gives thirteen different meanings to the word, some of which are not ancient. They are as follows:

1—A road.
2—Law or principle.
3—Method or policy.

4—To go through; to understand thoroughly.
5—Favorable.
6—The name of a teaching or doctrine. Taoism.
7—A political division. There are several Tao in a province.
8—A surname, or clan name.
9—To speak, or words.
10—Cause.
11—To govern.
12—To lead, to conduct.
13—To follow.

All these meanings belong to the same character, and most of them are supported by quotations from the classics. Besides this, the source book gives seventy-two common phrases in which the word Tao occurs. Only two of these need be considered.

In the *Book of History,* (2,2,15), there is a sentence in which Jen Hsin, or the heart of man, is balanced by Tao Hsin, or the heart of Tao. Legge translates the latter phrase by "that which is right," which is unsatisfactory because the expression Tao Hsin and Jen Hsin are frequently used in later works, man being balanced by Tao as an opposite.

Another expression is Tao Teh, which is the title now given to the work of Lao Tzu. The commentator Wang Pi, 226-249 A.D., explains this phrase by saying, "Tao is the cause; Teh is that which is gained by men." Legge calls Teh the attribute of Tao, in his translation of the Tao Teh Ching. The ordinary translation of Teh is virtue, and in the Book of Rites, Tao and Teh are coupled with Love and Righteousness, but the Taoist writers make a sharp distinction between them.

Tao also occurs in the *Book of History* and the *Book of Changes,* as well as in other classic works, in the expression T'ien Tao, or the Tao or Principle of Heaven. The *Book of History* says, (4,3,2), "The Tao of Heaven is to bless the good." Lao Tzu also uses this expression. It is evident that even before Lao Tzu the word had an abstract meaning, so that if we assume that the original meaning was a road or way, there had already been a considerable philosophic development by the sixth century B. C.

In Lao Tzu, Tao is the fundamental principle of the universe, which cannot be described except by a series of antinomies. These opposites, such as changed and unchanging, known and unknowable, active and passive, all imply a unity, and that unity is Tao.

Lao Tzu founded a school of thought which took its name from the word which he chose to express his idea of the absolute, and so Tao has come to be inseparably connected with Taoism. This conception has been intensified in the west by the habit of western scholars of translating Tao when it occurs in Confucian works, but simply Romanizing it when it is in a Taoist book. The result has been to make those who do not read Chinese think of Tao as a mysterious entity, a vague something which has significance only to the followers of Lao Tzu. This is unfortunate, because the Confucianists used the word quite as much as the Taoists, and when it occurs by itself as an abstract principle, the meaning is much the same in the early books of both schools.

In the Confucian Analects alone the character Tao is used eighty-eight times.

Eight times it occurs as a verb, as in the following sentences;

"The master said, 'To govern (Tao) a country of 1000 chariots, there must be a reverent conduct of affairs. . . .' ". (1,5).

"If the people are led (Tao) by government. . . ." (2,3).

"Happy in speaking (Tao) of the goodness of others. . . ." (16,5).

It will be noticed that in these three sentences where the verb is Tao, it must be translated by three very different English words.

Once only in the Analects is the word used in the sense of an actual road.

"Although I may not get a great burial, shall I die on the road (Tao)?" (9,11,3).

In the remaining seventy-nine places where the term occurs it is used as an abstract noun, either by itself, or as the property of certain men or classes of men.

When it is used in the latter way, it is usually translated by way, or characteristic. There is the Tao of the Superior Man, (5,15-14,30,1), the Tao of men of high rank, (8,4,3), the Tao of the good man, (11,19), the Tao of the father, (1,11-4,20), the Tao of the former emperors, (1,12,1), the Tao of ancient times, (3,16), the Tao of Wen and Wu, (19,22,2), and finally the Tao of the Master, Confucius himself. (4,15.) Lao Tzu also uses the word in this way in the phrase, the Tao of Heaven. (*Tao Teh Ching, 73-77-79.*)

Tao as a quality of something or someone, is sometimes connected with lists of virtues. Once, it is with humility, reverence, kindness and justice. (5,15). Again, it is self-control, sincerity and propriety. (8,4,3). In a third place, it is benevolence, wisdom or being without doubts, and courage. (14,30,1). Lao Tzu also does something like this when he says that "the Tao of Heaven has no favorites; it is always with the good man." (*Tao Teh Ching,* 79.)

There is one passage in the Analects which is a connecting link between the use of Tao as a quality of something else, and as an abstract principle.

"When superior men learn Tao they love men; when the common men learn Tao, they are easily commanded." (17,4,3.) Here Tao is something which can be learned by all men, no matter what their ability.

On the other hand, Lao Tzu contrasts Tao with the virtues in several passages.

The Use of the Word Tao in The Confucian Analects 2

"When great Tao fell into disuse, (or ceased to be practiced) benevolence and justice appeared." (*Tao Teh Ching,* 18.) This distinction between Tao and ethics is sharpened by Chuang Tzu, and is one of the differences between the Taoists and the followers of Confucius, but only the beginnings of this gap are present in Lao Tzu and Confucius themselves, and neither of the sages is altogether consistent with the doctrines which go by their names. Lao Tzu in the passage already quoted does connect Tao with virtue, and when Confucius uses Tao by itself as an abstract principle, it is in much the same sense as his older contemporary. In fact, the best definition of Taoism is to be found in Confucius' description of his own teaching.

"My Tao," said the sage, "is an all-pervading unity." (4,15).

Having delivered this remark, Confucius left the room, and the disciples asked Tseng Tzu what he meant.

"The Tao of the Master," Tseng Tzu interpreted, "is reverence and love."

The words Chung Hsu, reverence and love, themselves need a good deal of study, for they give the essence of Confucianism. The translators have followed Chu Hsi, the Sung commentator, in defining Chung as conscientiousness, making it apply to oneself, while love applies to one's neighbors. The Erh Ya, however, defines the word as reverence. The important point is that these are the words of Tseng Tzu, and not of the master. In this passage, Confucius himself described Tao in a way that is as Taoist as any phrase of Lao Tzi, but his chief disciple, who established what is regarded as the orthodox line of Confucian thought, at once turned the remark into a different channel. Was Tseng Tzu right in his interpretation of the mind of his teacher?

Western scholars have followed him, and no one ignorant of Chinese reading their translations would imagine that Confucius had ever used the word Tao, which in Taoist works is left untranslated. Legge and Couvreur render Tao by doctrine, Soothill and Ku Hung Ming, by teaching, and Zottoli, whose translation is in Latin, by agendi.

There are other passages in which Tao in the abstract is discussed.

"If Tao is established, it is the Decree; if Tao is destroyed, it is the Decree." (14,38,2.)

Here Legge translates Tao by "my principles," Zottoli by *"rectam doctrinam,"* Ku Hung Ming by "my teaching among men," Couvreur by *"ma doctrine,"* and Soothill by "my principles." When the word is left untranslated, the sentence might have been written by a Taoist. The instance is particularly interesting because there is no word "my" or "true" in the text, and the translators had to insert it from nowhere in order to square the passage with what they felt Confucius ought to have said. The term Ming, or the Decree, means either Fate, or the Command of Heaven.

Confucius also said, "When a man has heard Tao in the morning, he can die in the evening without regret." (4,8.)

In this case, Tao is translated by "the right way," by sapientiam, by wisdom, and by "the Truth." Yet when Tao is simply Romanized, the sentence might have been taken from the Tao Teh Ching.

Tzu Kung said, "When the Master speaks about the Nature and the Tao of Heaven, he cannot be understood." (5,12). The translations are "the way of Heaven," "de natura coelique lege," "metaphysics or theology," and "l'action du Ciel." The mysticism of Confucius, which was misunderstood by the matter-of-fact disciples who interpreted his doctrine, is entirely lost.

Tzu Yiu said, "The Superior Man concentrates upon fundamentals, and Tao is born." (1,2,2). Tao is translated by "right courses," "practical courses," and wisdom. It seems as if the translators have been willing to go to any lengths to remove the least taint of Taoism from Confucius' fair name. Last of all comes a passage that is nearly too much for them.

"The Master said, 'Man can enlarge Tao, but Tao cannot enlarge man'." (15,28.) Tao is rendered by "his principles," and even by "his religion, or the principles he professes."

Chu Hsi, the great Sung commentator, treats the passage as follows:

"Apart from man, there is no Tao, and apart from Tao, there is no such thing as man; but the mind of man is sentient, while the body of Tao is inactive." (Chu Hsi's Commentary on the Analects.) It is significant that here the standard Chinese interpreter of Confucius, in describing what Confucius meant by Tao, uses the very words of Lao Tzu, Wu Wei, or non-action, a characteristic Taoist phrase. The translations of Legge and Soothill do not even make sense, and the latter apologizes for the "apparently fallacious aphorism." He is forced to it because he translates Tao by "principles." In Chu Hsi the meaning is perfectly clear, whether or not it is the real meaning of Confucius.

These passages, in which Tao is considered as an abstract principle and not as the Tao of someone in particular, show that Confucius used the word in a sense that was not very different from that of Lao Tzu, and that the two were not as far apart as has usually been assumed.

This is confirmed indirectly from other sources. Lieh Tzu, the Taoist thinker who lived about a century later, is quite respectful toward Confucius and even attributes miraculous power to him, although admitting that he did not use it. Lieh Tzu also quotes the favorite disciple of Confucius, Yen Hui, and Chuang Tzu makes Yen Hui much more Taoist than Confucius himself, although he interprets a passage in the Analects, (2,4), as showing that the sage became a follower of Lao Tzu. Had Yen Hui lived and become the chief interpreter of his master, instead of Tseng Tzu, Confucianism might have been a very different thing.

There are certain conclusions to be drawn from this brief analysis. As soon as the word Tao is left untranslated and simply Romanized, it becomes apparent that while Confucius did not develop the word and give it paradoxical attributes as Lao Tzu did, nor make it the key-word to his teaching, he did use it in much the same sense as the older man.

This similarity has been almost entirely lost sight of, first, in the interpretation which Tseng Tzu and the long line of orthodox Confucians have given to the teaching of the sage, and second, in the translations based on this interpretation by western scholars. Tao used as a verb, or as a road, or even as an attribute, may be translated, but Tao as an abstract principle ought to be left untranslated in Confucian, as in Taoist works.

The word itself is difficult, not because of any mystic significance, but because it has so many meanings. When the various words which are used to translate it are brought together, it becomes clear that the complex of ideas which is associated with the character does not correspond with any similar word in English. Yet when the word is used in one sense by a Chinese writer, it carries with it as a penumbra into the consciousness of the reader the other meanings associated with the character. Similar associations will not be found with any English word, and therefore, in translating passages where Tao occurs, one should first try to get into one's mind the varied associations which the word has for a Chinese, and then leave the word untranslated. Perhaps, to paraphrase the famous sentence of Lao Tzu, the Tao that can be translated, is not Tao.

TWO NOTABLE PHILOSOPHIC WORKS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

I.—*Dualism After Thirty Years of Controversy*

NO more important or fascinating theme for a course of lectures on the Paul Carus foundation could possibly have been chosen than that which Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy undertook to discuss when afforded that enviable opportunity. Professor Lovejoy belongs to the very modern school of philosophy which has called itself for some years the school of Critical Realism, and his analytical power as well as sound scholarship have given him a place of distinction in that school.

He was eminently qualified to review and evaluate a movement in modern philosophy which for twenty-five years or more has challenged the minds of the most profound thinkers of Europe and America—namely, the attack upon Dualism.

That attack has not been confined to the Idealists of the old type. Thinkers truly and radically modern, men who are at home in physics as well as in metaphysics, and who are familiar with the latest revolutionary discoveries in all the realms of thought, have endeavored to overthrow Dualism by using the most improved weapons at their command. What are the results of the great battle to date? Is Dualism dead and buried, doomed to everlasting dishonor? Or has the terrific assault, frontal and other, failed, and Dualism still stands intact and solid?

Professor Lovejoy is satisfied that the attack on dualism *has* failed. The philosopher, he thinks, is bound to admit that Animal Faith, as Santayana would put it, or Common sense, as Professor Lovejoy would say, is still amply justified in adhering to the empirical idea of an objective world, with Man as part of it in a sense, yet a part capable of thought, of feeling, of judging, of contemplating the rest of creation subjectively, of looking even into his own inner self.

Nothing to be found in the works of Russell, Eddington, Whitehead, Jeans and other acute and profound contemporary thinkers, Professor Lovejoy affirms, and successfully shows, has undermined Dualism.

We may resolve matter and apparent objects into mere *events;* we may hold that the same process or phenomenon is physical at one end and mental at the other; we may say that the stuff of the Universe is neutral, or insist that it is mental. We may follow the new physics, the new metaphysics and the new psychology bravely to their revolutionary conclusions, but we have not disposed of Dualism, according to Professor Lovejoy. Relativity, indeterminism, uncertainty and doubt as to the relations between causes and effects, two-way time, and other startling developments in science and philosophy have perhaps obscured and complicated the issue, but it remains a stubborn fact as an issue, and must be faced by philosophers in a co-operative spirit.

Professor Lovejoy himself gives us a fine example of that spirit. He is not dogmatic, despite the irresistible logic of his argument at more than one vital stage. He is tentative and he briefly summarizes his own views in the form of modest observations.

There are those who hold that to criticise the revolt against dualism and convict the insurgents of inconsistency, confusion of thought, use of identical terms in various conflicting senses, is to repudiate Monism as well. But Professor Lovejoy has no quarrel with Monism properly defined and correctly understood.

The essence of Monism is the idea that the Universe is governed by one set of laws, and that its ultimate nature is single. That this has not been fully and conclusively established, is of course incontestable, but neither has an ultimate and essential Dualism been proved. Certain attempts at proof have been made by both sides, and it is Professor Lovejoy's task to show the inadequacy of the cause against Dualism in sundry forms.

Let us grant for the sake of the argument that he is wholly successful. Let us admit that no one has yet demonstrated the unity of the mental and the physical. What of this? It certainly does not follow that mind and matter never meet, never merge into something different from each, or that the laws governing the one have no application to the other.

Professor Lovejoy divides his analysis and review into two parts. The first phase of the revolt is traced to William James and G. E. Moore and the second to the alleged implications of twentieth century science. The conclusion or the verdict is rather *Not Proven* than *For the Defendant, Dualism.*

Philosophy has been warned by thinkers like Whitehead and Russell against leaving common sense and practical reason too far behind their abstractions. Naive realism is as impossible to reflective minds as naive idealism. But dualism is not synonymous with naive realism. Dualism proves that inference plays a large part in our apprehension, and no psychologist can deny this. But it does not take us very far.

Science can prove to the average man that the table or desk at which he sits is not as round or flat or green as he thinks it is. A few tests, instruments and demonstrations will convince him that his impressions are misleading. But he cannot be convinced that, when he turns his chair to the window, the table or desk vanishes into thin air, simply because he does not see it for the moment. He cannot be convinced by any strained subtleties that his friend in another part of the world does not exist when he does not see him or hear his voice over the telephone, or read a letter signed by him. And there is no reason why he should be. The distinction between subject and object is *given,* and there is no arguing it away. We cannot really think that there is no external world. But we do not know just what that world is.

There is, however, a constant action and reaction between the subject and object. Each somehow and in some degree colors and conditions the other. This undeniable fact makes for a Monistic interpretation—as far as it goes.

Again, it is perfectly plain that a given phenomenon may be physical at one end and mental at the other. And some phenomena are both physical and mental at the same time. This, too, is suggestive of a Monistic view of nature.

Yet these lines of argument or evidence are not incompatible with a critical and tentative realism.

Professor Lovejoy has rendered a real service to philosophy and to clear thinking generally by his thoroughgoing but very fair and sympathetic survey of the great and protracted controversy over Dualism. He is not constructive in this work. But he has cleared the atmosphere; he has defined the terms of the problem; he has disposed of fallacious explanations which leave the central issue unexplained. Let us hope that other philosophers as well equipped and as dispassionate as Professor Lovejoy will perform similar services for other unsolved problems in modern philosophy. The time fro a new synthesis is not perhaps at hand, but philosophers should understand one another better than they have done in the past, and they should agree, at least, upon statements of fact and definitions.

Meantime Professor Albert Einstein, of Relativity fame, has announced further discoveries in physics which may greatly strengthen the case for Monism. He is working on formulas which, he hopes, will demonstrate the unity of all cosmic phenomena. Already he has correlated electricity and magnetism. He has also revised his original conception of space. He now regards it as primary, and matter as secondary. Space, he says, is devouring matter. What the genius of Newton began in interpreting space and giving it a physical character, Professor Einstein may finish by revolutionizing our ideas of space and matter alike. Thus what the new physics has failed to do, as Professor Lovejoy shows, it may yet achieve in the not distant future.

Philosophy and metaphysics have been admonished by Dr. Dewey and others not to sever their organic tie with science. In the discussion of Dualism, it is particularly important to keep one eye on the exact sciences. It will doubtless be their good fortune to give dualism the *coup de grace.*

II.—*The Vain Quest for Certainty*

Professor John Dewey, in his Gifford lectures, essayed a task of broader and bolder scope, but one that incidentally touches the particular problem dealt with by Professor Lovejoy. The lectures made a deep impression in England, where the instrumentalist theory of knowledge is not as well known as it is in this country. To Americans the ideas expressed by Mr. Dewey are not novel, and his method of approach has long been familiar to them, but even they will find the book in question, entitled *The Quest for Certainty,* highly profitable.

Professor Dewey does not hesitate to attack what he considers a vice common to all schools of philosophy, ancient and modern namely, the assumption that thought and action are two distinct categories, and that certainty exists even if imperfect and maladjusted human beings have not as yet managed to discover it and make it their firm and cherished possession.

Professor Dewey pleads for a revolutionary reconstruction in philosophy—not only in its methods but in its aims and objectives. He does not want philosophy to continue a vain quest. Certainty is not to be had for the asking or thinking; the only thing certain is the instrumental and experimental method.

Professor Dewey repudiates the notion that the world of thought is radically different from that of action. Moreover, he contends, we do not seek knowledge merely for the sake of action. Knowing is continuous with action; he who thinks and knows is an active participator inside the natural and human drama. There is nothing antecedent or fixed in human affairs; we must inquire, observe, test and compare, to be sure, but knowledge implies action, change of conditions, adaptation of ends to means and means to ends. We make our own world by thought and action, and we never achieve perfection. We cannot use our thought to *escape* the world in which we find ourselves. There are no Eternal Forms or Final Truths; there are problems to solve by means of thought and of its applications. We may remove obstacles, clear up doubts here and there, improve our conditions, create a better world, our own point of view furnishing the standard of goodness, but our standard is itself subject to change in a world full of contingency and uncertainty.

Professor Dewey finds that the assumption of a certainty to be reached by thought plays havoc in politics, in economics, in ethics as well as in metaphysics, religion and philosophy. He endeavors to illustrate this proposition and to trace the evil consequences of the error in every department of human activity and human thought. Not all his illustrations are apt. The individualist will take vigorous exception to his assumption that the school of *Laissez Faire* in economics postulated the existence of fixed laws which men must discover and obey without demur. What the individualists, from Adam Smith down to Spencer and his disciples have maintained is that an "invisible hand" reconciles superficially conflicting commercial interests; that competition in a fair field is better than state monopoly or bureaucratic control of industry, and that liberty is the mother of order and harmony.

Now, all this may be true or it may be false. But the appeal of those who call themselves individualists is to experience, to common sense, to scientific generalization, not to any eternal principle of right.

Dr. Dewey is bound to find instances in support of his theory even where they do not exist. But even if we reject all doubtful illustrations, enough remains to prove the assertion that philosophers have divorced the world of action from that of thought and contemplation. And modern psychology supports the Dewey view of the unity of thought and action, with all the important deductions which he makes in the realm of philosophy.

The truth is, we do not know when or where thought ceases and action begins. We do not even know whether thought is not, as some Behaviorists assert, a form of action. We do not understand the process of thought; and can only analyze certain conditions or phases of thought. But we do know that action aids and stimulates thought, gives it purpose and direction. It would revivify certain schools of philosophy wonderfully if it could free itself of the vice pointed out by Dr. Dewey and make a fresh start from the new basis.

The instrumentalist theory has its limitations, no doubt, but these would be better understood under the Dewey concept of knowledge than they are now. Let us see how far that concept will carry us before complaining of its inadequacy and seeking to modify it. Certain it is that it would brush aside a number of unreal or paradoxical problems in philosophy and permit concentration, in the cooperative way favored by Professor Lovejoy, upon the real and legitimate problems of that department of human intellectual activity.

THE INSIGHTS AND RAPTURES OF THE MYSTIC

BY RADHAKAMAL MUKERJIE

(Concluded)

IN our previous installment conversation between master and disciple is of abiding interest in the history of religious mysticism. as showing a demarcation of the grades of higher mystical experience which all persons engaged in elevated contemplation must reckon with, irrespective of religion and country. In the fourfold sequel of *Arūpa-jhānas,* only attempted by the adept, and as a final step for complete emancipation of the self, all consciousness of detail or of limitations is done away with.

(a) By passing beyond any conception of matter or idea of sensation, and suppressing the idea of multiformity, a bhikkhu attains the state of mind in which the only idea present is the infinity of space (*ākāsañchāyatana*).

(b) On this follows a stage in which the infinity or unboundness of intellect (*viññānañchayatana*) is alone present.

(c) The next stage is reached when there is nothing at all present to the mind (*akiñcaññāyatana*). Then is achieved the stage when neither the presence of ideas nor the absence of ideas is specifically present (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*).

(d) Finally is attained the state where there is suppression of both sensation and idea (sannavedayitanirodha).[12] Only the clarity and equanimity remain. The Buddhist *jhayin* in the above manner through the meditation of unbounded void space, of knowledge without object, of nothingness, passes into the stage where there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness and finally realises the actual disappearance of feeling and notion. He introduces into the series of his thoughts such a number of blank spaces that the further generation of thought and desire is stopped.[13] Anuruddha, a disciple of the Buddha describes his final experience as follows:—

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[12] Keith: *Buddhist Philosophy,* p. 124, see also Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology,* pp. 117-119.

"In five-fold concentrated ecstasy (samadhi)
My heart goes up in peace and unity.
Serene composure have I made my own;
My vision as a god's is clarified.
I know the destinies of other lives:
Whence beings come and whither they do go;
Life here below, or other-where of life—
Steadfast and rapt, in five-fold Jhana sunk."[14]

Mrs. Rhys Davids remarks: "The *jhayin* seems to be always master of himself and self-possessed, even in ecstasy even to the deliberate falling into and emerging (as by a spiritual alarm-clock) from trance. There is synergy about his Jhana, combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference."

Quite distinct from the above *jhana exercises, we have also in* Buddhism the cultivation of a positive attitude such as filling the mind with love, with sympathy with sorrow, with sympathy with joy and with equanimity, and "prevading the whole world" with the above four emotions. Such states of emotional as contrasted with intellectual meditation are called Brahma-viharas, and they are sometimes represented as coming after the four *jhanas,* and sometimes as replacing them.[15] If the mind deliberately cultivates charity and harbours no uncharitable thought, charity becomes a psychic force and inundates the world even as the sound of a trumpet spreads in all directions. The ideal is set forth in a most remarkable passage in the Sutta-Nipata:

"Even as a mother watcheth o'er her child
Her only child, as long as life doth last,
So let us, for all creatures, great or small,
Develop such a boundless heart and mind
Ay, let us practise love for all the world,
Upward and downward, yonder, thence
Uncramped, free from ill-will and enmity."

Along with a profounder sympathy for all fellow creatures and a greater intensity of life and vividness of consciousness, the mystic, as we have seen, attains certain powers of both body and mind which, when they are correlated by ordinary faculties, lead to supreme achievements measuring human greatness. We have rec-

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[13] Poussin: *The Way to Nirvana,* pp. 165-66.

[14] *Psalms of the Brethren,* 916 ff.

[15] Eliot: *Hinduism and Buddhism,* Vol. I, p. 316.

orders of premonition, pre-cognition, telepathy or clairvoyance, from the mystics of all countries and of all ages. The world's greatest artists have always listened to strange music and rhythm of expression within which emerge with spontaniety in spite of themselves. They have found in their compositions unimagined excellence of technique. They have written at some one else's dictation and when the masterpiece has come out in a flash can hardly attribute it to conscious art or device. The world's finest natures are guided at critical situations by a vision, by a dream, by a mysterious monitory voice within which they revere and for which they embrace suffering and even death. It is thus that out of the raw material of the mystical consciousness genius and inspiration are fashioned. Myers' great work on Human personality and survival of Bodily Death and the Proceedings of the Society of Psychical Research are full of evidence of the communication between minds in the spiritual world which overcomes barriers of time and distance. All this is proving scientifically the intuitional world of the mystic. Para-psychology or physical research is a science now in the cradle though there is a growing recognition that this problemetic aspect of psychology is now exceedingly important for the advancement of the science. Telepathy and mind-reading suggest that the individual minds are parts of one super-mind and that under inner discipline and control one individual mind, on the foundation of the one super-mind, knows about the contents of other individual minds, just as in dissociation one ego knows about the other ego's contents. Clairvoyance, lelekinesis, materialization and prophecy are far more difficult to understand. May it be that the mind is a *miroir de l'univers* though in very exceptional persons does the performance of this mirror become conscious in the ego-form? The hypothesis is that when the ego-side of the pure mind becomes, through the process of abstract concentration, free from the disturbance of the sensory and organic processes, the omniscient pure mind operates and apprehends phases or states of reality which are not bound to the spatio-temporal system of relations. The spiritualist hypothesis is also legitimate and the spirit might be a part of this super-mind and might only become individual spirit again under certain conditions and communicate with this world.[16] Patanjali in his Yoga-sutra refers to the following powers which the mystic acquires.—The capacity to enter another's body, to float in water, to walk on thorns, super-normal hearings, lightness of body, invisiblity, etc. It is incontestable that during fervent ecstasy or deep contemplation the sensibility to external impressions diminishes a great deal. This is due to the fact that the motor activity in relation to ordinary sensory objects which gives the sense of life, is suspended, and the incipient responses are all directed to the objects of meditation. Thus when the body is lulled to relative passivity the mind enters upon a new phase of creative activity and working upon the amorphous materials supplied by the organic experiences, fashions a world of symbols, images and transcendental experiences. Such is the origin of the divine vision, the hearing of the divine voice or the healing and soothing touch of the Lord familiar in all religions. As the mystic adapts his behaviour to the constructions of his own imagination, he sees, hears, smells, intuitively, with the senses of the mind, as if they are actually experienced. Severe fasting and deprivation of sleep or isolation, the prolonged maintenance of a characteristic posture, and certain breathing and physical exercises of the chest, diaphragm and abdomen; the rhythm of music; the repetition of rhythmical bodily movement or peculiar dancing, singing or reiteration of a word or formula—all these change or remove the kinaesthetic and visceral feelings, and alter the normal feeling of self. There is thus engendered a different sense of relation between the body and the outside world. Respiration is partially inhibited, and the sensations of pressure and equilibrium may be lost. Thus the mystic may feel that his body has been floating in the air or that he has left the body and ascended the third heaven. A changed visceral sensitivity is the basis of many of the super-normal impressions of mystics, who revel in the separation of the soul or 'the subtle body' from the physical frame. Sweet odour of flowers or incense, characteristic pressure contact shown, for instance, in the laying on of hands and fingers, and in ceremonially holding sacred symbols, deep rhythmical breathing, etc., modify the viscera and organic functions, and induce a feeling of exhilaration, of a successful adjustment within the body and adaptation to its world. The tense nerves throughout the organism bespeak an emotional state in which the mystic feels beside himself. This is the mystic's familiar feeling of ecstasy, which greatly diminishes the sense of fatigue. Unusual physical or intellectual toil may be undertaken at times by the mystic when he is aglow with spiritual fervour. Hunger and thirst may also disappear, and eastern mystics have been known to shut themselves up underground for months and even years, and to come back to life after a state of suspended animation. Lastly, there may be insensibility to pain altogether. This explains, for instance, the agreeableness of the red hot irons for the Muhammedan darvishes, who stick these in their arms and legs and cool them in their mouth without a complaint, murmur or sign of pain. In fact they call such red hot irons 'roses' because the use of them is as agreeable to them as the perfume of the rose is to the voluptuary.[17] Similarly many of the Christian martyrs suffered torture or died at the stake without a cry or moan of pain. Differences in methods of concentration produce different effects. The fixation of the eyes upon the sun, the moon, or any bright object, or, again, upon the tip of the nose or, again, the prolonged concentration of the pupils towards the forehead produce hyperaesthetic visions. Often, also, there are hyperaesthetic auditions induced by prolonged control of respiration and shutting both the ears by finger tips. Sometimes, again, the normal relation between sense-organs and sensations is changed, and touch, sight and hearing may be the outcome of the stimulation of a different organ. New colours are appreciated, strange music is heard while the familiar sights and sounds take a new brilliance. The modification of breathing, the longer rhythmical spells of inhalation and exhalation as well as cessation of breath influence circulation by acting upon the unstriped muscles and glands—the muscles of the arterial walls (blood pressure). Hence a great variety of new organic sensations emerges, which supplies the physical background of the deeply moving sentiments and experiences of the mystics. The time and space relations are affected. The mystic sees a light that never was on sea and land. He hears a sound which ear has not heard. He conquers space and time. He exists in different places at the same time, according to his sweet will. Strange feelings surge from the unfathomable depths of his heart. The voice of the whole humanity is uttered in his prayer. His body expands into the macrocosm, or shrinks into the electrical sub-atom. There is, as it were, a thorough transformation of his mind and attitudes. Such is the naturalistic explanation of some of the experiences of religious mysticism. But elevated religious meditation delves deeper. Both the sensory phenomena and the ineffable feelings are transcended. The mystic then leaves the wonderful world of rapture. Realising in himself the universal and permanent conditions of contemplative union with the divine, he arrives at intuitions of a metaphysical import, which reveal a new relation between the Being and things. It is there that he establishes a new relation with an all-inclusive Source of Life and Mind; from here emerge, as a result of fresh efforts, the spiritual infinitudes, which, and not the mystic's efficiency and rapture, are his highest gifts. In Buddhism the following are among the super-ordinary powers mentioned:—the capacity to resist pain and death, the capacity of creating phenomena outside one's body, the capacity of transforming one's body into different personalities, the power of creating one's own double, telepathy of sight or hearing, thought-reading, super-normal insight into the past or the future, improved memory, etc.[18] Such powers are called *kuvveh i roohe,* among the Moslem Darvishes, and enumerated as follows:—the faculty of foreseeing coming events; of predicting their occurrence; of preserving individuals from harm and evil which would otherwise certainly result for them; of restoring harmony of sentiment between those who would otherwise be relentless enemies.[19] Evidence of superior intellectual and spiritual powers (as distinguished from supernormal physical powers described above) of the mystic and the saint has indeed come and still comes from all countries. Such powers are regarded by Patanjali as obstacles to Samadhi; but they are powers in the worldly state. According to the Sankhya the powers attained by *yoga* are not to be denied like recovery through medicines, etc. Cases have been recorded similarly by Myers in which men by experiment leave their bodies and show themselves to their friends. It is not strange that mystics and saints who discipline their intellect and emotions acquire these and other supernormal faculties and that their whole life becomes an inspiration based as it is on the concentration of the best of man's faculties and joys. No doubt when in the ecstatic state the consciousness or reference of self entirely disappears and yet there survives a lucidity and equanimity by which the highest truth of the intuitional world become accessible. This is the experience of all mystics. The process by which these truths are revealed is not yet analysed but that there is such revelation, and that it can be, deliberately sought, are familiar matters of the mystical world. George Russell says "when our lamp is lit we find the house of our being has many chambers, and we must ask whether they have the right to be in our house; and there are corridors there leading into the hearts of others, and windows which open into eternity, and we can hardly tell where our own being ends and another begins or if there is any end to our being. If we brood with love upon this myriad unity, following the meditation ordained by Buddha for the brothers of his order, to let our mind pervade the whole wide world with heart of love, we come more and more to permeate, or to be pervaded by the lives of others." He asks 'Is there a centre within us through which all the threads of the universe are drawn, a spiritual atom which mirrors the spiritual infinitudes even as the eye is the mirror of the external heavens'?

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[16] For a suggestive discussion, see Hans Driesch, *The Crisis in Psychology*, Chap. V.

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[17] *The Awarifu-L-Marif*, p. 167.

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[18] *Compendium of Philosophy,* pp. 61-64.

[19] Brown, *Darvishes,* p. 129.

No doubt psychologists like Starbuck, Leuba and Coe who have attempted a naturalistic explanation of mystical states so far have confined themselves to those phases of religious experience which are characterised by the play of the emotions arising out of union with a personal God. The mystic's complete personal history and religious tradition as well as his childish affective life have thrown a flood of light on such states. But even in the study of the emotional situation those deeply moving unvertalised responses, which integrate themselves into this ecstasy and higher apprehensions of the mystics are not adequately understood, while the acquisition of super-normal powers also is not fully explained. In more elevated meditation, the explicit emotions and sentiments which only have been attacked by the naturalists disappear. The mystic mediating upon the infinite modes and attributes of God is led to a true intuition of a metaphysical import, viz., that of absorption of the self or soul into the deity without modes and attributes. Here instead of the raptures the insights, deep and intense, dominate. No doubt the insights into an eternal mode of existence which transcends both time and space depend upon a gradual closing and simplification of the avenues through which these ideas come from the defining senses. It is then that the kinesthetic and organic senses intimate those subtle and indefinable adqustments which assures the mystic perfect fulfilment and harmony and constitute his experience and rapture. Time and space are the special objects of the defining sense. But there are deeper experiences like truth, beauty or goodness, which extend beyond the spatial and temporal existences, and which elude definitions and descriptions. Such profounder insights and attitudes are the outcome of a perfect poise and sensitivity of the entire mechanism of body and mind that becomes finely attuned to the world of experience. Now the mystic's organic sense-complex enters directly into such vital and mental processes, while cognition can only use the language of symbolism, that merely suggests and cannot define.

Gradually he transcends both definite and indefinite consciousness, sensory processes and indescribable feelings. The complex of organic sense experiences which provides the basis of the sense of personality must disappear before the mystic can rise above the duality of self and the divine. Here he enters upon the stage of pure consciousness, in which he realises a union or identity with the object of his contemplation. The inadequacy of religious psychology consists then in this that it is helpless with regard to this aspect of experience which is, however, a real fact with an objective significance. In philosophical mysticism as well as in higher forms of art or music, mind and object are transcended; and the mystic's spirit in its absorption into the Pure Being or the Absolute rises above form, space and time, above consciousness itself, above all relativities. Psychology so far may accordingly analyse mystical experiences into complex, affective and intellectual states but it cannot decide on the value of the deeper insights and attitudes of a metaphysical significance. Nor is a direct examination of such experiences by experimental psychology possible. For this probably we have to depend solely upon the mystic's own testimonies as regards the nature and process of modification, of their imagination and consciousness, and these have to be clarified and reduced to order through the use of comparative and genetic methods. It is then that we shall understand one most significant way of interpreting the world of experience. Science and philosophy in all their forms express the unity of the Idea but cannot exhaust the reality. It is by contemplative union that the mystic feels the concrete unity of Life, and satisfies the fullness of human aspirations. The mystic intuition which alone can express the ever-receding fullness and harmony of concrete individual experience must represent, therefore, the starting point of philosophy. On the other hand, unless the individual's concrete experience is fashioned into concepts and symbols by philosophy it cannot rise beyond the flash of ecstasy, and be preserved as a universal treasure. Philosophy at each step enriches mystical intuition, helping it onward to seek and find fuller and fuller concords.

HENRY D. THOREAU, ORIENTAL

BY FRANCES FLETCHER

"I found in myself, and still find, an instinct toward a higher, or, as it is named, spiritual life, as do most men, and another toward a primitive, rank and savage one, and I reverence them both. I love the wild not less than the good."

There was none of the Calvinist in Thoreau. Though externally his life was one of negation and great austerity, Thoreau knew the simplicity of his manner of living to be not a virtue in itself, but the path leading towards spiritual self-knowledge and realization. In fact, he often called attention to the lack of sensual perception in mankind, and openly repudiated the religion of his countrymen. "Christianity," he says repeatedly, "is a religion of philanthropy." And where is the beauty of necessity of philanthropy in a philosophy which recognizes the true place of man in the natural scheme?

It is rather to the Vedas, the Zendavestas, Upanishads and Puranas that Thoreau gives his loyalty. "Idleness is the most productive industry," he insists. Only meditation and study enrich the mind. Action in itself is devoid of sense, entirely without meaning. Man, far from being the son of God, or even close to the divine, is conceivably (often Thoreau says certainly) on a lower plane of existence than birds, trees and plants.

Consciousness is continually opposed by Thoreau to *action*. Being is a far cry from appearance. "Why should we be in such desperate haste to succeed and in such desperate enterprises? If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he hears, however measured, however far away. It is not important that he should mature as soon as an appletree or an oak."

And again: "Sell your clothes and keep your thoughts. God will see that you do not want society. If I were confined to a corner of a garret all my days, like a spider, the world would be just as large to me while I had my thoughts about me."

This is the very essence of Hinduism. Like a spider, the East Indian holy man or saint spins the web of consciousness about him: and in the web he lives and dies. He has no other clothing, no other shelter. *Being* is nirvana. Conscious identity with the spirit of the universe is the goal and attainment of life. The holy man becomes nature itself.

The hatred and contempt with which Thoreau regarded the stupidity and commercialism of the average dweller in the town, is well known. The farmer, tilling his land and growing his beans for profit in the market, was no more worthy in his sight than the publicly exalted politicians and "great men" of the day. The naturalist found them all despicable and ridiculous.

Thoreau liked winter because in that season man seemed to live a "more inward life." He believed with Abu Musa that "sitting still at home is the heavenly way; the going out is the way of the world." He found pleasure in moonlight, and understood perfectly why it is that the Hindus compare the moon to a saintly being who has reached the "last stage of bodily existence." He preceived readily how religions might spring up around the moon as goddess and how the rites of worship might serve to stimulate and invigorate the participants. "The moon is a mediator . . . I am sobered by her light and bethink myself. It is like a cup of cold water to a thirsty man."

Astrology, Thoreau maintained, held within itself the germ of a higher truth than does modern astronomy. Discredited with official academicism though the ancient science was, Thoreau could find nothing to arrest his attention in the dry mathematics and cold deductions of the then current astronomy. "The naked eye," he said, "may see further than the armed. It depends on who looks through it."

Mankind is but a "phenomenon in the horizon." The life of man is mean and trivial. Only nature is "holy and heroic." Man's existence takes on beauty and significance only as it approximates the clarity and simplicity of nature.

"To be awake is to be alive," the New Englander writes again. Yet he confesses never to have met a single man who was quite awake. Only one in a million was capable of intellectual exercise, while only one in a hundred millions might be aroused to the point of being able to live a poetic or divine life. As for himself, Thoreau wished to "suck all the marrow out of life." He wished not to discover, when he came to die, that he had never really lived. He deliberately sought then to "front only the essential facts of life."

In another civilization this ideal would have been less difficult of achievement. In the civilization into which Thoreau had, however, the accident to be born, to seek out the essential facts of existence implied an extreme individualism very rarely encountered. The birth of so unusual a man was for the age a felicitous anomaly: and for Thoreau himself, we are convinced, a misfortune not so deeply regretted as it might perhaps have been had there existed no Walden Pond, no Cape Cod, no Maine Woods, no adjacent Quebec nor virgin forests through which the seasons swept their changing harmonies of color, sound and animal life.

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THE LEGEND OF LILITH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE legend of Lilith is an intriguing revelation of old Semitic superstitions and persists to this very day in various forms. The personality of the Hebrew Lilîth has been generally derived from the Babylonian-Assyrian Lilît, Lîlu or Lilîtu, an evil spirit. As we shall see later, this personification was a sort of fusion of the Roman Lamia, the Greek *hetæra,* and the Turkish vampire. Belief in this demoness, growing up among the Jews during their Babylonian captivity, developed into a cult which lasted among the Jews of Mesopotamia down to the seventh century of our era. The Lilith legend is found only in the uncanonical works, although the word Lilith is already mentioned in pseudo-Isaiah. The earliest extant account of this legend is in the Alphabet of Ben Sira, but it was elaborated in the Talmud, the Targum and the Cabala.[1]

Biblical mention of Lilith occurs when depicting the scene of desolation among Edom's ruined fortresses, where "the wild beasts of the desert shall meet with the wolves, and the satyr shall cry to his fellow; *lilîth* shall also settle there and find for herself a place of rest." (Is. xxxiv. 14.) This biblical reference is not to an animal, as might be supposed from the context. The translation of *lilîth* in the Septuagint as "a tailless ape" and in the King James Version as "a screech owl" has been bitterly and justly assailed. Symmachus in his Greek translation and St. Jerome in his Latin translation of the Old Testament understood better the Hebrew meaning of the word by rendering *lilîth* as "night-monster." (cf. "terror by night" in Psalms xci. 5.)

---

[1] As for critical literature on the legend of Lilith, we will mention, in addition to the items listed later, the following: Bacher, "Lilith, Königin von Smaraged," *Monatsschift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums,* XII (1870). 187-9; Adolf Waldauer, "Lilith," *Populär-wissenschaftliche Monatsblätter,* VI (1886), 248-50; Israel Lévi, "Lilîth et Lilîn," *Revue des études juives,* LXVIII (1914), 5-21. The reader will also find a chapter on Lilith in Karl Knortz's interesting book, *Hexen, Teufel und Blocksbergspuk in Geschichte, Sage und Literatur* (Annaberg, Sachsen, 1914), pp. 120-49.

The fact is that the Hebrew word *lilîth* is a feminine derivative of the Hebrew *lay'la* (Assyrian *leila*), which is the regular noun for "night." Thus Lilith was originally not a proper name but a general noun which signified "a daughter of the night" and designated any kind of monster in the form of woman who exercised her power for evil during darkness.[2] The mass of legends that gradually centered around a nocturnal monster in feminine form seems to have transformed her into a personality.

In Talmudic tradition Lilith is primarily a demoness who selects small children as her special victims. She is said to steal infants in the night and carry them off to the desert. The rabbinical writings depict this demoness as a terror to women at childbirth, whom she wishes to rob of their offspring. This specter, dressed in her finest raiment, is supposed to stand at the foot of the beds of lying-in women in order to snatch new-born babies from mothers' arms. However, this fiend in the form of woman can be fought with certain amulets, according to the Talmud. This accounts for the custom, prevailing to the present day among many orthodox Jews, of hanging an amulet, inscribed with the names of the angels Senoï, Sansenoï and Sanmangeloph around the child's neck at birth or of nailing "childbirth tablets," on walls or door-posts of the lying-in room in order to ward off Lilith's pernicious power over new-born children. Other Jews place in the chamber occupied by the new mother four coins with labels on which are inscribed the names of Adam and Eve accompanied by the words *"Avaunt thee, Lilith!"*

The hatred of Lilith for the children of men is, according to old Jewish belief, the result of her jealousy of the mother of mankind, who replaced her in the affections of Adam and thus robbed her of the joys of motherhood. As is well depicted in poetry and painting, Lilith is represented in Jewish mythology as the first wife of Adam, whom she later abandoned and turned into a demon. Another Jewish tradition has it that Lilith did not abandon her human husband until after she had borne to him a host of demons, spirits and *lilîn* (plural of *lilîth*).[3] The Koran contains the screed that Lilith presented our common ancestor with a daughter named Zelinda the Fair, and that it was this half-sister whom Cain married. Anatole France, in "la Fille de Lilith" (1889), tells the story of another deathless daughter of Lilith, who envies her half-sisters, the daughters of Eve, and prays for the experience of death that she also may enjoy life, and for remorse that she too may know pleasure. The French author has the immortal but fatal maiden come up to earth and attach herself to a young Parisian, wherefore it requires the exorcisms of the curé Safrac to purify this modern Tannhäuser from his voluptuous relations.

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[2] Alfred Kubin's *Dämonen und Nachtgesichte* (Dresden, 1926) contains a series of 128 fantastic illustrations of nocturnal visions, unapproached in modern art.

[3] The Hebrew word *lilîn* is not a true plural of *lilîth*. We would expect *lilitim* or *lilitos* as a plural. The word is in reality the masculine counterpart of *lilîth* and denotes a male night-monster.

Talmudic tradition has it that Lilith was created simultaneously with Adam, both being joined together by the back, for it is written "male and female created He them, and called their name Adam." (Gen. i. 27.) In this condition they constantly quarreled and tore at each other. Then the Lord repented that he had fashioned them in this way and separated them into two independent bodies; but even thus they would not live in peace. A mismated pair from the very start, their incompatability of temperament was too great for peace. Their views differed considerably on the all-important question of the headship of the family. Lilith was the first woman to challenge masculine supremacy. This *Mater malorum* is said to have started the fight for equal rights for women by contesting her husband's claim to be the head of the family. Adam began the first conversation with his bride by asserting that he was to be her master. Lilith replied that she had equal right to be the chief of the family. When she realized how hopelessly stubborn Adam was, she reached a decision similar to that of the end-of-the-nineteenth-century Nora in Ibsen's *Doll's House* (1879). She pronounced the *Shem hamephorash* (the Ineffable Name), the result of which was that she obtained wings with which she flew out of Eden and out of sight.

Adam, heart-broken over his loss of Lilith, cried in distress: "Master of the world, the woman whom Thou hast given me has flown away." The Creator then sent the three angels previously mentioned to find Lilith and persuade her to return to her husband and her hearth. She would not yield even after the angels had been sent again by the Lord to convey to her the doom that she would bear many children and that they should all die in infancy. Lilith considered the penalty so awful that she was about to put an end to her life by throwing herself into the sea. The three angels, moved by her anguish, agreed that she should have by way of compensation full power over all new-born children during eight days after birth for boys and during twenty days after birth for girls. In addition, she was given special power over all children born out of wedlock.

When Lilith refused to return to Adam, the second Eve (*i.e.* Mother) was now formed to compensate him for his first marital fiasco.[4] This time, however, the Lord created the woman out of man's rib in order that there might no longer be any question of her independence, and that the embarrassing problem of women's rights might never be raised again among men.[5] Evidently Jehovah with all his omniscience could not foresee the widespread suffragist movement of the present day.[6]

Samaël, chief of the fallen angels, one day found beautiful Lilith lamenting her errors in loneliness, and fell in love with her. As Lilith found Samaël radical on the question of the equality of sexes, which she had raised in Eden, she accepted him, and the two settled in the Valley of Jehannum (Gehenna). As successor to Adam in the affections of Lilith, Samaël is also called in the Talmud Adam-Belial in distinction to Adam-Kadmon, our first ancestor.

Samaël found in his consort a willing conspirator against the Lord in the latter's plans for man and womankind. Lilith was jealous of Eve, who replaced her in the affections of her first husband, just as Samaël was jealous of Adam, who was destined to be his successor in the celestial choir-stalls. While the demonic pair were witnessing the pleasures of our common ancestors in Eden, they burned with envy and decided to bring man and woman to a downfall so that they would be driven out of the Garden of Eden. According to the Revelations of St. John, it was Samaël or Satan, who, disguised as a serpent, tempted Eve to disobey the Lord by eating of the forbidden fruit and thus brought upon herself and her husband the wrath of their Creator. A certain Christian tradition identifies the serpent of the Garden of Eden not with Samaël or

---

[4] The Jewish belief in the two wives of Adam is mentioned, among post-medieval Christian writers, by Robert Burton in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) and by Johann Albert Fabricius, who, in his *Codex Pseudoepigraphus Veteris Testamenti* (1713), states that two wives were created for Adam "quarum una ex luto extra paradisum, altera in paradiso ex costa condita faerit." The first is Lilith, the second is Eve.

[5] See M. D. Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (2 vols., London, 1879; 3rd ed., New York, 1889) II, 92 ff.

[6] Mr. A. B. See, president of an elevator company, was undoubtedly right when he stated that it was Satan who procured in this country the passage of the law granting women equal rights with men.

Satan but with Lilith, who thus was the main instigator in the fall of our common ancestors. Dante Gabriel Rossetti, in his famous poem "Eden Bower," follows this later tradition in ascribing the temptation in Eden to this serpent woman Lilith.

*
* *

The idea of a "Devil's Dam" belongs wholly to Jewish tradition. It is foreign to Christian thought. Church doctrine has it that the Devil can have no wife inasmuch as he is excluded from the sacrament of marriage. In compensation, Christianity has conferred upon the Devil a mother or a grandmother. In the German secular play of Pope Joan, written in 1480, Lilith appears, therefore, as the Devil's grandmother. Victor Hugo, in *la Fin de Satan* (not published till 1886), identifies the Babylonian-Assyrian Lilith with the Egyptian Isis and represents her not as Satan's wife or mother but as Satan's daughter.

In addition to Lilith, who is his legal and lawful consort, Satan has had many connubial connections. The four concubines given the Devil by the Cabala are Nehema, Aggareth, Igymeth and Machlath. Satan also had incestuous relations with his daughter Sin, who, according to Milton, sprang full-blown from Satan's head, even as Minerva sprang full-panoplied from Jupiter's head (*Par. Lost.* ii. 758). The fruit of this forbidden union is Death (*ibid.,* ii. 728 and 787.).

*
* *

Samaël presented Lilith on their wedding-day with a splendid kingdom where she was attended by four hundred and eighty troops. But all the wealth and honors heaped upon her by her second husband failed to compensate her for her lack of children. She has remained to this day the Lady of Sorrows. It is believed that her voice of grief can be heard in the air at night, like that of Rachel weeping over her children.

The grief of Lilith over the loss of her children from her first marriage is more pronounced since she was cursed by the Lord, who decreed that her children by her second husband must all die in infancy for her deserting her first husband.

According to another Jewish tradition, the Lord cursed Lilith, for her refusal to return to Adam, to beget demons, and, during her second marriage, she mothered a host of monsters. Asmodeus, Leviathan, and indeed most devils of distinction, sprang from this union. Lilith is represented by certain rabbis as giving birth to a brood of *zebub* or flies.[7] A second flock of children attributed to her by the Talmudists are the *succubi* or devils who normally retain the female form.

This fact accounts for Lilith's hostility to new-born infants, for whom she lies in wait to snatch them into the desert. But Lilith may after all not be so black as she is painted. Her intention in visiting the lying-in rooms of mortal women is perhaps not to harm but to hug the babies. This fatal immortal, who has been denied the joys of motherhood, seeks to press to her heart the babies of the happier members of her sex. This supposition is supported by a certain Jewish belief to the effect that Lilith loves babies and plays with them in their sleep on the night of the Sabbath. It is written in the Talmud that, if a child smiles during the night of the Sabbath or the New Moon, it is a sign that Lilith is playing with it.

⁂

The Legend of Lilith has had much charm for modern writers, both in poem and play, in song and story.[8]

Alfred de Vigny, in his fragment "Lilith" (1859), offers us an original interpretation in that Lilith, the first incarnation of womankind, is an impersonation of sensuality and sterility. When Adam wearied of her and received Eve in her place, Lilith cursed the offspring of the woman who replaced her in the affections of Adam and started on her journey across the ages to found the religion of murderers. Through her influence, the first-born child of her rival became assassin of his own brother.

Among modern dramatizations of this ancient legend, Remy de Gourmont's *Lilith* (1891-2) merits special mention. This play is the biblical story of the creation and fall of man retold in dramatic form with great skill by a sensual sceptic. The author fabricated the revolting scenes of his play from the legends recorded in the mystical writings of the Jews. In this play, Lilith, though created by the Lord as Adam's helpmeet, never shared the bed and board of our common ancestor. She displeased her Creator by sensuality, which she asserted from the very moment of her birth, and for this reason she was handed over to Satan. As soon as this woman opened her eyes, she immediately asked to be led to man in order to satisfy her appetites. When the Lord announced to her that as a punishment she would never know man, she defiantly declared that woman always gained what she wished. Being banished to hell to keep company with the fallen angel, Lilith, not satisfied with the unfruitful caresses of her infernal husband, succeeded in seducing Adam at the moment when Satan soiled the mother of men in the form of a serpent.

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[7] See R. P. Dow: "The Vengeful Brood of Lilith and Samaël," *Bulletin of the Brooklyn Entomological Society*, XII (1917), 1-9.

[8] The "Bibliography of Lilith," published by A. S. Freidus in the *Bulletin of the Brooklyn Entomological Society*, XII (1917), 9-12, contains a caption "Lilith in Modern Literature," to which the reader is referred. We will add the following titles unknown to this compiler: Edmund W. Putnam, *Lilith, Epos*, 1907; G. S. Viereck, "Queen Lilith" (in his *The Candle and the Flame*), 1912; Carl Macleod Boyle, *Where Lilith Dances*, 1920; Wilhelm Jensen, "Lilith" (in his *Gedichte*), 1869; Marcellus Emants, *Lilith* (translated into German in 1895 by Anna Crons); Wilhelm Kloos, *Lilith Triumphatrix* (translated into German by L. Hauser).

This interpretation of the fall in Eden is based on an ancient Jewish tradition, which interprets the sin of our ancestors as sensuality. The Slavonic version of the Book of Enoch already states that Satan committed adultery with Eve. The Cabala, which also interprets the biblical story of the gastronomical temptation as an allegory, goes a step further and represents the sin of Adam and Eve as a twofold debauchery. The Zohar expressly states that Adam and Eve led a *ménage à quatre* with Samaël and Lilith. At the moment when the demon debauched the mother of mankind, the demoness offered her beauty to the founder of the human race. In another Cabalistic work, the demon is named Leviathan, and his consort is called Heva. Other mystical writings represent Leviathan as a sort of androgyny, of whom Samaël was the male incarnation and Lilith or Heva the female. From the illicit union of Adam and Lilith issued legions of larves, *succubi* and elemental spirits, who filled the earth in order to corrupt the human race but who will be annihilated at the end of time.

The story of Adam's domestic troubles has also been treated by Robert Browning in *Adam, Lilith and Eve* (1883), by George Bernard Shaw in *Back to Methusaleh* (1921), by André Spire in Samaël (1921), by John Erskine in Adam and Eve (1927), and by Murray Sheehan in *Eden* (1927).

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The fatal power of Lilith is not limited to new-born infants. She offers a greater danger to men, particularly in their youth. In Eastern tradition, Lilith, as princess of the *succubi,* is primarily a seductress of men. "Lilith," says Langdon, "is the Semitic name for the beautiful and licentious unmarried harlot who seduces men in streets and fields."[9]

Lilith was so beautiful, so overpowering in physical charms and intellectual gifts, that she was known everywhere in the Orient and came to be worshipped. It may be remarked in passing that a kind of Lilith-worship also existed in southern Europe during the seventh century, just as demon-worship has sporadically broken out in almost every European country and still exists today among the Yezidis of Asia Minor and among primitive tribes in other parts of the world.[10]

Eastern Tradition declares that Lilith, the queen of hell, disguised as the Queen of Sheba, tempted Solomn with her beauty and wit.[11] If the wisest of men fell a victim to her charms, how can poor mortals resist? It is said in fact that no man ever escaped the siren seductions of this deviless. Her beauty has attracted countless poets and painters who vied with one another to draw her portrait.

Many indeed are the inspired poetical and pictorial representations of her infernal Majesty. Dante Gabriel Rossetti has, by both his arts, celebrated the beauty of this diabo-lady.[12] G. Widmann, in his poem, *Der Heilige und die Tiere* (1906), speaks in enthusiastic terms of the beauty of Lilith. The Spanish novelist, Emilo Carrere, has written a novel about her eyes (*los Ojos de la Diablesa,* 1913). But the remarkable thing about her person is her hair. Ben Sira states that Lilith was beautiful with long black hair. When Lilith arrived among the Nordics, she realized that gentlemen prefer blondes and so apparently dyed her hair. Rossetti, in his sonnet, "Lilith," describes her with golden locks. But in the meshes of her hair lurk a multitude of evil spirits. This demoness cannot be proud of her feet. But, as Anatole France has well remarked, she is clever enough to "hide her cloven hoof under a trailing skirt embroidered with pearls" (*le Jardin d'Epicure,* 1894).

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[9] Cf. Stephen H. Langdon: *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford, 1914), p. 74. Lilith originally was not a harlot, although the temple harlot often passed herself off in the darkness as a *lilîtu,* a "night-lady." See Josephus: *Jewish Antiquities* (XVIII, iii, 4) for such tricks and for the popular credulity with regard to the cohabitation of gods with mortals.

[10] See the article "The Synagogue of Satan," p. 732.

[11] The kernel of the legend of the Queen of Sheba is in 1 Kings x. 1 ff. On this legend, consult J. Halévy: *la Légende de la Reine de Sabæ.* (*Annuaire de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Section des Sciences historiques et philosophiques.*) Paris, 1905.

[12] On Rossetti's portrayal of Lilith, read Lafcadio Hearn's *Appreciations of Poetry* (New York, 1916), pp. 97-8.

Lilith has not evidently lost allure through the centuries. Her fascinations still operate on all who behold her. Daniel Defoe had this devil-damsel in mind when he said, "A lady-devil is about as dangerous a creature as one could meet." Like all beautiful women, this "accursed damozel" has a heart of ice. She uses her golden hair to captivate the young men; and the youth who loves her always dies, and after his death a single hair is found twisted around his heart, as described in Rossetti's sonnet.

When Faust beheld Lilith in the Walpurgis Night, Mephistopheles warned him against her charms in the following words:

"Beware the lure within her lovely tresses,
The splendid sole adornment of her hair!
When she succeeds therewith a youth to snare,
Not soon again she frees him from her jesses."
(*Faust* i. 4120-23.)

According to certain demonologists, Lady Lilith has not been exempt from the law to which all flesh is subject. She, too, could not withstand the ravages of time. Although in her younger days a woman of great beauty, she has now become a regular hell-hag. No demon of hell is a match for her in ugliness and wickedness. This Lilith forms the subject of the poem entitled *The Diabo-Lady, or a Match in Hell,* which was written in England in 1777 and "dedicated to the Worst Woman in her Majesty's Dominions." Richard Garnett, in *Madam Lucifer* (1888), paints a very unflattering portrait of the King-Devil's better or bitter half, of whom, as he says, he is "a thousand times more afraid . . . than of all the saints in the calendar." Kornel Makuszynski, in *Another Paradise Lost and Regained* (1926), represents Satan's spouse as a regular shrew, a monument of ancient art, as her husband humorously calls her.

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In every legend there is some bit of eternal verity. What is there symbolic in this Lilith legend; how is it to be appraised and interpreted? Evidently Lilith as the first wife of Adam is the symbol of "first love remembered." It is a well-known fact that a man rarely marries the first woman he has loved whether in reality or in reverie. Lilith represents the ideal woman of man's dreams. She is every man's dream-wife, in a word, perfection in petticoats. Each of us has in his heart, as Flaubert has said, a chamber for a queen, which is almost always left uninhabited. The woman we marry does not seem to occupy it. But often in our dreams this "nocturnal specter" enters into this chamber bringing with her a breath of air from a supernatural world.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS DIVERGENCE FROM THE SPIRIT OF THE CONTEMPORARY WEST (I)

BY EDWARD L. SCHAUB

THE philosopher Fichte spoke from deliberate conviction when he variously declared that the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of person one is. To him it seemed that, basically, there are two types of men, and two alone. This led him to substitute for the threefold classification of philosophies advanced by Kant, a dual division. Whereas his predecessor had differentiated dogmatic, skeptical and critical philosophies, Fichte insisted that every philosophical system is dominated either by an insistence upon human freedom or by the thesis of universal determinism. Given a man who exhibits intellectual spontaneity and is aware thereof, and who possesses conscious aims which he ardently pursues in the face of physical and mental lethargy and of environmental oppositions; given a man who is genuinely self-conscious, self-directing and self-critical, who sifts data for their truth value and reaches out in intellectual exploration, and who passes judgment upon himself and his world; given a self who is truly in possession of himself, and we have a person who is invincibly committed to a metaphysics and a social philosophy of freedom. Such a person can understand why the one of the contrary type holds to the view he does. He can understand why one who has never with freedom acquired selfhood and spontaneity, and who consequently identifies himself with substances and things, inevitably maintains what Fichte variously characterized as a substantive, a materialistic, and a deterministic world-view. But as to the error of this view the self-consciously free spirit is as fully convinced as he is luminously aware of its causes.

These contentions of Fichte obviously grow out of an interpretation of the self that is essentially individualistic, and the present writer, for one, finds much of value in them. They should, however, not obscure the fact that for certain purposes it may be more significant to trace differences in world-views along other lines. It may not be gainsaid that philosophy in general feeds upon the concrete facts of life, and reckons with the numerous areas of experience organized through the operation of practical and theoretical interests. Man, for example, requires food, shelter, and safety, and these he must win through practical adjustments to and through manipulation of his environment. The most advanced as well as the most primitive thus possess habits, aptitudes, systems of practices and bodies of ideas that constitute an important sector of life. This sector is social in the sense that it has acquired its character through activities in which the individual has co-operated with his fellows, and through the pressure of traditions and norms sustained by the group. As moulded by the features of the real world in which life is carried on, it may be differentiated from a set of ideas and practices, from myths, tales and taboos, which arise from the play of imagination that is largely uncontrolled by the stubborn actualities of the existing environment, and that assume organization through the forces of fear and other emotions of thwarted and half-formed desires, of hopes and present needs. Still again, in the history of human culture there gradually emerge a variety of activities, a body of ideas, and a characteristic outlook—a sector of experience—that we have come to call aesthetic. This, in turn, may be demarcated from sets of interest that are theoretic and scientific, or more strictly social and ethical, or essentially religious and cosmic.

Now philosophy may not safely neglect any phase of human experience. It becomes significant in proportion to the comprehensiveness, as well, of course, as to the success with which it interprets and synthesizes the facts, and more particularly the organizing interests and categories, of all the departments of individual-social life and thought. But philosophers, like other people, see and achieve only in part. As a matter of fact, their conclusions take shape under the predominating influence now of this and again of another field of concrete experience. According to the latter, therefore, and to the range and degree of the organization of the facts that fall therein, will be the resultant world-view, or at least certain important features of this view that enable us significantly to compare and to contrast it with rival doctrines. Among different peoples, and at different epochs, however, different areas of activity and interest have tended to exercise the dominant rôle. To the extent that this has occurred, we are apt to find more or less general drifts in those systems of ideals and facts that comprise the world-view.

If we keep in mind these facts, an interesting and a significant contrast is revealed when we compare, in a very large and general way, the contemporary thought currents of the West, and particularly of America, with the outlook which is often broadly characterized as Indian. The former, it becomes clear, have their basis, to a unique degree, in the experiences of practical and ethical life and activity, and find their logical orientation primarily in science, more specifically in the natural sciences; the latter, on the other hand, is peculiarly dominated by features of the religious consciousness. As a confirmatory fact, it might be pointed out that in so far as our own present American philosophy ventures at all beyond the technical consideration of particular problems to broad metaphysical construction, or to a comprehensive social philosophy, it in the main does so without first consulting the deliverances of the specifically religious consciousness. Even philosophical interpretations of religion are in a large measure based upon metaphysical conclusions derived from sources which, however extensive, fail to include the facts of religious experience or the generalizations reached through a comparative, historical or psychological study of them. That religious attitudes and expressions represent facts, and that the comparative, historical, sociological and psychological treatments of them offer considerations, no less significant for the larger tasks of philosophy than other facts and other methodically reached considerations, seems to be quite disregarded by perhaps even the majority of our Western thinkers. In the case of India, on the other hand, the articulation of philosophy and religion seems so close at times as to defy any clear separation of the two. Religion, it would seem, has continued to be perhaps the chief cultural influence, and the primary source of the content as well as the inspiration of philosophy, while the latter has discharged its debt by transforming and yet sustaining, by purging and yet confirming, the pivotal affirmations of the religious consciousness. Garbe has even contended, with respect to India, that "not only has the most absolute freedom of thought always prevailed, but also philosophical speculation, even in its boldest forms, has placed itself in accord with the popular religion to an extent never again realized on earth between these two powers.[1]

The contrast thus alleged demands elaboration, and the affirmation of its existence requires defense. Especially is this the case because the allegation is made in the face of a penetrating study which Professor Radhakrishnan has recently published under the title, *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.* In this volume, Professor Radhakrishnan deals with the pluralistic systems lately current in Western philosophy. He points out the way in which they diverge from what he considers to be the natural conclusion of sound, impartial philosophizing, namely, monistic idealism. These deviations he then ascribes to what he calls the "reign of religion" but characterizes as "the interference of religious prejudice." It might thus seem that Professor Radhakrishnan finds religion potent precisely where we have just declared it to play a relatively subordinate part; and it might further seem that, whereas he regards as deleterious that impact of religion which he discovers, we shall intimate it to be a loss that the influence of religion upon our thought and culture is not relatively greater than it appears to be. Instead of indicating any strictures we might have upon the conclusions of Professor Radhakrishnan, or of entering upon an examination of the extent to which that which we have already said or may still have to say does ultimately diverge from his conclusions, let us merely point out that, while Professor Radhakrishnan's primary, even though not exclusive, gaze is upon Europe, our point of fixation is America, with Europe as marginal. Moreover, while he singles out for consideration those philosophical systems which expound pluralistic theism, we shall be concerned not with these exclusively but more generally with such liberalistic and humanistic doctrines as seem most clearly to reflect and most directly to affect our present cultural life. Furthermore, and more importantly, the term 'religion' as used by Professor Radhakrishnan does not designate the same form of consciousness or body of facts which we have in mind.

Let us then undertake an inspection of the religious consciousness, directing our attention particularly to some lines of consideration connected with its salient features. While we shall aspire to all possible brevity in our description, some amount of detail and of elaboration will be necessary if we are to realize our aim of preparing the way for what we shall wish to emphasize, in the paper which is to follow, in connection with Indian philosophy. Now, religion, obviously, is psychologically an extremely complicated phenomenon. Anthropologically and sociologically, it has appeared in an enormous variety of forms, widely divergent whether we pay regard to its cognitive, conative, or emotional phases, to its myths and creeds, its cults and impact upon life, or its reverberations in the feelings of its devotees. Historically, it has exhibited change and growth which, though perhaps not as rapid as the transformations in other phases of culture, are nevertheless as deep-going. Religion, in its factual as distinguished from its normative connotation, therefore represents a domain in which every generalization, like all definition, suffers from a certain degree of arbitrariness, and thus lays itself open to possible objection.

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[1] Garbe, *The Philosophy of Ancient India,* p. 24.

Little, therefore, may be predicated of religion if the predication is intended as sweepingly universal. Nevertheless, one may with some assurance insist that in the main, whether in its more primitive or its more advanced forms, the religious consciousness involves as one of its features man's awareness that he is living in a power-world, and that he must orient and adjust himself thereto as best he may. The controlling power or powers, as he indeed with some measure of clearness realizes, are but inadequately understood by him, or are perhaps even deemed to be incomprehensible. Yet he is convinced of their existence, and at every given time he believes that he knows so much of their character as is implied by acts and attitudes to which he has been led, and to which he subsequently feels constrained, in relation to them. Religion, that is to say—at least in the greater number of cases—is an experience in which the individual, as a psychological matter of fact, is conscious of an objective reality, and of the fact that an essential feature of this reality is its extraordinary power, a power supernormal in its degree and portentous in its bearing upon the well-being of the individual and his group. Indeed, subject to the reservations always necessary when speaking of religion in general, one may safely say that it involves man's conscious and practical attitude to the reality that for him is ultimate, and that is peculiarly and mysteriously related to the events of nature and to man's vital concerns.

Such being the case, the reality with which the religious consciousness is concerned is by it conceived in terms not alone of power but also of value. This aspect of value, indeed, has of late received increasing recognition. Whether under the influence of

Ritschlians and other post-Kantians, or of Hoeffding's fruitful thesis that religion is essentially faith in the conservation of values, or whether because of voluntaristic psychologies which give to interests a priority over ideas, recent students of religion have even tended to stress its value aspect to the point of one-sidedness.

It is our contention that the object of which the individual is conscious in his religious experience possesses for him the attributes both of power and of value. It is supremely real, if indeed it is not the ultimate being; it is practically significant; it more and more acquires the traits deemed loftiest at the time; eventually it becomes the indissoluble synthesis of the irrefragably real and the truly ideal.

Kant resolved the basic human questions into three: what can I know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope. These questions are all of serious moment to the genuine religious consciousness. In its most highly developed forms, pronouncedly when its mystical element comes to the fore, it insists that absolute truth is attainable (though—be it marked—in the specific sense only that ultimate reality is accessible to man), that duty is not an illusion, and that desire, when conscious of its deepest requirements, may be fundamentally satisfied. A completely ascendent religious mysticism affirms a type of experience which fulfills man's supreme cognitive aims and also his desiderative and volitional life. Difficult paradoxes and intellectual puzzlements here present themselves. These center about the fact that actualities, as Baldwin develops in considerable detail in his *Genetic Logic*, "are what we discover, whether we desire them or not," whereas desire looms large in the texture of ideals. In the teeth of all difficulties, however, religion has tended stubbornly to resist any suggestion that it relinquish in its object the aspect either of actuality or of value. Both power and goodness, it firmly maintains, are essential to its object.

The religious consciousness, therefore, is not to be interpreted, as it so commonly has been of late, in terms of escape from reality. The very contrary is the case. Religion is an earnest and a stubborn quest for truth and reality. It is convinced that any conception which reason shows to the untenable must be discarded, however deeply it may have become rooted in emotion and life. For, it is staunch in the faith that only the real can completely and permanently satisfy that which is deepest in us. In matters of creed, as well as of feeling and practical concern, it voices the determination expressed in Job's tragically heroic resolve that "though He slay me, yet will I trust Him." The developed religious consciousness would seem to acquiesce only in that which most fully, indeed which completely, satisfies man's deepest requirements. Its object is one believed to interpret the courses of history and of nature, to embody whatever man's self-conscious reason leads him to value and reverence, and to guarantee unalloyed bliss. It may, to repeat, not be denied that such a faith sets to philosophy tasks of extraordinary, if not completely baffling, complexity. And it must be confessed that not even a Plato, and no subsequent philosopher, has as yet resolved with more than partial success the various antinomies presented by religion. Nevertheless, religion continues as a perpetual refusal to divorce power from perfection, reality from ideality.

Nor will religion consent to a severance of its supremely real and worthful object from the lives of finite individuals. On the contrary, it declares the possibility of a human existence permeated by the divine spirit; and such an existence it is disposed to require, its conviction being that blindness and sinfulness are involved whenever the finite reserves any remnant of himself in isolation from the divine. To certain religious mystics, indeed, the life of man, in its apical experiences certainly, if not throughout, represents the very pulsations of God. Nevertheless, there are spiritual requirements which impel even the religious mystic to a contrary attitude, to an advocacy of and a struggle for the preservation of selfhood and individuality. Here again paradoxes and moral perplexities are engendered. The intellect is confronted with the perennial question, in one of its aspects, of the one and the many. Morally, there is a tension between the demand for the free determination and exercise of duty on the part of volitional agents and the craving for divine guidance and control, or, at any rate, the need—if life is to be at its fullest—for unreserved dedication to a superfinite which for the individual must be the all in all.

The religious consciousness, thus, holds fast to various affirmations which to it are all fundamental even though they are not easily reconciled. In its impact upon the philosophic quest, therefore, it arouses deep discontent with metaphysical systems which adopt the easy course of singling out and treating as basic certain specific features of reality and of disregarding all that seems incompatible therewith. It challenges the thinker to a more catholic view and to more arduous reflection; it stirs him to persist in the face of all obscurities and defiant difficulties, in order that his thought may do justice to the fullness of the reality which presents itself to the religious devotee in his most serious and most satisfying experience.

With this we pass to another of the lines of consideration alluded to above. Religion, as just noted, disallows to philosophy any ready acquiesence in results achieved through the neglect of central features of experience. Thus it prods the philosopher on to perpetual efforts. This it does also through a further influence to which we now advert. Religion involves a consciousness that the ultimate object transcends present comprehension. To quote from Rudolf Otto's *Naturalism and Religion,* "religion seeks depth in things, reaches out toward what is concealed, uncomprehended, mysterious. It is more than humility; it is piety. And piety is experience of mystery." Religion has repeatedly proclaimed that the ways of the Divine are not our ways, as we have come to understand them; nor are its thoughts our thoughts. For it, the nature of the Divine is not fully—or perhaps, as it is sometimes alleged, not at all—learned by observation or analysis of any particular reality that has come within our ken. Hence the Sorbonne was acting in defense of one of the convictions of the religious consciousness at the time when it rejected as heresy the doctrine that it is possible to "know" God. Instructive at this point it is to note that Wundt's extensive researches and penetrating psychological analyses as reported in his Völkerpsychologie led him to the doctrine that the god of religion is a synthesis of the hero with that mysterious creation of the emotions which he designated the 'demon.' The distinguished American psychologist of religion Leuba has also insisted that "mysteriousness and awefulness always belong to gods, and man's relations with gods will be more or less deeply colored with awe." Let the Divine receive embodiment in specific imagery or material representation, or let it acquire definite formulation in a creed, and there is bound shortly to arise a vital religious spirit to declare that that which was accepted as Divine is but an idol, a figment of an all too limited experience and of a religious need but imperfectly conscious of its own requirements.

It is reported that Paul, coming in his long missionary journeys to Athens, found there among its several temples devoted to the gods of Greek mythology, one dedicated to the unknown God. The latter he sought to make known unto the people. But even his all but consummate genius failed. Of the Athenians, only a very few seemed convinced; some mocked, and others, though stating that they would hear him again on these matters, were left so unillumined, and therefore apparently so indifferent, that Paul, in seeming discouragement, departed from among them, leaving the folk and their philosophers with the unknown God. We allude to this incident only for purposes of illustration. Is it not the case that, whenever any advanced people have found themselves with specifically imaged gods, or with such as were with considerable completeness understood by them, they have become profoundly dissatisfied, and have felt an irresistible impulse either to reject their deities or to supplement them with a further god essentially unknown?

True it is that all religions living for long in the spirits of men, have affirmed various attributes of their gods as they have come to know them through one form or another of revelation, or it matters not how. But no less true is it that in one way or another, and at some point or another, they have persistently and stoutly declared that no human thoughts or finite consciousness may express the nature of the religious object, that the Divine in its essential nature as such is qualitatively other than the limited realities accessible to our comprehension, is somehow genuinely transcendent of finite existence and of human apprehension.

It has often been noted that religion has been fed by man's sense of the mysterious. Here we are concerned merely to suggest that religion has in turn sustained that by which it has been nourished. For the life of philosophy, this, as we shall in our concluding paper observe, is a fact of no little moment. Epochs and peoples that preserve a living nexus or osmosis between religion and philosophy possess not only a religion but likewise a philosophy essentially other than is to be found where the connection is weakened or severed.

In its most characteristic and lofty forms, then, the religious consciousness postulates a reality that synthesizes being and value; it insists upon a union of the human and the divine; and it is sensitively alive to the fact of an uncomprehended, if not incomprehensible, presence, and to the lure of the mysterious in nature and human experience. Its source is in the stirrings of a dissatisfied or rent soul; its emphasis oscillates between the attitude of the self to its world and the bearing of the world upon the self; its promise is salvation and realization.

To be sure, the term religion covers a great variety of phenomena. In part the variations are due to the fact that in its relation to other elements of the cultural life, as well as to philosophy, religion has in some cases been primarily active and formative, and has therefore preserved its essential integrity; whereas, in other cases, the conditions are reversed—numerous cultural elements have developed in considerable independence of religion and have in the course of time put their stamp upon the latter. Thus, the religious outlook of India has pretty much preserved its unique—and not merely its traditional—quality, and its essential integrity; that of present day America, on the other hand, is strongly dominated by the influences of industrialism, of the democratic ideal of society, and of ethical requirements. In the former case, religion's function is connected with man's endeavor to transcend the world and his own present state of being; in the latter case, it is widely held that the proper aim of religion (as indeed only less fully that of philosophy) is to effect desirable changes in the physical and the social environment.

Generalizations, to be sure, are perilous and they become doubly so when employed in the drawing of contrasts or even of comparisons. Yet, when we consider what is typically Indian in relation to what is today generally prevalent in America, certain important differences emerge, at least in degree of emphasis, as respects the relations of philosophy and culture to religion.

How the features of the religious consciousness as sketched above have reflected themselves in the philosophy of India and have thus led to a divergence of the latter from the spirit of the contemporary West, will appear in some detail in the second part of our study.

THE ART OF RELIGION

BY S. I. ROSENBERG

TO art has traditionally been assigned the position as handmaid of religion: even a cursory acquaintance with the vast amount of writing in this field will make the general acceptance of this relationship apparent. Only as recently as the positivist school, art was postured in this subordination to religion, and still anthropologists have been reluctant to consider art and religion as being more closely related both in origin and career: to them religion has always been the womb that conceived and the breast that has nourished art.

Religion, however, had its genesis in the same impulses as art: before ever art was, was the germ of the esthetic need of art, and the emotional fountain head of the arts received its first expression in the art of religion. For religion has been a syncretism of the arts, synthesized skillfully and deftly to provide expression for all the emotions of mankind: to primitive man it offered means for the expression of his desire for rain or his dumb joy at victory, to more modern man it has offered a shadowless, glimmering land wherein he may erect his ideals and the ultimate goal of his frustrate aspirations. Religion has been the art of expressing man's emotions and aspirations.

The oldest religions of which we have knowledge are those of Central Australia and though these are remote in time and form from truly primitive religions whatever speculations and notions of primitive religions we may have are conjectural deductions from the religions of the natives of these regions.

It has been observed that a player who throws a ball to the left when he desired it to go the right will lean to the right as if to influence the ball to swerve from its course. The connection of this psychological phenomenon with imitative rites such as the simple rain ritual is manifest: the making of an imitation shower is merely the instinctive expression of a powerful emotional anxiety caused by a draught which may mean famine and consequent starvation. Thus the motive lies not so much in the hope for the efficacy of the rite as in the relief it offers to the pent up apprehension lest the draught be fatal, for all strong emotion tends and seeks to find expression in action.

However abstruse may be the purpose and character of the present Intichiuma and other rituals, their remarkably imitative nature has been stressed by Strehlow and other investigators, and consequently the problem of the origin of these rituals as emotional expression has been simplified, for it may readily be seen that they had their cause in the same psychological instinct as the swerve of the ball player, and were originally an expression of an emotion.

That the ritual of the Wollunqua snake is still a celebrative affair is obvious and it is not much less manifest that it had its genesis in a purely rejoicing activity such as would occur at the close of the agricultural season or after a victory, and was primarily a spontaneous expression of powerful emotion.

One can appreciate these dances as means of emotional relief: after the men have been chanting awhile the fires all about the clearing are lit, and the whirling, crackling laughter or the huge flames, their fitful, momentary gleams of bright light and beams of white cleaving the gloom of night, the flickering black tracings fluttering over the clearing, the whelming, monstrous roaring of the bull roarers, the exotic, rhythmic, clashings of the boomerangs, the mad cries and hoarse screams of the men and the wild abandon of the dance pulse pizicati through the veins of all.

In its incipience this dance undoubtedly merited the name of art. For to "primitive man, to whom esthetic needs are no more foreign than to civilized man . . . primitive dance is the most immediate, most perfect and most efficient expression of primitive esthetic feeling."[1]

And so we perceive that in Central Australia religion and art were indistinguishably joined in this primitive dance, which became a definitely religious celebration as time went on and the periodicity which marks ritual crept in; for questionless, when the dance was appreciated as a festivity and opportunity for emotional relief all occasions for revelry found the dance useful. And forthwith the continued repetition of the dance gave rise to tradition, to legendary and half true tales of previous dances, and about the festival was woven the subtile gossamer of tradition and associative legends.

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[1] Groos, *Beginnings of Art.*

And here art and religion part, to be more distant relatives hereafter, for the life of a true religion could not be the life of an art. For the fine arts became the form for expression of a select few: art entailed virtuosity, restraint, and labor. Religion, with its far flung bournes, offered channels of expression for all, art was fastidious in selecting its votaries. But religion availed itself of its former relationship with art, and employed all the arts from perfuming to architecture, and upon the loom of poetry spun the shimmering silk of mythology to soothe the restlessness which became ever increasingly incurable. For here the interminable hot flow of religions shamelessly and brazenly borrowed from the arts techniques of incense burning and chanting and the various forms of its ritual; and a mythology to satisfy emotions which could find no rest in sensual beauty.

There is a fallacious notion quite universally current that there exists an emotion intrinsically and quintessentially religious, a notion analoguous to that which would classify all melancholy as poetic in its essence because of Shelley's lyric. Thus we find in so standard a book as Parry's *Evolution of the Art of Music* the statement: "It can hardly be denied that music was called into existence by religious feelings as well as by any of which human creatures are capable."

An emotion is essentially a dynamic force, described or formed only by the matter or incident which has aroused it, and religious or poetic only by the expression it receives. Thus awe at the western summer sky where a setting sun rears its splendid state in vivid blood shot clouds and soft roseate distances may be expressed by a poem, making the awe secondarily poetic, or it may be expressed by communion with a god, the emotion being then secondarily religious.

Thus the emotion stirred by the sublime slow swell of an organ in a cathedral suffused by the golden red "dim religious light" of sunlight sifting softened through the rose crimson windows is translated into the terminology of religion because of the religious setting and the mental associations which cluster about the emotion; the same emotion can be called up again by the sight of a large swollen yellow moon dripping molten gold into the purple infinity of an August night alive with furious stars, and it will not, probably, find expression religiously.

Besides imaginative associations which make certain emotions find expression religiously, there is the fact that for all emotional people there is in every experience something revelatory or noetic. All experience is in its ultimacy mystical, prior to analysis, for it is ineffable: when an experience becomes highly emotional there is always concomitant with it a revelatory quality which is for its experiencer valid and undeniable. Being emotional at core. all esthetic experience also is mystical, and mystics have invariably drawn from the mother sea of pain, beauty, and love for their mystical experiences. In the bitterness of pain and the fierce pulsing of agony they have felt the maiming flame of pain to purge the dross from existence and leave them febrile and tense in the dazzling brilliance of reality. In the moment of stark emotion following the perception of beauty as a lucid and luminous vision they have felt themselves transported for a fleeting tantalizing glimpse of a world fierce with unimaginable flames of color, silver snarls of music holding the soul in an inhuman bewitchment, leaving them struggling and helpless in the warm whelming reality. In a moment of ineffable love everything coalesces into a harmony of mellitous melting loveliness, one forgives everything, and it would be strange not to forgive, leaving the soul burning and trembling in this translucent moment of reality.

Hence, for a person educated in a religious tradition the noetic quality of the emotion is translated immediately into the language of his religion. The delusory sensation of a presence, of receiving divine knowledge, of having known something or someone unearthly is transformed into union with a god, into divine revelation from Christ. Professor Coe has expressed this aptly: "The mystic brings his religious convictions to the mystical experience he does not derive them from it." Lowie has proven quite incontrovertibly that the religious experience is a matter of social tradition: our religious imaginations and emotions and experiences are moulded according to the form of our social heritage.

But religion has utilized the fact that esthetic emotions are always at their core mystical, and hence religion has been amply supplemented by art. Thus we have the Indian sand paintings, the distinctive Egyptian religious art, and the Greek art. For the history of institutionalized ideals and methods for the expression of emotion pullulates with exemplary instances of the employment of the mystical value of estheticism to augment the religious experiences. Questionless the superior popularity Mahayana Buddhism enjoyed over Hinayanaism finds its cause to a great extent in the introduction of Boddhisatvas and iconography.

Music has been universally used by religions for emotional excitation which the circumstances and religious imaginative associations transform into religious ecstacy and fervor. So, in the worship of Cybele, on the "day of Blood" "The barbaric music of the clashing cymbals, rumbling drums, droning horns and screaming ffutes"[2] all playing in an intense exotic rhythm, aroused the onlookers and holiday spectators to such pitches of excitement that, stirred by the flowing blood of the priests, the men would leap forward and castrate themselves on the spot.

The extensive use of music at negro revival meetings, the importance of the cantor on the more important solemn holidays of Judaism, and of organ music in the church today all testify to the importance of this supplementation of religion by art.

Courteously enough, the aid art has lent to religion is returned in the imaginative stimulus religion yields to art. On the creative side, the rich mythology of religion and the opulence of legendary figures has been an everlasting source and inexhaustible mother sea of themes for the artist. Art has drawn ceaselessly from the store of religious lore in its search for subjects, and religion has lent its treasures for the genius of art to make use of, it has been a mold into which art has been poured, and about which art in certain eras has centered. In some instances it may be that religion has been one of the impulses to artistic creation, the emotional power of religion finding its expression in poetry, and providing a secondary motive concomitant with the poet's desire to create. Thus apparently John Keble and Gerard Hopkins were actually urged to write their religious poems by an impulse quite apart from the creative desire; thus also Fra Bartolomeo felt that his adoration of God found most satisfactory expression through his painting. So religion has offered both the stimulus for creation from its emotional power and from its mythology the mold into which the artistic efforts were directed, although religion has more often been the source of subject matter than of dynamic impulse to art.

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[2] Frazer, *Golden Bough.*

But in the appreciation of painting and poetry and music religion has been a potent and moving factor. Art, ideally, should be appreciated not for what it says or represents but for the manner in which it says and represents. The degree of success achieved by the artist, in utilizing and conquering his medium should be the norm of esthetic appreciation, if any norm is possible. Deplorably such esthetic judgment by precision and justice in poetry and painting and music is but a chimerical ideal for most of us. We are too apt to respond sensitively to the object represented, to lose ourselves in Schwarmerei upon hearing a Tchaikowski symphony, to exclaim at the emotion of Earnest Dowson and Wilfred Owen rather than at the artistic perfection. Thus the religious periphery about the painting of The Madonna sets into motion all the imaginative faculties and arouses the emotional responses which we are accustomed to yield religion. This gossamer and tenuous weaving of emotions plays like a radiant wreath about the painting and yields it a power which otherwise its artistic flaws would prevent. A perfectly executed picture of a dead fish will never arouse the reaction a less excellently done painting of the descent from the cross will evoke. All the love, awe and adoration which our social background and religious training has so sedulously cultivated spring willy nilly to lend lure and enchantment to the picture, all the rich lore of tradition is remembered again, and all the imaginative mythology elaborated about the painting.

As the spontaneity and verve of ritual was lost, there sprang up as interpretations and rationalisations of acts that were once irrational eruptive expressions of emotions an opulence of mythology and theology. This function of mythology is apparent in the explanation it offers for the worship of a mirror in a Shinto temple. The legend runs that the Sun, upon her visit to earth in some way left this mirror behind her and hence it is a symbol of the Sun. But it is fairly obvious that the connection in the legend of the Sun and the mirror has no firmer grounds than their resemblance, and the legend has no other cause for existence than to make explicit the otherwise silly custom of worshipping a mirror. In the same manner the Eucharist, which may be traced to the mystery rite of drinking and eating the flesh and blood of the slaughtered divine animal in order to obtain its manna, has been the focus of a theology which alone merits Christianity the rank of somewhat a superior among mystery cults.

But the myth is invented in "satisfaction of deep religious wants"[3] quite apart from its function of rationalising and interpreting irrational and incomprehensible acts. Mythology and theology should rather be comprehended as artistic imaginary projections of human hunger for a perfection and happiness which are but transitory and illusory in a chaotic reality. Theology and mythology are the balm and opiate to soothe minds troubled with doubts and desiring calm peace and tranquil sanctuary. For many people for whom the world appears as a strident, discordant confusion and turbulency and life is a torture chamber construct for the predelection of a monstrous saddist, theology and mythology offer another world wherein they may wander in revery without fear of any intruding reality. When this life in the other world displaces the life in reality a state akin to mysticism sets in, and the escape is complete.

But distinct from this desire for complete escape there is another dynamic want which creates this land of mythology. For our warped and thwarted existence on earth leaves us aching and hungering for something which we feel is lacking; our lives seem disjointed and incomplete fragments of some unfinished symphony: as Tweedledum said "We are just part of the dream." But the dream is dreamt by an idiot, it is incoherent; and our lives seem a monstrous anacoluthon, for which only mythology can be the graceful correction. For mythology shows us as real and true our ideals; and shows us our circle of life swinging to a completion in a heaven where all the lacunae of our earthly interlude are found carefully constructed.

And in building this land of all our dreams come true, this quaint tale of Cinderella, man has compensated himself for the minor role he plays in mundane affairs by relegating to himself a lead in the drama he has constructed as being more real than the concatenation of unrelated events life appears to be. For him God has divided waters and stilled the sun's motion; man's sins are the grave concern of divinity, and God has walked among men and suffered the searing retchings of torment for man, so that man might dwell in loveliness in the sweet symphony of heaven, the companion of God. In this most dynamic of fairy tales, where no breath of intruding air from reality might flutter the pleasing reticulation of delusions and dreams, religion has found its most efficient aid for the healing by mesmeric necromancy the ever recrudescent wound of living.

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[3] Malinowski, *The Myth in Primitive Psychology.*

Almost numberless are the other techniques the art of religion has employed, subordinate in importance and value to mythology, but nevertheless extremely interesting: there are the techniques of prayer and ritual, of sacraments, and most peculiarly religious is the use of sacred languages. Thus we find Russia using Slavonic, Judaism using Hebrew, and Pali is used by Hinduism and Latin by Catholicism. This singular phenomenon of religion has its cause in several psychological peculiarities of the human mind.

The most obvious explanation of the continued use of these obsolete tongues is that of tradition: man has ever been given to an irrational veneration of and disinclination to alter anything which has gathered about itself the cloak of time. Thus we find that while Torahs in the early days of Judaism were written in scrolls as a matter of necessity, they continued to be written in this inefficient manner even after inventions would so greatly have facilitated their reproduction in other forms.

However, this interpretation does not fully account for the use of sacred languages, for even in the case of the scrolls there is the fact that the writing is more difficult to read than ordinary script or printing; and it would seem that a desire for obscurity and mystification enters into the causes for the retention of obsolete languages and forms. Analogous to this desire for obscurity which is clear only to the members of a body is the use of mystic terms, symbols, and Greek letters to lend glamour to the institution characteristic of secret societies and fraternities. Another instance of the use of an unknown language may be found in opera: certainly the presentation of an opera in English detracts from its enjoyment by English speaking people.

Also there enters into the various causes for the use of sacred languages the psychological fact which lends to the objects that are different from those encountered in every-day life a greater holiness and attraction. Thus, a book is manifestly not nearly so impressive as a scroll and the ordinary, undistinguished language of the profane world lacks the lustre which an unusual language possesses.

Evidently there is something about a sacred language, aside from its practical value as in Judaism, where many of the prayers sound stupid and meaningless in English, that lends glamour and appeal to the institution that employs it and religion has availed itself of this fact.

That the efficiency of most traditional contemporary religions is so poor at present that their demise is close at hand is apparent to any who have given thought to the subject. Reform Judaism is a manifestation of a pathetic attempt to remain "au courant" and in the hasty, sightless eagerness for reform decorum has been blindly substituted for the spontaneity of Judaism, convention for fervor in a deplorable misapprehension of the fundamental purposes of religion. Equally guilty on this score are the majority of modern Christian sects: in the unintelligent anxiety for attendance they have resorted to elision of desirable features and additions of novelties basically valueless.

To prognosticate the religion which will rise up out of the inchoate contemporary religious welter is both hazardous and otiose, but it can be said with some degree of certainty that it will not be the religion of beauty. It is true that at one time there existed and for a brief career flourished a religion of estheticism, but its impress on society was always superficial and weak, for a religion of beauty postulates as prerequisites a highly wrought aesthetic life, an ability to make of all experience an end.

The seed of the sensitive plant of estheticism which bloomed to a religion in the days of Walter Pater and the Pre-Raphaelites happened to fall upon an unusually fertile and immeasurably small plot of land. To escape from a dissatisfying life not by idealism or a spiritual religion but by exploiting the sensations and experiences of life, to lose one's self in the emotional revery of esthetic experience, to be continually in the vague emotional excitation of mystical experience is a life almost impossible except to a very few today.

To make a religion of beauty does not mean to apotheosize an absolute beauty, to make a monotheistic god of the Beautiful, for beauty is to us relative. A religion of beauty will have to be pantheistic in that it sees all beautiful things as aspects of a beauty intrinsic in them. What it actually results in is the availing one's self of cloudy tumultuous emotion of esthetic experience. "To burn always with a hard, gem-like flame." It is essentially and admittedly a way of escape from life, and is hence a subversion of the religious life of ideality.

Religion at present must provide expression for the less obvious emotions of mankind. It must construct a dim, twilit land to be the land of our heart's desire; it must yield comfort and solace to bruised aspirations and must heal them and permit them to flourish unmolested, rising rich and strong from the bare ruins to which the world has demolished them. It must be land of escape from the flecks and flaws of the present world, but it must not be a land in which innumerable murmuring streams run through a dreamland lying forlorn of light, lulling us to an untroubled sleep. It must be a land in which the dreams of perfection and ideality construct, however tenuously, visions of ideal perfections, and it is to these constructions we are to escape. But let not these ideals be too remote: they must be ardent and sincere expressions of vital and affective necessities and desires.

In our present industrial civilization, complicated bewilderingly, and apparently becoming augmentingly complex, a universal religion which will actually be religious for all is impossible. The numberless intermeshing ties and obligations and duties, the increasing and multiplying number of professions and occupations necessitated by our highly involved society create desires and needs and duties which attack each man differently. Aspirations and hopes are not so concentric as they were in a simple agricultural society, or an unindustrialized urban society. Complex organizations and a variety of modes of life create complex ideals. The conditions which necessitated the profound changes their religion underwent in the adoption by a people of an urban life in place of a heretofore rural life are still with us. In our civilization where modes of life are so numerously and deeply various, different religions will have to be constructed to meet the needs of different groups.

Of the religion of piety as Santayana uses the word there is an excellent example in contemporary industrialism in such movements as Rotarianism. Its chief vitalizing current is a loyalty and attachment to the existing order of things as it affects its members. It is a glorying in the actuality of their milieu, and they achieve the paradox of mythologizing the actual and yet not detracting from its reality. It is the complacent religion of the Rotarian who makes the pieties of his obsolescent religion subserve his more dynamic religion, the religion of industrialism; living entirely and cheerfully in the industrial world, the Rotarian has directed his religious fervour into an incredible attachment to his world. Yet there is an element of idealism in this religion of loyalty which is made manifest in their attempt to better their world, but the idealism is a negligible factor in this religion whose life force is the almost fanatic devotion to the industrialism of today.

In contrast to the religion of "piety" there is the much more efficient religion of industrialism illustrative of Santayana's "spirituality." Thus people who suffer the same maladaptations will group together, united by a common desire for adjustment and having in common ideals and dreams for the abolition of the maladjustments. In the growth of ideals and the procedure of the attainment of these ideals, in the imaginative mythology woven about the expression of their aspirations, in the gradual transpositions of the lives of these people to the realms of realized aspiration and ideal will be found their religion. All the hate and abomination of their environment of lives made frustrate by an uncongenial and hateful surrounding will metamorphose into love for the region in which their imagination is allowed free play with their hopes, and will engender a powerful yearning for the possession of this state, for the coming of their kingdom. In the social expression of these emotions will be the ritual of their religion, in the conception of the ideal state will be their theology.

An existing religion of this kind is the communist movement in Soviet Russia. They have abandoned Christianity, for in their new religion there is a sufficiency of the religious life. Ardent communists cannot be ardent Christians merely because it involves a plethora of religions, aside from any colliding philosophical or moral principles.

Communists in Russia are leading a life guided and perveded by the controlling light of an absolute Communism, the ideal political state to them. For them, all their strife and energy is directed toward the establishment of the ideal, and all the ramifications of their ideal state, all the activities and duties and manners it implies, all the hopes and loves it generates are for communists their theology. In the imaginative construction of this visionary realm the communist finds his escape from a country disrupted by civil conflict and discontent. His religion is eminently Apocalyptic, for he dwells in the coming millenium, after the Revolution. He sees wealth, and immediately it becomes his, the Rolls Royce, the luxury, in the glorious kingdom of the Revolution, where he will be the conqueror and ruler, and the wealthy relegated to the limbus of proletarianism. It is again the ineluctable exaltation of the devotees, the unmistakable stamp of a religion.

Even the supernatural, in spite of the strenuous dicta against any such force in Communism by the leaders, is present to a certain degree in the Communism of the masses. For they know not the precise principles of Marxism which make the Revolution and the consequent communism inevitable, and to them these principles are incomprehensible and vague and sacred, and are accepted on hearsay. The "agit props" (agitators and propagandizers) feel that if they continue to propagandize, the Revolution will follow, by the thaumaturgy of some law or other; the intermediary agent is almost in the class of the God of the medieval prayers for the cures of toothache, one must do and say so and so and the relief will come.

Leading the lives of founders and active supporters of a religion, it is inevitable that Communists should have a ritual. And so there are public assemblies and public institutions to expound theology, and for worship and adoration, for already the febrile worship of Lenin and Marx have canonized them, and before long they will doubtless be encompassed by the glowing periphery of adulating myths, characteristic of all the apostles of a religion. There are holy days also, to celebrate important events in the history and development of Communism, and the country is governed as nearly as possible by the doctrines of their theology: it is in effect, a theocracy.

Certainly the religious zeal of the early Christians, and their craving for martyrdom which so distressed the Roman authorities was no more fiery than the Communist's fervor which takes the form (among other forms) of the furious hatred of the capitalist class and the willingness to undergo excruciating privation rather than abate one whit their enmity.

This is the case particularly in America. Comrades who have suffered because of their unrestrained zeal in making themselves obnoxious to the hated bourgeoisie are admired, and at every opportunity this desire for martyrdom is displayed, as their behaviour at numerous riots will testify. Every action and every thought, is weighted with a significance; all opinions and ideas and people are classed categorically in the terminology of Communism and the class struggle; their meals are eaten together and so far as practicable they dwell in their own communities.

Most recently Communism has erected a system of apologetics by dialectic materialism. At the recent conference for the furtherance of Marxistic and Leninistic science it was made apparent that the scientists attending were primarily Communists and scientists only to advance the work of surrounding Communism by an impregnable apologetics. In the paper that set the tone for the conference was deplored the tendency of scientists to rethrone God upon every new discovery that is inexplicable by mechanism, and the discussion ranged from plangent criticism of the Western dialecticians to feral calls for the foundation of an institution for research to advance dialectic materialism to the utter confusion of the Vitalists, apparently.

At present, Communism is the most vital of our industrial religions. By its mythology its intense Apocalyptic faith, its deification of Marx and Lenin and the minor apostles, by the religious zeal which pervades it in all its manifestations, by the prompt ferreting out and suppression of all heretics, as Trotsky, and its attempt to construct a system of apologetics Communism has proven itself a religion and offers a foretaste of whatever religion industrialism may give rise to in the future.

Our religious hunger in the future will be assuaged by a diet sundered as completely from the old diet of the past as our experiences in the future will be sundered from those of the past, but consciously to endeavor to prescribe that diet for an appetite veering treacherously and uncertainly in the unstable subversive milieu of today is foolish. Our religious palate will suffer no coercion toward this or that satisfaction, will endure no trammeling regimen in its election other than the needs prompted by our experience of life.

The manifest inadequacy of Christianity and Judaism and their utter dissonance with the experiences of tomorrow does not necessarily signify the death of these religions. The new religions will differ, questionless from the old Christianity and Judaism fundamentally, yet when one considers the chasm that divides Orthodox Judaism from Reform Judaism, or Christian Socialism from Catholicism, it seems not beyond conception that with another transformation or two Judaism and Christianity will be prepared for the future. Thus, while changing so radically and unrecognizably, they will yet be called Christianity and Judaism, insuring a "specious permanence." At present we must wait patiently to perceive either the metamorphoses of Christianity and Judaism, or the first faint glimmers of the religions that are coming to birth.

JESUS AND JEWISH TRADITION

BY ROBERT P. RICHARDSON

ALMOST everyone whose knowledge of Christianity goes beyond that of the Sunday School knows that, besides the four canonical gospels of *Matthew, Mark, Luke* and *John,* there were a number of heretical and apocryphal gospels giving a somewhat different account of the career of Jesus of Nazareth. Comparatively few people, however, even among the cultured and well-read, are aware that in addition to the orthodox and heretical Christian traditions there is a Jewish one which found its final elaboration in a work known as the *Sepher Toldoth Jeshu* or *Book of the Generation of Jesus.*[1] This book has been translated into various modern languages: German, French and English. Yet one would search in vain at the book stores for a copy, and in the catalogues of nearly all libraries the title is conspicuous by its absence. Modern works hostile to Christ and Christianity are to be found in abundance, but the typical librarian, no matter what his own religious belief, appears to have a peculiar fear of contact with this medieval anti-Christian book, and there almost seems to be a tacit conspiracy to keep knowledge of the very existence of such a work from the general public.

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[1] The Jewish life of Jesus is found in several redactions differing materially in both contents and title. Among the titles under which it has been put forth are: *The History of Jeshu the Nazarene; The History of Jeshu, Queen Helena and the Apostles; The Book of the Condemnation of Jeshu ben Pandera; The History of Him who was Hanged;* and *The History of Him and His Son.* The account of the Jewish tradition given in the present article does not attempt to adhere strictly to any single redaction, but note has been made of feaures in which the various redactions differ when the difference is of any real interest from a historical point of view. Differences in features that are obviously entirely fantastic need not be given such close attention, and in these cases we may follow the most colorful of the several accounts. Texts and German translations of various redactions are given in *Das Leben Jesu nach Judischen Quellen, herausgeben und erlautert von Samuel Krauss,* Berlin, 1902. An English version of the Strassburg manuscript of the Toldoth will be found in G. R. S. Mead's *Did Jesus Live 100 B. C.?, an enquiry into the Talmud Jesus stories, the Toldoth Jeschu, and some curious statements of Epiphanius; being a contribution to the study of Christian origins,* London, 1903, a work whose scholarship belies its sensational title. A recent work dealing with the career of Jesus from the modern Jewish point of view and including a critical examination of the Toldoth-Talmud stories is Joseph Klausner's *Jesus of Nazareth, His Life, Times and Teachings,* translated from the Hebrew original by H. Danby, London, 1927.

Towards no other work, save perhaps the *Book of the Three Impostors*[2] is such an attitude taken. It is wholly unreasonable, for we cannot properly estimate the character of any historical personage unless we know what his enemies have to say about him. To learn this, indeed, often has the effect of heightening our esteem for the victim of a bitter and venemous attack. It is quite natural that Christians, even the most broad-minded, should find the Toldoth repulsive, but it is absurd for anyone to cherish a special abhorrence for this hostile Jewish tale. The Christians who know of it would seem to regard it as the very summit of insult to the memory of Jesus, and are strangely oblivious of the fact that his fame has suffered far more from the deeds of his nominal followers, who have committed in his name all the crimes in the calendar, than from the words of his open opponents.

None the less, to him whose way is that of the philosopher, the attitude of the Toldoth is anything but pleasing, for it is that of religious controversy, not of candid criticism. In the field of religion it has never been the custom to attempt to do justice to one's opponents, and, following the usual precedent, the Toldoth is anxious to heap reproach after reproach on the head of Jesus instead of being content to inquire into his claims and attempt to refute them. Its story makes Jesus an illegitimate child, and not satisfied with setting this forth once for all, continually brings this alleged illegitimacy to the fore in the epithets by which Jesus of Nazareth is designated. Jewish hatred of Jesus was not, it should be noted, a product of persecution by the Christians, for it existed long before Christianity became a power in the state. Already in the middle of the second century, as Justin Martyr testifies, the Jews in all their synagogues, at the conclusion of their prayers, cursed the name and memory of Jesus, the false Messiah. And we even learn from

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[2] *De Tribus Impostoribys*, a work of unknown origin but attributed to various authors, e.g. Averroës and the Hobenstauffen emperor, Frederic II. The "three impostors" are Moses, Jesus and Mohammed, and this work takes the ground that "The greater part of their utterances are so obscure as to be unintelligible, and so badly expressed as to make it evident that these three men did not themselves understand what they were talking about and were only ignorant charlatans." The sayings of Jesus which the author of *De Tribus Impostoribus* had in mind here were probably the theological disquisitions of the gospel of *John* which biblical scholars do not to-day regard as authentic.

Jewish writings that in these early days a pious rabbi who, notwithstanding his rejection of the Messianic claims of Jesus, believed that the latter's name had power to work wonders, preferred to see a relative who had been bitten by a serpent die rather than permit him to live at the cost of being healed by a friendly neighbor in the name of Jesus. The hatred of the Jews for Christianity was not, in fact, primarily the fault of the Christians. It was due to that fierce intolerance which characterizes monotheism and makes Judaism, Christianity and Mahommedanism compare so unfavorably with the relatively tolerant pagan religions.

In the Jewish tradition Mary, the mother of Jesus, was betrothed to a good rabbi who "was learned in the law and feared heaven greatly." In the neighborhood however dwelt a certain worthless and licentious youth named Pandera. Mary's betrothed, the story tells us, was in the habit of going in unto Mary at night "after the manner of men," a feature of the tale which implies that the Jews of the period were somewhat free and easy in their pre-marital customs, and one night when the rabbi was at the synagogue, Pandera came in the darkness in his place. Believing him to be her promised spouse, after some weak protests on the ground that she was then in a state in which by Jewish Law even married women must keep apart from their husbands, Mary allowed Pandera to work his will upon her, the result being the conception of Jesus. Later in the night, after Pandera had withdrawn without detection of the fraud, the real betrothed came to Mary, and being reproached for coming twice in the same night, learned what had taken place. Apparently any pity for Mary in her predicament did not enter the head of the pious rabbi; his only care was for himself, and when it became manifest that Mary was with child, the betrothed said: "She is not with child by me; shall I abide here and hear my shame every day from the people?" So he "arose and went to Babylon" after which he passes out of the story. The suspicion that rested on Pandera was made a certainty by his boasts of his amorous exploit, and some years later he is even said to have confessed his crime before a rabbinical investigating committee.[3]

[3] The different redactions of the Toldoth show a variation in the name of the seducer who in some is called not Pandera but Joseph ben Pandera, Mary's betrothed being designated as Jochanan, while in others the former is called Jochanan ben Pandera and the latter Joseph. In the oldest Jewish tradition the seducer, a soldier, appears to have been designated simply as Pandera, and Jesus was called "ben Pandera," that is, son of Pandera. Early Christian writers seem to admit that there was a tradition ascribing the name Pandera or

Abandoned both by her betrothed and the father of her child, Mary struggled bravely to do her best for the son to whom she gave birth. She named him Jehoshua, after her brother, but later "when his corrupt birth was made public" we are told "they called him Jeshu," that is "may his name and memory be blotted out," there being thus put in evidence the kindly way in which the pious Jews dealt with the unfortunates in their midst. Mary managed to provide a teacher for Jesus, and gave him what among the Jews passed for an education. He was duly instructed in Talmudic lore, and, as he showed himself to be intelligent "became wise in the Halacha and learned in the Horah and the Talmud." In fact we are told he learned more in a day than other pupils could learn in a year. In consequence he grew conceited and lost all respect for his elders. One day passing by some teachers of the Law Jesus was seen to omit the customary salutation, and instead of walking by with his eyes cast modestly to the ground, strode along with his head erect, paying no attention to the rabbis seated at the door of the synagogue. From this behavior alone one of the wise rabbis knew at once (we are told) that Jesus was of illegitimate birth, while another contended that the boy had been conceived at a period in which a woman could not lawfully have to do with man, and a third went further and informed his colleagues that both stigmas must be attributed to the impudent youth.[4]

Panthera or Panther to Jesus, and sometimes it was explained that the father of the husband of Mary had Panther as surname to Jacob, and sometimes that the name pertained to Mary's own pedigree, her grandfather having been known as bar (= ben) Panther. It has however been thought that the name really arose from a pun; that the opponents of the Christians, hearing them speak of Jesus as the son of a virgin (*parthenos*), called him in mockery the son of a panther (*panther* or *panthera*), this animal being sometimes taken as a symbol of licentiousness. In the Talmud Jesus is also called "ben Stada," which according to one rabbinical commentator arose from the nickname Stada having been given to Mary because she was unfaithful (*stath da*) to her husband. One redaction of the Toldoth represents Mary as actually married, not merely betrothed, and in fact, in the Jewish view, betrothal was almost on a par with matrimony.

[4] The earliest reference to Jesus to be found in the Talmud fastens on him the stigma of illegitimacy, and takes as authority Rabbi Simeon ben Anzai, who claimed he had found this recorded upon a "genealogical" roll in Jerusalem." One redaction of the Toldoth names as the third rabbi to whose unerring eye both procreation stigmas were manifest, Rabbi Akiba, a bitter opponent of Christianity and revered among the Jews as one of the very greatest of their leaders. The Talmud itself has a story of how a boy (whose name is not given) once passed some rabbis without salutation. Just as in the Toldoth tale, two of the rabbis disputed as to which stigma rested on the boy, and Akiba declared that both were to be imputed to him. Challenged to prove it, he went to the boy's mother, and found her sitting in the market place selling pulse. He said to her: "My daughter, if thou tellest me the thing which I ask thee,

Still more offensive to the rabbis was the incident which took place somewhat later. Being in the synagogue while teaching was going on, Jesus seized a moment when there was a lull in the talk, and began putting forth "Halacha" or interpretation of the Law, all his own. Naturally the rabbis were highly indignant, and one of them said to the presumptious youth: "Hast thou not learned that he who giveth forth a Halacha in the presence of his teacher is worthy of death?" In no whit abashed however Jesus replied: "Who is the teacher and who the scholar?" implying that he himself was the better qualified of the two, and proceeded to argue with the rabbis. Here obviously we have the Jewish version of the biblical story of Jesus expounding the Law to an admiring audience in the Temple at Jerusalem.[5]

The Jewish story goes on to say that after Jesus had shown his disrespect for the rabbis he was denounced "by the blowing of three hundred trumpets" as of impure birth and unfit to come into the congregation, and it was resolved unanimously by the teachers of the Law that as punishment for having been disrespectful to them he must undergo death by strangulation, so that he was obliged to flee. One tale is that he merely went into hiding in upper Galilee, but the favorite one makes him take refuge in Egypt where he learned magic. What he learned here was however only a stepping stone to further necromantic powers, for he had in mind schemes requiring a much more potent instrument. This he found in the Shem Hamphorash, the Ineffable Name of God, which was known only by the consonants, JHVH, in which it was ordinarily written, these giving no clue to its proper pronunciation. Jewish legend said that he who could pronounce this name properly had at his command the highest of all magic, and could work whatever wonder he might list. Now there was in existence, as Jesus knew, a stone dating back to the time of the patriarch Jacob on which the name was inscribed in a way indicating how it ought to be pronounced.

I will bring thee to eternal life." She replied: "Swear it to me." Thereupon, says the Talmud, this godly Rabbi Akiba "took the oath with his lips, while he cancelled it in his heart." He then proceeded to question her, and learned that his surmise about the boy was correct. The Jews who greatly cherished Rabbi Akiba, apparently thought his behavior on this occasion was without reproach, but those who are not afflicted with racial or religious prejudices cannot but feel that the pious rabbi, by what he did, affixed upon himself a stigma vastly greater than that born by the woman and her son.

[5] For the probable genesis of the biblical story of Jesus teaching his elders the Law at the tender age of twelve, see an article by the present writer, *Jesus and His Family*, in *The Open Court* for February 1929.

Through King David this stone had been discovered and placed in the Temple. "For when David laid the foundation of the Temple he found a certain stone at the mouth of an abyss on which the Name was engraved, and taking it up deposited it in the Holy of Holies." Known as the Foundation Stone it was regarded as of great importance in the ceremonies of the Day of Atonement when the High Priest solemnly laid his censor upon it. In this stone the Wise Men had soon sensed danger, for, said they, if the heedless youth of our people get knowledge of the Name of God they might so use it as to bring destruction upon the world. Just why the Name could not be used for good as well as for evil, and why it was not resorted to in order to free the Jewish people from the Roman yoke and bring back the glories of the kingdom of David and Solomon the reader is not told. At all events, to keep the Name ineffable, the Wise had placed two brazen lions (or, as some redactions say, brazen dogs) one on each side of the entrance to the Holy of Holies, and then by means of magic had given these metal images vocal powers for use in emergencies. In case anyone went into the Holy of Holies to learn the pronunciation of the Name, the brass lions would roar at him so terrifyingly that in his fright he would forget all he had learned within, while if he carried on his person anything in writing the lions would not permit him to pass.

The wily Jesus easily overcame the obstacle of the brass lions. After finishing his course in magic he left Egypt and came once more to Jerusalem, where, the story tells us, for him to enter the place in which the stone reposed "it was necessary for him to use magic and incantations; otherwise how could the most holy priests, the descendants of Aaron have allowed him to go therein?" Thus gaining access to the Holy of Holies, Jesus carefully copied on a piece of parchment the indications of the way in which the Name of God ought to be pronounced. He then cut a slit in his flesh near the hip with a knife, utterance of the Name preventing any pain being felt. Uttering the name a second time he caused the flesh to heal up immediately over the parchment, and now proceeded to leave the chamber. As he passed through the doorway the brass lions did their duty, and their roars took away from Jesus all recollection of the pronunciation of the Name, but once safely away from the Temple the dauntless youth pulled out his knife, cut open his thigh, and taking out the parchment was now monarch of all he surveyed.

Jesus now proceeded to make his debut before the public. He gathered an audience around him, and told the people that the imputations his enemies had cast upon his birth were false, and were occasioned by the fact that he was the son of God and born of a virgin. The clerical clique that had circulated false stories about him were, he said, mindful only of their own advantage and were animated by the desire to have power over the people and lordship over Israel. Asked to show a sign as evidence that he was really the Messiah, and having brought to him a man lame from birth who had never been able even to stand on his feet, Jesus by pronouncing over him the Name, gave the cripple the power of walking. They brought him a leper, and Jesus promptly healed the man. They dug into an old tomb, and finding a skeleton of dry bones, brought it to Jesus. The latter gave the bones a covering of flesh and blood, and he that had been dead stood up alive. And when the people saw this they fell down and worshipped him, saying: "Verily, thou art the son of God."[6]

Tidings of what Jesus had done was brought to Jerusalem, and "then the profligate rejoiced greatly, but the old men, the devout and the wise, wept bitterly; and in the greater and the lesser Sanhedrin there was sore lamentation." Finally it was resolved to lure Jesus to Jerusalem that he might be destroyed, and accordingly Ananias and Achasias, described as "the most honorable men of the lesser Sanhedrin," went to Jesus and "when they came unto him fell down upon their faces and worshipped him, that they might increase his iniquity." Their primary object in pretending to believe in Jesus was however to persuade him to come to the capital and appear before "the Queen," for by a curious anacronism, Jewish tradition ascribes rulership of the land of Israel in the time of Jesus to the Maccabean king, Alexander Jannaeus and his widow. After the death of the former in 76 B. C., the latter, Alexandra Salome, took the throne and reigned until 67 B. C., and it is in her reign that the trial and execution of Jesus is supposed to have taken place. It appears indeed that the Toldoth known to Agobard in the ninth century and one of the two mentioned by Schemtobion Schaprut in the fourteenth, date the career of Jesus in the time of Tiberias and even make him have an audience with that emperor. Misdating of the story in the manuscripts now extant may have originated in a subterfuge of the Talmudists who to avoid trouble with the Christian authorities of Europe, besides using this device, in many passages designated Jesus as "a certain one" or by a pseudonym (e.g. ben Pandera, ben Stada, Balaam). By so doing, when it was alleged that the Talmud maligned the character of Jesus, the Jews could plead that this was a mistake; that the person referred to could not be Jesus since he neither bore the name of the latter nor had lived in the same period, and some Jewish apologists even went so far as to assert that the "Jeshu" Talmud passages had no reference to Jesus. But quite aside from intentional inaccuracies there are in the Jewish tradition historical blunders showing astounding ignorance on the part of the redactors. Alexandra is given the name of Helena, and confused with Queen Helena of Adiabene, and sometimes even "Queen Helena, the wife of Constantine" (i.e. St. Helena, the mother of constantine) is brought on the scene three hundred years before her time. And we have already seen that David, instead of Solomon, is represented as laying the foundation of the Temple.

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[6] The original Talmud story, of which this is the outgrowth, does not make any mention of the Shem Hamphorash. There Jesus relies on Egyptian magic alone, and, in order to smuggle out of Egypt the necromantic formulas, is obliged, according to one narrative, to make an incision in his flesh to hide the parchment on which they are written, but according to another merely writes or scratches them on his skin. Evidently the tale is the Jewish counterpart of the Christian legend of the flight of the Holy Family into Egypt through which was brought about the fulfilment of the "prophecy": "Out of Egypt did I call my son." It has been remarked that the alleged sojourn of Jesus in Egypt between the time of his dispute with the rabbis and that in which he appeared as an evangelist would serve to fill a notable gap in the gospel account of the career of the Prophet of Nazareth.

Before going to Jerusalem, Jesus performed new wonders in the presence of certain messengers that had been sent by the Queen. He had the people make clay images of birds, lambs, asses and oxen, and when they were brought to him the magic of the Shem Hamphorash quickly gave life to these figures of clay. The birds flew up in the air and the quadrupeds ambled around in the grass. A great millstone was set before him, and he launched it on the sea and made it float on the surface of the water as lightly as though it were an egg shell. As he seated himself on it a gentle breeze blew Jesus and his improvised boat over the water, and he amused himself by catching fish and throwing them to his disciples who ate them. Bidding the emissaries of the Queen hasten to Jerusalem and tell her what they had seen, Jesus leisurely followed. Before the Queen he staged his miraculous performances for her benefit, and all the people were amazed. As proof that he was the Messiah, he cited the Old Testament texts used by Christians in later days for this purpose, and the Wise Men of Israel, utterly failing to see the want of cogency in these citations, could only say that the hoped-for Messiah would show still other signs, and in particular that it had been written of him that "He shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth." Greatly impressed by the miracle worker, the Queen refused to condemn him, and the rabbis were in despair.

There now comes on the scene the hero of the Jewish story who, strange to say, is Judas Iscariot. Upon the condition that the Wise Men of Israel take upon their shoulders the guilt of the sin he will have to commit in carrying out the plan, Judas agrees to imitate Jesus in unlawfully obtaining knowledge of the Shem Hamphorash so that he can duplicate the performances of the false Messiah. The offer is accepted, and Judas duly braves the brass lions, and leaves the sanctuary, carrying imbedded in his flesh the parchment on which is written the Ineffable Name. Once more Jesus is brought before the Queen. Staging a new miracle, he raises his hands like the wings of an eagle, and uttering the Almighty Name, flies up like a bird and soars in the air. But Judas comes forward and, asserting that this is no proof that Jesus is the Messiah for he himself can do the same, likewise invokes the Name and flies up after Jesus. The two struggle in mid-air, and Judas finding Jesus too strong for him befouls his antagonist and himself by ejecting a bodily fluid supposed to be especially detrimental to ritual purity. Both being now made unclean, the virtues of the Shem Hamphorash are of no avail to either until purification has been accomplished, and consequently the two fall to earth together.

The Wise Men now seize Jesus, and proceed to convince the Queen that he no longer has supernatural powers and hence cannot really be the son of God. Binding him they fasten a stinking woolen cloth over his eyes and nose, and then seventy elders armed with cudgels of seventy different kinds of wood, olive, fig, pomegranate, etc. strike lustily one after another at their helpless victim, demanding that he prove his claims to supernatural knowledge by telling who has struck him and with what kind of wood. The conjectures with which Jesus replies proving wholly wrong, the Queen consents that the Wise Men should deal as they choose with the false Messiah. The pious elders now debate what they should do to Jesus. Some propose to hew him to pieces instantly; others to torture him for a month before killing him. The most proper thing to do first, some opine, would be for every good Israelite to spit in his face and strike him a blow, the men using their staffs, the women their sandals. But it is finally decided to begin by mocking his pretensions to kingly dignity, and a crown of thorns smeared with pitch is put upon his head.

In the meantime the friends of Jesus had been getting together, and three hundred and ten of his disciples came and overpowering the tormenters of Jesus carried him off in safety to Antioch. Jesus there underwent ritual purification, after which he was able to use the Name as of yore, and once more he stepped on the stage as a worker of miracles. Judas however went in disguise and "mingled with the wicked fellows" (i.e. the followers of Jesus), and one night, when Jesus was in a deep sleep, enchanted him and entering his tent had no difficulty in cutting open the thigh, imbedded in which the precious parchment was always kept by Jesus, and carrying this away without waking the sleeper. With no record of the Ineffable Name, and no recollection of how it ought to be pronounced, Jesus was powerless to work further wonders. So he resolved to go to Jerusalem on the next Passover and repeat the trick of eluding the guard of the brazen lions. Accordingly, a few days before Passover, Jesus, riding on an ass, with his followers around him, made triumphant entry into the city. When in Jerusalem Jesus was careful that he and all his disciples should be garbed alike, and it was hence necessary that he should be identified before he could be arrested. According to some redactions of the Toldoth this was done by Judas, who in disguise had been accepted as a new disciple, but according to other redactions one of the three hundred and ten original disciples betrayed him. To avoid breaking the oath that all his disciples had sworn "by the ten commandments" not to say which among them was Jesus, the betrayal was accomplished by the man falling down before Jesus and pretending to worship him, at which sign the agents of the authorities, who had gone out to the Mount of Olives and mingled with the crowd, seized Jesus and brought him in captivity to Jerusalem. In the reason here given for indicating indirectly which of the assemblage was Jesus instead of simply pointing him out, we have what may be a piece of good tradition, since it affords a reasonable explanation of a rather puzzling part of the gospel story of the betrayal.

Sentence of death was soon passed on Jesus by the greater and the lesser Sanhedrin. No details of the trial are given in the Toldoth, but the Talmud is more circumstantial. It tells us that according to custom no traps are set to make criminals betray themselves except in the case of the most heinous of all crimes: "leading astray to idolatry." In this case however it is legitimate to adopt a scheme which, as we subsequently learn, was used against "ben Stada" (i.e. Jesus). "If the enticer has made his enticing speech to two, these are witnesses against him, and lead him to the court of justice, and he is stoned. But if he has used the expressions, not before two but before one, the latter should say to him: "I have friends who have a liking for that." But if he is cunning, and wishes to say nothing before the others, witnesses are placed in concealment behind the wall, and the remark is made: 'Now tell me once again what thou wast saying to me, for we are alone.' If he now repeats it, the other says to him: 'How can we forsake our heavenly father and go and worship wood and stone?' If then the enticer is converted, well and good, but if he replies: 'This is our duty; it is for our good' then those who are standing behind the wall bring him before the court of justice, and he is stoned." In the case of Jesus, two "disciples of the Wise" were secreted in the inner room of a house, and Jesus was brought into an adjoining room where there was a lighted lamp, so that the hidden spies could see his face as well as hear his voice. These two witnesses duly testified against Jesus and he was condemned to death. If this be an authentic tradition, the fact that such deceit should have had to be resorted to will explain why the Christian account of the trial speaks of the difficulty the Sanhedrin had in finding witnesses against Jesus, and why the two who at last came forward are, in the gospel story, described as "false witnesses," though what they testified was actually the truth according to the account of the gospels themselves.

According to the Talmud, for forty days before the execution of Jesus a herald went around crying: "Jeshu goeth forth to be executed because he has practiced sorcery, and seduced Israel, and estranged them from God. Let any one who can bring forward any justifying plea for him come and give information concerning it." Later on a certain Rabbi Ulla opined the authorities had been far too indulgent in giving Jesus this chance of being exonerated. Said Ulla: "Dost thou think that he belongs to those for whom a justifying plea is to be sought? He was a very seducer, and the All-merciful has said: 'Thou shalt not spare or conceal him.'" And in reply it was explained that neither mercy nor justice played any part in the attitude of the Sanhedrin, but that Jesus had been allowed this forty days' grace because "his place was near to those in power," i.e. because he had relatives or connections who stood high in governmental circles. However the delay did not save Jesus, for no one came forward in his behalf.

The Talmud and the Toldoth know of no intervention of Roman procurator or Roman soldiers in the condemnation and execution of Jesus. The Jews of olden time were anxious to claim for themselves all the glory (as they deemed it) for both. Nor is there any question of crucifixon in the Jewish tradition, though this punishment was by no means unknown among the Jews, Alexander Jannaeus having at one time crucified no less than eight hundred Pharisees. According to the Jewish story, Jesus was stoned to death and his body subsequently hung upon a post. When it came to hanging up the corpse it was found that this could not be accomplished with any ordinary wood. For Jesus, foreseeing his tragic end, had, when in possession of the Shem Hamphorash, put a charm on all trees so that the wood of none of these was able to support his body. Posts of each of the seventy different kinds of woods to be found in Palestine were tried in turn, and all broke down under the weight. In those days it was deemed advisable to hang up the dead body of a false prophet so that there could be quoted against his memory the text: "A curse of God is he who is hanged," and the Wise Men were in despair, for the common people began to murmur that the strange behavior of the wood was evidence of the great godliness of Jesus. Once more Judas came to the rescue, fetching from his garden a tremendous cabbage stalk taller than a palm. As Jesus had not been thoughtful enough to bewitch the cabbages, this held the body aloft when the latter was hung upon it. And fearing lest the reader should be inclined to doubt that such a cabbage stalk could have been at hand, the veracious chronicler remarks that it is no unusual thing, even "unto this day," for overgrown cabbage plants to be found in the neighborhood of Jerusalem so large that a single one yields a hundred pounds of seed!

In the afternoon the body was taken down and buried, not put in a tomb as the Christian tradition would have it. "The apostates wept over his grave," the Toldoth tells us. Subsequently the body was secretly unearthed and hidden, and when people came to the grave they found it empty. In one of the early anti-Christian traditions transmitted to us by Tertullian, the grave was in a market garden, and so many people came to visit it that the gardener, to save his vegetables from being trampled under foot, took away the body that there might no longer be any inducement for crowds of visitors to flock to his garden. The Toldoth ascribed the emptying of the grave during the night to a gardener who overhearing a plot of some of the disciples of Jesus to steal the body from the grave and then pretend their master had ascended to heaven, forestalled them, and taking away the body by night reburied it in his own garden.

The disappearance of the body caused the followers of Jesus again to raise their heads. The priestly party was denounced by "the apostates" who said to them: "Ye have slain God's annointed," and even the Queen wavered and began to blame the priests. Now however the gardener came forward and, for thirty pieces of silver, disclosed where the body lay. The Rabbis tied it to the tail of a horse and dragged it all around Jerusalem, amid great rejoicing on the part of their adherents. The Clericals then got permission from the Queen to deal as they pleased with the followers of Jesus, many of whom they killed.

In the usual Toldoth story the gardener hides the body under a brook (or irrigation canal) which he turns out of its course for that purpose. This feature of the tale, as it stands, is an unintelligible complication, and is apparently derived from a more primitive version. The version known in the ninth century to Agobard, Bishop of Lyons, related that the body was originally buried by the side of a canal which at night overflowed its banks and carried away the body and the latter could never afterwards be found. This would seem to be the original tale, the embellishment that the body was ultimately recovered and dragged through the streets of Jerusalem being evidently a fiction of later date. In some versions of the story the "canal" was said to be the place where the rubbish of the city was disposed of, and the implication would seem to be that after the execution of Jesus his body was contemptuously thrown on (or given shallow burial in) the city refuse heap by the side of a stream. Here, perhaps, is a trace of authentic tradition. Heavy rains could easily have brought about enough of a flood to wash the body away, and deposit it covered with rubbish in some distant place. It is however doubtful whether a disappearance of the body regarded at the time as mysterious, even by the Christians, ever took place. For no such thing is ever mentioned by Paul in his Epistles, though he again and again sets forth what he deems to be the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, which is the cornerstone of all his own teachings. And another Toldoth story, unearthed in 1610 by George Sandys during his travels in the Levant, put forward as the facts in the case that Jesus "being dead they buried him privately in a dung-hill lest his body should have been found and worshipped by his followers." In fact as the grave of Jesus, a religious leader put to death by the government, could easily have become a rallying ground for malcontents, the authorities would have been well advised to keep its location a secret. In recent times realization of the dangers arising from the grave of a prophet was shown by the British when, after the conquest of the Sudan in 1898, they destroyed the tomb of the Mahdi, burned his body and threw the ashes into the Nile. And commenting on this Sir E. A. Wallis Budge remarks that "had the building been allowed to stand, and the body to remain in its grave, the tomb would have become the center of fanaticism and revolt."

The malignancy of the clerical party towards Jesus did not cease with his death. Years afterwards they sardonically spoke of a gallows on which criminals were executed as "the lecture room of ben Pandera." The disciples of "Balaam," i.e. the Christians, have hell as their inheritance, says the Talmud. In the eyes of the rabbis Jesus had been guilty of the gravest of all crimes: the daring to oppose the priestcraft that dominated the Jewish people. How serious a sin this was esteemed may be judged from the fact that the Mishnah tells us: "It is more culpable to teach contrary to the precepts of the scribes than contrary to the Torah itself." There are, we are told, four punishments dealt out to those who dare oppose the teachers of the Law: banishment, stoning to death, strangling (or hanging) and beheading. The shameful death of Jesus did not, in the view of the rabbis, atone for his sin, and in one passage of the Talmud we are told that the spirit of Jesus appeared at what we would now call a spiritualistic seance, and gave an account of how he was suffering on the other side of the grave for his misdeeds while on earth. The story goes that a Roman, a relative of one of the emperors, had various spirits conjured up, and inquired of them which religion was favored in the next world. At modern seances it is difficult to get a precise answer to such questions: the spirits who make their appearance are unwilling to give any denomination the preference, and confine themselves to vague generalities. But in this case every spirit conjured up, that of Jesus included, promptly replied that heaven's favorites were the Israelites. And, unlike modern spirits, Jesus had no tale of the happiness he had experienced in "Summerland," but instead told how his fate in the beyond was to be tortured by immersion in "boiling filth," the place of this boiling filth being, as we learn in another Jewish tradition, the very bottommost pit of hell.

In this Talmud tale the spirit of "Balaam" as well as that of "Jesus" appears at the seance, the abode of the former being given as the place of "boiling pollution." If this is not a rhetorical device of reduplication it runs counter to the usual view that the "Balaam" passages in the Talmud refer to Jesus. And we might parenthetically suggest that if Balaam is not Jesus it is probably Paul who is meant. For Paul appears to be designated as Balaam in the *Revelations of John,* the last book of the New Testament. In II, 14 we read: "But I have a few things against thee [the Christian Church in Pergemum] because thou hast there some that hold the teachings of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumbling block before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed to idols and to commit fornication." Biblical critics regard this passage as aimed at the Pauline faction in the Christian Church, it having evidently been written by one of those Jewish Christians who taking the stand of the heretical Ebionites and upholding the Mosaic Law as still binding upon Christians and still counting the latter as among the children of Israel, held in abomination the innovations that Paul introduced into Christianity. And Balaam here would seem to be Paul, while Balak may very possibly be intended for Peter. The Toldoth gives us a hint as to why Paul might have been nicknamed Balaam by the Jews who abborred Christianity. For it shows that the pious Israelites held Paul to have really rendered a service to Judaism by casting aside the regulations of Jewish Law for his flock, since this had as result the withdrawal of the Pauline Christians of Jewish origin from the community of Israel. And just as Balaam, called upon to curse Israel, blessed it instead, so Paul, who by becoming a Christian leader was expected to harm Israel, proceeded to confer upon it a benefit. Thus it may be possible to solve a question usually regarded as insoluble: why Balaam should have taken as a pseudonym for an *enemy* of Judaism.

After the execution of Jesus, the Toldoth tells us, his disciples fled from Jerusalem and scattering themselves throughout the world "misled the peoples, but everywhere they took refuge God sent his judgment upon them and they were slain." Among the followers of Jesus were "twelve men (base offspring of foul ravens) who wandered through twelve kingdoms, and spread false doctrines among mankind." Five important disciples are specifically mentioned as having been killed by the Jews, their names, according to the Talmud, being Mathai, Nakkai, Netzer, Bunni and Todah. And the pious narrator tells in glee, how, in sending these men out to be slaughtered, the rabbis amused themselves by grimly making jesting word-plays on the name of their victims.

The rabbis were unable to murder all the Christian propagandists, and many Jews listened to them and became "apostates." The apostates reproached the Israelites who remained true to the faith with having slain God's annointed, while the Israelites replied with the taunt: "Ye are children of death because ye have believed in a false prophet!" Nevertheless the apostates "went not forth from the congregation of Israel," and there was contention and strife resulting in "confusion of prayers and much loss of money."[7]

It was hence resolved to "root out these wicked men from the community of Israel that they should have no more any part or heritage with the Israelites." And to accomplish this the rabbis had recourse to their usual policy of dissimulation and deceit. According to Jewish tradition it was Paul, the Christian saint, who carried out this plan. The original name of Paul, the Toldoth asserts, was Elijahu, and he was "very learned in the scriptures." He never became a Christian at heart, but agreed to feign to become one if the other Wise Men of Israel would take upon their shoulders the sin he committed in doing this. The agreement having been made, he learned the pronunciation of the Ineffable Name in the usual way, went to the Christians and, announcing himself as one sent to them by Jesus, performed miracles until "they fell down before him and said: 'Truly thou art the messenger of Jesus, for thou hast shown us marvels as he did.'" The consequence was that the Christians "added foolishness to their foolishness." Paul gave out, as the commands of Jesus transmitted through him, that the Christians should remove themselves from the Israelite community,

[7] One redaction puts it more specifically: "And they made Israel lose much money which went into the hands of non-Jews."

should "profane the Sabbath," keeping Sunday in its stead, and should replace all the Jewish holy days with new ones of their own. They were ordered also to give up the practice of circumcision, and to eat ritually impure foods. "Whatsoever God created in the world" ordained Paul "from the smallest gnat to the mightiest elephant, pour forth its blood upon the ground and eat it." The precepts of the Sermon on the Mount were, according to Jewish tradition, due to a clever trick on the part of Paul, who put them forth, not in good faith, but in order to enable the Jews to maltreat the Christians with impunity. "All the evil that the Jews do unto you accept in love and good will" said Paul. "If one of the Jews compel you to go a mile, go with him twain; if a Jew smite you on the left side, turn not to him the right also; if a Jew revile you, endure it and return it not again as Jesus endured it; in meekness he showed himself, therewith he showed you also meekness as he practiced it, that ye might endure all that any should do to you. At the last judgment Jesus will punish them, but do ye have hope according to your meekness." And we are told that "Elijahu, who gave them these laws, laws that are not good, did it for the welfare of Israel, and the Christians call him Paul. After he had introduced these laws and commandments, the erring ones separated themselves from Israel, and the strife ceased." Some redactions give Peter instead of Paul the credit for separating the Christians from the Jewish flock. Others bring both Peter and Paul on the scene, both being represented as at heart faithful to Israel and posing as Christians only in order to do injury to the followers of Jesus. At all events there was in this devious way attained the happy result that the Christians "have no part and lot in Israel. They are accursed in this world and accursed in the world to come" says the Toldoth, which concludes with the pious hope that now may "the Lord bless his people Israel with peace."[8]

It will be observed that this hostile account, instead of discrediting Jesus, really redounds to his honor, and there is thus no justification for Christians desiring to keep it sunk in oblivion No imputations that can be deemed really serious are cast on Jesus by the Jewish story. Nothing hateful in either word or deed is ascribed to him. Aside from the charge that he, without justification, called himself the son of God, this tradition accuses Jesus merely of practicing sorcery and opposing the dominant clique of priests. The worst that his Jewish enemies have to say about him in no way effects any disparagement of Jesus. When we hear what they have to say about their victim all our sympathy goes out to him, all our antipathy to his persecutors. On the other hand the revelations which the "Wise Men" of ancient Jewry make of their own mentality and morality is simply appalling. To pass judgment upon them we have no need to inquire whether the events narrated in the Jewish story ever really took place; it is enough to know that the spiritual leaders of the Jewish people complacently boasted of deeds of the most disgraceful description as having been committed by their own party. Cruel and merciless, ignorant and superstitious to an extent unparalled, to them justice and fair dealing were unknown. And we may not unaptly characterize the Jewish story of Jesus as a record of rabbinical deceit and dishonor.

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[8] Some redactions append an episode dealing with the Nestorian schism in the Christian Church in A. D. 431. The narrator says exultantly that Nestorius "departed from them [the main body of Christians] and made a mock of them just as the heretics had laughed at the Wise Men [of Israel.]"

THE PLEASANT PAINS OF ASCETICISM

BY LEO MARKUN

ASCETICISM, according to the Rev. Dr. Charles Morris Addison's definition in *The Theory and Practice of Mysticism,* "is belief in pain and want for their own sake, as agreeable to God laying up grace in Heaven." Martyrdom may, then, when voluntary, be included under the term; but here we shall be chiefly concerned with self-inflicted and willingly received pains falling short of death.

After mentioning certain cruel disciplines that St. Francis inflicted upon himself, Dr. Addison remarks, "And here his aim was joy as much as that of any epicurean." This is the interpretation of a minister, made in a lecture addressed to theological students and intended to draw them into the practice of mysticism. I think it is true; and if it is, the fact is important.

As soon as we say that even the person who tortures himself in the name of God is seeking his own joy, we reduce the ethics of all systems of religion and philosophy to a common hedonism. After all, Carlyle's Professor Teufelsdröckh is quibbling when he says "there is in man a HIGHER than Love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof find Blessedness!" His everlasting yea, "Love not Pleasure; love God" is self-contradictory. Perhaps there are people to whom the love of God can bring greater joy than any sensual delight can; nay, there undoubtedly have been and are such people, but joy is joy however sought, however found. The worship of sorrow is really the adoration of bliss.

The story is told of St. John of the Cross that in his old age, after he had spent his strength in virtue, Christ came to him and asked what reward he desired for his good deeds. "Lord, that I might suffer most!" was the final reply. Lecky, telling the story, says that "every selfish wish was forgotten" in the saint as he made this request. This is a gross psychological mistake. To be most like the Man of Sorrows, to be as nearly as possible Christlike, was certainly the most selfish of all desires to the saint, even though Lecky was incapable of envying him such a reward. The story is told again of a Spanish saint, Ramon Monat, who, after refusing a crown of roses at the hands of the Virgin, receives Christ's own crown of thorns.

Asceticism is, however, not a mere historical curiosity interesting only a few hermits and monks and their admirers. The tribal taboos and religious prohibitions which arise out of a more or less clearly formulated theory of sacrifice are so widespread that no one of us, however anarchical and revolutionary in his thoughts and actions, can entirely escape their influence. Though we go our daily way as if ignorant that gods exist, though we go out of our way to deny that gods exist, we are constantly doing things simply because the interpreters of divinity have suggested or commanded that these things be done, and we are ever omitting to do things which are said to arouse divine wrath.

Asceticism is often bound up with belief in future rewards and punishments. The doctrine that our existence on earth is but a test to determine where and how we shall live evermore after death has no doubt had more influence than any other religious teaching in causing pleasure-loving men and women to renounce the ordinary mortal joys. To the anticipation of future bliss is often added the mystical delight of communication with or mergence into the divinity.

But asceticism does not inevitably imply a belief in personal immortality. Painful practices may be directed toward Nirvana, which is at once the loss of individual consciousness and an entering into the godhead. They may be intended to produce mundane prosperity. They may become, by a transfer of values, symbols and manifestations of a higher, more intense order of bliss. Indeed, properly speaking, this last is what asceticism means. He who clings to a glorious horror of never-ending tortures in Hell is more truly the ascetic than he who is convinced that his austerities on earth assure him of all the delights of Paradise. The latter is but a thrifty soul who appreciates the value of compound interest at an infinite rate of increase, and to whom the security offered is satisfactory.

The Paradise-seekers have almost invariably been gregarious, at least with respect to their plans for eternity, even though many theologians have represented among the leading joys of Heaven that of looking down upon the damned in Hell. The ardent fearers of damnation have sought to make others share in their pleasant pains. Moreover, because self-cruelty is ordinarily associated with greater than normal cruelty, they have not stopped at suasion. In Christianity, to be specific, the desert anchorites were succeeded by the monks, some of whose orders were especially devoted to the task of converting pagans and suppressing heresy by force. Among schismatic groups, the Catholic doctrine of the counsel of perfection was discarded in favor of the theory that every Christian should sanctify himself by ascetic practices.

Considered in the light of his own experiences, after as well as before he wrote *The Critic as Artist,* there is much meaning in the words of Oscar Wilde: "Self-denial is simply a method by which man arrests his progress, and self-sacrifice a survival of the mutilation of the savage, part of that old worship of pain which is so terrible a factor in the history of the world, and which even now makes its victims day by day and has its altars in the land."

Perhaps Wilde says too much here. If self-denial includes the postponing of pleasures, the occasional subordination of individual desires to communal action for the ultimate advantage of all the individuals participating in it, surely it is one of the methods that have been used in erecting our civilization. It was really self-denial and self-sacrifice for their own sakes (forms of enjoyment he could understand, at least in his prison days) to which Wilde objected.

We cannot all say with the Christian mystic Jacob Boehme, "that this is joy, that the will to nature is delivered and freed from the dark anguish; for else there would be no knowledge of what joy was, if there were not a painful source." We cannot all be placed upon the same algohedonic level, although most, probably all, of us are capable in some ways of deriving pleasure from painful sources.

But, try as we will, we cannot altogether escape the consequences of the teaching that it is blessed to suffer. This message of consolation to the slaves and the poor artisans whom the Nazarenes gathered around them quickly became and has remained to this day a cardinal dogma in official Christianity. The luxury of the decadent Graeco-Roman world has been much exaggerated, together with the extent of its "vices," but at any rate it was altogether out of the reach of the poor followers of Jesus. Accordingly they were delighted to hear that those who were then carousing and reclining upon soft couches were not to be admitted into the imminent Kingdom of Heaven.

Thus then is the teaching explained: "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink: nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on." Of course, some persons of our time who describe themselves as Christians do pause to consider whether a green necktie goes well with a pink shirt, and whether synthetic lemon pop will be quite as efficacious as synthetic raspberry pop in relieving their thirst. Comparatively few are they who sell all they have and follow in what they conceive to be the way of the Lord. The Christian self-cruelty of today is for the most part more subtle, being concerned largely with conscience, which is built up to a considerable extent upon the obsolescent dogma of original sin.

Theological ingenuity long ago discovered that we have all inherited wickedness from Adam and Eve, and theologians have hardly yet stopped arguing to what extent original sin can be eradicated. Our present morality represents in large measure the attempt to repress natural impulses, to conquer the "sinful old Adam" who is supposed to dwell in all of us. Indeed, a great many of our crimes, including some that are punished with great severity, are such only because of taboos that are without rational meaning for us now.

It can hardly be denied that some of our religious taboos have served useful purposes, and that a few of them remain harmless; but the superstitious self-cruelty of our ancestors has cast about us many an irksome bond which we cannot think of removing without trembling at our own temerity. Those who venture to free themselves on their own account soon learn how cruel "virtue" can be.

The initiates into the Roman mysteries were taught, according to Cicero, that men come into this world to atone for sins which they have committed in a previous state of existence. This is literally the same as Origen's teaching, and it amounts in effect to the orthodox Christian dogma of original sin.

The curious will of man to find himself guilty is inexplicable except as pleasurable self-cruelty. Conscience is very real to some of us, at times more potent than the fear of tangible punishment; but of course the result of conscience may or may not be socially beneficial. We have but to think of the inner spiritual tribunal of Queen Isabelle of Spain, which permitted her no rest until many heretics and infidels were slaughtered, many fair cities laid waste.

The New England or Nonconformist conscience is first and foremost a manifestation of pleasant pain.

Christian preachers have repeatedly stressed the importance of humiliation and affliction. Men are still advised to approach God in the humble attitude of the child that has repented of its misdeed and voluntarily kisses the whip with which it is to be chastised. (Not that the kissing is likely to be altogether voluntary in the case of an unperverted child.) Harriet Beecher Stowe, who thought she had freed herself of the cruel Calvinism of her ancestors, remained capable of saying the "sorrow is godlike, sorrow is grand and great, sorrow is wise and far-seeing."

If present-day advocates of the "blue laws" seldom argue that we need an abundance of sorrow, it is yet asceticism more than anything else which clamors for a Sunday without amusements and an eternal interdict on that which "maketh glad the heart of man." Paradoxically, while the Calvinist theology is apparently drying out into nothingness, its psychological spring is furnishing holy water to religious leaders who have abandoned predestination and original sin, and even to humanists who profess full allegiance to utilitarianism in ethics.

Whether the divinity served be wrathful Jehovah or the new American god Efficiency, self-denial is the favorite sacrificial offering of our time. The worship of Efficiency (perhaps the same deity which has been condemned under the name of Mammon) has in fact led to certain modifications of the Sunday laws. The priests of Efficiency were agreed a few years ago, although they hesitate a little now, that workingmen should be sober on Monday mornings, even though this involves certain industrial losses and an enormous cost in enforcing the relevant laws.

The characteristic prudery of England and the United States, which continental Europeans often refer to as hypocrisy, is a sort of psychic celibacy. It amounts in effect, however, to the spicing of sex with algolagnia or pleasantly painful voluptuousness. Certainly there are men and women who take great delight in suppressinfi books and pictures. If they cannot burn alive the artists and the publishers, they must content themselves with the lesser cruelty of flinging the supposedly indecent books into the fire. Their desire to commit malicious mischief seems legitimately satisfied when they smash to bits a splendid statue or empty rare liquors into a sewer.

The principle of sacrifice has taken many curious forms, and there are peoples even more convinced of the value of a taboo on milk than good Americans are of their taboo on champagne. There was a puritanical sect in the fourth century which proclaimed that no true Christian would defile himself with any sort of animal flesh.

The teaching that virginity is holy has had an influence on the lives of millions of persons, beginning long before the Christian era. Celibacy plays an important part in Brahmanism, Lamaism, and Buddhism. Although the main line of Jewish religious thought distinctly favors fruitfulness, it was from a Jewish sect, the Essenes, that the Christian ascetic ideals were derived. An important sect in normally polygamous Islam believes in the holiness of celibacy. Among the aborigines of South and Central America many tribes had celibate and otherwise ascetic priests and priestesses. Dionysus, the Greek god of love, was served by priestesses sworn to chastity. Pythagoras taught his followers that they could not partake of certain mysteries unless their lives were virginal.

A sharp differentiation between matter and spirit, such as can be found in some Greek philosophies, is usually accompanied by an ascetic tendency. This was noticeable, for example, in the old Christian heretical sects that were more or less akin to Manichaeism. The erratic young Otto Weininger, who defended celibacy only a few years ago, says: "Denying sexuality merely slays the bodily man, and but for the sake of giving full scope to the spiritual one."

Removing the spirit from the debasement of its corporeal alloy is an intermediate process in mysticism, and it is indeed among the mystics that celibacy has been most important. The principle is that to communicate with a god, one must become godlike, therefore (according to some religions) removed as far as possible from the natural appetites of men. Possibly magical notions about the efficacy of celibacy and various other forms of asceticism arose before there was any worship or fear of gods.

Self-castration and other forms of self-mutilation, the voluntary suffering of flagellation, fasting, uncomfortable garb, abstinence from bathing and from knowledge, religious prostitution or other sacrifices of modesty, have been among the most important manifestations of asceticism. Except for fasting and (to a limited extent) abstinence from knowledge, these forms of self-sacrifice seem remote to most of us. Yet an important American sect debated not long ago the God-fearing way of fastening undergarments, and many religious communities are still sharply distinguished from their neighbors by their garb.

In our own time, when scholars and philosophers and scientists are chiefly to be found outside monastic walls, many of these men and women show a certain tendency toward asceticism. Choosing to devote themselves to pleasures which are not such at all in the eyes of the unsympathetic, they renounce others. Knowing in many cases that they are not to enjoy the material rewards which come to persons of intellectual ability inferior to their own, they nevertheless choose to serve humanity or to follow the inward gleam.

There are still men of religion who undergo great sufferings in their missionary labors. There are physicians and research scientists who willingly suffer the loss of health or life in their daily work. Many an artist weds Lady Poverty as surely as did the good St. Francis. There are self-sacrificing people who give much of their little for what they consider deserving causes. That they actually accomplish beneficial results does not, of course, always follow.

For the true ascetic nobility and even repose arise out of suffering. Out of their pains they make real and tremendous pleasures. The joys of renunciation are no less keen than the joys of appetite.

THE STRATEGY OF LIFE AND HUMANISM

BY OSKAR EMIL

DURING the past year humanism has gained considerable publicity, and we may say that it is being increasingly practiced. It is an anti-Copernican revolution bringing our world back to its source, ourselves. It is an anthropomorphic and ego-centric tendency—only with the mystic possibilities of the fundamental reality beyond Humanism realizes that the world is a product of mind, although it admits that this is a product of transcendental causes and factors which we may imagine and suppose but which can only be tested and tried by practice and decided by circumstantial evidence. As when a crime is committed but nobody knows who did it, only a verdict of probability may be rendered by the jury, and the real criminal may escape punishment while some innocent may be considered guilty instead. So with the factors of mind—maybe the ones we designate are the reason for the results and maybe not. We are still living in a hit and miss understanding of what we know, and should admit in face of all scientific excellence that we are drifting on the waves of unknown creative influences.

Perhaps many will condemn this as obscurantism and intellectual nihilism, as an unpractical theory. Nevertheless, humanism is in fine such a view, although it may be comfortably and correctly dressed in attractive fashion. Under the clothes there is a mysticism which does not exclude the religious possibilities although the sacred garments of the past may not fit this modern world. By its very lack of final understanding and its tentative character, its human relativity replacing theological and scientific absolutism, humanism advances man from being a more or less unfortunate accident in the scheme of things to be the major concern in our great experiment of life. It may consider our coming and going through this world as events of fashion, but it retains by a sound pragmatism what fits while it rejects the unfit, after testing by experience, intelligence and understanding.

Humanism tends to produce a world more suitable for man, and men more suitable to the world of forces in which we float. It reckons from a world of observed facts with a world of implied factors about which we may be mistaken, but which by all means and methods we try to define with greater mathematical exactness. It looks at all experience and facts as problems to solve. The sun as we see it is a problem to be solved and so are we ourselves. All we expect is to reach a better solution than before, better because it fits our calculations and gives us more control of events,—better because it is better for ourselves. Humanism must not overlook this second test if it shall survive. Physical and chemical sciences have given us a greater control of things than ever, but have largely also been used to destroy ourselves. They have not altogether been for our good. We are still far from being successful in the personal test. Men are still obviously fighting and defeating themselves in wars, in social and personal life. And men are still not improving as they could and should. This is the vital feature of the new humanism that it aims at calculating and controlling not only the new universe but at improving our standing in this. It does not consider man as a particle of dirt in a fatal mire, nor as an almighty god in an imaginative creation, but as a spark in a dark, flickering perhaps, but with the possibilities of flame and illumination. Life is such a personal illustration in the darkness and not a mere unconscious event of movements and fitness. We experience more than we know, just as a rock and a plant experience more than they know; but living as experience alone without knowledge is hardly worth while although it may be possible as the fall of a rock, the purring of a cat, and our sleep, is possible. Existence and experience provide foundation for knowledge and are good and valuable only insofar as they enable us to know; otherwise they are useless so far as we are concerned. We are not interested in a universe which not in any tangible way affects our knowing.

From the time of Eden there was knowledge of good and bad, and in itself good or bad. Humanism is interested in creating good knowledge of good and for good. We would rather ignore the painful and bad if it were not necessary to avoid the worse. Pains and bad knowledge are danger signals in the unknown for our best.

That is why we must contend with evil although we might otherwise exclude it from knowledge. In this connection humanism will meet with its crucial test, for what is good and bad? We have our personal preferences and idiosyncracies in this respect, which make it practically impossible to agree among ourselves, at the face of facts. It is unnecessary to rehearse history in its religious, social, political, economical, practical and personal phases. We have in vain tried to build the tower of Babel, and we are still outside of paradise. We live in a world of conflicting views and values, a world of warring gods. So long as humanism cannot overcome this embarrassment it will do little more than refine the previous results of living and increase the total of knowledge without increasing the relative amount of living. Therefore the new humanism must agree upon its good, if it will succeed in the world it develops and in which it develops.

We must not forget that we live a sort of double existence, partly in the world of knowledge, and partly in a world of unconscious experience. We must manage so we do not eliminate ourselves through our knowledge, and still so we enjoy the show more than ever. We live in order to know but we know in order to live still more. That is the strategy of life upon which the new humanism must be founded; considering good and evil of the show as secondary to good and evil for the show. The show must go on; that is the principle of our modern creed. We are interested in alleviating the tragedy and take bitterness out of the comedy of the show, altogether in making our known world more beautiful, more pleasant, more kind and good, more rich and full, than ever. Humanism will be a painless dentist if possible, but it will extract the tooth not primarily because it hurts in our knowledge, but because it hurts our existence upon which life and knowledge depend. The new faith will not drug our knowledge to the detriment of life. It will not enjoy knowledge to the detriment of the vital mechanism. If pains and hardships are necessary to brace us up for a higher level and greater extent of knowledge it will face and suffer them unflinchingly. But it will not take for granted that these unpleasant facts are justified whenever they happen. It will not without further investigation think that the sick deserve to be sick, the poor poor, the unfortunate unfortunate. Nor will it take success at par, but measure vitally their value as parts of the whole. Unless such a measure is applied the new humanism will only be an experiment in efficiency which may be socially and personally destructive.

In these estimates we must figure with time. Knowledge, happiness, good and bad, are all products of time, and must be valued accordingly. It is the length in which we are happy in proportion to the time of life that counts. And it is the hours of good in proportion to the hours of bad and indifferent knowledge that count, personally as well as socially. We are apt to exaggerate the great moments at the expense of the long run. The quality of the joy, the fascination of the fact, the idosyncracy of the sensation, the brilliancy of the signal, blinds us so we forget that we are on a perilous voyage. We are so attracted by the signs that we forget the science of life. We forget the code of navigation and get wrecked. We are so attracted by the sign that we altogether discontinue the voyage of life on that account.

The foregoing are essential considerations of the new humanism whatever it implies. We believe it will create a bigger and better show than ever. We believe it will make personal and social life more efficient and fit. We believe it will calculate the unknown for the benefit of knowledge and life with more mastery than ever. We believe that it will fear the mystery of God and increase the self-respect of humanity at the same time. Provided that it follows the strategy of life.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

OPENING OF THE SARNATH VIHARA AND BUDDHIST INSTITUTE.

Dear Sir,

I have pleasure to bring to the notice of the Buddhist world through your journal that the great Buddhist Temple and Institute called Mulagandhakuti Vihara, now being built by my Society at Sarnath (the old Isipatana Migadaya) near Benares where the Lord Buddha delivered his World-Message, will be completed in October next at a cost of over a lakh of rupees, and His Majesty the King of Siam will be invited to perform the opening ceremony.

This great Vihara marks an epoch in the history of Buddhism. The ancient Migadaya after a thousand years of desolation has come back to the Buddhists through the efforts of the Anagarika Dharmapala, and the opportunity now offered for the Buddhists to start religious and intellectual activities there is a unique one. The Vihara is a magnificent structure with ancient Buddhist architectural decorations carved on Indian red stones, and the frescoes will be done by famous Indian artists. Its excellent site is a gift from the Government of India.

The leading Buddhists and scholars might kindly help us to make the royal function a success by:—

1. Sending the names of intending visitors to us in time to make arrangements for them.
2. Preparing learned papers on Buddhism to be read during the Ceremonial Week. Subject of the paper and author's name to be sent to us one month before the ceremony.
3. Nominating delegates to participate in the general Buddhist conference to be held in this connection.
4. Sending valuable books, paintings and other relics for the Institute.
5. Giving the widest publicity to this matter in their countries and
6. By collecting subscriptions for the general building fund.

The delegates who are not able to attend may send messages which will be printed as a symposium. The exact date of the ceremony will be notified later.

Mr. Editor, any service you might kindly render in this connection would be gratefully acknowledged by my Society.

Yours faithfully,
P. P. Siriwardhana,
Hony. Secretary.
Maha Bodhi Society.

4A, College Square,
Calcutta, 13th June, 1930.

What is Christian Education? By George A. Coe. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. Pp. xii+300. $2.50.

Christian education is defined in the closing sentence of the present volume as "the systematic, critical examination and reconstruction of relations between persons, guided by Jesus' assumption that persons are of infinite worth, and by the hypothesis of the existence of God, the Great Valuer of Persons." The exposition of the book as a whole hinges on the contrast between transmissive education, designed to perpetuate a culture or important elements thereof, and creative education whose goal is the reconstruction of life and of the conditions under which it is carried on. Transmissive education is of various types but in each case it "hands on our faults, but conceals them, and by concealment adds to their prestige"; "it employs either force or evasion in the interest of effectiveness"; "its eyes fixed upon content," it is "slow to apprehend the forces at work"; "thinking to make men obedient to God," it "brings some men into subjection to others." Creative education is the building of a better future on the basis of the present and through a knowledge of the past. It involves a recognition of the worth of persons and of the fact that persons become such through the making of decisions, through intelligent participation in the life about them, and through the assumption of social responsibilities. Professor Coe argues forcefully that it is the path of perpetual discovery and perpetual creation which represents vital continuity with Jesus. He offers a stimulating account of how Christian education might be made more creative and how the Church might, in consequence, enjoy increased vitality. Of philosophic interest are suggestions as to how the experiences involved in creative educational procedure reveal realities and afford an approach to God.

A Debate on the Theory of Relativity. By Robert D. Carmichael, Harold T. David, William D. MacMillan and Mason E. Hufford, with an introduction by William Lowe Bryan. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1927. Pp. viii + 154. $2.00.

This debate, in which the first two authors mentioned (mathematicians from the University of Illinois and from Indiana University) argued in favor of the theory and the last two (an astronomer from the University of Chicago and a physicist from Indiana University) opposed the theory, gives to the intelligent reader an unusually lucid and interesting account and appraisal of the work of Einstein. The debate was originally arranged by the Indiana chapter of Sigma Xi, where it was staged shortly before the manuscripts were made available in print.

The Public and its Problems. By John Dewey. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. vi + 224.

In this book Professor Dewey scrutinizes our democratic state, the historical factors upon which its emergence depends, the sources of its present failure to function, and the indispensable conditions for its realization. Of additional interest are significant redefinitions of such concepts as "individual" and "social," "private" and "public," and the "state"—all of this in the light of the writer's "consequence" theory. Though constructive as well as critical, this study does not regard as significant or legitimate the search for a concrete program purporting to bring political salvation.

"The International Journal of Ethics Seeks to Clarify Theory and Improve Practice."--

T. V. Smith, *Associate Editor.*

SOCIAL problems will be separately analyzed in special issues of the *Journal* during 1930. Within the province of this publication lie both the central field of ethical knowledge and practice and the bordering fields of law, politics, economics, literature, and religion. The first of these related topics is Law and the Community.

IN THE APRIL ISSUE—the ethics of law enforcement analyzed.

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LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM OF BELIEF

BY T. SWANN HARDING

ABSTRACT science and philosophy seem subjects very remote from ordinary life. Actually they are not so at all. Generations of very ordinary men have heroically grappled with the problem of immortality, with that of a personal or impersonal creative intelligence, with that of what we should do now that we are here, and with other metaphysical enigmas about which scientists and philosophers argue in stupendous polysyllables, and about which they actually know almost as little as ordinary people. The invention of an impressive nomenclature has undoubtedly given them a feeling of erudition as a protective cloak, but they know so little that a highly intelligent man was recently heard to declare that the most important problem men faced today was whether life had any definite purpose, whether we have a life after death, and whether there is a god—to lump several closely related problems into one.

Consider this picture. A housewife awoke one morning in her sleeping-porch overlooking the back yard. The apple tree was a mass of white blossoms. The grass had just become thoroughly green. The scent of spring was in the air, and the birds were twittering vociferously. But, just as likely as not, she thought, they were swearing at each other. She should arise. Yet why should she arise? There were two animals, cat and dog, which now imperiously demanded her attention. There were no children who might have constituted a "duty." But would they have been a really important duty? Even they might reach maturity as a negligible clerk or a silly eternal flapper. But she should hang the front room curtains anew and get another china cabinet. Why should she? Having done that there would be that much less to do.

It was not so always. Some years ago, as a trained nurse, she had been kept very busy. She had never meditated on the futility of her existence in her life, until after marriage gave her leisure. She was happier then than now . . . . she was serving. How was she serving? She was helping to save and to preserve human lives. . . . Were they worth preserving—pimply youths and moron flappers? Probably not. Obviously not. The problem seemed involved.

Anyway, she could serve now through her husband. He worked in a laboratory and did what some people called wonderful things. He lectured and he wrote, instructing the people. Yet . . . . they were the same kind of more or less useless people she had served when nursing. That was all that service to humanity was; that is all that big reputations of artists, writers, orators, statesmen, are built upon—the ardent devotion of large masses of people whose intellects the great would find individually repulsive and whose habits, customs and ideas would undoubtedly offend them in personal contact. Yet upon their silly plaudits the "great" live. There wasn't so much to that.

Wasn't it probable that her husband had an itch to produce an article, or to complete a bit of research, just as she had an itch to purchase a new china closet or to hang new curtains—merely to opiate that curious and indescribable "underneath all" feeling which told you you were old, which told you you were going to die soon, which told you life was a sort of joke, which told you that even the earth would eventually grow cold and lifeless, and that this local jest of sentient life here—a very rare and unusual occurrence at best—would cease, the gods (were there gods?—silly idea) would laugh, and all would be as it had been before chaos became orderly a moment in one of the tinier and least important suburban universes. What could you believe about it all anyway? Why nothing!

So the housewife turned over and went to sleep again and she slept until noon. Then she still felt miserable so she went out and bought a new hat, which gets somewhat outside the territory of metaphysics and does not exactly concern us here. Certain it is that every person with any intellectual pretentions whatever has been prey to these same questionings. That is all that does concern us here.

What we have discovered is, then, that the common individual is no more free from metaphysical ideas than the philosopher and, secondly, that purely rational explanations will not carry as far as certain types of naturalism might led us to think. Husband and wife both, in very different ways, diverted themselves; in so far as the result was pleasurable to them their lives were successful and that essentially selfish criterion is the only one by which we can really judge. Our activities may be complex and intricate; they may seem to have very considerable significance in a decidedly limited manner, but push any activity to the ultimate limit and you come, as you do in all deeper philosophic thought, to complete skepticism and a conviction of utter futility.

At responsible intellectual levels diversion may well be paramount, for it is socially quite safe to have an intelligent man divert himself as he will. It is assumed, of course, that his emotions as well as his mind are educated; it is freely granted that there exist today hundreds of highly intelligent people whose emotional immaturity renders them socially far more dangerous than morons or near-imbeciles. That is natural because we devote little attention in our educational system to emotional discipline; in fact, to suggest discipline is somehow subtly unpatriotic anyway.

Thus when John Haldane Blackie assayed the American system of education in "Reviewed by a Briton" in *The Educational Review* for October, 1928, he noted that while English students accepted discipline as an unalterable fact of nature, and while their student prefects dared not give cause for rebellion, in America schools have entirely too little discipline. He continued "The American boy at his synthetic worst is conceited, ill-mannered, and without any sense of responsibility." Also, "It is only necessary to compare the police methods of England and America, and the almost total absence of 'graft' in the former . . . . to see that discipline is not merely a fad, or a tradition, whose sole merit lies in its whiskers."

At lower intellectual levels, however, the discipline of social regimentation is really necessary because intelligent self-discipline is impossible whether the emotions be mature or not. But Ethelbert Stewart, United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics, recently explained how very useful, socially and economically, the feeble minded can become when handled intelligently (*Monthly Labor Review, July,* 1928). This again involves scientifically controlled discipline by social pressure such as prevails, it is reliably reported, in the new schools of Soviet Russia, where the idea of beating up a student to make him obey has become actually grotesque. This discipline should always be accompanied by interesting and time-consuming tasks and fixed beliefs. It is especially the lack of the latter these modern days that has done so much to upset our civilization and give it a criminally chaotic aspect. Intellect is no more radical than it has always been, but lower levels of intelligence have hitherto been shielded from these strong mental brews, perfectly safe to quench the thirst of strong minds, by the fact that they have been uneducated and largely inarticulate.

This is an era of free education. The conquest of illiteracy is our high ideal. Whether or not minds and emotions are disciplined, every one must be able to read and write, and this leads to vehement articulation on the part of classes unaccustomed to be articulate in the past. The always dubious and skeptical ideas of the true intelligentsia also much more rapidly filter down to lower levels today than in the past; it is then assumed at those levels that the organized world has gone to the dogs—for though these radical beliefs are centuries old, they have never before been so clearly apprehended by those of moderate intelligence; therefore the old, fixed, traditional beliefs of the masses are no longer respected by them, and we have the widespread criminality and disrespect for social stability now rampant as a very natural consequence.

The true intellectual of culture can safely have fluid beliefs; he can be very skeptical, because such people have the personal sense of values to know that hypothetical beliefs should not control their actions; when they act they follow facts, whatever their momentary beliefs. On lower levels of intelligence, however, beliefs actually do condition acts. The only way out is, then, for the intellectual minority to condition the beliefs of the masses in such a way that they can act upon their beliefs to the greatest good of society as a whole. The ordinary man can not be skeptical and entertain fluid beliefs or indulge in suspended judgment without becoming absolutely unreliable as a citizen.

The true intellectual, like the great scientist for instance, can entertain these fluid beliefs which, like the fundamentals underlying science as well as religion, rest ultimately upon absolutely nothing, save a common assumption accepted as axiomatic, just as he accepts the polite conventions of society or the more delicate nuances of etiquette. He knows that his ultimate beliefs do not require proof, though he may have considerable faith in the temporary logical structure he rears upon them. This structure is a product of pure rationalism, a rationalism more pure than it is possible to use in the construction of any religion, yet, like religion, it rests finally upon pre-rational or non-rational assumptions.

These beliefs of the true intellectual, then, rest ultimately upon nothing save an assumption. This assumption does not require proof; it is accepted as axiomatic. It is like those propositions early in Euclid upon which the entire fascinating structure of his logical geometry is built. It just *is*—whether it be Creator or Unknowable, Creative Intelligence or the Law of Universal Causation; whether God or Absolute, it just *is*. It may momentarily, and in a specific emotional state, appear to be supported by an astute selection of apposite facts, but that is all you can say for it, and the true intellectual may be assayed by the fact that he actually knows when he has begun to rationalize *ex post facto* in order to buttress a belief he finds comfortable *per se*.

On the other hand, as we have seen, the masses vastly need discipline today. In the pursuit of the democratic ideal we have gone too far. It is quite true that the sort of discipline the nobility and royalty of one or two centuries past exacted from the masses had grown obsolete. It needed to be discarded. But the extreme democratic idea, the idea that one man is as good as another and, if poor and hard-working enough, a great deal better, has led the world to assume that no discipline at all is necessary. Yet during these very years science was rising to offer the newer and better discipline the intellectual minority should apply to the masses. However, it has remained rather well secluded in laboratories and behind walls even until today, and mass discipline is still attacked, if at all, with the anachronistic weapons of antiquated creeds, exploded philosophic notions and traditional moral concepts.

What the masses need today is a system of metaphysical beliefs which trained biologists and psychologists could certainly fashion for them. Science is recreant to its plain duty to society until such an attempt is made, and it will well deserve the antagonism of, and perhaps ultimate annihilation by, ignorant mass notions unless it girds itself to attack this problem. It is well enough to know the finer points of therapy or nutrition and to be involved in long researches upon lower animals, but the most important problem confronting science is that of so controlling society, the great mass of men, that science may pursue its humane studies and apply them to that society without disastrous interference from the very people it desires to help. This means simply that the paramount duty of science is to fashion beliefs for the masses and to discipline them into these beliefs so that ordinary men may again attack tasks commensurate with their intelligence, while resting in the protection and the sharp discipline of beliefs they can accept as final. Scientists can then also pursue their researches unmolested by recalcitrant mass values.

This new mass religion cannot be Science itself, however much the masses appear today to want to make it Science. Quite ordinary people today set up Science as a criterion of value even in religion; if it can be made to support a religious idea, that idea becomes more true; if not, the idea is weakened or Science must change, which is unfortunate for Science. Modern advertising and reading matter in the popular magazines make it more and more apparent that Science does tend to become the "New Messiah" for laymen in general. But it will really not do at all. It will not do because it admits, privately at least, that it rests ultimately upon purely non-rational assumptions which just are. A religion may be very logical in its superstructure but it never admits that its foundatin is non-rational; its foundation is super-rational because laid by Omniscience and Omnipotence and that is essential to religion. Science says, well here we are at the foundation; it just is; let us build up a beautiful edifice. Religion says here is the unchanging foundation which God, the Omniscient, has ordained as perfect and absolute from everlasting to everlasting; let us build upon it this or that pretty edifice; whatever it may become in the end the foundation is sure and absolutely final.

Science is, of course, merely a system of belief expressed dogmatically, but it is a system of belief for the intellectual minority, not for the masses. It differs from religion solely in its attitude towards its ultimate principles, but those principles remain simply assumptions, like the religious assumptions. Science, however, admits they are assumptions; it does not affect to regard them as final revelations. Science assumes, for instance, that if we observe and experiment we can find nature's laws by summarizing enough particulars. That is an assumption. For observation and experiment have certainly produced as many false as true beliefs. We could never prove that that assumption is rationally sound. It just is and from that science proceeds on its way. In similar manner it assumes universal causation and regularity of performance in natural law. In its assumptions about cause and effect it is up against a non-rational principle which just *is* in the universe, and in its adoration of consistency and regularity of nature's performance—the idea that the sun will arise tomorrow because it did yesterday and that a miracle cannot happen because of nature's law—it is simply making further assumptions.

A comedian sitting at the piano once said, "I will now play this piece just as Paderewski would play it if he played it just as I am going to play it," and that is somewhat the standpoint of science. We see the moon and it is the "real" moon which has sent its rays to our retinas; quite so, but why? We see a ghost just as surely and yet it is not a ghost; it may have sent its rays to our retinas surely enough but it is not a ghost because science says there is no such thing as a ghost. We must continually make such assumptions. We may say likewise that Christ, and twelve or fourteen saints after him, did not make water into wine because science says (uniformity of the operation of nature's laws) this cannot be done. Yet science devised these laws by summarizing particular phenomena; it does not even pretend to be able to prove any law absolutely because it is utterly impossible for it to ascertain every single particular in any single case. Why not allow for a miracle here or there, among the unsummarized particulars? There is no rational reason. It just isn't done. Science is dogmatic about such things.

Why not a Creator as well as a Universal First Cause or an Unknowable? There is no real reason. Science simply does not make use of that assumption nor does it need that assumption in its work. What is the essential utility of the doctrine of the uniformity of natural law other than as a club for a theologian's head when he appears with a miracle in his hand? Why is empirical knowledge drawn from observation and experience of more value than intuitive knowledge which just comes to us and tells us it is Truth? There is no *real* reason for these things. Science simply agrees to accept and be guided by the one and to reject the other as unreliable. And, in the intellectual system of belief called Science (the true intellectuals of today tend more and more to hold this belief in its best form) intuitive knowledge is not needed very much.

There is some confusion, of course, when the physicist meets the psychologist and the former says "All is mechanical cause and effect," to which the latter replies "All is the subjective action of our minds upon what appear to be external phenomena." But it is possible to fuse even such divergences into a sort of oneness for study as a whole, especially these days when physics becomes more and more amenable to mental moulding. For Lord Haldane's final article in *The Century* for December, 1928, said this, among other things: that Einstein has taught us time and space are ultimately nothing more than relations established between the mind and the things it observes, and that these relations vary according to the velocity of the observing mind. Hence we are driven back to mind even in physics; outside mind there is nothing, and apart from it, nothing has any meaning.

Why, we may ask for example, a theory of evolution? "Well, it rests upon scientific method, upon observation and experience." Upon what do these rest? O you must assume something. But observation and experience, even in the theory of evolution, have now and then produced wrong ideas or beliefs, have they not? "O yes, of course." Then which of your present beliefs are incorrect? "It is really impossible to say just which may be found wholly or in part erroneous after further investigation, but we certainly believe that progress will finally round the theory into a completely acceptable and true doctrine, and we hold just as certainly that the scientific method will lead us rightly in the future as in the past." But you have admitted that your fundamental assumptions are just assumptions, they do not rest upon scientific method, then. You have admitted that this scientific method has at times produced erroneous beliefs in your restricted field. How do you know that your dependence upon scientific method and your belief in progress are not among the erroneous beliefs? "Well, we have no reason to think so and, as I said, we must assume something." All right; assume that your theory of evolution has become an absolutely true thing, then what? It is then an absolute doctrine in which every one must believe. It no longer rests upon facts, phenomena, observation, experience, or scientific method; it just *is;* it is an axiom and has wiped away its foundation in becoming the perfect thing you hoped progress would make it. What then?

Logically and rationally there is nothing then. The theory of evolution like all other scientific theories is vulnerable to such basic rational treatment. Ultimately it just is. Science offers a fine, logical, useful system of belief; it has especial attraction for people of active intellects and self-disciplined emotions. It suits them as a more metaphysical or religious system of belief never could, and it also has more practical utility than such systems. But it is nothing more nor less than another system of belief founded upon certain fundamental assumptions, and to claim more for it, is to assume an arrogance no scientist should ever assume.

Coming back to where we started, then, we each and every one of us adopt a scale of values and a system of belief that seems comfortable to us. We essentially believe what it makes us feel good to believe and we indulge in those activities which most completely satisfy us. Despite our pretenses that is the real fact of the matter. These particular beliefs somehow protect us as individuals from the awfulness of complete doubt or intellectual chaos. They give us something to tie to, some point at which to start, some foundation upon which to rear a dwelling for our minds. They save us from a sense of utter futility. For we all have orderly minds in a frightfully disorderly universe and the only order the universe has is that with which our minds invest it. If we want a section of the universe pleasingly orderly we must synthesize this order mentally. It is in some such sense that Santayana meant that miracles had more reason than scientific laws, for they implied the very humanly comprehensible and reasonable desire of a beneficent father-god to see that we, his children, were protected and aided, whereas indifferent natural law simply was. What Santayana forgot was that God simply is also, if you place him as your foundation instead of some other non-rational assumption.

A system of social order should then be planned by those who think, and it should be planned so attractively that the beliefs evolved above (speaking intellectually now) for those below will discipline those below, while at the same time giving them the feeling of free will and independence. This means that culture and humanism must be added to science; that Goethe and Shakespeare and Beethoven must take their places beside Newton, Kelvin and Einstein. Science must learn to see life wholly; to temper its most cherished beliefs with a tinge of skepticism, to seek diversion and content rather than certitude and finality, and so to control minds of the lower intellectual orders that their discipline may make our entire society more happy and more stable than it is at present.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS DIVERGENCE FROM THE SPIRIT OF THE CONTEMPORARY WEST (II)

BY EDWARD L. SCHAUB

A CONSTANT feature that characterizes all the diverse philosophical systems of India resides in their approach to the tasks of metaphysical interpretation. This approach is identical with the persistent emphasis of the religious consciousness. It centers about the interrelations of the self and the world. Professor Leidecker has lent his authority to the contention that a "unifying theme that runs through all the systems is that of expressing experience in terms of the relation between the world and the self.[1] In this respect we find the contemporary philosophical situation in the West sharply different. Our behaviorisms, positivisms, naturalisms, most realisms, and speculative philosophy, however wide their departures from one another, alike manifest an objective orientation in consequence of which the relation between the world and the self is at most one of the questions that arise in the endeavor to frame a conception of reality under the lead of science, and only certain of these philosophies manifest any temptation to express experience in terms of this relation.

In raising the issue of differences between India and the contemporary West as concerns the influence of the religious consciousness upon philosophy, however, it was our intention to stress other matters—features connected with the lines of consideration mentioned in our preceding paper. First of all we would allude to a conception which is prominent in the thought of India, and enters into all its philosophic systems except the Cārvāka, but which, in the specific form in which it there occurs, is all but absent from our contemporary Western philosophies. That to which we refer is the doctrine of Karma; and that feature of this doctrine which we would here single out for attention is its unqualified synthesis of power, on the one hand, with justice or goodness, on the other. Neither of these traits would the Hindu consciousness sacrifice, even when confronted with the hard problems of human fate. Both in quality and in intensity, the teaching goes, the vicissititudes and fortunes of life are resultants of earlier deeds—a thesis which carries with it the doctrine of previous existence. Indeed, according to Garbe, the effects of human action are held to carry far beyond the experience of the individual agents. The "subsequent effectiveness of guilt and of merit, usually called *adṛishṭa,* 'the invisible,' also often simply *karman,* 'deed, work,' not only determines the measure of happiness and suffering which falls to the lot of each individual, but also determines the origin and evolution of all things in the universe. At bottom this last thought is only a necessary consequence of the theory that every being is the architect of its own fate and fortunes into the minutest details; for whatever comes to pass in the world, some creature is inevitably affected by it and must, therefore, by the law of atonement have brought about the event by his previous acts. The operations of nature, therefore, are the effects of the good and bad actions of living beings. On these assumptions all Indian philosophy, with the exception of materialism, is founded.[2] This account may not meet with universal approval on the part of scholars. Yet what does seem indisputable is the basic position in Indian thought of the belief in the inseparability of power, order and justice.

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[1] Leidecker, Kurt F., "Indian Philosophy and Western Thought," *Journal of the Interntional School of Vedic and Allied Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 18.

We find a characteristic, even though but a relative, distinction between Indian and contemporary Western, and especially American, thought, also in the fact that the former has always manifested an exceptional preoccupation with that whole or totality within which all elements of being are felt or conceived to fall. This means, in part, that it has exhibited a pronounced tendency to monism. This tendency is as ancient even as the Rigveda. Writes Mr. Prasad: "A careful study of the Rigveda will show that while individual gods are adored and the various phenomena of nature are attributed to them, the need of finding one comprehensive unity amid all diversity and one fundamental cause for all the manifold causes and effects is constantly pressing itself upon these poet philosophers of yore, and that as a result of this we already find in the Rigveda the theistic, the pantheistic and the monistic tendencies in juxtaposition with the more usual and predominant polytheistic notions."[3] The monistic strain becomes much more emphatic with the course of time, until, with the appearance of the Upanishads, it becomes indubitably ascendent. Again to quote Mr. Prasad: "For the most part there is one conception which dominates the whole of Upanishadic thought, viz., that there is ultimately only one principle of reality and it is Brahman or the universal self. All diversity and plurality of existence is either an illusion altogether or a manifestation of this same principle in a variety of forms."[4] Even where there is a theistic emphasis in the Upanishads there is a monistic note in the teaching that the universe, though having its source in Brahman, does not completely represent the latter but that Brahman transcends the universe.

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[2] Garbe, Richard, *The Philosophy of Ancient India*, pp. 8f.

[3] Prasad, Jwala, *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, p. 5.

In her philosophy India has indeed travelled upon almost all the paths of metaphysical exploration and has expounded widely varying doctrines of reality. Professor Radhakrishnan, however, has insisted, in his valuable historical studies, that Indian philosophy at its highest is monistic. Indeed, in his view, even those systems of thought that are avowedly dualistic or pluralistic have, unmistakably and inevitably, monistic implications. Now it is only fair to bear in mind that historical interpretations are easily colored by the historian's own philosophical affiliations; and Professor Radhakrishnan has been charged with having distinctly exaggerated the extent to which monism reigns in Indian philosophy. Whatever element of truth there may be in such a charge there nevertheless seems abundant evidence that, as compared with what obtains in the contemporary West, the monistic doctrine, or an underlying current thereof, uniquely prevails and has so prevailed, in the philosophy of India.

This is certainly the case when one envisages the situation from the standpoint of logical and epistemological teaching. But it is equally clear when the matter is viewed from the angle of ethics, especially in connection with the problem of evil. Generally speaking, life in the West has presented itself more in terms of struggle. Not nearly as striking as in India have been the tendencies to explain away evil or to seek escape from it through flight or disregard. Thus there has been a more widely prevalent as well as a sterner ethical dualism—a dualism often so stubborn as to carry the day both in theology and in metaphysics. The good, it has commonly been felt, is engaged either in an heroic defense against the invasions of evil or in a spirited attack upon it.

Often India's monism has been carried to extremes such as are seldom found in the classical systems of the West, and are today non-existent in America. In some instances, however, Indian thinkers have preserved the aspect of diversity, setting forth the ultimate unity, not as void of distinctions and utterly abstract, but as inclusive of, even though transcendent to, the differences which it organizes and synthesizes. Precisely as India, despite its astounding variety of climate, races, religions and civilizations, and its paradoxes and strains, is inclined to feel itself in some profound way as one, and often cherishes this unity beyond all else; and precisely as, speaking in the by and large, she, throughout the centuries antedating Western control, admitted with exemplary toleration the most varied types of religious beliefs and practices, acknowledging to all the value of bodying forth in some fashion the one eternal—just so have her philosophies, though prevailingly monistic, nevertheless at times sought to find place for all the vast choir of heaven and of earth. The point, however, which we are at present concerned to make is that in India the consciousness or realization of the ultimate or the all-embracing unity has ever seemed peculiarly clear.

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The experience of himself as in essence the ultimate, or as falling within its life, or as being nought except in and through it, has been so strong and so universal as to set the typical Indian seer and philosopher quite apart from most of the thinkers of contemporary America. Religion for the former could never be identified, as it so often is by the latter, either with a certain quality of the social consciousness or with active participation in the ethical tasks of mankind. For the Hindu, it involves as an essential feature a life hidden in the absolute, a feeling of unity with the ultimate, an overpowering sense of the nothingness of man apart from God, along with an assurance that God is all in all to him. The influence of this outlook and experience we find reflected in much of India's metaphysics.

Moreover, in the latter the emphasis falls upon being and eternal reality, rather than upon becoming, transformation and progress in time. How the energetic Aryan invaders originally came to substitute the ideal of realization for that of aspiration, of possession for that of search, of being for that of striving, we need not inquire. But early indeed the shift occurred. Thereafter, pretty much throughout, India's seers and thinkers, as well as her sons and daughters generally, have been widely agreed as to the priority, alike in theory and in life, of being over becoming. Writes Professor Radhakrishnan: "Except the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, all the systems aim at the practical end of salvation. The systems mean by release (moksa) the recovery by the soul of its natural integrity, from which sin and error drive it. All the systems have for their ideal complete mental poise and freedom from the discords and uncertainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, 'a repose that ever is the same,' which no doubts disturb and no rebirths break into. The conception of jīvanmukti, or liberation in life, is admitted in many schools."[5] Hence it is not surprising that "all the systems protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists, and erect a standard of objective reality and truth as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux. . . . It is assumed that whatever has a beginning has an end. Everything that is made up of parts can be neither eternal nor self-subsistent. The true individual is indivisible. The real is not the universe extended in space and time; for its nature is becoming and not being. There is something deeper than this—atoms and souls, or puruṣa and prakṛti, or Brahman."[6]

Entirely in harmony with the above is the typical Hindu view that even philosophy, as discursive reasoning and thought activity, cannot be the ultimate mode of human experience. To the latter philosophy can be but a pathway. Indeed much the same may be said of the ethical life. The one who knows, gets beyond reasoning processes to insight and realization; the holy man transcends the plane of moral striving where the good is a goal of effort—for him the good is an accomplished fact, an achieved experience. In an illuminating paper on "Approach to Metaphysics" which has recently appeared in *The New Era,* Professor Dasgupta has touched upon this point. In reference to metaphysical inquiry he writes: "Whether these intellectual efforts are required ultimately to point to some kind of solid experience as the ultimate result or whether the efforts themselves are sufficient to satisfy the craving of the mind in this direction, is a matter in which the Western and Indian minds are not in thorough agreement. I do not say that there is any history of open and positive disagreement and quarrel over this matter between them, but, it seems from the history of philosophy of the two countries, that European minds were always generally satisfied with the theoretical and rational enquiry, whereas, the Indian minds though they enforced strictest rational enquiry, always demanded some real experience which could verify the net results of the intellectual enquiry. With the Indian thinkers mere theoretical accuracy of thought leading logically to a certain conclusion, was not considered to be sufficient. It is curious that there were certain metaphysical results which they considered as being strictly verifiable in experience, and in which all the conflicting systems of thought, which were in hopeless quarrel over the epistemological, ontological and logical parts of the theoretical enquiry, were mostly practically in agreement."

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[5] Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy,* p. 26.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 25 f.

Hindu thinkers are therefore pretty much at one as regards their ultimate objective. This consists not in an accumulation of theoretical truths or even in the construction of a temple of knowledge. Truth is indeed highly prized and the vocation of the scholar is set on a pedestal. Yet in the last analysis the value of science and philosophy is deemed to be practical[6a] and religious. It is the function of these disciplines to serve and to satisfy the basic needs of human life. Whatever the historic origin of the belief in the saving power of knowledge,[7] it is primarily because of such power that knowledge is sought. Of the earlier thinkers, including the author of the *Gita,* Edgerton says that, though frequently differing on other points, they all agree in their fundamental attitude towards the objectives of speculation. These "are primarily religious rather than philosophical"; "all Hindu philosophy has a practical aim. It seeks the truth, but not the truth for its own sake. It is truth as a means of human salvation that is its object. In other words, all

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[6a] Our exposition would seem to receive general confirmation in Professor Dasgupta's recent volume, *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought.* Here it is pointed out that the speculative features of the Yoga philosophy were intended as a rational basis for the prescribed practises; their value, it is stated, is "that of a hypothesis, which, according to Yoga, enjoys the patronage of the Upanishads and serves to explain the results of the performance of Yoga practises." (p. 7.) It is but fair to add, however, that the same page from which this quotation is taken, includes also the sentence: "The Yoga . . . *unlike other systems,* (ital. mine) does not base its claims merely on the consistency of its speculative reasonings but also on a system of practises by which the speculative results at which it arrived can be directly verified." It is difficult to see how this passage can be reconciled with that which we quoted in our text from *The New Era.* True, the reference in the *Yoga Philosophy* is to a system of practises rather than to a direct experience of verification through realization, such as Professor Dasgupta said in *The New Era* that "Indian minds . . . always demanded." Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how one may logically claim, on the one hand, that Indian systems other than the Yoga base their claims *merely* on the consistency of their speculative reasonings and, on the other, that "Indian minds . . . always demanded some real experience which could *verify* (ital. mine) the net results of the intellectual inquiry." What may be said, we have allowed ourselves to claim, is that the ultimate objective of Indian philosophers has been in part to blaze a trail for thinking minds to a non-reflective yet noetic experience, while yet and also, in cases where this experience has been arrived at independently of speculative thought, to furnish logical underpinnings for it.

[7] Professor Franklin Edgerton attributes it to primitive ideas of magic which left lingering traces even when they became transcended and transfigured. (*Cf. The Bhagavad Gita,* p. 7.) This would help to explain how it comes that in India knowledge commonly possesses a value quality that is quite unique, a quality quasi-transcendental as it were, and commanding a reverential regard akin to that often maintained toward the mysterious and the supernatural—a quality that distinguishes it from what is prevalent in the West in those circles where knowledge is construed as instrumental to needs and to practical or spiritual ends.

Hindu philosophy is religious in basis. To the Hindu mind, 'the truth shall make you free.' Otherwise there is no virtue in it. This is quite as true of the later systems as of the early and less systematic speculations. To all of them knowledge is a means to an end."[8]

The contention that Indian philosophy, while *religious* in basis, is *practical* in aim—that its esteem for scientific and metaphysical knowledge is due not to any independent value which such knowledge is supposed to have but to the practical value ascribed to it—might seem *prima facie* to bring into conjunction terms that we set into contrast in our foregoing exposition. For we referred to Indian philosophy as peculiarly dominated by certain features of the religious consciousness, and in so far we differentiated it from contemporary American culture which was said to reflect in a peculiar degree the experiences of practical, as well as of ethical, life and activity. This particular antithesis of the religious and the practical, however, in no wise prevents bracketing together the two terms in a description of the objectives of Indian philosophy. The reason for this is simple. It resides in the different meanings carried by the term "practical" in the two cases. In the earlier context, the term was given its Western connotation; now, in defining the aim of Indian philosophy, we employ it differently. In the one case, its associations are with utility, with particular ends to be attained, with the relations of objects and instruments to needs and desires, and to specific purposes realizable through courses of action; in the other, it refers to the satisfaction of a religious and spiritual yearning, to an experience of the absolute, to the attainment of a salvation that puts to rest the restless questioning of the intellect and the passionate urge of desire.

That from which knowledge is held by typical Indian thinkers to emancipate the individual is suffering[8a] and samsāra, or the cycle of life. The bondage in this case is attributed to a peculiar form of ignorance, an ignorance whose nature it is to misconstrue the true character and value of things. Such ignorance is to be dispelled by traversing the paths of philosophy with the aim of securing an immediate realization of truth and reality. Salvation from samsāra, the supreme question of man, is found by every philosophical school of India in some special form of cognition. Yet there is a sense in which philosophy as reflective thought carries us only to the portals of realization. The tenets common to all the philosophical systems of India, Professor Radhakrishnan describes, almost at the outset of his discussion, in the following sentences: "Reason is subordinated to intuition. Life cannot be comprehended in its fulness by logical reason. Self-consciousness is not the ultimate category of the universe. There is something transcending the consciousness of self, to which many names are given—Intuition, Revelation, Cosmic Consciousness, and God-vision. We cannot describe it adequately, so we call it the super-consciousness. When we now and then have glimpses of this higher form, we feel that it involves a purer illumination and a wider compass. As the difference between mere consciousness and self-consciousness constitutes the wide gulf separating the animal from man, so the difference between self-consciousness and super-consciousness constitutes all the difference between man as he is and man as he ought to be. The philosophy of India takes its stand on the spirit which is above mere logic, and holds that culture based on mere logic or science may be efficient, but cannot be inspiring."[9]

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[8] Edgerton, Franklin, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[8a] *Cf.* Dasgupta, S. N., *Yoga Philosophy*, p. 87: "The practical motive of all systematic speculation in India was deliverance from suffering."

Indian philosophies, thus, transcend, in many cases, the level of strictly ethical experience. Or, at any rate, they carry us beyond that which Bosanquet has aptly called "the realm of claims and counter-claims." "While virtue and vice may lead to a good or bad life within the circle of samsāra, we can escape from samsāra through the transcending of the moralistic individualism."[10] Taken in conjunction with a universalistic and a cosmic perspective, this tends to make for great breadth of sympathy and good will. Mr. Chenchiah goes so far as to allege: "The essence of Hinduism is best expressed in the words of Coleridge: 'He prayeth best who loveth best, all things both great and small.' The religious mythology of India is shot through and through with this tender love for all manifestations of God. In the psalms of the Indian saints (unlike those of the Old Testament) there is never a hint of anger nor a desire for revenge."

Mr. Chenchiah's pronouncement is perhaps too exuberant. Nevertheless, in some respects, as exemplified in her reverence for and protection of the cow, Hinduism indubitably senses the oneness of all forms of life. Moreover, Hinduism has exhibited a rare hospitality to alien faiths; it has to a considerable degree included and taken up within herself various bodies of worshippers with

[9] Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy*, p. 25.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

different gods and forms of cult, having been receptive, indeed, even to those for whom all gods are but subjective creations of finite mind; it has exercised a measure of religious toleration that brightens the annals of mankind. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that humans are humans. They live not on or by creeds and insights alone. In practice, India has had and continues to have much bitter religious strife. Alike the Jains of the south and the Buddhists variously, as in Nepal and Orissa, have much to complain of regarding persecution by Hindus. Far worse still have been the sufferings inflicted by Hindus upon low caste co-religionists. Even the great philosopher Sankara quotes with approval the law books which prescribe that, if a Sudra overhears the Vedic chants, his ears are to be filled with lead; if he utters verses from the Veda, his tongue is to be cut off; and if he touches a copy of the Vedas, his body is to be dismembered. Aspiration to be a hermit subjects the Sudra to persecution. Indeed, the Ramayana reports that the god Rama beheaded Sambuka, a Sudra, because he had practiced penance, and the other gods are said to have been jubilant over what Rama had done.

In the life—and, indeed, even in the thought—of India, as elsewhere, there thus are clashing elements. But it is worth noting that Hinduism peacefully shelters within herself extremely diverse points of view in relation to gods and no-gods, as well as to worship and the cultivation of emotions. Moreover, the typical Hindu aspires to transcend the plane of narrow individualism and to attain to a cosmic perspective wherein everything finite is given place within an all-inclusive whole and is through such membership, or as an expression of the totality, vested with such reality and value, if any, as it may be deemed to have. These features operate strongly towards the expansion of sympathies and the exercise of tolerance in religion and philosophic views, as well as in the attitudes both reflected and cultivated by them.

Aristoxenus tells the story of a visit paid to Socrates by an Indian philosopher. When the immortal Greek told the latter that he devoted himself to the study of man and human affairs, he is said to have received a smile and the reply that no one could understand things human who did not understand things divine. Whether or not this story has any foundation in fact, it illustrates the profound conviction of Indian philosophers generally that there is a reality undisclosed by sense and that this reality affords the key for such comprehension as may be possible of that which engages the thought of man. . . . .

The population of India generally has displayed an acute sense of the infinite and a reverent devotion to the unseen. It has felt that only in this perspective might one understand particular things and events, and only in this light should one direct one's life. Margaret E. Cousins, writing on "The Womanhood of India," has recently said: "Only those who have lived long and intimately amongst the women of India can appreciate the change that is flooding their lives bearing them forth to freedom, literacy, creative activity of all kinds, and all tinctured, nay, sprung from the fountain of spiritual realization, for the Indian woman's source of strength is ever her sense of the Eternal." Drawing on a larger canvas, Mr. P. Chenchiah has given us the following sketch: "The pursuit of the infinite, the search of the unknown has been the main pre-occupation of India all through the ages. The pageant of India —benevolent rulers, far-famed conquerors, learned pundits, incomparable philosophers, great poets and singers; palaces, palm-shaded villages and populous towns,—all these are in the picture. But in the center are the Sadhu and the Rishi (seer), the searchers after truth. All Indian arts, crafts and sciences are born of her religion. Indian music is the praise of the gods, Indian painting their portrait gallery, Indian architecture their temples. Amidst a thousand voices, all attractive and charming, India followed the trail of the Brahman, the mystery of God as it emerges in human consciousness and history."

For our present purposes it is indifferent what may be the specific forms in which the conviction of the infinite has received philosophic expression. Some there were, for example, who held the view that being possesses a depth which is unfathomable by the instrumentalities of abstract thought. Others, again, insisted upon a type of reality which, though designated as unknown, they nevertheless ardently longed in some way to capture and to express. However varied the formulations, we find in India, to a degree unknown in the West, a sense of the infinite, and this it is which not merely permeates wide reaches of her life but likewise dominates much of her philosophy.

Now we of America too are actively engaged in the search for the unknown. Never before in our history has so much importance been attached to discovery or so much energy and resourcefulness been displayed in research. This is true of our universities and technological institutions, and it finds exemplification also in numerous organizations which are sustained exclusively for purposes of scientific investigation. Indeed, even some of our larger industries have set up well equipped laboratories and staffed them with highly trained specialists in numerous fields not only of applied but also of the pure sciences. But in the main the unknown which is in these cases the object of the quest is equivalent essentially to the not yet known. It is continuous with that of which we possess clear knowledge. Often, indeed, it is conceived as of a piece with the perceptual order. The latter is in such cases commonly given a twofold rôle: that of setting the problems with which reason should occupy itself and that also of validating or negating the conclusions which reason proposes.

Among India's thinkers we find some who are fascinated by the natural and psychological orders of perceptual and introspective experience, and who are very fearful of any departure from the leadings of modern science. And, on the other hand, there are philosophers of contemporary America who are stressing the extent of the unknown and are insisting that, as the latter enters knowledge, much or all of what has been accepted as true will require revision; there are those who are sensitive to the limitations of that which is ever actually knowable, even though it be not in principle unknowable. Thus, India has thinkers who exemplify the dominant Western traits and America has those who in some measure embody characteristics common in India. Hence outer wings of Indian and American thought tend to meet. Yet even in these cases closer scrutiny will disclose differences arising from divergent matrices. In their central, their most characteristic and potent, features, the unknown, the infinite and the real being of which large numbers in India have always had some form of consciousness and for which they have maintained an intense longing, are very different indeed from anything that commands wide attention on the part of our intellectual explorers even in the field of philosophy.

The contrast thus alleged may receive further illumination through another which is closely related thereto and to which we now pass. From the days of the Vedas on down, we find closely associated with the consciousness of the essential mystery of things, a restless feeling of wonder. In the earliest time, this experience was aroused by physical nature, whose awesome features in India are peculiarly fitted to exercise such an influence. At a later period, the sense of mystery and the associated wonder were stimulated more especially by subtle stirrings and forebodings within the self. Now the wonder thus aroused has a quality that not merely impels the mind beyond what is already grasped to something essentially similar thereto, as does that form of wonder which prevails in the America of today. The wonder of the Indian is one akin to that involved in the religious consciousness, one that engenders a relation to a reality genuinely, and in some very significant sense qualitatively, distinct from the physical and the psychological factors arousing it. I am not sure but what the latter rather than the former represents the experience of Kant when contemplating the starry heavens above and the moral law within. If so, those interpreters of the Koenigsberger have a point in their favour who construe his doctrine of noumena and things-in-themselves not in terms of the limits of the given, as does the Marburg School, but in a much more dualistic fashion. Or again, consider what Plato meant when he described wonder as "the mark of the genuine philosopher so that he was no bad geneologist who said that Iris is the child of wonder." Contrast this with the wonder described by Comte in a passage which declares that this is man's deepest motivation, and that no suffering can be more acute than the consternation arising from the thought that some event may happen in violation of the laws of phenomena. This wonder is that of the scientists, the positivists, and certain of the empirical philosophers. From it we must distinguish that to which Carlyle referred when he contended that "He who cannot and does not wonder (and worship) were he President of innumerable Royal Societies and possessed the epitome of Hegel's philosophy and the knowledge of all the laboratories and observatories of modern Europe within his single head, he who does not perpetually wonder is but a pair of spectacles behind which there is no eye." Now this wonder which for Plato constitutes the mark of a genuine philosopher, which was in all probability associated with the awe and reverence aroused in Kant by the starry heavens and the ethical imperative, and which, in Carlyle's phrase, distinguishes a seeing eye from glassy spectacles is, if my limited knowledge may be trusted, precisely what we find to an exceptional degree among the seers and thinkers of India's many centuries. Together with Plato and the major philosophers of medieval Europe. they powerfully strengthen the conviction of those who, despite much of unquestionable value in the thought of contemporary America, find therein limitations connected with the functioning of what William James labelled the thick-skinned mind.

The drawing of contrasts is theoretically perilous, especially when one is dealing with matters as complex as philosophy and culture. Nevertheless, it is hoped that enough will have been said to justify the affirmation that Indian philosophy diverges in significant ways from the spirit and the thought currents of the contemporary West, and to render at least plausible the thesis that the differences which present themselves arise in no small measure from the more intimate relationship which the life and the speculative thought of India have maintained with the deliverances of the religious consciousness. The chief points which we have sought to make might be summarized as follows: In respect to the feeling of wonder, the concept of practical, and the value attached to knowledge, there are significant differences between the spirit of India and that of present-day America; and in each case these differences arise from the greater prominence in the Indian mind of a sense of the infinite and of the religious note. Indian philosophy has its orientation in the relation of the self and the world; its goal is not abstract knowledge but a characteristic type of experience. Its aims are practical—practical, however, not in the sense of enhancing man's power over the material or the social environment, or of realizing ends of a purely or narrowly ethical sort, but in the sense of satisfying the more ultimate need of salvation. It thus transcends the plane of morality. In distinction from the centrifugal philosophy of an "expanding will" which, at its best, centers about the perfecting of society and its world, the philosophy of India turns to a supernature discoverable in the recesses of the human soul and suggesting the need for spiritual realization. Its emphasis is upon being rather than becoming. In opposition to doctrines of flux, it stresses an objective reality that furnishes an absolute standard of truth and of spiritual values. The individual aspires to an overpowering experience of the ultimate, and the philosopher is inclined to a metaphysical monism which looks beyond particulars to a whole or a totality within which they fall. Power and goodness are conjoined in the concept of karma. We thus have a marked divergence from the temporalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism, and pluralism which are so prominent in the contemporary West, and from those analytic and intellectualistic strains that pervade so many of its philosophies.

THE LOVES OF THE DEMONS

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE medieval superstition about the loves between demons and humans is a theological interpretation of the ancient belief in the cohabitation of gods with mortal women. The pagan deities, after they had been raised to demonhood by Christianity, still continued to seek the company of the daughters of the earth. In the Northern European countries, this medieval belief was, in addition, a survival of the old Teutonic mythology in which elves and trolls woo or abduct mortals. The mystagogues and occultists of the eighteenth century reverted to the old indigenous belief that the demons who joined themselves carnally to mortals were actually elemental spirits. "In the latter half of the eighteenth century," Anatole France tells us, "much was spoken of sylphs and salamanders, elves, gnomes, and gnomides. They are born with souls as perishable as their bodies, and they acquire immortality by commerce with the magi. . . . Demons are no other than sylphs and salamanders. They are in truth beautiful and benevolent. . . . The angels whom Enoch shows us allying themselves to women in amorous intercourse are sylphs and salamanders" (*la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* 1893). The reader will recall in this connection Fouqué's *Undine* (1811), which is based on this belief in an amorous alliance between an elemental spirit and a man. It is the story of a beautiful water-fairy, who has no soul and who can obtain a soul only by marrying a mortal. But she gains with this soul all human sorrows. Her husband is unfaithful to her, and she kisses him dead.

The apocryphal Book of Enoch, in its elaboration of the biblical account of a union between the sons of God and the daughters of men (Gen. vi. 1-4), fully admits the possibility of physical relations between celestial and terrestrial beings. The Talmud teaches that the angels who forsook the choir-stalls of heaven for the love-beds of earth received corporeal forms so that they could be carnally joined to mortal women. The demons who descended from these fallen angels inherited the bodies of their parents, and therefore could continue seeking the company of the daughters of men. Other demons, who, in Talmudic tradition, formed a part of the six days' creation, received no corporeal forms because they were fashioned toward the end of the sixth day when the Lord was in a hurry to finish his work in order to avoid desecrating the holy Sabbath. These evil spirits, nevertheless, in the opinion of the rabbis, could avail themselves of human senses and passions by nestling in the hearts of human beings.[1] In Christian mythology, the cohabitation between ethereal and material beings offered no difficulty. The demons, although possessing no bodies, could borrow human forms whenever they wished to join themselves to mortals in amorous union.

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* *

Medieval superstition knew of a species of demons whose special mission was to seek carnal relations with mortals. They appeared either in the form of men or of women and were consequently called *incubi* and *succubi*. The *incubus* (Latin term for the English expression "lie on") was a demon in the form of a man who haunted women in their sleep, and the *succubus* (Latin term for the English expression "lie under") was a demon in woman's guise who visited men in their dreams. The Church put its full faith in this popular superstition and persecuted all who confessed having had such carnal connections. Medieval monks and nuns stood in holy terror of these lustful demons. The French novelist, Joris-Karl Huysmans, humorously calls these imps of hell "ecclesiastical microbes," since they chiefly tormented holy men and women in the monasteries and convents.

The belief in *incubi* and *succubi* was prevalent in all European countries. Witches and wizards openly avowed their relations with these demons. Cæsarius of Heisterbach, in his *Dialogus magnus visionarum et miraculorum* (thirteenth century), records several manifestations of *incubi* and *succubi*.[2]

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[1] Cf. Moncure Daniel Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (2 vols., 3rd ed., New York, 1889), II, 94.

[2] On the belief in the *incubus*, see the chapter "Die gespenstische Buhlschaft" in Erasmus Francisci's *Der höllische Proteus* (2nd ed., 1695). Professor

The delusion of these diabolical paramours did not end with the Middle Ages, that dark period of human history. It has continued to this day, especially in Catholic countries. This fact need not surprise us at all. For the Catholic, this belief, as any other belief, has been fixed *ne varietur* by the Church. Thus, in 1861, the Abbé Lecanu, writing a history of Satan, began with these words:

> "In the matter of beliefs, we must return to those of the fifteenth century; we set forth this aphorism right at the beginning, in order that those who do not feel themselves in agreement with us may not waste their time by reading us."

Father Sinistrari, of Ameno, living in the seventeenth century, gives, in his learned work on *Demoniality or, Incubi and Succubi,*[3] long and detailed accounts of these demons who assume human forms for the purpose of indulging in the vices of men. An English priest, the Reverend Father Montague Summers, who has recently brought out a critical edition of Sinistrari's work, fully shares, in this "enlightened" century, the belief in this medieval *incubus*-delusion.

In all fairness, however, it should be added that the belief in *incubi* and *succubi* is not now generally held by the Catholic priests. Anatole France, in *les Opinions de Jérôme Coignard* (1893), puts doubts into the mouth of his spokesman with regard to this medieval superstition. He has this liberal priest say:

> "It is not written in the Fathers that the Devil begets children on poor girls. All these tales of Satanic lust are disgusting imaginings, and it is a disgrace that Jesuits and Dominicans have written about them."

The psychological basis for this belief in evil spirits who visited human beings in their sleep is sufficiently clear to any person who is even superficially acquainted with the modern theory of sex-repression and the working of the subconscious mind during our sleep. Reginald Scot, as early as the sixteenth century, explained

George Lyman Kittredge, in his *Witchcraft in Old and New England* (1928), also has a long chapter on this subject. An interesting legend of a *succubus* will be found in E. L. Linton's *Witch Stories Collected from Scotland and England* (London, 1861).

[3] The original Latin manuscript of Sinistrari's book was discovered in 1872. It was translated into French in 1875 and into English four years later. A new English translation from the Latin, accompanied by an introduction and notes, was issued, in 1927, in London.

the common belief of his day in *incubi* and *succubi* on physiological grounds, by assuming "some euyll humour" in the mortal's physical constitution. His contemporary, Johann Schenck, a Rhenish physician, explained the *incubus* delusion as the obstruction of the vessels which connect the spleen to the stomach by the thickening of the melancholic juices, which are converted into black bile.

The medieval belief in *incubi* and *succubi* has been frequently employed in works of fiction. Balzac has treated the *succubus motif* in his story *le Succube* (1833), which tells of the tragic fate of a beautiful woman, believed by her contemporaries to be a demon who charmed men in order to lead them to their ruin. Zulma, the Mauritian, had been brought to France from Africa by gypsies and left as a young girl in a church of Tours to fill the place of a statue of the Virgin Mary which they had carried off. The priest of the church baptized her and placed her in a convent; but when she grew up, her Oriental blood asserted itself, and she yearned for the world. After having escaped from the convent with the aid of a priest, who first taught her to sin, she sank lower and lower until she menaced the morals of the town. She was accused of luring men to sin by supernatural means, condemned and sentenced to death. Joséphin Péladan's novel, *la Victoire du mari* (1889), is an interesting modern handling of the old *incubus* delusion.

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The amorous ability of the Devil himself has been doubted on theological grounds by many demonologists. Inasmuch as Satan's fall, according to tradition, was the result of his pride and envy, it has been taken for granted that an incapacity for admiration or affection was the chief characteristic of the fallen angel. Théophile Gautier, in his essay on Baudelaire (1868), clearly states that "the distinguishing feature of Satan is that he is incapable of admiration or love." In Byron's *Cain* (1821), Lucifer mocks and gibes all through, not only at love of God, but at all human love, at Cain's love for Adah and for his children, at his affection for Adam and for Abel. Moreover, misogyny is generally included in misanthropy. His hatred of woman necessarily must form a part of the arch-enemy's hatred of all mankind. Furthermore, Satan's aversion to woman is probably even greater than his enmity to man. The war between woman and the Devil dates back to the days in Eden when Satan used Eve as a tool to accomplish the fall of man, and when in revenge the Lord gave the woman the power to crush the serpent's head (Gen. iii. 15). This biblical story has justified many demonologists in affirming that dislike for the fair sex is a distinctly diabolical trait.

Certain demonologists, wishing to offer a reconciliation between the Catholic conception of the character and conduct of Satan and the popular superstition about the Fiend's fondness for the fair sex, in this respect distinguish between the Devil and his demons. Satan himself, they maintain, has no room in his heart for any affection. The rest of the demons, however, having followed their leader, in his rebellion, out of devotion to him, are not safe against the wiles of women.

The belief in Satan's sensuality presents, however, a greater difficulty from the psychological point of view. The consistency of the character of the Tempter demands his unsusceptibility to the charms of the beautiful sex. For he is certainly a poor general who depends for victory on a certain weakness of his enemy which is also his own weakness.

These objections can be answered by calling attention to the fact that Satan, in paying court to the fair daughters of this earth, need not have his heart in the affair; and, not unlike many a mortal man, he merely pretends that he has an affection for his victims. Neither is it necessary to infer from Satan's relations to mortal women that he has sexual desires. He may in such instances act only as the tempter to sin without himself feeling any emotions. In fact, the frigidity of the Fiend has been well established by tradition. The medieval witches who confessed to having had carnal connections with the Devil complained of the bitter coldness of their diabolical lover. Very remarkably unanimous on this particular are the confessions of all the witches of every country.

European folk-lore contains many instances in support of the belief that the Devil himself did not disdain dallying with the fair daughters of Eve. The strategy of Satan in his relations with the beautiful sex was simple and infallible. When he wished to dominate a woman, he first took from her her virginity. It seems that, after this first sacrifice, she could refuse him nothing more and became his very obedient slave. In his efforts to obtain the soul of a woman, Satan would not shrink from any sacrifice. For a woman this *cavaliere servente* was willing to perform any sort of service, no matter how menial, if he had hope of winning her in the end. (In this respect, Satan is again not unlike many a mortal man.) But the Devil was often duped out of his due. There is a story of a Portuguese courtesan named Lupa, whom Satan served as a waiting-maid for several years, deeming this one soul worth such long and patient labor. But she died, in spite of all this trouble, repentant and sanctified, with St. Francis and St. Anthony mounting guard at her bedside.

Satan, as this tale shows, did not limit his attentions to virtuous girls, but even courted women of loose morals. He seemed, however, to prefer to pay his devotions to married women for the reason that adultery is a greater sin than unchastity, and his aim was always high. Anatole France, speaking from the viewpoint of the credulous common folk, assures us, in his already mentioned work, *la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque*, that in former times the demons "used to take a hand in domestic life in a far more intimate fashion than they do today." One of the tricks, in which the Devil indulged on his amorous adventures, was to impersonate some man of spotless character in order to besmirch his name. "Occasionally," writes Lecky, "with a still more refined malice, the Evil One assumed the appearance of some noted divine, in order to bring discredit upon his character; and an astonished maiden saw, prostrate at her feet, the form of one she knew to be a bishop, and whom she believed to be a saint."[4] Satan's power of impersonation was so great that women often gave birth to children that in miniature perfectly resembled the parish priest.

Apart from the ambiguity of such philoprogenitiveness, the procreative ability of the Devil has, however, often been called by Protestants into question, although Luther formally declared that the Devil, as the antithesis of the Deity, could beget children by virgins.[5] The Old Testament, figuratively of course, speaks of the sons and daughters of Belial, and the New Testament of the children of the Devil (Acts xiii, 10; 1 John iii, 10). Sir Thomas Browne emphasized Satan's sterility. "I could believe," said he, "that spirits use with man the act of carnality, and that in both sexes; . . . yet in both, without the possibility of generation" (*Religio Medici*, 1642). Balzac likewise affirms that the Devil "copulates but doth not engender." It is probably because he lacks children that Lucifer complains in Byron's *Cain* (1821), "My brotherhood's with those who have no children."

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[4] Wm. E. H. Lecky: *A History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, 2 vols., London, 1865.

[5] Consult on this question Schubart's learned Latin treatise, *De potentia Diaboli in sensus hominum* (1748).

Many demonologists hold the belief that the offspring of demons can only assume the form of animals. "When a demon fathers a child," says Anatole France, in his already twice mentioned work, *la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque*, "it takes the shape of an animal." Others assert that the children of demons can only be demons or some other uncanny creatures. According to the belief of German country folk, elves are the offspring of demons and witches.[5a] Still others maintain that the child of a demon comes into the world only in the form of a physical monster.

Hoffmann's story, "Der Teufel in Berlin" (in *Die Serapions-Brüder*, 1819-1821, has for its subject the birth of a devil-baby. Satan, however, is not the physical father of the child born to a high Prussian commercial dignitary. In this tale, it was the impression made by the Devil upon the woman during her pregnancy that produced this monster to the great consternation of his parents.

The green monster in Gérard de Nerval's story, "le Diable vert" (1849), owes its deformity to still less material causes. In the French author's story, at a police sergeant's wedding-feast, the groom drinks the wine from a bottle found in a fantastic cellar, although he knows that this liquor is possessed of the Devil. Nine months afterwards his wife gives birth to a monster who is as green as the seal of the bottle emptied by the father on the occasion of his wedding. All efforts on the part of the parents to change the color of the child's complexion are in vain. The boy remains to the day of his death just as he was at his birth, a green monster. For this reason, the author explains, it is customary among Frenchmen to send each other to the green devil—*au diable vert*.[6]

The turning-point in Hoffmann's famous work, *Die Elixiere des Teufels* (1815), comes with the birth of a demon-child, who, in this case, is the product of a demon-mother and a human father. This story goes back to the days of the Thebaid, at which period a certain saint obtains an elixir from the Devil. This fatal phial is later brought from the Egyptian wilderness to Europe and, after many centuries, it falls into the hands of a painter and pupil of Leonardo da Vinci, an Italian prince, who drinks it and is fired with infernal aims and ambitions. He produces amazing paintings, commits a series of atrocious crimes, and finally consummates an unlawful union with a diabolical phantom, by whom a son is born to him. At the sight of this monster, the father is seized with the most agonizing feelings of remorse. He is suffered to purchase his pardon, however, on condition that he shall continue to do penance as a wanderer on the face of the earth until the race to which he has given origin shall die out in virtuous atonement. That end must focus in the person of some descendant whose sanctity shall be as remarkable as was the original depravity of his cursed ancestor. This consummation comes in the eighteenth century in the person of Brother Medardus, who is the custodian of this elixir in a monastery in East Prussia. He also drinks it and is led to quit the cloister and commit numerous and atrocious crimes. But he repents in the end and thus brings about not only his own salvation but also that of his wandering ancestor.

[5a] In A. Petőfi's poem, "Schwert und Kette," the chain as symbol of slavery is the child of Satan and of a witch.

[6] For the correct explanation of this expression, see Littré's *Dictionnaire de la langue française*. 5 vols. Paris, 1863-77.

The belief in a devil-baby has survived to this day among the backward peoples of Europe, as may be seen from a news item, printed in the New York World of February 18, 1920, about the birth of a devil in Russia.

This belief has even been transplanted to our own country. Miss Jane Addams, in an article printed in the *American Journal of Sociology,* of July, 1914, tells of the vivid interest of many old Italian women in the story of the supposed birth of a devil-baby in Chicago.[7]

The tradition of a child sprung from the union of a demon-father and a human mother was confused in the popular mind with the belief in a demon-baby placed in the bed of a lying-in woman. The demons, in imitation of the elves, were often supposed to substitute a child of their own for the human baby, which was therefore called a changeling. Thus in certain parts of France, we are informed by Victor Hugo in *les Travailleurs de la mer* (1866), the child from the union between a demon and a human mother was called *cambion,* which is the equivalent of our "changeling."

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[7] This story has been revised and reprinted in the *Atlantic Classics,* 2nd series, Boston, 1910.

Not all the sons of Satan, however, bear in their faces the mark of their diabolical descent. The "Mark of the Beast" in the children would defeat the aim of their father, who, in bringing these imps into the world, wished to promote through them in a more efficacious manner the work of hell on earth.

Many historical persons are believed to be of diabolical descent. The false prophet Bar-Jesus is called by St. Paul "child of the Devil" (Acts xiii. 10). Merlin the Wizard was, according to medieval legend, the son of a demon or an arch-*incubus* and a nun.[8] He was to undo on earth the work of Jesus, but instead turned from his father to Christ. It was Merlin, Satan's own son—for such is the irony of mythology—who helped Parsifal recover the largest of all diamonds, dropped from the crown of Satan as he fell from heaven, out of which, according to legend, the Holy Grail was fashioned.[9]

Robert the Devil, who also had Satan as his progenitor, did not follow in his father's footsteps, either.[10] On the other hand, Ezzelino, the tyrant of Padua (in Albert Mussato's *Eccelinus*), another son of Satan, lived as was befitting his procreation. Mohammed and Pope Sylvester II were also considered children of demons. Luther and Dr. Faustus were in the Roman Catholic eyes twin sons of the Devil. Voltaire was also held by his enemies to be of diabolical descent. It was even rumored that Satan (Eblis in the Koran) was the real father of Cain, whom Eve passed off on her unsuspecting husband. The medieval sect of the Cainites worshipped Cain as the son of Satan. The Catholics formerly believed that all Freemasons were the fruit of Eve's adultery with the Serpent.

Whole families, peoples and races were popularly believed to be of diabolical descent. The Jews taught that all other races descended from the demons, while the other races believed that all Jews had horns. To the Greeks the Scythian race was of diabolical origin. According to Cæsarius of Heisterbach, the "fortissima gens Hunnorum" was descended from outcast Gothic women and *incubi dæmones.* All the kings of Britain down to the present day are alleged by Cæsarius to be the descendants of a *mater phantastica.* This credulous writer supports the belief expressed in English metrical romances that Richard Cœur de Lion had a demon mother, who flew off through the roof of the church when King Henry tried to detain her at the moment of the elevation of the host.[11]

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[8] According to the belief of the eighteenth-century occultists, as expressed in Anatole France's *la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* Merlin was not the son of a demon but of a sylph, who had intercourse with his mother. On Merlin's diabolical descent, see also the chapter "The Devil-Compact in Tradition and Belief" of the present work, note 23.

[9] Geoffrey of Monmouth, in his adaptation of Nennius' *Historia britonum* (ninth century), brought the Marvelous Merlin into Arthurian romance and Robert de Borron, in a poem dating from the thirteenth century, connected the old Welsh enchanter with the legend of the Holy Grail. See F. Lot, "Etudes sur Merlin," *Annales de Bretagne,* XV (1900).

[10] A résumé of Balzac's lyrical analysis of Meyerbeer's opera, *Robert le Diable* (1831), will be found in the present writer's article, "Balzac and the Fantastic," *Sewanee Review,* XXXIII (1925), 2-24. On Robert the Devil's diabolic descent, see also the chapter "The Devil-Compact in Tradition and Belief" of the present work, note 27.

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The *motif* of the demon lover plays a prominent part in the legends and literatures of all European countries. Many writers recall the fancy conceived by the fiends of hell for the fair daughters of this earth. The anatomically melancholy Burton tells of an evil spirit who was smitten with a mortal maiden. Walter Scott, in his *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border* (1802), retells the old medieval legend of the dæmon lover.[12]

This legend of the dæmon lover has also been treated by Bürger in his "Lenore" (1774). In this Ballad, the Devil appears on horseback at midnight beneath the window of Lenore in the form of her lover William, who fought at the side of King Frederick at the battle of Prague and died on that occasion, and calls her to ride with him to their bridal bed.

The French fantastic writer, Jacques Cazotte, in his romance, *le Diable amoureux* (1772), tells the story of Beelzebub, who, having taken the form of a fair young woman, conceived a passion for an earth-born man. This work is so important as the first specimen of French fantastic fiction that we offer a lengthy summary of its unusually interesting subject-matter.[13]

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[11] See George L. Kittredge, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-7.

[12] Cf. Franz Hartmann: "The doctrine of the Demon-Lover," *Borderland,* III (1896), 353-8.

[13] The synopsis of this story has been written after the résumé given by Edward Yardley in his book: *The Supernatural in Romantic Fiction,* London, 1880. Cazotte's romance has been translated several times into English under the title *The Devil in Love.* The first English translation appeared in London in 1793, and the second translation followed seven years later. An English

In this work, a young Spanish gentleman named Alvarez is the speaker throughout the story, and relates the adventures as happening to himself. He is a captain in the guard of the King of Naples, and among his brother officers is one named Soberano who is a cabalist, or, in other words, a man versed in Hebrew necromancy. He is skilled in the science of transmuting metals and enslaving the elemental spirits. Alvarez burns with the desire to communicate with the spirits, and presses Soberano to give him at once the means of doing so. Soberano intimates that, to accomplish his desire without danger to himself, he should first pass through some long term of probation. But the impatience of Alvarez will not permit him to wait. He declares that nothing, however terrible, can shake his resolution, and that he would pull the ears of the biggest devil in hell. Seeing him thus resolved, Soberano lets him have his way. They dine together, in company with two friends of Soberano, who are also cabalists, and then set out to the ruins of Portici. Proceeding through the ruins, they arrive at a vault, in which Soberano inscribes a magic circle. He instructs Alvarez to enter the circle and pronounce certain words, calling out three times the name of Beelzebub. He then withdraws with his companions. Alvarez, left to himself, pronounces the words, and calls on the Devil, according to his instructions. Hardly has he done so, when a window opens opposite to him at the top of the vault, a torrent of light, more dazzling than that of day, bursts through the opening, the head of a camel huge and horrible, with ears of enormous size, shows itself at the window and cries out: *Che vuoi?* Alvarez sustains his courage and orders the phantom to appear under another form. Thereupon the camel vomits a white spaniel, with ears sweeping the ground, and vanishes. As Alvarez makes a movement to pull the spaniel's ears, it throws itself on its back, and he perceives that it is a female. The dog, or rather bitch, afterwards appears in the form of a beautiful woman, to whom Alvarez gives the name of Biondetta. She, submissive, and to all appearance passionately attached to her master, does all in her power to form with him the closest connection. Alvarez, although by no means insensible to her fascinations, is somewhat alarmed at the prospect

version also appeared in Boston in 1830. An illustrated edition of this romance was published again in Boston in 1925. It was also turned into an opera by Saint-Georges and Mazilliers and produced at the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane in 1843. A Spanish translation of Cazotte's work (*El Diablo enamorado*) appeared in Gibraltar in 1890.

of thus giving himself utterly to the Devil. She, however, deceitfully maintains that she is not the camel that appeared to him in the first instance, but that she is a sylphide, who, having fallen in love with him and assumed the form of a woman, is now doomed to continue this existence. As a compromise, he proposes marriage, but she naturally shrinks from anything so proper, and redoubles her efforts to seduce him. At last she is successful, and then the following conversation and scene take place.

> "With a voice, to whose sweetness no music could be compared, she said:
>
> " 'Have I made the happiness of my Alvarez, as he has made mine? But no; I am still the only happy one; he shall be so; I will intoxicate him with pleasure; I will fill him with knowledge; I will raise him to the summit of greatness. Wilt thou, beloved, be the most privileged of creatures, and rule with me over mankind, over the elements, over all nature?'
>
> " 'Oh, dear Biondetta,' I said, 'thou art sufficient for me; thou fulfillest all the desires of my heart.'
>
> " 'No! no!' she said quickly, 'Biondetta is not sufficient for thee; that is not my name; it flattered me; I bore it with pleasure; but it is necessary that thou shouldst know who I am. I am the Devil, my dear Alvarez, I am the Devil.'
>
> "She pronounced this word with an accent of enchanting sweetness.
>
> " 'Cease,' I said, 'my dear Biondetta, or whosoever thou mayst be, to pronounce that fatal name, and recall to me a mistake long since abjured.'
>
> " 'No, my dear Alvarez, no, it was not a mistake; I was obliged to make thee believe so, my pet. It was necessary to deceive thee in order to make thee reasonable. Thou seest I am not so black as I am represented to be.'
>
> "This badinage disconcerted me.
>
> " 'But answer then,' she said.
>
> " 'And what shall I answer?'
>
> " 'Ingrate, place thy hand on the heart that adores thee; let a little of the delicious fire that burns in my veins be infused into thine; soften, if thou canst, the sound of that voice, so fit to inspire love, which thou usest only to terrify my timid soul; say to me, but with all the tenderness that I feel for thee, "My dear Beelzebub, I adore thee." '
>
> "At this fatal name, though so tenderly pronounced, a mortal terror seized me; stupor and astonishment crushed my soul. She did not give me time to recover myself and

> reflect on my folly. Without perceptibly altering the tone of her voice, she continued:
>
> "'Thou camest to seek me; I have followed thee, served thee, assisted thee, and have fulfilled all thy wishes. I desired possession of thee, and, in order that I should obtain it, it was necessary that thou shouldst abandon thyself freely to me. Henceforth, Alvarez, our union is indissoluble, but it is important for us to know each other. As I already know thee by heart, in order to make the advantage reciprocal, I must show myself to thee as I really am.'
>
> "I had no time to reflect on this singular harangue. I heard a sharp hissing at my side. . . . I turned my eyes, Instead of the ravishing figure, what did I see? Oh! Heaven! it was the frightful head of the camel. It articulated with a voice of thunder the gloomy *Che vuoi!* which had so terrified me before, burst into a fit of human laughter more dreadful still and put out a monstrous tongue."

In Vigny's poem, "Eloa" (1823), the Devil's Dulcinea is not an ordinary mortal, but an angel, for there are women among the angels, at least so the poets tell us. This woman angel, who abandons heaven in order to dwell with the Devil in hell, is no other than the daughter of Christ. Eloa has sprung from a tear shed by Jesus over the tomb of Lazarus and was transformed by the Lord into an angel of the beautiful sex. The mission of this woman angel is to console the disconsolate, to love the afflicted. She is the celestial original of those mortal women who devote themselves to suffering creatures, degraded and guilty, whom they endeavor to raise and redeem.

In heavenly conversation with her brother angels, Eloa happens to hear with horror the story of the fallen angels, and, far from feeling any antipathy toward her wayward brothers, she is stimulated to aid them in their affliction. Eloa is no longer happy in the perfumed groves, amid which the angels wander, but yearns to descend into the abyss to bring consolation to her condemned co-angels. She feels that the angels of heaven do not need her sympathy because they are all happy. Among the children of men there are indeed many unhappy, but among the fallen angels there are some who are still more unhappy; and the angel most in need of her sympathy is Satan himself. In her opinion, Satan as "the most culpable must also be the most unfortunate of all the unfortunates."

Eloa feels that, if she could but find this great culprit, she would comfort him and perhaps even lead him back to righteousness.

Tormented with this thought, Eloa vacates her celestial dwelling to go in search of the exiled archangel. One day, as she is winging her way in the solitudes of the sky, she encounters an angel of brilliant beauty and seducitive melancholy. Without telling her who he is, the Devil ensnares the fair angel with his personal charms and eloquent speeches of sweet sensuality. The unsophisticated maiden from heaven listens to the bland words of the Arch-Deceiver, is won by his hypocritical tears and finally sinks into his arms. Not knowing who he is, she loves him. Angel as she is, she is also a woman. Her compassion is thus rewarded by falling passionately in love with the banished archangel and resigning herself to his fatal power. Mephitopheles awakened aversion in Margaret, Ada felt pity for Lucifer, in Eloa this pity changes into love. It is her pity for the poor Devil that brings about the undoing of this maiden angel. "The Catholic priests," remarked Anatole France apropos of this poem. in his essay on Alfred de Vigny (1868), "who have acquired such a sure knowledge of the human heart, are right in saying that pity is a dangerous sentiment." Born on this earth, Margaret contributes to the redemption of Faust, but the heavenly daughter of Christ, the angel Eloa, forfeiting forever the delights of heaven, falls into the arms of the king of darkness. Unsuccessful in her efforts to lift the Devil to heaven, she consents to be dragged down by him to hell. Wrapped in a flowing cloud, the two pass together down to hell; and a chorus of faithful seraphim, winging their way back to heaven, overhear this latest and fatal dialogue:

"Où me conduisez-vous, bel ange?—Viens toujours.
—Que votre voix est triste, et quel sombre discours!
N'est-ce pas Éloa qui soulève ta chaîne?
J'ai cru t'avoir sauvé.—Non, c'est moi qui t'entraîne.
—Si nous sommes unis, peu m'importe en quel lieu!
Nomme-moi donc encore ou ta Sœur ou ton Dieu!
—J'enlève mon esclave et je tiens ma victime.
—Tu paraissais si bon! Oh! qu'ai-je fait?—Un crime.
—Seras-tu plus heureux? du moins, est-tu content?
—Plus triste que jamais.—Qui donc es-tu?—Satan."

The Devil's greatest *passion de cœur,* however, was for a Georgian girl, who sought refuge from demoniac love in a convent and died there. Lermontov, in his poem, *The Demon* (written in the years 1829-1841), depicts the Devil as suffering from boredom and seeking happiness in a woman's love. He has broken with earth and heaven and looks with contempt upon all who are moved by petty passions. An exile from paradise and a hater of human virtues, he has known these petty passions and despises them with all his superiority. He flies over the earth and contemplates the actions of men with contempt. He is weary of everything. Mankind has become corrupt and no longer offers any opposition when he tempts them. Hatred is predominant in his heart, and he has nothing but scorn for whatever he sees.

But Tamara, the daughter of Gudal, a Caucasian chief, is about to be married to the Lord of Sinodal. She spends the evening preceding her wedding, dancing and singing with her girl friends. This girl is so pure and lovely that she would arouse noble thoughts even in the Demon, and make him long for his lost paradise, if he chanced to see her. The Demon does see her, and he loves her. In order to prevent the marriage of Tamara to another, he tempts the Lord of Sinodal, who is riding to the wedding at the head of a gay cavalcade, to travel more swiftly through a dangerous mountain-pass, where he is attacked by robbers and slain. The horse of the groom arrives at Gudal's castle with the dead rider on its back. The Demon appears to Tamara in her dreams, as she lies on the bridal bed, after she has fallen asleep exhausted from the tears shed over her dead lover, and urges her to grieve no more for one who is now past help, but to open her heart to a love greater than that of any mortal.

Tamara, seeking a way to protect herself against the visits of the Demon and hoping to find consolation in religion for the loss of her lover, begs her father to permit her to enter a convent. But even in her sacred cell she can find no peace or safety. Her new lover is but a phantom. She prays and weeps before her crucifix but receives no comfort. In all her dreams the Demon appears and begs for her love. The Demon, after long hesitation, finally ventures into the convent in person. He is confronted by a seraph, Tamara's guardian angel, who, with a flaming sword in his hand, wishes to bar the door for the Demon. Exulting in his great power, however, the Demon tells the angel that the latter's efforts to protect Tamara are all too late, for he is in love with her, and nothing can now keep him from her. Angry words are exchanged, and the seraph, believing Tamara to be hopelessly lost, leaves her. The feeble light in Tamara's cell grows dim and finally is wholly extinguished, as the Demon enters. He makes known his identity to Tamara and speaks words of passionate love. He tells her that he has loved her from eternity, and that she will have his love to the end of eternity. He begs her to love him and bring happiness to his wounded heart. He will give her what she has never dreamed of, though both must remain in hell. He offers her treasures untold and declares that he will even make her queen of the world. So eager is he to win her love that he expresses his desire for reform and his wish to be allowed to believe again in the power of goodness. He tells her that her love will redeem him to the heaven and happiness which he has forfeited. With all his powers of persuasion he tries to win her love, only to be rebuked. In the end, however, Tamara is overcome with pity and tells the Demon that if his words are sincere, he must vow that from now on he will turn from all thoughts of evil and lead a good life. So great is his love for the mortal maiden that solemnly he finally swears to molest mankind no longer and to ask pardon and mercy from his Maker.

Touched by his promise and his expressed desire for forgiveness, Tamara can no longer refuse the Demon, and permits him to take her in his arms and impress a kiss on her virginal lips. The Demon thus enjoys a brief moment of triumph. But Tamara, from fear of him, loses her reason and dies in agony. The sentry on duty hears a scream of pain and passes on. The Demon confronts the angel who is bearing her to heaven and claims the soul of the woman he loved. The angel, however, replies that God has already judged her and forgiven her because she loved and suffered. The gates of Paradise are open to Tamara, but the Demon remains alone as before, isolated and dissatisfied "without hope and without love."

The German poet, Friedrich Hebbel, in his poem, "Die Braut des Teufels" (1836), treats an interesting old legend, which tries to account for the name Die Jungfrau (The Virgin) given to one of the Swiss Alps. According to this legend, there once lived in Switzerland a beautiful and proud young maiden, who was in no way inclined to yield to the gentle passion of love. Many youths came from far and near to woo her, but all failed to awaken any emotion in her heart. On a certain midnight, a young man in dark clothes knocked on her window. So great was the potent charm which the Devil exercised over her that tremblingly she admitted him into her chamber, as if he were her husband. He clasped her in his thin arms and stole kiss upon kiss. She wept, but, as if she were bound hand and foot, she could not resist. He proceeded to the last enjoyment, but still she did not utter the least sound of protest. When he had accomplished his evil deed, he said to her mockingly, "Good night, good night, thou art the Devil's bride." From shame, the young maiden climbed to the highest peak of the Alps, which has been named after her.[14]

Edward Garnett, in "Madam Lucifer" (1888), tells of a real infatuation on the part of the ruler of Gehenna for a slip of a girl. Lucifer falls head over heels in love with an earth-born maiden, named Adeliza. In order to win her, he dispatches her human lover to hell and assumes his form. The ruse, however, is discovered by the girl, and the discomfited Devil is forced to return to his Luciferetta in hell.

The belief in the wooing of mortal women by demons exists still today among the peasants of Ireland, as may be seen from the following anecdotes entitled "The Devil" (1892) by William Butler Yeats:

> "My old Mayo woman told me one day that something very bad had come down the road and gone into the house opposite, and though she would not say what it was, I knew quite well. Another day she told me of two friends of hers who had been made love to by one whom they believed to be the Devil. One of them was standing by the road-side when he came by on horseback, and asked her to mount up behind him, and go riding. When she would not, he vanished. The other was out on the road late at night waiting for her young man, when something came flapping and rolling along the road up to her feet. It had the likeness of a newspaper, and presently it flapped up into her face, and she knew by the size of it that it was the *Irish Times*. All of a sudden it changed into a young man, who asked her to go walking with him. She would not, and he vanished.
>
> "I know of an old man too, on the slopes of Ben Bulben, who found the Devil ringing a bell under his bed, and he went off and stole the chapel bell and rang him out. It may be that this, like the others, was not the Devil at all,

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[14] On Hebbel's interest in the Devil, see the present writer's article, "Der Teufel bei Hebbel," *Modern Philology*, XV (1917), 109-22, and P. Sickel, "Hebbel und das Dämonische," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Bildung*, Bd. V, Heft II (1929).

> but some poor wood spirit whose cloven feet had got him into trouble."[15]

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* *

European folk-lore records few instances in which the Devil sought a mortal maiden in marriage. In Fred B. Perkins' "Devil-Puzzlers" (1871), the demon Apollyon appears as a bachelor. "I have a mother, but no wife," he tells the charming Mrs. Hicok. "Permit me to say," this gallant demon, however, adds with a graceful bow, "that, if I could believe there was a duplicate of yourself in existence, I would be married as soon as possible." This was, however, a meaningless compliment. The Devil has never had any serious intention of getting married. It stands to reason that Satan, who can see sufficiently into future matrimonial complications, would not enter the bonds. Moreover, why should he encumber himself with a wife of his own, while so many husbands, as Fernán Caballero has so aptly said, are daily supplicating him to take theirs off their hands?

The French Romantic poet, Edouard d'Anglemont, however, represents Lucifer consenting to lead a poor young girl, whom he has seduced, to the altar in order to save her from shame. In the poem "Marie" (1829), based on a Breton legend, a young girl sees in her dreams a young man who is so wonderfully beautiful that, upon awakening, she still cannot get him out of her mind. Her dream soon turns into reality. The man of her dreams appears to her in flesh and blood. He is no other than the fallen angel in person. Marie, who finds no strength in her to resist his sweet words of seduction, offers herself to him body and soul. When she realizes that she is soon to become a mother, she implores her lover to marry her. The Devil consents out of pity for his victim. He approaches the altar, however, without making the sign of the cross. This omission deeply chagrins the pious young girl. When the priest, holding the consecrated wedding-ring, asks the groom for his name, the latter in lieu of an answer assumes his proper shape. Marie flees at this sight and goes mad from fright.

In most legends, however, it is the Devil, who, in his attempts to marry mortal maidens, is worsted in the deal. An Italian tradition shows Satan, seized suddenly with a wish to know what it means to be married, successively leading three sisters to the altar. But he proves in the end to be no match for the cunning of his several spouses.[16]

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[15] Among the latest novels relating the loves of the demons may be mentioned J. W. Brodie-Innes's *The Devil's Mistress.*

The Spanish woman novelist, Fernán Caballero, in her adaptation of an old Andalusian legend entitled "The Devil's Mother-in-Law" (1859), tells how the Devil, with all his reputation for wisdom, meets a mother-in-law, who knows more than he does. He is just as helpless against this marital appendage as most married men. An old widow "uglier than the sergeant of Utrera" and nicknamed Mother Holofernes, curses her daughter. The latter, too much occupied with matrimonial plans to help her mother in her work, is consigned to marry the Devil himself. The Evil One, availing himself of the right given him by the anathema launched against the girl by her mother, presents himself as an aspirant for the maiden's hand and is accepted. But Mother Holofernes, in her shrewdness, discovers the identity of the red-haired and mild-mannered young man, and devises in her head a cruel plan of revenge. After the wedding has been duly performed and celebrated and the bridal pair is preparing to enter the nuptial chamber, the old lady presents her daughter with a consecrated olive branch, with which she is told to beat her husband as an indication of a woman's mastery over man. The Devil, at the sight of this holy object, wishes to make a hasty retreat. As the doors and windows are locked, he slips through the key-hole, only to find himself caught in a black bottle, which is held by his mother-in-law on the other side of the door. The Fiend is carried in the phial to a secluded spot on the summit of the highest mountain and remains imprisoned for ten years, when he is finally released by a soldier under conditions which he considers undignified and cruelly oppressive.[17]

Niccolò Machiavelli, the Italian statesman, pictures the demon Belphegor entering the bonds of matrimony as a sociological experiment. The story *Belfagor* opens in the infernal regions. Almost every man whom Charon ferries across complains that his wife was responsible for his downfall. The judges in hell are perplexed. They wish to be fair in pronouncing their sentences upon the sinful men, and finally decide to send a demon to discover whether women really have the power to lead men to their ruin. Belphegor is delegated to go up to the earth, stay there ten years, and come back and report. The mission of the infernal deputy's terrestrial sojourn is to marry a mortal maiden and learn by personal experiences what are the respective conveniences and inconveniences of holy matrimony. But the demon's earthly career is cut short, and he abandons this earth before he has served the full term of his apprenticeship. He cannot support the asperities of the temper of the lady, who has made the earth a hotter hell for him than the place from which he came. He deserts her and runs back to hell as fast as he can.[18]

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[16] This tale "How the Devil Married Three Sisters" will be found in Thomas Frederick Crane's *Italian Popular Tales,* London, 1885.

[17] This story will be found in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (New York: Knopf, 1921).

Machiavelli is said to have written several tales, but only his *Belfagor* has survived to our days. The Accademia della Crusca, which set no very great store by Machiavelli's productions, made an exception of *Belfagor* and placed it in the canon of Italian classics.

This story is of medieval origin, and is not based on the author's married life. The idea of the story is ingenious and contains many entertaining incidents. It was first printed by Giovanni Brevio in 1545, and appeared for the second time with the name of Machiavelli in 1549, twenty-two years after the death of the author of *The Prince.* The two writers did not borrow from each other, but had a common source in a medieval Latin manuscript which seems to have first fallen into the hands of the Italians, but was later brought to France where it has been lost. The tale of the marriage of the Devil appeared in several other Italian versions during the sixteenth century. Among the Italian novelists, who retold it for the benefit of their married friends, may be mentioned Giovan-Francesco Straparola, Francesco Sansovino, and Gabriel Chappuys.

In England, this story was no less popular. Barnabe Riche inserted it in 1581 in his collection of narratives. This version was the starting-point of a great number of dramatizations. We will but mention *Grim the Collier of Croydon or, The Devil and his Dame* by Haughton and Henslowe (1602); *Machiavel and the Devil* by Daborne and Henslowe (1613); *The Devil is an Ass* by Ben Jonson (1616); and *Belphagor or, The Marriage of the Devil* (1690). The story, *The Divell a Married Man* (1674), which is a skit upon marriage, has likewise Machiavelli's *novella* for its basis.

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[18] This tale will also be found in the collection of *Devil Stories* mentioned in the preceding note.

In France, this story was translated in 1664 and rendered into verse by LaFontaine in 1694, and in Germany it served the Nuremberg cobbler-poet Hans Sachs as the subject for his farce *How the Devil Took to Himself an Old Wife* (1557).[19]

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[19] In Achim von Arnim's *Halle und Jerusalem* (1811), the sexton reveals himself as the Devil, and carries off Celinde's mother to be his bride.—The *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, XLV (1899), 128, contains an interesting Negro story of the Devil and his bride.—Mrs. Margaret Townsend published, in 1905, a very interesting play entitled *The Devil in Search of a Wife,* which is a satirical skit on the women of New York.

OCCIDENTAL MARTHA

BY LLOYD MORRIS

THE fundamental disparity between the Occidental and Oriental races is their respective qualities of mind. The former is objective and pragmatic; the latter, subjective and rational. The one, introspectively exercised with the interpretation of spiritual reactions to phenomena, starts with God; comes deductively to phenomena; and, returning in upon itself, effloresces in spiritual sublimations. The other, concerned with phenomena as they affect material being, essays by induction to dislodge an Oriental Creator from an elaborated Occidental Paradise, and elevate itself to the godhead of a suspicioned mechanical universe.

The material expressions of these differing reactions of consciousness are correspondingly dissimilar. Upon their polarities of the abstract and the concrete have been superimposed two social systems—the introvert organization of the East having its zenith in the Sermon on The Mount; and its nadir in the products of an inconsequential attitude towards physical life; and the extrovert civilization of the West having its highest expression in sanitation; and its lowest in penitentiary ethics, a ballot box intelligentsia, and the psychological confusions comprising the christianity of Christendom.

These extremes of sociological development are quite a normal expression of the consciousnesses from which they rise. It is logical that the Orient seeing the spiritual as the only reality and truth, should condemn ephemeral materialities and the physical sequences of filth and disease and suffering thereby incurred. To Eastern thought, human life and relations present themselves as without any sanctity: mere shadows of infinity incapable in themselves of hurt; soilable with impunity. The human race itself is seen as no glorious acme of a supernal creation central and all-dominant to a servitor universe, and mystically to be conserved in eternity of type to a prime necessity.

It is equally logical that the West worshipping the concrete should glorify physical being; and, regarding the Infinite myopically, either fail to perceive it, or deny its spiritual content in an attempt to measure it by material standards. To Western thought the Human Race is sacrosanct and eternal; the cosmically revered apex of a finished creation. It is beyond the orbit of Occidental apprehension to conceive Humanity a failure; or that equivalents or superiorities might be substituted for it; and that somewhere between evolutionary sea and evolutionary shore the Cosmic Purpose took a wrong turning; and reorienting itself went on; leaving the Human Race as excreta of a Divine Necessity pursuing its further aliment in an eighth day.

It is obvious that of necessity the great religions of the world originated and came to flower and perfume in the Orient. It is equally apparent that of necessity they would come to decay on their importation into the West; where the Occidental mind treating them as phenomena, reduced their spiritual reality;—at the best, to philosophy and metaphysics; at the worst, to the vulgar inanities of evangelism. The word and deed teachings of the Syrian Christ became mere raw material at the ports of entry of the West which erupted factories in the form of theological seminaries for processing the crude Asian product into academic pabulum; theocratic hierarchies; and the volume production of an evangelistic proletariat grafting and paying graft to a Supreme Being whose largest implication in christian doctrine and ritual, invests the Christian God with the attributes of a Celestial Traffic Cop. The manufacture of the Christ into Christianity for home consumption and reexport, is today one of the major Occidental industries; possessing in the Roman Communion the strongest and oldest of Trades Union.

It is obvious that of necessity the employment of poison gas in the high concernment of warfare; the exploitation of the atom; hospitalization; chivalry; eleemosynary coordination and plumbing originated in the Occident. It is equally apparent that upon their full importation into the Orient they will result in—What? some future Liao Yang?

Between states of mind so opposite there can be no sympathy of understanding; even though or because they share a degraded likeness that exhibits the pure and simple precepts of religious founders as no more pure, no longer simple, but overlain by doctrine and dogma to the point of obscurity; warped by prejudice and fanatacism to travesty; brought into disrepute by the conduct of their fiducary interest; and their simple, beautiful spirituality reduced to dialectical scholasticism, degenerate superstition and lugubrious sentimentalities.

For each others material expressions, also, neither can have the kindly tolerance that flows from the accord of charity. Their nearest approach to outward similitude is the sundering difference of manner in which each purposes to lure God from the skies by repetitive liturgies; and imprison Him in barbaric temples or, with mouldy ancestral bones, pompous vestments, and such other indica of Christianity housed in ecclesiastical edifices of tawdry brick and iron Bethels, decomposing stone Minsters, and imposing cathedrals whose flamboyant heaven-aspiring architecture rises above jerry-built and scamped foundations.

Though temple bells call never so sweetly in Asian lands; though turbaned heads be prostrate in their millions at prayer; these things of worshipful devotion do but advertise a benighted, uncivilized heathendom to the superior Occident; which is stimulated to redress by missionary enterprise the balance of spiritual obligations incurred in the past. Clerical bagmen, however, drumming out of the West with their samples of sectarian religion have failed to "put it over." High pressure methods applied in the form of military force challenging the poor heathen at the cannon's mouth with a stentorian, "civilize, civilize," have been equally unproductive —except for repulsive statuary commemorating successful robberies under arms. The Druses are still Druses in their Hauran; the Moslem still usher in the dawn with the significant ending to the clarion call, "Muhammad al Akhbar; the Brahmin still is disdainful; the Buddhist indifferent; the Hindu malevolent; the Confucian contemptuous of the manner and matter of the products of Western theological factories and secular accomplishments.

Where ideal is opposed to ideal, judgment lies arbitrarily in the accepted point of view, and Truth perhaps in some transcendental arbiter who, looking upon the diversities comprising human effort, sees none of greater delusion than another. Therefore, seeing that they of the East and they of the West have each their grovelled being with no orientation beneath the stars, it is matter for small wonderment that their appraisal of each other can only be distorted and provocative of controversey; and their own self-criticism either prejudiced to sightless worthlessness, or blatantly hypocritical.

The unutilitarian Orient spectacularly castigated in its material being by physical improvidences, denies its sores. The Occident with its braggadocio criterion of bank balances, number and luxuriousness of automobiles, political influence, astuteness of legal spoliation, and every other pretentious vulgarity and applauded baseness whereby the suffrage of Occidental approbation is canvassed and gained—it, with hypocritical smirks and flatted eyelid, disclaims its own self-chosen touchstone of externalities; protests to neutral criticism that the standard of Western comity is not material, nor its glory in phenomena; denies that the seamless white robe of the Christ has become the imperial purple of Christendom; with more of mortal crimson than cerulean blue in its tatterdemalion patchwork.

Quasi historically we have the eminent authority of Jesus of Nazareth sustaining the Oriental viewpoint in his discrimination between the characters of Martha and Mary. Under that Oriental ruling Oriental Mary has *hitherto* chosen the better part; and Occidental Martha lies under the rebuke of nourishing inferior ideals.

Contemporaneuosly we have the self-styled dominant European peoples declining to accept the rebuke of its professed spiritual ideal, and being primly censorious of Sister Mary. In this attitude Christendom in sober fact rams the lie down the throat of its Christ.

While the superiority of differing ideals is matter of opinion, their expression in conduct is matter of fact; and the disparity between profession and performance is a measurable quantity of pragmatically successful hypocrisy, or honest failure, susceptible of graphical representation.

To be true, however, the factual picture of any cross-section of sociological phenomena must extend to all the facts as they are *in situ*. There must be no selectivity nor composition; and the medium employed must have the necessary field of vision and present no distortion of image; and, though in sight of the Absolute there may be naught but delusion, yet for finity's sake there must be laid down some plane of reference; in order to establish a comparative value in addition to an evaluation of intrinsic worth.

It is when such critical standards are applied to the West's judgments of the East, that the unsoundness of Occidental picturization of the Orient emerges; and no more completely does it become manifest than in the book, *Mother India;* whose status as a best seller entitles it to be considered the accredited champion of Western ideals.

When the authoress of *Mother India,* representative of the foremost Western nation and herself completely progressive, set out to view India, it was *sine qua non* she would employ for her examination only the highest and most up to date methods of Occidental devising. What was the medium through which she scrutinized the lined linaments of aged India? Was it a spiritual eye that vivified with lively delight the vision of a civilization already compassed when the loins from which the authoress sprung were naked to gaze or dressed in raw pelts? Was it a spiritual ear whose convolutions perpepuated in a replication of sweet sounds the song of the *Bhagavad Gita?* Was it a votive mouth to intone in praise the everlasting harmonies of Vedic hymns? It was none of these. In metaphorical epitome it was a length of sewer pipe.

Normally at the end of a sewer pipe one expects to find sewage—the book, *Mother India* found it. Normally at the end of a sewer pipe one does not expect to find a quintessence of spirituality or philosophy, but a well known public utility. The *Mother India* book found neither; and as the pipe was perfectly designed and fabricated, and of course perfectly manipulated, obviously Mother India was naught but the foulest of foul old hags.

No other portraiture was logically possible from the view point taken; and if demand be any indication of majority opinion, we are to accept the *Mother India* technique as the acme of Occidental skill and vision of artistry *where the Orient is the subject.*

Whatever of our sublunary life be viewed through material values, material values alone will appear in the field of observation; and material values are the accredited resources the West knows and has at its command. Man however does not live by obstetrics, feminism, social statics, eugenics, and main drainage alone; he may die of them; and under Oriental eyes the West may appear as worse than dead—putrescent. For if the Orient apply its ideals as a standard in a critical survey of the West; then as equally distorted a portrait will result as did that of the Orient under Western limning.

East and West should each be judged according to its own standards, and the result given in terms of defection from their respective ideals. But the West declares there is only one standard —that of the West. Oriental Mary therefore must spy out Occidental Martha in Martha's own fashion; and in doing so an image considerably more dubious than *Mother India* comes into view.

In a little green island in the west appear bold clear outlines of little grey homes where the ubiquitous hog shares the peat fire with its human companions; and the sprightly cock waking among the smoke blackened rafters greets the dawning of the day with a shrill clarion but never a "gardy loo;" Kathaleen ni Houlahan is seen obviously no winsome colleen with emerald green skirts and dear grey eyes, beneath brows and lashes smeared on as with a sooty finger; but as a wrinkled old crone; dirty and given over to leprechauns, bogles, a low bred intolerant priest caste, assassins and corner boys.

In Scandinavia we get as a decaying custom of the country the unabashed tubbing of male guests by serving maids; and pre-martial sexual relations esteemed a superior bridal asset over mere virginity.

Slavonic Europe becomes nationalized atheism; and the Latins synonymous with erotic libertinage, illiteracy, dirtiness, ignorant priesthood, and religious proscriptions.

The Commonwealth of Australia running true to Botany Bay form intrudes upon the eye as an impudent repudiator of state borrowed moneys. The Dominion of Canada assumes prominence as a confiscator of private railway property; a manipulator of audits; and the gestured expositor of national independence and equality which it condescends to permit the Mother Country to pay for in the shape of naval and military protection: just as the little dog full of valiance beneath the belly of the big fellow, dins dogdom with yelping asseverations of its tykedom.

England with its slums, its Protestant illiberality, its sottish lower classes, and its imperial rapacities for territorial aggrandisements, is seen yielding her dark eminence in all these aspects to the United States of America.

Founded in religion and starting with a virgin land, this great nation is exhibited to day as an international spectacle of political and moral corruption; dominated by a debauched Press, big business, and a cynically nefarious administration of Law. Its cities are heard resounding to the clamor of the scions of Brian Boru, contending with the descendants of noble Romans, the glory that was Greece and the débris that was Poland; for the possession of city halls; the exclusive right to assassinate policemen; and follow the gainful occupation of peddling poisioned liquor, narcotics, venerally diseased prostitutes and abducted virgins.

Its self-vaunted states of southern gentlemen strut across the scene in character of flippantly bilking payment of their foreign borrowings, like any common sneak-thief.

From breaking solemn and sacred treaties entered into with its Indian wards; and embezzling their estate; the historic panorama of the United States of America's idealistic integration moves sturdily on from mere shystering misfeasance to the ampler aspect of an international fence purchasing territories it knew to have clouded titles; and continuing its career of humble abnegation to the assumption of its majestic orbit of an imperialism so thinly veiled under hypocritical explanations as to be insulting to the most ordinary intelligence.

This is the West as it appears when viewed after the manner the book, *Mother India* viewed the Orient. Is it a right picture? Most certainly it is not; because it is not the whole picture. Nor was the book, *Mother India* the whole picture; yet the Orient was condemned by it with an unreserved opprobrium; the image depicted was accepted a good and faithful portraiture and the mirror reflecting it, a good and true glass. Then, will the Occident acknowledge its own image as reflected in that same glass of sociological fashion, as good and faithful portraiture also? With an unanimity equal to its own large approval of the book, *Mother India*, it will deny in its own case the truth of the glass. Only when turned towards the Orient does the derogative effect of Western perception obtain. Directed upon itself, it lapses into a vacant stare; or estatic contemplation: habitude of its own stercoraceous self, transmuting its unsavoriness into aureate excellence.

The book, *Mother India*, was intended as a condemnation of the Orient. Little logic, however, is required to see that in effect it is, also, a mirror wherein the West is reflected in all its essential grossness and hypocricy. It is the most cruel and brutal *expose* of Occidentalism of modern times.

If such thing as neutrality could be within the compass of our Finite days; what could be its utterance when pondering upon these twain East and West. Until the last decade the Orient was as it was when the Christ walked beside the Gallilean sea; and the Buddha sat under the Bo Tree; Lao Tsze passed through the Western Gate; and Muhammad came down from Mount Hira in the dawning, and raising his hairy throat, pealed up to the paling stars the scarlet cry of Islam that has come down through the centuries. The Sermon on the Mount; the Noble Eight Fold Path; the Tao Teh King, and the Fatthah were uttered by men who lived, moved and had their being in an environment exactly as depicted in *Mother India today*—an environment of caste prejudices, child marriages, female chattelage, septic obstetrics, no main drainage, and the poverty and disease which the founder of Christianity ruled of no moment in comparison with things of the Spirit.

Has the West out of its sanitized ideals ever produced men such as these founders of religions in the East—the Eastern Garden of thought which *Mother India* finds so lamentably revolting? Among all the effigies that disfigure Western concourses, is there one commemorating a character worthy to stand beside Jesus of Nazareth, or Gotama, Confucius? Instead we lay wreaths of immortelles in adulation before Light Horse Harrys, Iron Dukes, Stonewall Generals, cabbages and Kings.

Out of the East; the insanitary East—Divine Man. Out of the sterilized West—machine gun politics; bribery, graft, perjury in high places and low; a progressive spectacle of murders, suicides, deaths by starvation of women and children; rape, sodomy, sadism, incest nymphomania, satyriasis, lesbianism; nude sons of coal black mammys burnt alive at the stake, while blonde Occidental misses jump hysterically round the *auto da fé* and pump lead into the shrieking bodies; millions of men staring up to the sky, their trailing guts gnawed by rats paddling in the red pudding of brain oozing through eyeless sockets; priests of Christendom blessing the lethal weapons that tore out men's bellies, blew the faces off boys of fourteen; sent them to gibber in psychopthic wards; broke mothers' hearts, and damned to biological abnormality fatherless whelps of human infancy littered before their time; Sicilian Vespers, Saint Barthelomews, Bloody Marys, weltered shambles on Albigensian mountains, New England Witches, Covenanting cruelties, Puritan infernalities—but no Rig Veda, Upanishads, or Buddha; no Christ: only the East, the despised uncivilized East, has these.

It has, also, the Suttee; but the suttee has at least the sanction of a religious ideal. What sanction has lynching, and white misses participating in the game and play of barbecued nigger? It has the purdah system; but it has not a tithe of the sodomy and incest and other unnatural sexual intercourse practised by Occidental men and women. The purdah and child marriage have at least the sanction of a revered moral custom; what sanction has the promiscuous and fugitive coitus which sends high school girls with easy nonchalance from the co-ed class room to the secret temple of parturition; or to the quack medicine man who with equal readiness will guarantee an abortion, or a cure for their venereally infected vagina? It has its caste system which is no less justifiable than the color line which provides Jim Crow cars, and easy alibis for Nordic pugilists; or which separates the local four hundred in any city from the mere *hoi polloi.*

Matters of opinion inevitably become matters of circumstance. Yesterday's theorizings, today's applied practice; and today's pleasant academic contentions, tomorrow's furious physical tensions.

Between Occidental Martha and Oriental Mary, time and space no longer intervene. Yesterday is yesterday, and today is here in which the West having rendered time and space feudatory, the two civilizations approach direct confrontation; and demonstration will soon be made—not which is the better or truer; but which, if either, will prevail.

The West proclaims its own offence, sweetness; or denies, or sustains it as an Occidental prerogative. But the East must first be debauched with Western liquor; infected with Western disease, and then—cleaned up. Mr. Roosevelt out of his grest erudition and large experience of governing Oriental Races said so. Legions of other uniformable persons demand the East be—cleaned up. The authoress of, *Mother India,* out of her large knowledge of the immemorial East demands that India be—cleaned up. Crime, beastliness, cruelty, obscenity are to be the peculiar prerogative of the West; but the environment that produced and nourished the great religions must be abolished and Western atmosphere substituted. What will arise out of that?

The Orient is no fool. It has no lack of brain power; but in the past that great mentality has been absorbed in abstractions. It has been spent in producing Christs, Buddhas, Zoroasters and other spiritual leaders of the world. What will it produce when it is westernized?—some Asiatic Napoleon; some antipodal Attila who shall be a scourge among the smoking ruins of Western pride?

The East is becoming pragmatic and political. The bulwarks of subjectivism which protected its spirituality are disintegrating. The most sure and imposing sign of this are sporadic outbreaks of apparent religious revivals; and an apparent intensification of faith-jealousy. In this it is but paralleling the illustrious spectacle of Christendom whose facile declension from ideals is measurable by the amount of its remove from the still small voice to Boanerges. The still small voice is that tenuous echo from the Sermon on the Mount preached by an Oriental carpenter. Boanerges—well, you all do know Boanerges.

Failing and isolated voices in the Orient protest loud and shrill and earnestly against the decay and degradation of their faiths through admission into them of disintegrating heresies in the guise of broadening and vivifying movements; allegedly purposive of bringing them up to date and in line with modern conditions.

Here and there active Luthers emerge and strive to stay the weakening of the East's defence against Occidentalism: strive by reforming their faiths of intruding laxities, and bringing them back to an earlier purity—you fools! you dear Asiatic fools! can your Gotama, or the Book Quran teach you to weld and forge munitions of war equal to those of Christendom? Keep quiet! the Occident is forging that which you may presently paddle in Western blood as you did under the walls of Acre; as you did when man to man, breast to breast, courage to courage, thew to thew the Moslem rolled back the Paladins of Europe; chased the boasted chivalry of Frank and Hun in hacked confusion from the Mediterranean littoral to the lush plains of central France.

Invariably the zeal of these reformers brings them into collision with the material sovereignity carried aloft on Occidental bayonets; and in due season the zealots are suitably disposed of; either by the displayed might of the Western Power involved; or indirectly by their co-religionists suborned or coerced thereto by Western gold and Western tutelage.

The Senussi and Medani with their heads Sayed Ahmed and

Sheikh Omar Zaffar were scattered at Girba for impinging on British Western sovereignity; and today for one religious reformer in the East, there are ten million political rebels.

In the Nejd, Ibn Saud's political itch has been somewhat controlled by bribery which has been appraised at a figure much less than the cost of military coercion. In India the bribes so far offered Ghandi are insufficient in amount and unacceptable in quality. Turkey de-haremed, de-fezed, de-yashmaked, and altogether sartorially and caligraphically made over, is only implementing what several years ago a "Young Turk" member of the old C. U. P., expressed to the writer as their aim. Egypt too is only fulfilling carefully nourished aims often listened to a decade and a half since in ill-famed bazaars east of Suez. "Egypt," said the brilliant editor of a native paper, "Egypt did not care where the Califate was, or whether there was one at all; didn't care whether there was a Sultan in the Yildiz or a Khedive in the Kasr el Nil; but Egypt most emphatically did care that Egypt and the Sudan should be ruled by Egyptians."

The East is changing; it is being sanatized, Occidentalized Politicalized; and those fulsome publicists who have made a life long study of the Oriental question—in their libraries; those authorities who have studied it on the spot –as shepherded tourists, or in a year or two of residence; and all other Christian people may do well to stop, look, listen.

The Orient is learning the Art of Warfare. The nations of the West are teaching it that by demonstrations of its principles on each other; and by exercise of them in operations of territorial aggrandizement against the Orient itself.

Reluctantly, but with augmented sophistication the Orient is accepting Occidental tutelage; for as yet it knows that the swords of Christendom are sharper than those tempered in the Tigris, Nile, Brahmaputra, or Yangtse Kiang; that Woolwich, Krupp, and Creuzot artillery are more effective than any cast in Kabul or Anatolia; and that the cadet of St. Cyr, Sandhurst or West Point can organize volume production of human slaughter in a manner superior to the despised Asiatic.

But what will be the picture when Occidental generals can no more be heroically victorious at long range with their accomplished artillery against the man to man steel effectiveness of Asian armies?

What will it be when the East is letter-perfect in Occidentalism? when it has gun for gun? when it fully recognizes the mighty preeminence of the doctrines of Christendom as inspiration for rapine, pillage and the sublimation of materiality? and denying the immanent sterilities of its own Asian Christs, Eastern brains and Eastern men, which History displays as at least equal those of the West, organize warfare instead of spirituality?

In that day when once again the pot seethes and the scum rises to be skimmed by agents of God appointed—in that day will the West hypocritical and cowardly, lay hold on the horns of the Altar and cry, "Sanctuary, Sanctuary!" let us lay down our weapons, and abolish this unchristianity that is warfare!"

Christianity! what do you know of Christianity, Martha? Did Peter give you any? he was an obstinate man; and denied with scathing the promise to sit at the right hand in the Kingdom, he has built himself a temple and sits as God in the Vatican. Did Paul give you any? Paul the renegade Jew lawyer was ambitious and casuistical; and so enthroned in metaphysics he sits on a joint stool with Georgius Rex; and calls himself the Lord Spiritual.

Christianity died with the Christ; and so far is Christendom away from it, that if the Founder returned today Christendom in all its maze of warring sects would join as one to crucify Him for blasphemous imposture.

From President to parasite; Queen to scullery-maid, is there one among you who would not suborn in some particular, Justice for pelf or its equivalent in office or fame? Is there a woman who would not barter her virginity for adequate equivalent in chiffons, a jewel or their like in material worth?

Out of your own mouth you are condemned, Martha, by your own saying that every man has his price. And you, the immaculate, the superior, the Occidental Martha, have it on your conscience to make over Oriental Mary!

Send then, your drummers with plumbing specialities; your lobbied legislators with their flouted enactments; your sectarian bagmen with their samples of religion; your debauched police; discredited bench and bar; your out of work naval and military officers broken in your Christian wars—send them until a vision be seen of the World enthroned on poison gas, and the Sermon on the Mount crowned with a water-closet.

In that day will the West assume the discarded garments of the

East? Will some munition monger's son arise in the marts of the West to proclaim himself the forerunner of another to come the latchet of whose shoes he is not worthy to unloose? Will a dove be seen descending upon some Plumber's son beside Occidental waters; who will lift up this reeling world from the sewer to the spirit? Can any good come out of the cannon's mouth and sanitation? Will there come out of Occidental inductiveness an Occidental Christ who will lead us to a new and Occidental God? Or, at some final confrontation of the West and the Westernized East, will the Human Race perish from the earth and creation enter on its eighth day?

CARL SANDBURG: AN AMERICAN HOMER

BY J. V. NASH

IN Carl Sandburg, the striving and struggling humanity of America's plains and farms and cities has found an inspired literary voice. He has gathered up the inchoate folk-lore of that which Whitman called "These States," and has given it form and permanency in our literature. He is the poet of the rough and toiling masses, of the workers who lift the steel of the skyscraper and who drive the long, straight furrows through the black soil of the prairies. His language is their language; it springs directly from human emotions, as free from all artificial veneer and bookish allusiveness as is that of Homer. He pours forth the native, spontaneous speech of the people who live close to earth and to life's realities, as he has learned it in his own intimate contact with them.

There is an epic sweep to much of Sandburg's verse which tells us that here is a man of heroic mold. He is best explained by the factors of heredity and environment that have made him what he is. As his name suggests, he is of Scandinavian ancestry, descended from those hard-living, two-fisted, giant-framed berserkers of the North, who roved the seas, to Iceland, to Greenland, to mysterious Vinland, and who carved out kingdoms in France, in England, in Sicily, and in Russia. He is of the tribe of Leif the Lucky, Erick the Red, Norman William, and Rurik.

Along with the Scandinavian blood, there is, as he himself fancies, a strain of the dreaming, brooding, mystic Asiatic. "My father was a dark Swede," he tells us. "He had dark hair and brown eyes, and came from Asposoken, in the north of Sweden. I flatter myself sometimes in thinking that maybe somewhere back in my history there may be a Mongol or one of those old Asiatics. I have a sense for fantasy that runs through the Nordic folk-lore, but I do not have the Oriental's sense for plot."

His affinity with both the city and the country is perhaps explained by the fact that he was born in Galesburg, Illinois, a city on the edge of the great prairies. The date of his birth was January 6, 1878, when the memories of the Civil War were yet fresh, and pioneer conditions still prevailed in much of the midwestern country. Sandburg's father toiled in a railroad blacksmith shop, and his mother became prematurely aged through the struggles which she endured in their life of poverty.

"His boyhood," says Sandburg's intimate friend and former coworker on the Chicago *Daily News,* Harry Hansen, "was filled with harsh episodes, with meagre schooling, with little room for self-improvement. He worked hard, tried all sorts of jobs; the hours were long; the work unremitting. The fight for sustenance left deep scars on his sensitive nature."

At thirteen years of age, we find Sandburg driving a milk-wagon in Galesburg; a little later he was a porter in a barber shop, and after that he worked in a brick-yard. Then he decided to take Horace Greeley's advice and "go west." His journey was not made in a Pullman car, but largely by freight and "riding the rods." In Kansas he labored in the harvest fields, taking away souvenirs of the job in the form of blisters and callouses on hands and feet. Afterwards, he was employed as a dishwasher for hotels in Kansas City, Omaha, and Denver. At another time, with a pot of black asphaltum and a brush in his hand, he went from house to house, painting stoves in payment for his meals.

Such experiences, from which a person of more fastidious tastes would have revolted in disgust, furnished Sandburg with rich materials for the poetry of later years.

Returning from his *Wanderjähre,* he took up again his job on the milk-wagon route in Galesburg for a time; then he became apprenticed to the trade of house painter. By now, it was the year 1898. He was just twenty years old as the war with Spain began to loom on the horizon. Such an opportunity for fresh adventure, of course, proved irresistible. He joined the Sixth Illinois Infantry, which was sent to Porto Rico.

This experience, remote as it seemed from literary pursuits, proved to be the means of placing his feet on the pathway to authorship. For, while serving in the army, he fell in with a young fellow who had attended Lombard College, at Galesburg, and whose talk was all about college. A desire for the schooling which had been denied to young Sandburg now came upon him wtih powerful appeal; and, on his return to Galesburg, he managed to matriculate as a special student at Lombard. He was never a regular student, and so was not graduated; but in later years Lombard conferred upon him an honorary degree.

He began now to read books, his interests ranging over a wide field but centering largely in biography. A yearning to write had, even in the old milk-wagon days, been surging subconsciously within him and doubtless was an impelling factor in steering him toward college. At Lombard he met a sympathetic instructor in the person of Philip Green Wright, who taught English, mathematics, and astronomy, and who took a fatherly interest in struggling youths with literary aspirations. He it was who first sensed the unborn poet in Carl Sandburg.

Professor Wright encouraged Sandburg and two other congenial fellows to form a little society called "The Poor Writers' Club." The members met on Sunday afternoons at Wright's home, read each other's productions, and exchanged criticism and commendation. It was through Wright's kindly aid that Sandburg's first book, a slender and now long forgotten volume of poems, paperbound and entitled *In Reckless Ecstasy,* found publication. It was printed by the Asgard Press, at Galesburg, in 1904.

After leaving college, Sandburg again drifted about the country, enriching his experience all the time. He was a traveling salesman for Underwood and Underwood, the commercial photographers. Later he entered newspaper work in Milwaukee, where he was destined to meet his wife-to-be. On June 15, 1908, he was married there to Miss Lillian Steichen.

Then came Sandburg's brief experience in the political field. In 1910, Emil Seidel, a Socialist, was elected Mayor of Milwaukee. He made Sandburg his secretary. Two years in this position gave Sandburg a first-hand knowledge of practical politics in a big city: he mingled with all the diverse types of men who throng about, and do business with, the City Hall—ward committeemen, aldermen, labor leaders, and what not.

Then Chicago called to Sandburg. He secured a position with *System* Magazine, writing trenchant articles on factory management and various phases of the industrial process. One day he met N. D. Cochran, a leader in the struggle for clean government and social justice, who was just then establishing a tabloid newspaper called *The Daybook.* Sandburg joined the new venture with enthusiasm; but the newspaper, which carried no advertising and lacked adequate financial support, speedily languished and was discontinued. The big guns were now barking, across the Atlantic; popular interest centered in the European War.

Once more out of employment—it was by this time 1917—Sandburg thought of Henry Justin Smith, news editor of the great *Daily News,* whose acquaintance he had already formed. Smith immediately offered Sandburg a berth on the staff of that metropolitan afternoon paper. His connection with the *News* has continued ever since, except for an interval in 1918, when he made an extended trip through the Scandinavian countries under the auspices of the Newspaper Enterprise Association. While abroad, he formed first-hand contacts with the Old World background, historical and social as well as political, which greatly broadened his outlook. He wrote numerous articles on conditions in the countries which he visited.

Sandburg's extraordinary familiarity with industrial matters and his sympathetic understanding of the workers' point of view made him especially valuable as a writer on labor topics. "Strikes, lockouts, boycotts," as Hansen puts it, "were his daily fare; he listened to the grievances of teamsters and garment workers; he heard labor leaders at their daily counsels and discussed 'the men' with employers. From day to day he followed the fortunes of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America in their bitter but successful battle for recognition and justice in Chicago. For three years he attended conventions of the American Federation of Labor." For a time, too, he served as motion-picture critic for the *Daily News,* raising this new form of criticism to a high level and giving it a distinctive tone quite different from that of the "blurbs" which had been accepted as the norm in this field.

It was the impact of Chicago upon the sensitive soul of Sandburg that brought forth his first book of poems after he reached maturity. The volume was entitled *Chicago Poems* (Henry Holt & Co., 1915). In these poems he presents the various human types that are to be found in the great capital of the Middle West—"the hog butcher of the world," as he sees the city in one of its aspects,

> "Laughing the stormy, husky, brawling laughter of Youth,
> half-naked, sweating, proud to be Hog Butcher, Tool
> Maker, Stacker of Wheat, Player with Railroads, and

Freight Handler to the Nation."

Here we meet, as we turn the pages, workers of every stripe—peddlers, factory hands, shovel wielders, icemen, cash girls, roustabouts, and "pigstickers."

Next came *Cornhuskers,* Sandburg's second book of poems (Holt, 1918). Now he turns from the city to the wide prairies and memories of his vagabonding days:

"O prairie mother, I am one of your boys.
I have loved the prairie as a man with a heart shot full
of pain over love.
Here I know I will hanker after nothing so much as one
more sunrise or a sky moon of fire doubled to a river
moon of water."

In *Smoke and Steel* (Harcourt, 1920), the scene shifts again to the city, with excursions back to the country, and reminiscences of his trip abroad.

Then, in *Slabs of the Sunburnt West* (Harcourt, 1922), the country and the city mingle together.

Through these years of observation and writing, Sandburg has been shedding the bitterness of earlier days and growing broader and mellower. Only a cynic would attribute the change to the author's increasing material prosperity under the capitalistic system. A better clew may be found in the old saying—of Montaigne, I believe—"to understand everything is to forgive everything."

Sandburg's books of poetry, by the way, were never composed deliberately, "with malice aforethought." It is said that he had a wire basket on his desk in the newspaper office. At the close of a busy day, he would sit there musing over the events of that day. Then, seizing his pencil, he would jot down some lines of verse and throw them into the basket. After a sufficient quantity had accumulated, he would gather them up, study them, work over and expand them; thus his great poems were born.

In "The Windy City," one of the poems in *Slabs of the Sunburnt West,"* Sandburg incarnates, in appropriately heterogeneous verses, the spirit of the great, sprawling, roaring, striving, windy metropolis that he loves so well—Chicago.

"Winds of the Windy City,
Winds of corn and sea blue,
Spring wind white and fighting winter gray,
Come home here—they nickname a city for you.

"The wind of the lake shore waits and wanders.
The heave of the shore wind hunches the sand piles.
The winkers of the morning stars count out cities and
forget the numbers."

"It is one of the most revealing epics of the city ever written," thinks Hansen. "It tells its story pictorially, historically, emotionally—a story by sights, sounds, and smells. There is in it something of the broad-shouldered swagger, the braggadocio, that was once more generally characteristic of Chicago than it is now. There is in it the voice of the city, expressed in its buildings and in its people, in its achievements and in its vile oppressions. There is in it the note of change, of constant upheaval and turmoil. . ."

On the other hand, when in the right mood, Sandburg can be delicately tender and idealistic, as in "Lost" and "Under the Harvest Moon."

At times, in Sandburg's poetry, the Whitman note sounds out unmistakably, as in the following lines from "Prairie," the first poem in *Cornhuskers*:

"I speak of new cities and new people.
I tell you the past is a bucket of ashes.
I tell you yesterday is a wind gone down, a sun dropped
in the west.
I tell you there is nothing in the world only an ocean of
to-morrows, a sky of to-morrows."

Like the bards of eld, Carl Sandburg is a singer. In his deep, rich voice he chants, to the accompaniment of his guitar or to a few simple chords on the piano, many of the ballads of our American folk-lore. His voice ranges over but a few notes, and sometimes sounds like a soft crooning, but the total effect is of pure art. And there are those who hope that out of Sandburg's minstrelsy there may one day spring a great American native opera—an opera of Chicago and the open spaces of the prairies, an opera infinitely more vital than most of the tinsel mediaeval importations from Europe.

His speaking voice, too, has unique qualities. "Carl Sandburg's voice," said William B. Owen, late Principal of the Chicago Normal College, "should be perpetuated on records. For like the voice of Tennyson, it is an unforgettable and essential part of his poems." Under the spell of his impressive intonation, his hearers find in Sandburg's verses, formless thought they may be, a beauty and a charm which they had not perceived in them before.

But there is another Sandburg, the Sandburg of the love lyric and of the children's poems. Here he strikes a different note. In the love poems there is a finely restrained sentiment, never rising to extravagant heights, never slopping over; and, in the children's poems, there is genuine participation in the happy spirit of child life.

Then there is Sandburg the story-teller, who first revealed himself in the *Rootabaga Stories*. These exquisite fairy tales Sandburg wrote informally for his own children—"for the kids at home," as he confided to the group of lunch-room cronies to whom he first read some of the stories in manuscript. Publication was an afterthought.

While the *Rootabaga Stories* are fairy tales, they are ones springing out of the modern American environment, just as the older, conventional fairy tales grew out of the fancies of mediaeval European life. Sandburg himself regards them as simple folk-lore yarns—droll stories without the stock trimmings of the ordinary fairy tale. His invention of new, odd words, such as *spanch,* is reminiscent of Lewis Carroll in *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass.*

Last of all, there is Sandburg the historian, revealed in the great historical opus, *Abraham Lincoln; The Prairie Years* (Harcourt, 1926). For all midwestern authors, the saga of Abraham Lincoln seems to possess an irresistible fascination, especially for those who have lived in direct contact with the prairie people among whom Lincoln spent his formative years. As a new and fresh interpretation of the Lincoln of Illinois, this work is an invaluable addition to the great and growing Lincoln literature.

Sandburg dwells in a roomy old house at Elmhurst, on the fringe of Chicago. The building, seventy-odd years old, may have seen Lincoln's tall figure in the days of the great Douglas debates. Out in front, immemorial elms throw a dreamy shade about the place. There he has his den on an upper floor, looking out over a barn. In this retreat he works, surrounded by books overflowing everywhere. There are prints tacked on the walls, and huge metal cans crammed with newspaper clippings from all over the world—odds and ends of information such as the professional author is ever collecting.

So we leave Sandburg, as, now slightly stooping and with graying head, he advances through the years of middle life.

FLORIAN CAJORI

February 28, 1859-August 14, 1930

IN the death of Professor Florian Cajori the world has lost one of the best-known of its recent historians of science, not merely in the domain of mathematics but in the contiguous domains of physics, geodesy, and to a certain extent astronomy.

Not only was he a writer of books, but he was an indefatigable contributor to scientific journals in this country and abroad. The number of these journals and of his monographs is impressive and his numerous articles will long be looked upon as material from which historians will draw.

Born in Switzerland, coming to this country at the age of sixteen, educated at the University of Wisconsin (B. S., 1883) and Johns Hopkins (1884-1885), he began his teaching as assistant professor of mathematics at Tulane University in 1885, continuing at Colorado College (1889-1918). In 1918 he was called to the University of California as professor of the history of mathematics, doubtless the first man in the world to hold this title and be given the privilege of devoting all of his time to the subject. It was a great opportunity and the appointment was fully justified in the twelve active years that remained.

As to his work in these institutions, as to the academic honors bestowed upon him (Ph. D., Tulane, 1894; LL. D., University of Colorado, 1912, and Colorado College, 1913; Sc. D., Wisconsin, 1913), and as to his membership and official positions in various learned societies it is not possible, in the space here allowed, to speak in detail. Suffice it to say that his work was faithfully performed and the honors were worthily bestowed. Standing as the leading historian of mathematics in this country, his loss will be deeply felt by all who knew him, whether personally or through his contributions to the subjects of his major interest.

"The International Journal of Ethics Seeks to Clarify Theory and Improve Practice."--
T. V. Smith, *Associate Editor.*

SOCIAL problems will be separately analyzed in special issues of the *Journal* during 1930. Within the province of this publication lie both the central field of ethical knowledge and practice and the bordering fields of law, politics, economics, literature, and religion. The first of these related topics is Law and the Community.

IN THE APRIL ISSUE—the ethics of law enforcement analyzed.

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TSCHAIKOVSKY'S BLACK BEAST

The Lack of a Definite Philosophy Enhanced His Genius

BY JOHN HEINTZ

"TSCHAIKOVSKY was simply a man with intervals of neurasthenia, not a man with a philosophy of the cosmos," wrote Ernest Newman, in his book, *A Musical Motley.* Which goes to show, I think, that a man may utter a truth without being alive to the real significance of his facts, for while Tschaikovsky was undoubtedly a man with intervals of neurasthenia and he was also without, at least a definite, philosophy of the cosmos, it was precisely his inability to anchor himself to a rock in the shape of a religious belief or philosophic conviction that embittered his life and precipitated those crises which found their emotional outlet in musical utterance. One suspects that Mr. Newman, who does not appear to credit Tschaikovsky's philosophical difficulties with being a source of inspiration, is a better critic of music than of human nature. His labeling of the Russian composer as a "Weary Willie of the Arts," is the natural mental reaction of a healthy-minded individual towards that heterogeneous collection of conflicting emotions which were the bane of Tschaikovsky's existence.

If I grasp the meaning of Mr. Newman's phrase correctly, it is that Tschaikovsky's music can be entirely explained by his natural genius for composition plus a certain amount of nervous instability with its resultant moods. As a surface reason this is a plausible explanation, but anyone who will take the trouble to peruse that voluminous correspondence carried on by the composer which appears in his biography written by his brother, Modeste, must surely come to the conclusion that a deeper reason for some of his music grew out of those very philosophical difficulties which Mr. Newman passes over lightly.

Tschaikovsky was something else besides a neurasthenic composer. He was an educated, polished man of the world; a student of literature and philosophy. Familiar with the works of Tolstoi, Turgenieff, Schopenhauer and others, his interest in philosophy manifested itself in frequent criticisms and discussions of what he had read. His correspondence is full of his views and perplexities, particularly that which he carried on with Mme. von Meck, his friend, confidante and benefactress for a period of almost twenty years.

His letters to her give ample insight into his philosophical difficulties. On Nov. 20, 1877, he wrote her, discussing what he termed, "the skeptic's tragedy:" ". . . You may say what you please, but a faith—not that which proceeds from mere deficiency of reasoning power and is simply a matter of routine—but a faith founded on reason and able to reconcile all misconceptions and contradictions arising from intellectual criticism—such a belief is the supreme happiness. A man who has both intellect and faith (and there are many such) is clad, as it were, in a panoply of armor which can resist all the blows of fate . . . Our sufferings are the same. Your doubts are as strong as mine. We are both adrift in that limitless sea of skepticism, seeking a haven and finding none . . ."

To Tschaikovsky, the skeptic's tragedy, without the shadow of a doubt, was the dread of annihilation. Death to him was what he termed it, "a flat-nosed horror." Familiarity with the writings of the philosophers had caused him to believe, in the thirty-seventh year of his age, "that if there is a future life at all, it is only conceivable in the sense of the indestructibility of matter, in the pantheistic view of the eternity of nature . . . So I have come to the conclusion, as the result of much thinking, that there is no future life."

Had Tschaikovsky been able to rest his case there, had he been able to dismiss the subject with a phlegmatic shrug of the shoulders, it would have been better for his peace of mind, but the world would have been deprived of some of his greatest music. But such an attitude was impossible to the talented Russian's psychological mechanism and we find in his letters that he was eternally at war with the course of nature, continually depressed with the order of things as he deemed them to be. No Epicurean resignation to the inevitable marked his attitude. No Stoical indifference to his fate characterised him. On the contrary, he was in a state of perpetual rebellion against the fact of death, not through sheer love of life like Charles Lamb, but because of an overwhelming dread of personal extinction.

This contemplation and dislike of the idea of annihilation finally became so acute that Tschaikovsky sought a way of escape from it and in 1881 after attending the funeral service of Nicholai Grigorievich, he wrote Mme. von Meck: "My brain is obscured today. How could it be otherwise in the face of those enigmas—death, the aim and meaning of life, its finality or immortality? Therefore the light of faith penetrates my soul more and more. Yes, dear friend, I feel myself increasingly drawn towards this, the one and only shield against every calamity. I am learning to love God, as formerly I did not know how to do . . . I want to believe that there is another life . . ."

However, instinct and feeling are one thing and conviction is another and we may well believe that in a keenly analytical mind like Tschaikovsky's, well read in the skepticism of his time, such a reaction to the solace of religion was but a mere grasping at straws. It is indeed true that three years later, in a letter to Mme. von Meck, he reaffirmed his belief in God as a remedy for the tragic perplexities revealed by Tolstoi in his Confessions, but not more than a month had passed before he had confessed in a letter to Anna Merkling: ". . . At the same time one ought not to fear death. In this respect I cannot boast. I am not sufficiently penetrated by religion to regard death as the beginning of a new life, nor am I sufficiently philosophical to be satisfied with the prospect of annihilation. I envy no one so much as the religious man . . ." Still three years later, writing in his diary, he regrets that he can neither fathom life or drive away those disquieting questions of destiny.

But enough has been quoted here to show that the bete noir of Tschaikovsky's existence was the dread of an endless death. If he ever accepted those teachings of Nihilism, advocated by Herzen and Turgenieff, as some have claimed, I found no warrant for it in his letters. The only time he refers to Nihilism at length is in a letter to Modeste, in which he denounces it severely. Nihilism denounced religion, its doctrines and its ordering of life's affairs, where Tschaikovsky envied the religious man and appreciated the value of religion in allaying the very dreads from which he suffered even though unable, intellectually, to accept its consolations. No. The trouble with Tschaikovsky was not the acceptance of Nihilism but the fact that he was unable to accept anything. His tragedy lay in the fact that he was not made of the stern sort of stuff that his intellectual convictions called for. Philosophic beliefs often demand a tough hide. They require courage to face reality, the inevitable. But Tschaikovsky evidently was not courageous. He was thin-skinned, sensitive, over-imaginative. He was, moreover, immature in a psychological sense, inasmuch as he was constantly bewailing the fact that nature could not give to him that which he craved, and his music is the emotional expression, not of the denials of Nihilism, but of his own personal, poignant grief over his inevitable destiny, his pathetic, futile protests against fate; resignation—yes—but not that of the mature spirit, rather that of helpless, protesting despair.

Turning now to Tschaikovsky's symphonies in search of the emotional expression of his despair the opening measures of the Fourth come to mind. Analysing them in a letter to Mme. von Meck the composer said: "This is Fate, that inevitable force which checks our aspirations towards happiness ere they reach the goal . . . A force which, like the sword of Damocles, hangs perpetually over our heads and is always embittering the soul. This force is inescapable and invincible. There is no other course but to submit and lament . . ."

This explanation, however, was superfluous and unnecessary for the significance of those opening measures is clearly revealed by the music. That significance is surely Fate. No other meaning can possibly be drawn from that ominous and sinister melody. Fate, the listener unerringly recognises it to be. Not the three knocks at the door of Beethoven's masterpiece, but that ever-looming, ever-menacing finale that hides just around the corner in our lives and which inevitably overtakes us. One gets glimpses of the despairing revolt of Tschaikovsky against fate all through his music but it is in his Sixth (Pathetic) symphony that he really unburdened his troubled soul and gave free vent to his irreconcilable spirit.

Referring to this symphony in a letter to his nephew Tschaikovsky said that it was to be "a program symphony with a program which should be a riddle to everyone. May they break their heads over it . . . This program is penetrated by subjective sentiment . . . While composing it in my mind I frequently shed tears . . ." But to the reader of his letters the riddle no longer exists because the message of this symphony is clear and unmistakable. Whether we bring to mind the sinister opening measures for the bassoon, the noble but pathetic protest in the middle section of the first movement which follows that unforgettable melody given to the strings, or the trio in the second movement, of which Phillip Hale remarked, "Death beats the drum," the message of the composer confronts us in its stark and naked realism. As for the Adagio Lamentoso, who is there who can adequately describe his emotional reaction to it? To Vernon Blackburn it is the musical counterpart of Shelley's "Adonais." To James Huneker it is the cosmos draped in crepe. Words simply fail to describe the emotional power of this music which crushes even while it thrills one because words are merely guideposts to emotion. To anyone who has caught the harrowing message of those descending dirges any attempt to write down Tschaikovsky as a mere neurotic appears to be due to a temperamental incapacity for understanding. Possibly this music contains no message for those who habitually dwell upon the sunny side of life. Undoubtedly it is primarily intended for those who live on the ragged edge of existence, those "in-and-outers" whose mental lives are one eternal conflict, those heterogeneous personalities who cannot put their inner house in order.

But whatever may be the reaction of any individual to this symphony there is not the slightest question of a doubt but that the parts of it which I have referred to above are the emotional expression of Tschaikovsky's Black Beast, the eloquent musical outpourings of an agonized spirit lashed into a frenzy of despair by the ever-haunting dread of an eternity of nothingness.

Such a reaction to inexorable destiny is, of course, nothing unusual. The pages of literature teem with it. It is often the price paid to nature for the possession of a keen imagination. Wm. James is a typical example. For years he was tortured by a panicky fear over the uncertainty of life and regarded with amazement his mother, a very cheerful person, who serenely went about the business of living without giving a thought to the possibility of any impending catasthrope. Tschaikovsky's case was simply unique because he combined the dread of the extinction of his personality by death with the capacity for expressing his grief over the fact musically, and that he has done so was as inevitable as that sparks fly upward.

It is possible, of course, to read a larger and more impersonal message into Tschaikovsky's music. His friend, Kashkin, wrote of the Adagio Lamentoso: "If the last movement is intended to be predictive it is surely of things vaster and issues more fatal than are contained in a mere personal apprehension of death—it seems to set the seal of finality on all human hopes." This analysis rings true in the first place because in setting the seal of finality upon his own hopes by his music Tschaikovsky inevitably doomed the rest of humanity along with himself, and in the second place the music is all-embracing in its scope. However this may be true, it is evident, I think, that the wellspring of the Adagio Lamentoso was Tschaikovsky's personal, poignant grief over his own destiny. The man's mind was introspective. His own personal survival was the thing he was interested in. The stark, bleak tragedy of his life was to so ardently long for a future existence and yet to believe that he was denied it by nature. This is the burden of his song in his Pathetic symphony, the last movement of which, for all the critics may say with respect to its musical value, remains the most supreme lament in music.

HUMANIST TRENDS IN MODERN RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

BY CURTIS W. REESE

THE study of trends has come to be regarded as a matter of major importance in the understanding of life processes. Not that there is any less interest in what has been nor in what now is. In fact the past and the present are especially significant in what they indicate to be the direction things are moving. There has perhaps never been a time when more was being done than now to find out what has really happened in the ages past. All the fields of knowledge are being re-investigated by scientific minds equipped with scientific method, technique, and apparatus. Out of the new knowledge thus made available is coming a tentative understanding of how the present has grown out of the past and what historical and current processes indicate for the future.

It would be difficult to overrate the importance of understanding trends. Many persons have wasted their lives, many movements have dissipated their energies in trying to keep alive ideas and programs which the trends of history have relegated to the realm of the "dodo." Lost causes as such may appeal to sacrificial heroism, but hardly to critical intelligence.

Not that we should summarily surrender to undesirable trends, but rather that we should seek to control trends in the direction of desired goals. The limits of control, however, are determined by the facts that give significance to the trends.

When the persons most competent in the several fields of learning begin to modify or rationalize or abandon the things most commonly believed in their fields, we are then in the presence of a condition that obviously calls for study. If these persons, however they may differ among themselves in details, move in a given direction, then a trend is established. Some people will refuse to follow.

Others will grudgingly move a few paces. Still others will pass through three stages; first, they will be in bitter opposition; second, they will say there is nothing new about the trend; and third, they will say that they have always believed in accordance with the trend. But the more courageous and far-seeing will from the very beginning move steadily and surely in the direction of the trend insofar as it appears in harmony with facts and ethical idealism.

Now in basic religious matters the usual dogmatic way of dealing with trends has been not merely to fail to understand them, not merely to ignore them, but to deny positively the very possibility of their existence. The faith "once for all delivered" has admitted of no change. But in spite of this hostile ecclesiastical atmosphere the spirit of man has refused to be subdued. The winds move in the tree tops. Indeed the very roots of the trees are being torn from their bedding in the rock and the soil.

Insofar as we are friends of what religion ought to be we will give heed both to research when it tells us what religion has been, and to prophecy when on a factual basis it tells us what religion may become.

It is my thesis that in modern religious developments there are unmistakenable trends that move from *theo-centric* to *anthropocentric religion.* Let us see how this holds in regard to various aspects of modern religious developments.

Significant trends are noted (1) in the study of religious sources, (2) in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history, (3) in the evaluation of doctrines, and (4) in the understanding of the nature of religion itself.

I

Sources

(1) In the study of religious sources we think first of all of the sacred literature of the world religions. In past ages, before the advent of the critical scientific study of documents, religious literature had a way of getting itself approved as peculiarly authoritative. This authority derived from the supernatural origin of the literature, or from the unique place held by its human author. Usually the human author merely mediated the message. When few people could read and write, and when still fewer could understand what was written, it was comparatively easy for writings to

gain credence as the very word of God, or at least, as the Modernist would say, the *norm* of religious experience.

So the Vedas and other sacred writings held sway in India; the Zendavesta, in Persia; the Tripitaka, in Buddhist lands; the Classics, in China; the Old Testament in Orthodox Judaism; the whole Bible, in Orthodox Christianity; the Book of Mormon and the Pearl of Great Price, in Mormonism; Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, in Christian Science.

But in recent times critical students have successfully challenged not only the verbal inspiration of sacred books but also the very idea of authoritative books as *norms* of valid modern religious experience. Back in the fifties, four young men were sent by the Brahmo Samaj, a liberal Hindu movement, to study the four vedas at Benares and report to the mother Samaj in Calcutta. The result was the abandonment by this influential Hindu body of the doctrine of vedic inerrancy. It was fitting that this example should have been set by the Brahmo Samaj, for it was the founder of that movement, Rammohun Roy, who was the father of that most helpful addition to the theological curriculum called Comparative Religion. In Christianity the smoke of the battle over higher criticism still lingers on the far horizon; but for the most part the Fundamentalists have been put to flight. Well known are the exposures of the real origin of the Book of Mormon and of Science and Health. In the various great religions critical heretics have blazed away at the scriptures, with varying results; but with the general effect that now the educated leaders of all religions look with a mingled expression of pain and patronage upon their fellows who still appeal to the authority of sacred volumes.

With the passing of the unique origin of the sacred scriptures, their unique nature ceased to have unique authority. In other words, the trend is definitely away from regarding any ancient writing as the norm for modern religious life. The effect of this is not to rob the people of religious literature, but to increase the literary material available for religious purposes. All literature, ancient and modern, that is profitable for spiritual purposes is the sacred literature of humanized religion; and the burden is upon us to produce today literature that can equal and surpass that of yesterday.

(2) It is likewise with the institutions of religion; that is, religion in its organized form. In spite of the teaching of many great religious leaders to the contrary, their followers have gen-

erally regarded organizations, institutions, and places as religious sources. At times it has been a certain line of succession, at times a particular mountain top, at times a temple or a cathedral or a shrine. These and other visible and invisible evidences that peculiar sources of religious life were possessed have resulted in streams of pilgrims to these sacred sources from the most ancient times down to the most recent occurrence in Malden, Massachusetts. It has taken a long time for even a portion of the race to learn that the spirit of religion is not bound, that all worthful organizations and institutions and places are holy. But the present day trend is definitely in the direction of regarding all inspirational movements and places, all experience of art and skill and wonder as sources of religious inspiration. While this may finally have a sad effect upon the institutions of organized religion, it will nevertheless have a wholesome effect upon the life of mankind. The religious institutions that would survive must do so in open competition with all other human institutions. This again gives us not fewer but more sources of religious inspiration.

(3) With the passing of scripture and institutions as final authoritative religous sources, the Modernist type of mind fell in with the traditional mystical way and declared *experience* to be the authoritative religious source. Now this had a scientific sound. It made a universal appeal. It gave great promise. But the appeal to experience is already going the way of former religious sources. In its place will come, is now coming *experimental experience;* that is, scientific method applied to the spiritual experience of man. Uncontrolled and uncriticised experience was no safer guide than the older authorities. Experiences were varied, multiple, and belonged to their setting. It is only by controlled experience, under conditions of testing, that we have good hope of using it as a dependable source. This has been pointed out by various persons these last years. Prof. Wieman of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago in an article in the Christian Century gave solemn warning against appealing to uncontrolled experience as authority in religious matters.

Tests are being made to find out how experience is influenced, what it means, and how it may be improved ethically; as, for example, in the character tests under the auspices of professors in Teachers' College, Columbia. Their volume on *Studies in Deceit* is illustrative of what I mean. The work of Professor Starbuck and his associates in Iowa State University is in a similar vein.

The sum of the matter is that the study of religious sources tends definitely away from the superhuman and authoritative to the human and experimental.

II

Leaders

(1) How is it in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history? Most of the religions have been builded around the real or supposed teaching and personality of real or mythical founders. Hinduism and Shintoism are possible exceptions. The names of Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Mohammed, Joseph Smith, Comte, and Mary Baker Eddy are associated with the origin and history of the religions with which their names are so intimately connected.

(2) To a considerable extent the same is true of the sects. Even John the Baptist is claimed by the sect that bears his name. The name of John Calvin is linked with Presbyterianism, John Wesley with Methodism, Alexander Campbell with the Disciples, William Ellery Channing with the Unitarians, and so on. Most of the religions and sects are the lengthened shadows of dominant personalities. Great men have wrought mightily in behalf of their ideas of righteousness. They have not always been original creators but they have embodied and dramatized the emotions and ideas of the inarticulate multitudes. Some of them have even made valuable contributions to religious life.

((3) The great-man-complex once held sway throughout all social life. The shadows of the Napoleons have fallen across the face of the earth. But nothing is surer today than the fact that social theory and the democratic spirit tend to discount, even to retire, the dramatic and ofttimes irresponsible leader, and to magnify the cumulative notions of many people and the possibility of expressing the public will. Cooperative plans of social life are urged not only as wise but as unavoidable ways of life. Our very souls are socially created. The shared life is as inevitable as it is profitable.

Current theory and practice move away from the dominant personality. Many of the outstanding war-time leaders of the nations have been retired by the suffrage of their fellow citizens; and the feelings and ideas and hopes of the peoples of the world are beginning to be heard in the councils of the nations.

(4) Nowhere is this trend away from the domination of dramatic religious leaders more forcibly set forth than in the changing attitude towards Jesus of Nazareth. Only a little while ago the Christian world regarded Jesus as nothing less than very God of very God. Then the Unitarians made him something less than very God, but more than merely man. The next generation of Unitarians made him very man of very man. Then the Modernists followed suit with a view of Jesus as man, but what a man! He was used as a depository of all modern idealism. Others, however, challenged the doctrine of the adequacy of his moral and spiritual leadership. They pointed out that he said nothing against slavery although slavery was general in his day; that he said nothing against war although war was the chief honoric profession of his day. To the argument that his general teaching implied opposition to slavery and war they replied that the highest ethical leadership is not in abstract principles nor in pious professions, but in the concrete and the specific. Meaningful words must be tipped with steel and accurately aimed.

And not regarding these changes in attitude as enough came a whole bevy of critics saying that in point of fact Jesus never lived at all, that the whole Jesus fabric is mythical. Drews in Germany, Robertson in England, Smith in America startled the Christian world with slightly different theories of the non-historicity of Jesus. Various men including Professor Shirley Jackson Case of the University of Chicago replied. But the late George B. Foster after examining the literature for and against the historicity of Jesus could only say, "Jesus is historically probable but not religiously necessary." As the battle progressed other works were written by Couchond of France, Brandes of Denmark, and Chowdhuri of India against the historicity of Jesus, and many more in behalf of his historicity or upon the assumption of it. But today it seems to me necessary to go even further than the statement by Dr. Foster, and say, Jesus is historically doubtful and not religiously helpful.

(5) In my judgment, one of the greatest services that can be rendered to religion is to free it from the grip of the historic ethnic religious leaders. Thousands of modern minded souls in the midst of the new scientific spirit and method are more competent in the

spiritual realm than were the fathers of the world religions and of the sects of Christendom.

The trend is away from one-man-religion and in the direction of a social quest to find satisfactory values for all mankind.

3

Doctrines

(1) The trend of modern religious thought in the evaluation of doctrines is also in the humanist direction; that is, away from the dogmatic and in the direction of the experimental. It is perhaps here that we find the greatest difference between the older and the newer mind in religious matters. The older mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of a set of doctrines, and of doctrines as rather definitely fixed. The newer mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of experimental quests, and of the conclusions of the quest as tentative, and, like prices, subject to change without notice.

The older mind did not hold doctrines as hypotheses but as certainties. He was concerned with finalities. He felt the need of anchoring to some rock of ages. To doubt was to be damned. But the newer mind thinks of nothing so little as of certainty. In fact he rather doubts whether any certainty exists. He feels the thrill of novelty. For him it is postulates and hypotheses, not dogmas and certainties.

(2) The more modern minded of even the conservative clergy regard such basic doctrines as God, soul, and immortality as hypotheses. They defend these hypotheses on much the same ground as the scientists do theirs, namely, as working theories to be judged by their results. Now it is a far cry from this modern attitude to the old order in religion when a Jonathan Edwards spoke with absolute certainty of the will of the Calvinistic God to the immortal souls that hung on his words. There was a dramatic situation. Heaven and Hell were as real as Northhampton. Immortal souls hung in the balance. The responsibility of the preacher was beyond description. This situation accounted in large part for the great preaching of those days. It was likewise in the Hebrew tradition when prophets spoke the will of the eternal. But today it is difficult to get oratorical, much less eloquent over the tentative hypotheses that must constitute the metaphysical message of the modern preacher.

(3) But in the social realm it is different. What of a warless world? What of industry operated for the good of all? What of free peoples working out their own destiny? What of a new generation reared in the possession of the cultures of all time, and possessing the fruits of the arts today in all their richness and beauty? What of minds freed of the fears that haunt them—fear of the past that presses upon them, fear of the overarching unknown, fear of the plagues that waste the body and the mind, fear of fear itself? These are causes that will give dramatic content to effective preaching in a humanized world.

The trend is away from doctrines considered as authoritative pronouncements about the eternal, and in the direction of doctrine considered as the orderly arrangement of convictions about everyday life.

4

Religion

(1) Thus may be seen the necessity for a re-statement of the nature of religion itself. Here again the trend is away from religion understood as man's response to "the determiner of destiny," to use Professor Pratt's terms, or even as man's response to superhuman sources of fortune; away from religion understood as "man's conduct facing Godward," as I was taught in my theological school days; away from the fascinating and poetic theory that religion is "the life of God in the soul of man"; away also from the notion that religion is necessarily tied up with any theistic interpretation of cosmic existence.

Rather is the trend in the way of regarding religion as a human effort to find satisfactory modes of living, in the course of which many personal, social, planetary, and cosmological theories may be postulated, tested, and abandoned; the abiding thing being the urge to newer and newer efforts to reach ever-receding goals.

It is the testimony of Professor A. Eustace Haydon of the Department of Comparative Religion in the University of Chicago that today in practically all religions there are increasing numbers who interpret religion as the shared quest for a satisfying life.

(2) The very vernacular use of the term *religion* is tending to hasten the identification of religion with the questing process. When a man commits himself to a great *cause* we say that *cause* becomes his religion. We speak of men who make their art or their business

or their social theory, their religion. Communism is said to be the religion of young Russia, as indeed it is.

Not long ago I attended an experience meeting in an orthodox Christian church where some ten or a dozen men testified. Every man of them told of his religious experience in terms of ceasing to do this and beginning to do that. Unconsciously they revealed the real nature of their religion. It was a human doing and not doing. The only trouble was that they were concerned with doing and not doing inconsequential things, such as card playing. But they identified religious experience with human behavior in a human setting.

A few years ago I had occasion to argue a matter before a commission studying a certain problem relating to theological education, of which commission the late Charles W. Eliot was a member. In the course of the discussion one of the commission, himself an overseer of Harvard, remarked that he was not interested in a type of theological education that turned out what he called "social secretaries." Whereupon, Dr. Eliot, in his characteristically direct way said, "My dear sir, if I am not badly mistaken, within the next twenty-five or thirty years our idea of the very nature of religion will undergo a great change." That change is taking place even more rapidly than President Eliot predicted. Today great religious organizations are committing themselves to concrete quests. One of the most effective examples of this is the work of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Practically all of the great religious movements, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, have within the last ten years issued far-reaching programs of social reconstruction.

(3) It is not likely that religion will cease to concern itself with the effort to understand man's cosmic setting, nor should it abandon such effort. It is natural that man should forever attempt to push back the veil of mystery that hangs so tantalizingly about him. Modern minds are well aware how painfully inadequate is our total knowledge; but they feel that the little knowledge man does possess is his instrument and his hope of further conquests of the dark. In controlling life situations a little factual knowledge is worth worlds of mystery.

Religion as thus understood is developing new ideals and techniques for accomplishing its purpose. Fact finding becomes more significant than wishful petition. What man really wants becomes of more concern than what it has been said that he should want. Aesthetic expression is regarded as superior to monastic repression. Scientific apparatus ranks higher than sacred images. The free play of free minds replaces the submissive will. The buoyant thrill of physical and mental well-being are of first importance in spiritual well-being. Modern religion says to mankind, trust your capacity to understand increasingly the universe in which you live; trust your ability to order your way increasingly in harmony with the possibilities that inhere in the nature of man and the world; and so trusting, act accordingly.

In summary, the trend in modern religious developments is away from the transcendent, the authoritative, the dogmatic, and toward the human, the experimental, the tentative; away from the abnormal, the formal, the ritualistic; and toward the normal, the informal, the usual; away from the extraordinary mystic expression, the exalted mood, the otherworldly; and toward the ethical, the social and the worldly; away from religion conceived as one of man's concerns, and toward religion conceived as man's one concern.

THE PATTERNS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

THROUGH the tremendous vogue of Spengler's *Decline of the West,* the theory that history repeats itself has again climbed to par. Whatever one may think of the validity of Spengler's attempt to reduce history to a series of recurring cycles, the method has rendered history easier to grasp, and has put some semblance of order into what once was a trackless, uncharted confusion of dates and events. Even if Spengler has substituted the concept of fatality for that of causality, as one of his critics has put it; even if he sometimes strains or even garbles the facts to make them fit his theory, he has given the mind a grappling hook with which it may easily apprehend the once chaotic panorama of history.

The history of philosophy also may be rendered more intelligible if some sort of mental tool be devised with which to classify and put into orderly array the present Babel of conflicting theories and speculations. The idea of cyclic recurrence may with equal profit be applied to the development of philosophy through the ages. It is the purpose of this paper to do for the history of philosophy, on a small scale, of course, what Spengler has done for world-history.

Philosophy is the subject that is least of all studied by the average person. Professors of economics often complain that their science is the most flagrantly neglected of all studies, so that an appalling lack of influence and understanding exists between them on the one hand and industrialists, legislators, and the general public on the other. But their claim for sympathy is feeble compared with the plight of the philosopher. Someone has said that less than one-hundred people in America have read the books of John Dewey, our foremost American philosopher, and that perhaps only about forty-thousand Americans have ever heard of the man. It is certain that there is no subject about which the man on the street knows less than philosophy, no subject in which there is such a tremendous gulf between the initiated and the uninitiated.

This situation is very unfortunate, to say the least. The complete lack of philosophical training or knowledge on the part of more than 99 per cent of the population allows all sorts of false and ridiculous ideas and superstitions to pass muster. Witness the credulous avidity with which the public swallows the philosophical speculations of automobile manufacturers and business men. The critical training given the mind even by the smallest smattering of philosophic knowledge would be a vaccine against these infections of the popular mind with superstition and buncombe.

The chief reason for the widespread neglect of philosophy is the apparently hopeless difficulty of the subject. The field of philosophy seems, and there is a measure of justification for the belief, a bedlam of conflicting speculations and theories. It has been said that all the philosophers in the world could not fill a single page of a note-book with the truths on which they are universally agreed. Thus, it would appear, that the study of a given philosopher does not lead to a permanent addition to our knowledge, because the next philosopher we study will, in all probability, shatter everything we have learned from the former. Add to this the proverbial obscurity and difficulty of understanding philosophy, and we see why philosophy has been so neglected by the average reader.

As a matter of fact, the chaos and confusion reigning in the field of philosophy can be reduced to simplicity and order, by means of a little analysis and probing beneath the surface of the many apparently conflicting systems. The multiplicity of systems of philosophy can be reduced to a few persisting, easily understood types, which have retained a remarkable intactness throughout the centuries. Equipped with the knowledge of these simple, persistent pigeon-holes of philosophy, all the thoughts and speculations of the many philosophers can be placed with ease into one or another of the several compartments. There is no reason why the man of limited leisure cannot read philosophy with understanding, provided he learns the few simple molds into which all philosophic thought from Thales to John Dewey has been cast.

The conception of the ninety-two elements in the science of chemistry has proved a wonderful aid to man's grasp and control of what once seemed a baffling variety of substances. Any substance, no matter how complex, can now be analyzed into two, three, or four simple chemical elements. Simplicity can likewise be introduced into what appears to be the chaotic, disorderly confusion of philosophic thought. With a little practice, the cursory reader should be enabled to take any philosophic idea or speculation, and subsume it under one of the permanent elemental patterns.

What are these persistent patterns, these chemical elements as it were, which are the building blocks out of which the most baffling and involved metaphysical systems are constructed? These patterns are five fundamental world-views, or interpretations of the whole of reality. They are Materialism, Spiritualism (Idealism), Dualism, Monism, and Phenomenalism. Any given philosophical system can be reduced to one of these elemental patterns, or else demonstrated to be a compound of two or more of them. If the reader of philosophy knows these five fundamental patterns, and recognizes them beneath their raiment of philosophical verbiage, the task of understanding philosophy is immeasurably simplified, and is rendered a positive delight. We shall consider each one of them in order.

We shall begin with Materialism, not because of any prejudice in favor of it, but because it is the easiest system to understand. Our line of attack will always be from the easy to the more difficult.

The universe, according to Materialism, consists of nothing but matter and its motions. The All, or matter, is generally conceived of as being distributed through space in the form of tiny indivisible particles, or atoms. Every phenomenon, whether physical, chemical, biological, or psychological, can ultimately be resolved into a change of position of material particles or atoms, on this hypothesis.

The first consistent system of atomic Materialism was put forward by Democritus, the Greek philosopher who was the immediate forerunner of Plato and Aristotle. He got his atomism from a still earlier Greek philosopher, Leukippus. It will be seen, then, that the atomic theory of modern physics and chemistry goes back to the sixth century B. C.

The atomistic Materialism of Democritus was adopted by the well-known and much maligned ethical philosopher, Epicurus, of the fourth century B. C. The celebrated ethical principles of Epicurus, that happiness (as distinguished from sensual pleasure) is the chief object of life, and that enlightened self-interest is the guide to moral conduct, have been a potent influence in all later philosophy. Moral law is social or human law, ethical conduct is that conduct which enables men to live together with the maximum of harmony and happiness. The Utilitarianism of the last two centuries of English moral philosophy, and the Humanism of which we hear so much today, are modern versions of the Epicurean ethic.

Lucretius, the Roman poet flourishing immediately before the beginning of the Christian era, is the next important name in the history of the Materialist tradition. His wonderful poem, *De Rerum Natura* (The Nature of Things), presents a philosophy so modern, except for a few poetic licenses and exaggerations, that much of it might pass for the work of a modern popularizer of science. Evolution, natural selection, the nebular hypothesis as to the origin of the earth and the stars, and many other conceptions generally supposed to be peculiarly modern are to be found in this extraordinary philosophic epic.

Coming down to more modern times, we find a partial acceptance of the Materialistic tradition in the great scientific and philosophic contemporary of Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, who many critics contend was the real Shakespeare. Bacon expressed his preference for Democritus over the more spiritual Plato and Aristotle, and held that knowledge must emancipate itself from the Aristotelian tradition and return to the sounder principles of Democritus.

Thomas Hobbes, the next English philosopher of note, was a simon-pure Materialist. Even God was a material body with him. This inclusion of a Deity in a system purporting to be a thoroughgoing Materialism is an inconsistency. If reality consists of nothing but the action and reaction of material particles upon one another, there can be no God, unless of course one maintains that matter is God. This is purely a question of words, however. If matter is all that there is and we choose to call it God, we are expressing a purely verbal proposition. The problem of consciousness Hobbes disposed of by saying that thought consists in the movement of the particles or atoms making up the brain.

John Locke, the famous author of the *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* and one of the founders of modern philosophy, although generally a Dualist, in one passage advanced the speculation that it was not impossible that God may have added to matter the faculty for thinking. The French Materialists and Voltaire derived one of their fundamental principles from this passage in Locke's *Essay.*

Up to this time the Materialist philosophers had never adequately realized the difficulty, if not utter impossibility, of accounting for the phenomenon of consciousness under the assumption that material atoms are the sole reality. Furthermore, the problem of knowledge, which in materialist terms amounts to the question, how does matter become conscious of itself? had never been faced, or even asked. It remained for the Idealist philosopher Berkeley, whose influential work, *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* appeared in 1710, to render the older forms of Materialism absurd and untenable. Berkeley demonstrated, with a line of argument that never has been successfully refuted, that all we can know or experience is of the nature of sensations, perceptions, and mental states, and that matter has only an inferential existence. He held that this inference was a faulty one, and that matter, as distinct from our own states of consciousness, did not exist. Thereafter, matter has led a very precarious existence among philosophers. The very name Materialism is no longer in good standing in strict philosophic usage. The mind-body problem, the puzzle of consciousness, the critical analyses of Berkeley and his successor Hume, have rendered the old-fashioned Materialism of Democritus, Hobbes, and Holbach obsolete. The modern representatives of the Materialistic tradition now call themselves Naturalists. Still, practically speaking, Naturalism amounts to much the same thing as Materialism, in that the essential thing involved is the denial of a supernatural or spiritual order existing above the natural or material order.

Naturalism to-day recognizes the impossibility of accounting for the appearance of consciousness out of a collection of dead atoms. The atoms, electrons, or whatever the ultimate unit of matter may be, is given the attribute of mind, or sensation, in a rudimentary form by modern Naturalists, such as Haeckel and Lester

Ward. Another form of Naturalism conceives of matter and energy as being the dual manifestation of an Unknowable Power or Force. Mind is considered a form of energy. (Herbert Spencer.) Still another type of Naturalism regards experience, or the actual perceptual flux that is immediately known, as the stuff out of which reality is made. Matter and mind are but mental tools or conceptions abstracted from reality for the purpose of better apprehending and controlling the flux of "pure experience." (John Dewey.)

The evolution of the Materialistic attitude shows that the lines of thought of the various philosophers are not completely out of touch with one another, as is commonly supposed. We have seen how Materialism, through the influence of Spiritualism, has been forced to alter some of its basic conceptions. In truth, every philosophic system, every individual philosopher, influences every other system, sometimes profoundly, broadening its viewpoint. There is an unmistakable convergence of the once sharply severed, antagonistic rival philosophies. Perhaps the day will come when one philosophy will gain complete control of the field, after having enriched and expanded itself from all the converging philosophies of which it will be the synthesis.

We shall next consider Spiritualism, as it is the direct antithesis to Materialism. *Idealism* rather than *Spiritualism* is the term more generally applied to this philosophy, but *Spiritualism* is to be preferred, because of the popular confusion that exists between philosophic and ethical idealism. But there is danger in the term *Spiritualism* also, as it is liable to be confused with the popular superstition of that name, which pretends to hold communicatoin with the spirits of the dead. One of the greatest tribulations of the philosopher is the fact that many of the terms he uses are also used popularly in an entirely different sense from the philosophic sense.

Spiritualism contends that reality consists of nothing but spirit, or spiritual substance, in flat contradiction of Materialism, which asserts that reality consists of nothing but matter, or material substance. But do we directly sense and experience matter every moment of our lives? we may ask. Matter is but an illusion, the external appearance of that which is really spiritual, answers the Spiritualist. The appearance of things are the symbols by which they are known to us. The fundamental principle of Spiritualism is thus seen to be essentially the same as the contention of the Christian Scientists, that matter and body are delusions, and that only spirit and soul are real. Christian Science indeed is a variety of Spiritualistic philosophy, but a corrupt variety in which there are many misunderstandings and inconsistencies.

The philosophical basis of Hindu Brahmanism, as presented in the Upanishads, is the most ancient prototype of Spiritualism. Reality is the dream of the Absolute Mind, Brahma, who creates the universe by thinking or dreaming it. All appearances, the material world, our own personalities, are but illusions, the sole reality being Brahma, the Eternal God. Needless to say, this is not the Brahmanism of the masses of Hindu people; it is the doctrine of the Hindu philosophers and scholars. The popular Brahmanism is a gross, polytheistic superstition, holding several hundred-million people in the densest ignorance.

There is no exact prototype of Spiritualism among the Greek philosophers. Plato is generally spoken of as a Spiritualist, but he was, more properly speaking, a Dualist, in that he acknowledged the existence of two fundamental principles, Spirit or Idea and Void or matter. Spirit, according to Plato, exists in the shape of the famous Platonic "Ideas," which are abstract virtues, such as goodness, temperance, wisdom, and courage, given a substantial existence. The Ideas also consist of perfect divine models of all things, of which earthly realities are more or less imperfect copies. The Ideas realize themselves in our world of sense through the refractory, coarse medium of matter. The grossness of matter renders it impossible for the Ideas to realize themselves perfectly; hence the imperfection and evil of the world of existence. Above this disappointing world of sense exists the supernal, spiritual world of Ideas, the haven of the philosopher, and the solace offered by reason to the soul jaded by the cares and evils of the material world.

The first pure form of Spiritualism in European philosophy was the philosophy of the German mathematician and scientist Leibnitz, a contemporary of Isaac Newton. According to Leibnitz, reality consists of a large number of spiritual, spaceless, centres of force, which he called Monads. Matter is an aggregate of Monads of the lowest order, having a confused perception and no reason. The souls of animals are Monads having a somewhat more clear perception. The soul of man is a Monad having clear perception and the faculty of reason. God is the supreme Monad, having perfect perception and perfect reason. Each Monad mirrors the whole of reality more or less clearly according to its status as matter, animal soul, or the soul of man. All our perceptions are internal, proceeding from this mirroring of the universe by the Monad which is our soul. The realities and the perceptions are made to occur simultaneously by means of a principle of pre-established harmony.

This fanciful doctrine, one of the favorite objects of ridicule of the vitriolic Voltaire, had little influence on future philosophy, and it remained for Berkeley, the Irish bishop of the early eighteenth century, to present the first influential system of Spiritualism in European philosophy. The external world, and the thing we call matter, consist only of our own sensations of space, location, hardness, weight, pressure, color, sound, touch, etc. But each of these sensations is a state of consciousness, not a property of something external to our mind. Hence our knowledge consists only of mental states, and matter cannot be known to us. Indeed, said Berkeley, matter is a superfluous entity, since we derive it from a faulty inference, namely, that we really experience something outside our own states of consciousness. Therefore matter does not exist as a substance, and mind or spirit alone is real. The external world consists only of sensations and perceptions given us directly by God. The only reality is spiritual substance, in which the sensations and ideas making up the world inhere. Myself, otherselves, and God are the three spiritual realities making up all of existence in Berkeley's system.

This triumph of the Spiritualists over the Materialists was short-lived, for soon after Berkeley had undermined Materialism by destroying matter, David Hume, the Scotch skeptical philosopher did to Spiritualism what Berkeley had done to Materialism. He cut the ground from under Spiritualism by showing that spiritual substance is as much a faulty inference as material substance. Berkeley had pushed matter out of existence by saying that it is only the sum of its properties, i. e., hardness, extension in space, resistance, etc., and that there is no substance underneath in which these properties reside. Hume, using the same line of argument, said that neither could we find a "spiritual substance" underlying the sensations, ideas, volitions, and memories making up spirit or mind. Both matter *and* spirit then are faulty constructions of human thought. Sensations are the sole reality! A material body is a complex of sensations having a more or less persisting identity, to which we have given a name. Similarly, an ego or soul is but a complex of sensations, ideas, and memories also having a more or less persisting identity. Hume's doctrine is known as Phenomenalism or Sensationalism. We shall consider it in greater detail later.

Modern Spiritualism has evolved out of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the great German thinker whose work was largely an attempt to refute Hume's uncanny Sensationalism. Kant held that the raw sensations are worked into perceptions and conceptions, and that these conceptions are in turn organized and synthesized into knowledge, the various sciences, and complete systems of thought. There must be something that performs this transforming work. This something Kant called the "transcendental ego of apperception." For our purpose it is sufficient to know that this formidable phrase represents Kant's resuscitation of the ego and spiritual substance, which Hume had so cruelly slain.

Furthermore, according to Kant, the mind or ego renders the sensations, which Hume had said make up the world, intelligible by means of the "forms" of space and time. These forms are not from the sensational world, but are tools of the ego, which enable it to grasp the sensations. The chaos of the sensational world is further reduced to order by means of the "categories," that is, the ideas of cause and effect, sequence, totality, modality, etc. Like the forms of space and time, the categories are also "intuitive." By intuitive is meant beyond experience, not derived from the senses, but inherent in the mind. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made up what is known as the "empirical" school, in that they held that all knowledge was ultimately derived from sense experience. Kant was a "rationalist," in that he maintained that some knowledge is not derived from experience, but is intuitively known to the reason. The forms, the categories, and truths of mathematics are intuitive truths.

Kant thus rehabilitated spirit. Furthermore, he also rehabilitated matter by his doctrine of "things-in-themselves" or *nouomena,* the realities giving rise to our sensations or *phenomena.* These nouomena, or things-in-themselves, are beyond our experience and unknowable. Kant was, then, strictly speaking, a Dualist, since both matter and spirit were admitted in his system. But because of his profound influence on later Spiritualist philosophers he is commonly called a Spiritualist or an Idealist. His entire system is known as Transcendental Idealism.

Kant's German successors, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, dropped Kant's notion that there are things-in-themselves. This was somewhat of a return to Berkeley in denying the substantial existence of matter. Spiritualism now became a pantheism, strikingly like the Hindu Brahmanist philosophy. Reality is one self, Absolute Idea, all including mind, of which our finite minds are partial expressions. The Absolute Idea creates reality by thinking it. The evolution of reality is the unfolding of a logical reasoning process on the part of the Absolute. Hegel reduced reality to logic, which ever advanced by means of his famous "triads." A triad is a series of three steps; *thesis, antithesis,* and *synthesis.* Something is asserted by the divine logic, that is, comes into being, and then is contradicted. These two steps are thesis and antithesis respectively. A higher union of the two contradictories then takes place, and this constitutes the third step of the logical and evolutionary process, synthesis. Reality is a logical evolution progressing by means of these triads, said Hegel. For example, the Russian Revolution swept away capitalism (thesis) and set up pure communism (antithesis). With the passing of time, the Russian State has been obliged to make concessions to capitalism. The result is a synthesis of capitalism and communism. Everything that exists is a blend or synthesis of two opposites, the resolution of previous contradiction.

Another representative of Spiritualistic philosophy is Schopenhauer. With this celebrated pessimist reality is the expression of a blind, unconscious Will to Live. Schopenhauer differed from Hegel in that he substituted a voluntaristic for and intellectualistic conception of reality. Reality is thought or intellect, said Hegel. Reality is Will, and intellect is but a product derived from the Will, said Schopenhauer.

A word as to the famous pessimism of Schopenhauer. Since Will is the basic reality, the fundamental fact of existence is a constant striving to satisfy some desire. But desire is a condition of want and dissatisfaction. Existence leads to misery because of the constant pain of desire which the Will seeks to satisfy. But assuming that every desire is finally satisfied, then a still greater unhappiness befalls the Will, the misery of inactivity and boredom. Therefore the Will, in its effort to conquer the pain of desire only succeeds in achieving a still greater pain. All existence, then is a stark tragedy, according to Schopenhauer. But the greatest tragedy of all was when the Will became fully conscious of itself and its futility in man.

The philosophy of Hegel, or Absolute Idealism as it is called, is still a live doctrine. Indeed, until about twenty-five years ago Absolute Idealism had most of the philosophers in its camp.

One of the principal causes for the present reaction away from Absolute Idealism, is that philosophy's inability to find a satisfactory explanation for the existence of error and evil in the world. If reality consists of nothing but an all-including mind or God, of which our personal, finite minds are partial expressions, where does error come from? No fact is more obvious than the tremendous amount of error and illusion in the world. And worse still, we know that the world is full of evil, which we are constantly striving to overcome. But according to Absolute Idealism, this evil must be a part of the divine plan, must proceed from the source of all being, the Absolute. It becomes almost impossible to build a satisfactory ethical theory out of such a philosophy. The house of ill-fame, the gambling hell, are as much parts of the divine plan as the music-dramas of Wagner, the statues of Praxiteles.

We have somewhat anticipated our discussion of Dualism in our previous discussion of Spiritualism. The truth is that the development of each of the fundamental philosophies carries with it implications influencing all the other philosophies. We have seen how Materialism has been profoundly influenced by developments in the Spiritualistic type of philosophy. The Dualists, Plato and Kant, have left their impress on all later philosophy, regardless of its type. Therefore, it was impossible for us to outline the growth of Materialism and of Spiritualism without bringing in something of Dualism.

Dualism, as its name implies, holds that reality is made of two independent substances. Matter cannot be reduced to spirit, and spirit cannot be reduced to matter, says the Dualist. The mind is not a mere aggregate of material atoms, but the manifestation of a spiritual principle, the soul. Neither is the material body an illusion of the soul. Both soul and body exist in their own right in Dualistic philosophy.

The most common example of Dualism is ordinary Christian theology, of course. Of late some of the more intellectual Protestant clergymen have accepted the Hegelian Absolute Idealism, but the rank and file of the Christian clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, still cling to the Dualistic interpretation of reality.

(To Be Continued)

EL DORADO

BY LLOYD MORRIS

THE hour that was to usher me through an unobtrusive door three hundred feet in the air, passed up the street on a windy flaw in failing pulses of chiming sound; and the clock, its signal completed, moved a warning finger of gold one space forward on the black dial registering in terms of Man, the incomputable. Yet I lingered in the throbbing ways below, where all that was purposeful in human life jostled with accomplishment.

I thought as I faltered in my going that the minatory tongue beneath the crocketed spire, bidding men from the marts of stridency to appointed quietudes of prayer, was not greatly dissimilar in harsh utterance from the street car's horatory clangor addressed alike to those who trafficked, and him who loitered in this lane of marque and merchandise. And I wondered if for me this sounding hour of noon knelled something cherished, now to receive meed and gesture of farewell; or was the bright clarion of an emergence richer in fancy and fruition than that of the dreams and wakings which had attended all the earnest days that had been my life's idyll.

History was about me, shuffled into obscure byways by avid years; its outworn braveries cared for by reverent hands. Plumed with futurity, the present, imperious and oppressive, shouldered arrogantly upwards; its terraced loftiness of steel and stone four-square about a House of God that crouched small and weather-stained, in its own iron-gated garden planted all-a-row with seed of perishability.

A few score lives of men and this History will have become touched with the mellowing tones of tradition; and this present taken on the wistful charm of a faded chronicle; but the fevered hope and curse of futurity plumes for ever trodden street and beetling facade.

Here but yesterday the insolence of power was rebuked, and from the declaration of a people free by the redemption of blood, came to hardy nativity a nation ripened now to stature exceeding any ever set down in annaled time. From here but a longbow shot away, some wandering Indian in yet recent day did stand at gaze where there was much mariners' noise, with heave and ho; and wave-scarred argosies limped in to their landfall; or, yielding proudly from the river's sheltering banks, passed with stately carriage of summer clouds, beneath the circle of the sea. And in retired *bouwerij,* a brief promenade onward from where now I stayed, moccasined runner had panted tidings from outfall and foray consummated no distant leagues in space, yet already old in time.

Here, today, in titanesque impressiveness the coffered wealth of nations reposes; obedient in Pactolian flow to pens whose slightest traceries diminish antique epics of graven stele to pleasing simplicities of quiet story. Here at this high noon in a second's space of time, whispering wires tell of devastation from earth and sky butchering pygmy mankind, and toppling fair cities and gracious landscape to wholesale catastrophe beyond the world's rim where night is still on the land; while from the air tongueless voices call a pentacostal medley of grievous announcings, far-supplications of perilled and lonely men, and manifold divertisments.

To this place on this autumn morning I had come from pursuit of lettered Art and simple sylvan joys; once again in a rough but honored mart to dice with fortune for stake of gold against my very self in future thrall; and on a winning hazard, set cherished hostages free from jeopardy of economc circumstance; and myself turn anew to where a scorned road of little ease goes marvelously on with noble company of knights and dames riding there in gallant mien to El Dorado.

Often beside the smiling Pacific as the declining sun mantled the darkening Sierras with silken gold and purple, opulent hours of friendship took on grace and fragrance of immortality from the frank shy confidences of eager minds exploring the extremities of life and love; but beneath bubble of wit and sober presentment of russet sense, the careful mind of one friend to me brooded over my material occasions and moved to avert my regard from phantasms of ideality, wherein spiritualization was accepted the essence of endeavor, to the display of life's adventure as a deferential obeisance to sociological inexorabilities; to which in duty and wisdom I should address myself. For I in youth had daffed the world aside to join those riders to El Dorado; and now the first rime of age touched me to winter of years with small store of economic substance garnered; while on receding horizons in planes of shifting light gleamed and wavered the still uncaptured, still unscaled shining streets and bannered roofs of towered El Dorado.

I do suppose that once to each of us all in some one moment, some one hour comes a great Wonder of enlightenment; which none may tell if it be a perturbation of Divine disquietude, or thing remembered from dead celestial years, or aura of epileptoid signifiance. That is El Dorado; shining, elusive El Dorado.

It is a fashion of Man that some in their certain day should doubt, extinguish or deny this thin flame of inner visitation which motions the laborer, as seems, to till the barren, reap the stubble, and bring to harvest at life's ending only the unsubstantial husbandry of dreams. To others the manner is to follow secretly, intermittently, in furtive shamefastnesses, or with obsequious expedience of deference to the authorized and customary. A few follow wholly; consistently pursuing a conviction of ideality to its logical extremities of conduct. And once or twice or thrice in our human story comes one that transcends the vision.

The fruits of negation are apples of Sodom plucked in fields of Asphodel; but every human aspiration, every intrepid endeavor is El Dorado. In youth and the prides of life it is the vision of the eye, the sounds in the ear, and all the gay and variant pleasantries of the physical world that rioting in our blood inform our exaltations; till the very linaments of ecstacy seem to lie in the whorl of the flesh, and slumber in the essence of beauty on all the flowing symmetry of unveiled loveliness. But when adolescence is done the fairest image takes on stain of mortality; and our unsophisticated candidness withers and is gone; when it is seen that the ultimate frankness of nature is not beyond question, and indeed utterly is suspect of perpetuating its economy by shallow deceits offered before the human race which so pathetically is eager to be deceived. Romeo and Juliet exchanging vows in the perfumed dusk beneath a heaven painted with bright gold are purely selfish, and in no degree concerned with the continued existence of the *genus homo.* Yet, all their aureate rapture is but the sugared comfit of a prelude whose passion is decreed to an obstetric end: for the concerto of life's orchestration—its most tenderly muted motif of wood-wind; its triumphancies of polyphonic brass—has for its secret sardonic theme the dignification of the continuity of the human race.

With Isis unveiled and deflowered, the Hegelian Absolute must needs put forth fresh artifice and lure disillusioned mortals anew with philoprogenitiveness, and the pomps and circumstance of corporate life draping our sordid individual ephemeralities. But tinsel and tapestry alike wear thin; the very bones of Being grin outwardly through the cunningest fabric; and we turn as in avoidance of a charnel house, away from ideals of the flesh, to where in shifting confusion of splendour, El Dorado reappears in the beautiful austerities of philosophical abstraction.

In calm contemplation of our cold new god, we reflect in contemptuous tranquility on those derogatory days when the delusive snares of the sensory world seemed to have form of loveliness or hold shape and truth of beauty. There is no god but intellect, we cry; and philosophy is its prophet. Nothing to us in our fervor of new servitude is it, except evidence of our present rightness, that to our paens be joined in jangled discordancy, the sorrows of Rachel weeping for her children in hospitals; with crooked backs and crumbling skeletons; or griped with hunger, wolfing through city thoroughfares; or staring up to the sky on sodden battlefields—their emptied skulls pillowed on the soft pudding of their own spilled brains—Nothing, till in the tears of a universe our El Dorado of ethic or metaphysic; esthetic or corporeal perfection—our very categorical imperative crumbles, and totters down through the shallows of utilitarianism into annihilation beneath obliterating tides of sentiment.

To us poor mariners adrift on this perilous sea, every sail on the horizon wafts a galleon more utterly desirable than our own poor hulk; till we board it and find the glittering allurement was only the gold of sunset lacquering the weathered poop of a billow-raked old hull newly come from battling desperate seas in its passage to some homely anchorage; and from its deck the barque we abandoned seems now to have the similitude of a fine tall ship pendent on the mirror of the sea; and bound with jocund company for El Dorado.

It is then the cry goes up from the deeps of human character: "Where is El Dorado that with lance in rest, beaver up and gonfalon blazoned on the streaming wind, we set out to seek and to follow?—What is El Dorado? Is it but many things to many people; and to each a kaleidoscope of idealities shaken into and shaken out of variant pattern by the sums and differences of psychological states; which have their fervid consciousness at the functional dictate of physiological being?"

For the eye never ceases to look differently upon its local world nor reflection to be of a different temper. Day by day ancient songs tell other tales than those we read into them yesterday. Day by day the Art of forgotten days takes on changing significances and the piled up wisdom of eras yields stranger and simpler conclusions. In the morning of our life we laugh softly to ourselves and say, Thus, will we do, and Thus. At life's heyday we dispose ourselves to conclaves of solemn discourse and grave intents to mould and elevate mankind. In the evening of our days when our importunities, our curses, our ineffective defiance and nugatory efforts are done, we remember the thoughts that we thought in youth; when in the ways of human life appeared no harshness, and our ambition clad itself in shining mail and hewed at Beauty's foes, or with stout lance thrust at enchantments and bore its affection to dazzling palaces forlorn in fantasy. We remember how our stammering tongue could never confess nor our lively eye convey the fulness of our lover's passion, nor exhaust our friendship for a friend. We recall the hour when our exquisite idylls of innocence became pierced by protusion into human affairs of inhuman potentialities; and existence no more appeared a gentle thing of physical delights to our irresponsible young animalities, but presented aspects that appalled; and experience gave such meaning to what before had been mere words of academic definition, that we had perforce to dream stronger dreams of the envy of men and love of women; of being a solid man in the city; a leader of politics; an author of many editions; a painter with a picture well hung on the line; a nice fat balance in the bank, a man of property and perhaps great possessions. In the twilight of life's little day when the physiological timepiece ticks low, and the assured Reason recoiling from pursuit of that which is fugitive to the understanding, is stricken from its heroic complacency, we think on the time when our human spirit entered upon a strong endeavor to discover a corrective to the enigmas that troubled it. We clashed ethic of the Dust with ethics of the Stars; we looked down into the manure that gave delicacy to the hue of the blossoms waving above it; and up to the subtility that weaved the stars in patterns; we searched among the shadows in the eyes of the friend who clasped our hand, and we thought to read more plainly there when the light of life had been stifled out; we pondered upon the imponderable to part the greater from the less, to grasp faiths and establish theories; we heard the voice of the Absolute in Archangelic Trump and the regurgitatory murmurs of hyperchlorhydria; we hunted the Final Reason from oviduct to a warp in space, and thought to catch and cage it in apparatus and formulae and in temples that we builded and hung with blue and with silver. At nightfall, sitting in the shadow of the Infinite we wonder supinely if any of those hard-won and tremulously cherished beliefs we evolved cloaked Truth, and if they and all that we fabricated and followed were only idols and salve for our offended Ego; and if El Dorado itself is nothing but a cowardly escape, or perchance a pragmatic carrot dangled from the Infinite before our asses' nose. We wonder if the Absolute is pragmatic; if the Pragmatic is absolute; if in the shadows lying beyond human understanding, unnegatived by definition, a Celestial Observer looking upon the dissensions comprising human effort sees them each and all of one value and no one of greater delusion than another; and if it be not well for Mankind that there is ever a residuum which evades research and renders the pageant of life a glory of growth that justifies; and not a dirge of decay whose accents are nothing but despair.

El Dorado is nothing till it has ceased to be El Dorado; nothing till it has ceased to be something; nothing but a city of dreams which none shall ever find; though into it all shall ride at last from over the hills and far away; nothing but a great weariness of the flesh till we shall have beheld windmills become whirligigs and Barataria a plain hoax; and seeing have ceased to be offended; and passing through egoism to the Ego are convicted with the positive conviction that the pragmatic cannot endure, and the end of all rationalization is irrational.

Our pursuit of the real has its recalcitrant hours in which we wantonly lubricate our egotisms with the unctuous oil of pragmatism; or are so straitly compelled to palter with Nominalist exiguousness that Inspiration, taking alarm, clutches for defence at the ludicrous; by reducing to cynical paraphrase of catchpenny philosophy the short but vulgar aphorisms of the poor; who question with leery knowingness if it be possible to worship God with cold feet; if it were not well for him who has his head in the clouds to keep his feet in a bun-shop; if spiritual equilibrity is only feasible on a gold basis, and the path to life's superlatives, a devious motion of planetary economics.

Such insurgence of speculative dubities held me immobilized now in the vortex of the world's traffic; and the cheating devices of caricature were of no present avail to repel the starkly pervasive reflection that whereas in time previous I had extended but small salute of dalliance or *devoir* to the world and yet had it seemed failed to achieve the ineffable; might it not be that here in the booths of the money-changers was not merely all the eye desired and the heart hoped, but that Ideality itself waited to yield happily captive to him who never came.

Here in this Broadhighway no magic casements looked down from cloud-capped towers; yet perhaps Romance was twenty-five floors up in a frowning office building over against the House of God—for did Romance always take the air gorgeously in sumptuous gown and never tread plain ways in hodden gray? The pallid-faced men of immobile mien and snapping diction who had their waking being in dollar frenzies within that vibrant congeries of offices: was that what they visioned of the future forty years since; when chin on knees they embraced their shins and started into the sunbright surface of the "ol' swimmin' hole?" When with the long, long thoughts of youth they stared abroad their little world to kingdoms beyond—was the face that came between their inner eye and the outer heaven, that of the peevish blonde or atrabilious brunette who bears their name? The youth and age of femininity, also, going about their economic business in that economic pen; what thoughts are theirs as they battle age and strain with cosmetics? Was this the El Dorado that glowed in their girlhood's golden dreams? Was the gentle knight who carcolled over their fancy's plain; or the troubadour who luted his *rondelet* in the secret chambers of their heart, the husband over whom the turf is green; the husband absconded to parts unknown; or the loose-lipped wastrel for whom they must leave their day's drugery to drudge anew at night?

Yet, because there is measurability to our knowledge, not alone of ourselves, but of those with whom we have been life-long trencherman and bedfellow in the jog-trot of human association; may it not be that some other insight than the critical faculties could discern within the lives of these lords and conscripts of industry here—and of all who live move and have their being in the commonplace—heroisms of simple duties simply done, sacrifices silently, ungrudgingly, lovingly made, and cherished ambitions denied that have lit for the doers a splendour exceeding any that seemed to them a sacred lamp in the morning of their life? May it not be that in very deed and sober fact there is for us all an ivory gate three hundred feet up or down or at street level; behind which all our rich imaginings, and the wild errantries of our questing souls are caught and held without end in despised beatitudes of drab occupation; and that we have only to put forth our hand and the wicket will roll back on its valves, and our wandering feet from garden of rue, and fields of asphodel shall tread the streets of El Dorado.

Be that as it would; here in this street at this moment of time, decision was to be made whether I followed still the prompting I had ever cherished as El Dorado, and whose effulgencies had been the lure and compensation of laborious years; or whether El Dorado, timed for noon, lay behind an ivory gate no larger round than the tip of my thumb, and Pegasus being foundered, I must ride thither in the express—twenty-fifth floor only—click! click! slam!

In childhood days, old wives tales overheard in chimney nooks when winter's storms fouled all the ways, bound me with spells of fearful delight. I listened to stories of men who, coming victoriously from grim and sudden contest with death by flood and field; had declared life as they had lived it from its earliest recollections even unto that strangling moment, flashed before their eyes glazing upon the verge of dissolution. In later years I came by ways more philosophic to surmise that for all poor souls upon whom are come the ends of Fate the shuttle of Time is reversed; and, even as the physiological embryo epitomises in its foetal history the evolutionary story of the genus; so, at the point between quickness and death there is a process of psychological devolution correspondent to physical disintegration, during which consummated individual existence retraces in swiftest panorama to puling infancy; and the ego crying aloud at the portal of this second threshold of the unknown often ejaculates a parental call; and even seeks mystical passage through the very umbilical cord into the womb that was the earliest shelter of its fleshed Odyssey.

I have seen many men die, and of some roystering metropolitian blades might bear witness that "a babbled o' green fields;" and that some as their last timeous act did from adopted tongues and secular fields of thought revert to their native Aramic. And not alone, it would seem, is this recessional phenomenon peculiar to crises of Mortality; but those episodic occasions when the conduct of life comes up for sharp settlement, are, also, under its governance to the extent that under present mental and emotional stresses there is a tendency to escape or solve them by retreat to some anterior plan of reference.

Myself in Ultima Thule had both infancy and youth. Age was about my growing years. As preceptors to adolescence there attended me, Romance—Romance in withdrawing rooms fragrant with roseleaf; in paneled halls and oriel-litten galleries hung with panoplies of chivalry; in quiet churchyards; in ancient chantries commemorative of the dust and themselves epitaphic memorials of men's desire so to register himself in the book of life, that later travellers might read and know that here, too, had passed before them, one like unto themselves along the road to El Dorado. Upon me, too, the transcendental laid its impress; when of nightfall the vesper bell ringing across the meres filled my bedchamber with a golden wistfulness of sound. While as the shadows drew out and ruffling winds complained through casement and corridor, and whooped among twisted chimney stacks; I lay, a wisp of human consciousness in my high and carved and curtained bed, and hearing the great bell in the neighbouring church tower strike out its loud curfew, thought of the world that lay beyond the sound of bells, where no king's writ ran and the tongue of episcopacy spake not; and of the time when I should adventure it.

So now under the press of decision in the pulsing heart of modernity, life flashed for me to youth; and at the sound of the bell striking out its harsh monition here where no king's writ ran; I thought on the world that lay beyond the sound of bells where the tongue of episcopacy spake not; and of the time when I should adventure it. . . . and turning aside I went through the iron gate and sat among the rude emblems of mortality.

THE DEVIL, THE WORLD AND THE FLESH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE *Devil, the world* and *the flesh* are linked together in the phraseology of the baptismal formula. The world, as well as the flesh, is thus definitely associated with the Devil in the Christian religion. Although not explicitly stated in the creed of any sect, Protestants as well as Catholics consider the material world, in contrast with the spiritual realm, a diabolical work. The fact is that the Devil is commonly credited with the creation of the cosmos.

There is much significance in this often mentioned saying, which is well worth historical analysis. As a rule, popular phrases have a good deal of meaning for the investigator. Under the guise of a figure of speech there is psychological value, regardless of whether or not serious belief is given to such conceptions, inasmuch as this is a discussion in terminology rather than theology.

THE DEVIL AS MASTER OF MATTER

The belief in the world as a diabolical work can be traced back to Iranian-Persian teachings. In the Zend-Avesta we find that the Devil created the evil part of the world in contradistinction to the good part fashioned by the Deity. The Jews, who obtained their notion of the Devil from the Persians, rejected the theory of a dual creation. In the Old Testament the Lord is represented as the maker of the material as well as of the spiritual world, of darkness as well as of light. In the New Testament, however, the Devil's power over this world is strongly emphasized. He is not named the creator of this world, but is called "the prince of the world" (John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11; cf. Eph. ii. 2; vi. 12) even "the god of this world" (2 Cor. iv. 4). The belief in the temporal world as the work of the Devil, however, soon took root in Christianity. First appeared the Gnostics with their teachings that the world was created and is ruled by the Devil. In the Valentinian Gnosis, this material world is the work of a fallen æon, and in the writings of the Gnostic Saturninus, dark matter as the domain of the Devil is placed in opposition to the light-realm of the Deity. The Manicheans, who drew the logical conclusions from the syncretic speculations of their Gnostic predecessors, taught that all matter, good as well as evil, had its origin in the kingdom of darkness. The creation of man, as of the material world in general, is, according to Manichean teachings, the work of the Devil, who wished to imprison and finally to destroy the souls emanating from the god of light in the diabolically created bodies, to which they must cling.

Although Manicheism was considered a heresy, the Church nevertheless could not wholly combat its concepts. Manicheism took deep root in Christianity and could not be extirpated.[1] Throughout the history of the Church, the belief in the creation of the world by the Devil appears again and again in various forms and in various parts of Christendom. This belief formed the essential element of the system of the heretical sects and is still held by the Yesidis, a sect of devil-worshippers in Asia Minor.[2] The Church itself adopted this belief, at least in part. If it did not consider the Devil the creator of the world, it regarded him as the master of all matter, and looked upon all nature as the domain of the Devil. This conception, prevalent in the Church, will account for the idea of the inherent wickedness of all matter and for the belief that evils of every kind spring from our material bodies. Our forebears held that all diseases were caused by demons and that relief from all ailments consisted in the exorcism of the demons—the diabolical ancestors of our modern germs—from the human body.

Many modern writers also share the belief in the creation of the world by the Devil. Gœthe, in his youth, looked upon Lucifer as the author of all creation. William Blake stated unequivocally: "Nature is the work of the Devil. The Devil is in us as far as we are Nature." Byron, in *Cain* (1821), represents Lucifer as co-creator of the world. In Immermann's *Merlin* (1832), Satan is the demiurge, the creator of the earth in Gnostic and Platonic philosophy. The Spanish lyric poet, José de Espronceda, in his fragmentary *El Diablo Mundo* (1841), also identifies the Devil with the world. Leconte de Lisle expresses his belief that the world is the work of the Evil Spirit, and that it will exist only as long as Evil exists on earth. In his poem, "la Tristesse du Diable" (1866), this pessimistic poet affirms that the result of the six days' labor will be abolished on that day when, from the bottom of limitless spaces, the oppressed races of the earth hear a voice crying, "Satan is dead!" Anatole France, in his work, *le Jardin d'Épicure* (1895), speaking of the Devil, affirms that "he has created at least one half of the world . . ." In an earlier work, however, this latter-day diabolist expresses the belief that the Demon has created all the world (*la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque,* 1893).

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[1] See G. Messina's article, "la dottrina Manichea e le origini del Cristianesimo," *Biblica,* X (1930), No. 3.

[2] On the various sects who held the belief in the Devil as the creator of the world, see the present writer's essay, "Des Teufels Schöpferolle bei Gœthe und Hebbel," *Neophilologus,* VI (1918-9), 319-22.

Alfred de Vigny also believed in the infernal essence of Nature. This "enigmatical divinity," with its inflexible and inexorable laws, was, in the opinion of this pessimistic poet, silent and indolent, cold and cruel, disdainful and unmerciful to the ephemeral creature, man. Nature, hymned by mortals as the beneficent mother of men, was to Vigny only their living tomb. In Baudelaire's eyes, Nature, though not created by the Devil, was nevertheless inherently defiled and, according to his own expression, Satanical. In the opinion of this Catholic and diabolic poet, original sin had indelibly stained all Nature.

Even if we do not hold the belief that the Devil created the cosmos, we may agree that it is he at least who makes the world go round. Satan is putatively a very potent power for evil on this planet. His kingdom is in the human mind, through which he directs the affairs of this earth. It is not without reason, therefore, that the Demon was popularly regarded in the Middle Ages, and even for many centuries afterwards, as the governor of this globe.

As for the creation of man, even if we do not favor the belief that man is the Devil's handiwork, orthodoxy contends that he was created through the instrumentality of Satan. For his existence on this earth, man is at least indirectly indebted to the Devil. It should be remembered that man was created solely as successor to Satan in the celestial choir-stalls. If the beautiful archangel had not rebelled, no vacancy would have occurred in heaven; and with no vacancy in heaven, there would have been no need for man's creation. It is thus proved, to the satisfaction of believers, that man's creation is at least indirectly the work of the Devil.[3]

THE DEVIL AS PRINCE OF THIS WORLD

Furthermore, it is to Diabolus that man is indebted for all human accomplishments and achievements. Inasmuch as the Spirit of Evil was in the eyes of the Church the master of all terrestrial matter, he was considered the incarnation of all human endeavor which was based on mundane interests. The Church was concerned with things spiritual and of the other world, consigning to the Devil the possessions and deeds of this world. This ecclesiastical antithesis between heavenliness and earthliness amounted in the end to this fact that whatever did not directly contribute to the glory of God, in other words, did not profit the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, was denounced as diabolical. In fact, whatever was displeasing to Rome in any field of human thought or activity was regarded as the Devil's work.

SATAN AS SPONSOR OF REASON

It is a matter of historical record that the priests placed all mundane pursuits, professions and pleasures of man under the protection of the Powers of the Pit.[4] The learned pursuits in particular were believed to be under the inspiration of demons. The priests preached at all times, but especially in the Middle Ages, what André Gide calls "the evangelical depreciation of reason." Satan was regarded by the Church as the incarnation of human reason in contrast to the Saviour, who represented faith. The Spanish reactionary, Cortes Doñoso, less than a century ago, denounced reason as a gift of Gehenna. Heinrich Heine, in *Die Elementargeister* (1834), explains the Catholic condemnation of human reason in the following words:

> "The Devil is not only the representative of the supremacy of earthly interests, of sensual delights, and of the flesh; but he is also the exponent of human reason, simply because reason vindicates all the rights of matter. In this respect, Diabolus is the antithesis of Christ, who sets forth

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[3] On the Devil's partnership with the Deity in the creation of the world, see also the chapter "Diabolus Simia Dei" in the present work.

[4] Baudelaire's dictum that commerce was in its essence Satanic should certainly meet with the hearty approval of the socialists.

> not only the spirit, the ascetic abnegation of the senses, and heavenly salvation, but also faith. The Devil does not *believe,* he does not accept blindly the authority of other persons, he rather relies on independent thought; he uses reason. This method is of course dangerous and terrible; and the Roman Catholic Church has logically condemned independent individual thought as devilish, and declared that the Devil, as the representative of reason, is the Father of Lies."

It is for this reason that, in the eyes of the Church, thinking was equivalent to blaspheming, and that it imprisoned, tortured, hanged or burned every person who dared to think for himself.

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Modern writers, in conformity with Catholic teaching, regard Satan as a luminous genius of reason. Gœthe conceived the Evil Spirit not only as the subtlest of all the beasts of the field, but also as the subtlest of all the intellects of men. In the opinion of Anatole France, it was thought that led the beautiful archangel to revolt (*le Puits de Sainte-Claire,* 1895). Rapisardi's Lucifer is the exponent of Reason, which will finally conquer dogma and do away with superstition and unsupported tradition.

The Devil has a reputation for wisdom. He appears to possess a great amount of brains between the two horns on his head. Anton Chekhov, in "The Shoemaker and the Devil" (1883), maintains that Old Nick, notwithstanding his hoofs and tail, has more brains than many a (Russian) student. Max Beerbohm, in "Enoch Soames" (1916), affirms that the Devil is well informed in all things.

SATAN AS SCHOLAR

Satan, it is generally agreed among modern writers, is a learned scholar and a profound thinker. He has all philosophy and theology, ancient learning and modern science at the tip of his tongue. Anatole France, in his previously quoted work, *le Jardin d'Épicure,* calls the Devil "a great *savant.*" This French writer credits Diabolus with a philosophical mind, and Friedrich Hebbel goes so far as to hail Satan as the first philosopher. Heinrich Heine, in the previously quoted *Elementargeister,* represents the Devil as a master in metaphysics, and Edgar Allan Poe, in "Bon-Bon" (1835), reveals the Devil as a practised metaphysician. Maxim Gorky, in "The Devil" (1899), maintains that Satan is a master ironist, who will, however, not apply "the scalpel of his irony" to the majestic fact of his own existence. Heinrich Heine, in the work just mentioned again, tells us that Satan is a logician. Anatole France says likewise, "The Devil claims that he is a logician" ("le Scepticisme," 1888). Paul Verlaine calls Satan "the old logician." Heinrich Heine assures us further that Diabolus possesses clear, luminous logic,—in fact the greatest ability in argument. According to this German poet, Satan is famed for sophistry and fine-spun syllogisms. Gœthe, in *Faust,* has, to a great extent, availed himself of this characteristic of sophistry on the part of the Evil Spirit. Satan, it should be remembered, is a good dialectician, an incomparable casuist, and a controversialist. The Demon is very fond of disputing when driving a bargain with men for their souls. "The Devil," says Anatole France, in the essay just mentioned, "definitely remains the only doctor who has not yet been refuted." Huysmans warns us with regard to the Devil, "You must not discuss with him; however good a reasoner you may be, you will be worsted, for he is a most tricky dialectician" (*En route,* 1895). Mrs. Browning, in *A Drama of Exile* (1845), portrays Lucifer as an argumentative, introspective spirit, well read in modern poetry and well versed in modern thought. In Molnar's *The Devil* (1907), the protagonist is a masterful ironist and casuist, who demolishes all the stock arguments for goodness, which have been advanced by mortals throughout the ages.

The Devil is no less a theologian than a philosopher. Anatole France testified that the Tempter is a great theologian, and is thus necessarily well versed in the Sacred Scriptures. Martin Luther affirmed that the Devil can quote Holy Writ as fluently as any minister, and can twist and torture texts to any meaning that will suit his evil ends.

SATAN AS SYMBOL OF SCIENCE

By medieval man the Devil was believed to hold the key to all knowledge. This belief has scriptural sanction, inasmuch as mastery over the world through the intellect was one of the lures held out to Christ by the Tempter. The Serpent in the Garden of Eden also tempted our ancestors to eat of the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. The reward which the Evil Spirit offered his victim for his soul in the Faust legend was likewise power through knowledge. For this reason, all worldly learning was taboo to the theologians.

To the dominion of the Devil the Church handed over philosophy, science and secular learning in general. Philosophy was regarded by the Church as the forbidden fruit of human reason. Ever since the day when the mob of Nitrian monks, in the month of March of the year 415, murdered Hypatia, the last of the Greek philosophers, Catholicism has considered philosophical speculation the work of Satan.

Especially was the study of science invested by the medieval Church with a diabolical taint. Satan has always been considered the symbol of science. In Flaubert's *la Temtation de Saint-Antoine* (1874), the father of the anchorites sees Satan as the personification of science. The Protestant clergy holds the Catholic view on this point. A speaker at an assembly of Lutheran pastors held at Berlin in the month of September, 1877, identified modern science and culture with Belial. All inquiry into the mysteries of nature was regarded by the Church as black magic. The practical investigation of natural laws was denounced as the work of the Evil One. A certain poet of a generation ago referred very seriously to the laboratory as Satan's smithy.

DIABOLICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

Every discovery of science, every invention of material benefit to man, was believed, during the Middle Ages, and in Catholic countries for long centuries afterwards, to have been secured with the Devil's help. The Marquis de Mirville, author of the treatise, *Des esprits et de leurs manifestations fluidiques dans la science moderne* (1858), also refers all scientific discoveries to the demons of hell. Speaking from the Roman Catholic viewpoint, Jules Michelet exclaims: "Name me one science that has not been a rebel! Every new one," continues this French liberal thinker, "has been Satan." Accordingly, the Vicomte Joseph de Bonald, a religious reactionary living in the beginning of the past century, long before our own fundamentalists, perceived the idea of evolution to be born of the Evil Spirit.

According to the contention of the theologians, it was Satan who in all ages inspired the philosophers and scientists. Every man who was distinguished from the masses by his learning was suspected of having signed the Satanic pact. Any extraordinary power of intellect was sufficient for our credulous forefathers to credit its possessor with a knowledge of the Black Arts or dealings with the Devil. The human mind was not considered capable of accomplishing anything outstanding without the aid of Satan. "In the popular belief," says Professor Ward, "pre-eminent success in any of the paths which human ambition follows, especially if achieved with extraordinary rapidity or in the teeth of unusual difficulties, was associated with the possession of supernatural powers."[5]

Scholars were especially regarded as servants of Satan. "You scholars carry on dealings with the Devil," says a character in Alexandre Dumas' *la Tulipe noire* (1850). It is common knowledge that men of great learning, like Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon, figured in the eyes of our ancestors as magicians. Giordano Bruno, Servetus and Galileo, it was believed, owed their scientific theories to the inspiration of the demons below.

In all ages the Devil has received the laurels for the labors of the learned. The discovery of the art of printing—the right hand of our civilization—was ascribed to Diabolus. Heinrich Heine, writing of the invention of printing, also said that an art which gave science the victory over faith, an art, moreover, which plunged us into doubts and revolutions, finally delivered us into the hands of the Devil. Johannes Fust or Faust, a promoter of Gutenberg's invention of the art of printing, was considered by his contemporaries a servant of Satan and a magician. The black slave, whom Aldus Manutius, the great Venetian printer, employed in his printing shop toward the end of the fifteenth century, was popularly said to be an imp of hell. This belief accounts for the term "Printer's Devil." The invention of paper money was attributed to the Devil by Gérard de Nerval in *l'Imagier de Harlem ou la Découverte de l'imprimerie* (1851).

Among all scientific pursuits, chemistry was especially considered black magic and identified with alchemy. The chemist's crucible, and the fumes and vapors emanating therefrom, assumed the dimensions of the alchemist's cauldron. Sulphur and phosphorus, in particular, were regarded as articles of purely diabolical equipment. A character in Balzac's *la Peau de chagrin* (1831) also calls chemistry "that science of a devil." This idea survived so long that, in the eighteenth century, Friedrich Hoffmann, a professor at the University of Halle, and a prolific writer on chemical and medical subjects, was believed to have discovered carbonic acid gas with the aid of the Devil.

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[5] *Cf.* A. W. Ward: *Old English Drama.* 4th ed., Oxford, 1901.

The German Franciscan monk, Berthold Schwarz, who invented gunpowder about 1350, was believed to be a servant of Satan. A plate in Johannes Brantzius' *les Artifices de feu* (1604) shows the Devil instructing Schwarz in the art of making gunpowder. Chapelain, in *la Pucelle* (1656), represents the Devil as the inventor of gunpowder and owner of a cannon factory. Milton, in *Paradise Lost* (1667-74), also credits the Devil with the invention of the cannon. Tammuz, the Syrian god of vegetation, who, together with all other pagan gods, was converted into a demon by Christianity, is said to be a rival inventor of artillery. P. J. Stahl, in *le Diable à Paris* (1842), similarly attributes the invention of fire-arms to Satan. This writer also terms the silkworm the Devil's worker.

The clergy also counted steam-power among the illusions of the Devil. Pope Gregory XVI called steam an invention of Satan. The priests found no difficulty in spreading this distrust in scientific discoveries among the masses of poor and ignorant country-folk. The peasants of Provence also considered steam an emanation of hell (Alphonse Daudet: "le Secret de Maître Cornille," 1869). The construction of the first steamboat was attributed to the Devil. "Fulton," said one of the characters in Victor Hugo's *les Travailleurs de la Mer* (1866), "was a variation of Lucifer." The locomotive passed originally for Satan's chariot. The school board of the town of Lancaster, Ohio, in 1828, declared the railroad a device of the Devil. In the eyes of the Old Order branch of the Church of the Brethren in America, the automobile is a "devil-machine." The Polish peasants call the radio the "devil-box." The possessor of a radio was recently murdered by Polish peasants in his vicinity, who, in justification, asserted that it killed their crops. Even sanitary appliances were attributed to the Devil. Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, living in the twelfth century, beheld Lucifer lurking in lavatories. The Russians, down to the seventeenth century, regarded purgings and clysters as infernal inventions.[6]

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[6] The telephone is considered by many Europeans, on grounds other than religious, as a diabolic invention, inasmuch as it implies a negation of per-

THE ARTS SPONSORED BY SATAN

But more than anything else, it was art that Catholicism counted among the works of Satan. The Church has at all times affirmed the diabolical origin of all artistic beauty. "Inasmuch as the Evil Spirit," says M. André Thérive, "was the most beautiful of angels, it stands to reason that he will tempt mortals, not by denying art, but through art and under the mask of beauty."[7] According to the Church fathers, the Devil lurks behind all beauty. St. Cyprian saw the Fiend in a flower. The Protestants were not behind the Catholics in their anathema against all art. The Church of England believed the Muses to be daughters of the Devil. The English poet and preacher, John Donne, in a sermon delivered before Oliver Cromwell at Whitehall, affirmed that the Muses were damned spirits of demons. By the Puritans the seven arts were counted among the works of Satan. Thomas Carlisle reported that his pious friend wished that "the Devil would fly away with the fine arts."

Strangely enough, this belief in the diabolical origin of art is sincerely shared by many moderns. André Gide, the contemporary French diabolist, affirms, "There is no true work of art without the collaboration of the Devil." James Huneker says similarly, "Without the Devil there would be no art." If art has always been diabolical in its essence, it has assuredly become increasingly so in modern times. Charles Baudelaire, a profound and penetrating thinker as well as poet, saw correctly when he said, "Modern art, in particular, has an essentially devilish tendency." This trend results from the fact that, more keenly than their predecessors, the moderns are interested in the demoniac element of human nature.

THE DEVIL AS ARTIST

The popular belief, which credits the Devil with a mastery of all arts, is also shared by many modern thinkers. Anatole France ap-

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sonal liberty by forcing man's attention at all hours of the day and the night. Read the editorial printed on the occasion of the death of Graham Bell, the inventor of the telephone, in the Paris daily, *le Temps,* of August 3, 1922. The reader who is interested in the war between the monastery and laboratory is referred to Andrew D. White's classical work on the subject, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology.* 2 vols., New York, 1898.

[7] André Thérive: "M. André Gide et le Diable," *l'Opinion,* August 17, 1923.

plies to Diabolus the singular epithets of "great artist" (*le Jardin d'Épicure,* 1895) and "wonderful artist" (*Thais,* 1890).

The Devil is credited in the popular mind with great skill in the technical arts; skill which he inherited, be it parenthetically remarked, from the giants of the old North. The Fiend, in fact, is famed as an architect. The many devil-bridges in Germany and other countries speak for his talents, and the cathedrals even show some of his handiwork as a great builder.

The Devil was always ready to aid artisans who found that they could not complete the work they had undertaken. For, in earthly pursuits, the Devil is man's best friend, ready to lend a hand whenever man is at the end of his natural capacities. "I am one," says Old Nick to Steenie Steenson in Walter Scott's "Wandering Willie's Tale" (1824), "that, though I have been sair misca'd in the world, am the only hand for helping my freends." The Devil never shrank from performing the most arduous tasks, and never even recoiled from carving intricate church-pillars for architects who found that unaided they could not carry out their plans. Solomon found no difficulty in recruiting demons to help him build his temple at Jerusalem. They quarried and cut stones for that edifice, which was erected to the glory of their Great Enemy.

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In Jewish mythology it was the fallen angels who instructed men in all the arts and sciences. Samsaweel taught men the signs of the sun, Seriel, the signs of the moon, and Arakiel, the signs of the earth. Kawkabel was, according to Jewish belief, the demon who taught men astrology, just as Set or Seth, in Egyptian mythology, is the originator of astronomy and many other arts, especially agriculture.[8] Barakel instructed men in the art of divination from the stars, and Ezekeel taught them augury from the clouds. Armaros showed men how to break spells, and Shemhazai taught them exorcism and how to cut roots. The inventor of the finery and ornaments with which women attract men is Azazel. This demon showed the daughters of Eve "armlets and all sorts of trinkets, taught them the use of rouge, and showed them how to beautify their eyelids and how to ornament themselves with the rarest and most precious jewels and with all sorts of paint."[9] This demon also showed the different metals to men and taught them "how to make slaughtering knives, arms and shields and coats of mail."[10] In European folklore, Bel, a prince of fire, is said to have made possible those technical arts of man which cannot be produced without the aid of fire.

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[8] *Cf.* Moncure Daniel Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (London, 1879; 3rd ed., New York, 1889), II, 279.

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[9] *Cf.* Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philodelphia, 1909-25), I, 125.

[10] *Ibid.*

(To Be Continued)

THE LAW OF REGRESSION IN RELIGION AND MORALS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

ONE of the principles definitely established in biology is that known as "the law of filial regression." A better formula is, "the tendency to mediocrity." Sir Francis Galton, a pioneer in the statistical study of inheritance, demonstrated that extreme or exceptional peculiarities in parents became less and less exceptional in their offspring. In the words of Galton, "the stature of adult offspring must on the whole be more mediocre than the stature of their parents—that is to say, more near to the mean or mid of the general population." Intellectually and morally, Galton was convinced, as other biologists have been and are, we fare no better. In Galton's words, again, "the more bountifully a parent is gifted by nature, the more rare will be his good fortune if he begets a son who is as richly endowed as himself." The tendency throughout nature, indeed, *is to revert to the mean and to eliminate the abnormal or super-normal.*

These facts are clearly quite as important to sociology and to scientific or philosophical reform movements as they are to biology. If there is a tendency to mediocrity in nature, social and moral relations can not escape the same fate. Society is not an organism in the strict sense of the term, but it is an organic entity nevertheless for all essential social purposes. Great seers and leaders, founders of religions, schools, parties, systems of government have spiritual offspring—disciples, interpreters, enthusiastic propagandists. The law of filial regression seems to apply to the spiritual sons and daughters of genius or of truly remarkable ability.

History, we shall see, is full of illustration of this tendency to revert to the mean and the ordinary. Some of the illustrations seem tragic, and therefore strained, improbable explanations of them have been advanced by minds otherwise acute and powerful. Ah, what progress humanity would have made had it been able to preserve and even improve upon the exceptional moral and spiritual gifts of its prophets, its supermen, its heroes and martyrs! But, alas, the rare exceptions and the peculiarities, no matter how valuable and beneficent they may be, are obliterated by the universal tendency to mediocrity. The children of the moral giant are "shorter" than the spiritual parent, and their children are apt to be still shorter. The noble and lofty teachings and examples of the parent are either forgotten, or misinterpreted, or honored only by lip service. Practice and conduct undergo little change, or else the change that does take place under the inspiring, influential leadership of the genius, like a revivalist's conversion of a multitude, gradually fades and melts into conduct hardly ditinguishable from that of the pre-conversion period.

But the thoughtful and open-minded student of history and of social psychology is not at all astonished, or disheartened, by these facts. They are seen to be natural and inevitable. Only, not even reflective students always draw the right moral from them.

Mr. H. G. Wells, for example, in his extraordinarily vivid and fascinating *Outline of History*, in discussing the early corruption and misconception of Buddhism, says:

"There seems to be no limit to the lies that honest but stupid disciples will tell for the glory of their master and for what they regard as the success of their propaganda. Men who would scorn to tell a lie in everyday life will become unscrupulous cheats and liars when they have given themselves up to propagandist works; it is one of the perplexing absurdities of our human nature."

Here we have a most sweeping generalization—namely, that religious and ethical systems tend to corruption because the zeal of the propagandists who flock to the master's standard leads them, or many of them, to invent lies and vulgar marvels for the purpose of arousing the interest and gripping the imagination of the indifferent, the unintelligent and the superstitious. To this generalization two objections may be raised. In the first place, few of the mendacious disciple-propagandists lie *deliberately and consciously.* They undoubtedly half believe their own inventions. They exaggerate spontaneously, they "romance," as children do, or even adults when carried away by any cause whatever, personal, class or social; and subsequently they are humanly ashamed to retract the half true or extravagant statements impulsively made by them. The capacity for self-deception, for self-exculpation, is known to psychologists and common-sense observers of human behavior, and these are not as ready as Mr. Wells to call enthusiasts and rhetoricians "cheats and liars." Care and precision, literal and rigorous truth in human speech, and especially in eager, excited speech, are rare and difficult virtues, seldom achieved even by men of science, especially in their ordinary conversations and their offhand, unguarded utterances.

The second objection to Mr. Wells' severe indictment of human nature in disciples and apostles is more important even than the first. Grant for the sake of the argument that the disciples too willingly become "cheats and liars" for the glory of their revered master, whose message they are so anxious to disseminate that they lose consciousness of their own initial violation of its spirit and even of its letter. What does this fact prove? That the disciples, who are of the people and intimately acquainted with their proclivities and mental habits, find it necessary to cheat and lie *in order to render the master's message acceptable.* The disciples seek to make converts, and do not hesitate, by the hypothesis, to stoop to conquer. Otherwise, their voices would be voices crying in a wilderness. The process of popularization, of corruption, of attenuation, of sugar-coating, which the disciples set in motion, even in the lifetime of the master, continues afterward with ever increasing momentum. In the course of a comparatively short period the master's original and revolutionary teachings become conventionalized, hardly distinguishable from the old, unsound creed they were intended to discredit and overthrow. Can we complain that the disciples lack the faith, the courage, the vision, the single-mindedness of the master? This would be irrational and futile. To repeat, moral genius, like intellectual, is rare. It is foredoomed to misconstruction and perversion. It is foredoomed by the law of regression or the tendency to the mean.

Let us go to history for some striking illustrations of this tendency. The rise, growth and decline of great religious systems might be expected, a priori, to supply them, and in fact they do.

Take Buddhism first. Mr. H. G. Wells, in his "Outline"—a compilation based on standard works and authorities—writes as follows concerning the fundamental teaching of Gautama:

"All the miseries and discontents of life he traces to insatiable selfishness. Suffering, he teaches, is due to the craving individuality, to the torment of greedy desire. Until a man has overcome every sort of personal craving his life is trouble and his end sorrow. There are three principal forms the craving of life takes, and all are evil. The first is the desire to gratify the senses, sensuousness. The second is the desire for personal immortality. The third is the desire for prosperity, worldliness. All these must be overcome—that is to say, a man must no longer be living for himself—before life can become serene. But when they are indeed overcome and no longer rule a man's life, when the first personal pronoun has vanished from his private thoughts, then he has reached the higher wisdom, Nirvana, serenity of soul."

Gautama's Rule of Life, or Eightfold Path to wisdom and serenity, is this: right views; right aspirations; right speech; right conduct; right livelihood; right effort; right mindfulness; right rapture.

Gautama's religion, Mr. Wells truly observes, was primarily a religion of conduct, not a religion of observances and sacrifices. It had no temples, no priestly order, no sacrifices, and no theology. The gods worshipped in India in Guatama's time were completely ignored—passed by.

What happened to Gautama's teaching, to primitive Buddhism? Let Mr. Wells answer:

"It was early the fate of Gautama . . . to be made into a wonder by his less intelligent disciples in their efforts to impress the outer world. We have already noted how one devout follower could not but believe that the moment of the master's mental irradiation must necessarily have been marked by an epileptic fit of the elements. This is one small sample of the vast accumulation of vulgar marvels that presently sprang up about the memory of Buddha. . . .

"Honest souls, for most of them were indubitably honest, were presently telling their hearers of the miracles that attended the Buddha's birth—of his youthful feats of strength, of the marvels of his everyday life, winding up with a sort of illumination of his body at the moment of death. Of course it was impossible to believe that Buddha was the son of a mortal father. He was miraculously conceived through his mother dreaming of a beautiful white elephant. . .

"Moreover, a theology grew up about Buddha. He was discovered to be a god. He was one of a series of divine beings, the Buddhas. 'Under the overpowering influence of these sickly imaginations the moral teachings of Gautama have been almost hid from view. The theories grew and flourished; each new step, each new hypothesis, demanded another, until the whole sky was filled with forgeries of the brain, and the nobler and simpler lessons of the founder of the religion were smothered beneath the glittering mass of metaphysical subtleties' (Rhys Davids' "Buddhism")."

Many of the disciples, misconceiving the idea of renunciation, lapsed into monasticism, a lapse particularly easy in the climate of India. Then Buddhism gained wealth and power; simple huts were giving place to substantial structures, decorated and adorned. Early Buddhist art was strongly Greek in character, and the cult and doctrine of Gautama soon gathered corruptions and variations from Brahminism and Hellenism alike.

The fate of primitive Buddhism is not exceptional but typical. Whatever one may think of Mr. Wells' own religious views, no serious student of history will take exception to the following general observations regarding primitive Christianity:

"The story of the early beginnings of Christianity is the story of the struggle between the real teachings and spirit of Jesus of Nazareth and the limitations, amplifications and misunderstandings of the very inferior men who had loved and followed him to Gallilee and who were now the bearers and custodians of his message to mankind."

Nor is it possible to dissent from the statement that Paul, who had never seen Jesus, built the ethical and spiritual doctrines of the Nazarine into a subtle theological system, or converted a way of living into a doctrine of belief, the beginning of a creed.

Islam, again, has been corrupted by zealous but credulous and limited disciples. "It was full of the spirit of kindliness, generosity and brotherhood"—writes Mr. Wells—"and it was a simple and understandable religion; it was instinct with the chivalrous sentiment of the desert; and it made its appeal straight to the commonest instincts in the composition of ordinary men."

But—"the splendid opening of the story of Islam collapses suddenly into squalid dispute and bickering of heirs and widows." The history of Islam degenerates, to quote Mr. Wells again, "into the normal crimes and intrigues of an Oriental dynasty." Why? Chiefly because Islam, as it spread and stereotyped itself, had to work on a less and less congenial basis—had to grow on soil that distorted and perverted it, answers Mr. Wells. Countless converts were converts only in name; they missed the spirit and essence of the faith they thought they were embracing.

Thus, without multiplying words, one may conclude with Mr. Wells that all great unifying religions "present the same history of a rapid spreading, like a little water poured over a great area, and then of superficiality and corruption."

Is the history of great political, social and economic movements, of the explosions we call revolutions, different from that of religious reformations? The answer is that it is not. In the words of Mr. R. S. Tawney, in his admirable little book, "The Acquisitive Society," painful experience shows that revolutions take their color and tone from the very system or order they undertake to overthrow.

Take the great French Revolution. Its principles were noble and inspiring. Its leaders were sincere and earnest men. They were ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of human liberty, equality and fraternity. They were tolerant and humane at the start. But how soon the movement so auspiciously and so thrillingly begun degenerated into the worst form of tyranny, into incredible cruelty and savagery! Leaders of groups and factions were sent to the guillotine for political, ethical or religious opinions which the men temporarily in supreme power deemed heterodox and dangerous. Freedom of speech and publication was suppressed. The tyranny of the liberators and humanitarians became worse than that they had thundered against and overthrown! No wonder the people of France were ready after years of disorder, or bloodshed, of insensate fanaticism and revolting injustice to submit even to Napoleon Bonaparte and his imperial regime!

In our day we have the object lessons of the Russian "social revolution" under the Bolshevik clique of dogmatists and pedants. This "real" or economic revolution was embarked upon for the purpose of completing the task of the political revolution of March, 1917. Lenin, Trotzky and their colleagues, as disciples of Marx, hoped and sought to destroy once and for all the capitalist-bourgeois order in Russia and in the world at large. They thought they had a rare historic opportunity and that it was their sacred mission and privilege to improve it. They had, they claimed, a more advanced type of democracy, a more genuine kind of liberty, to offer to mankind. They were evolutionists *in theory,* and they had written and spoken most earnestly against Utopian or sentimental radicalism that imagined the course of history could be changed, a process of development shortened, by mere willing or sighing or even terrorizing and fighting. But when the temptation seemed to present itself, they yielded. They forgot their science, their stern historical logic, their determinism. Russia was backward, primitive, ignorant, illiterate, barbarous; yet, after all, perhaps it *was* her lot to lead the West, to set an example of thoroughgoing revolution, to start the world-conflagration. Europe might follow. America was a formidable stumbling block, but she too might follow. The risk might be taken—nay, must be taken.

But when Europe, profiting to some extent by the bitter experience of the Russian victims of premature and non-evolutionary revolution, refused to follow Lenin, what did the Bolshevik pedants do? Acknowledge their blunder and make peace with the intelligent and constructive Russian radicals and literals? No. They persisted in their fatal error, and decline and degeneration set in. Espionage, terror, tyranny, ruthless suppression of the most moderate criticisms, wholesale arrests and executions were—and still are—the means adopted by the Bolshevist dictatorship to retain power and postpone the inevitable—surrender to irresistible forces, to the logic of facts and conditions. The followers and disciples of Lenin and his few associates surpassed their masters in violence, arrogance, impotent rage and ferocity. The great social revolution that was to liberate Russia at one stroke, thrill the world and establish the purest and truest form of democracy has assumed the revolting, abhorrent form of a depotism worse than that of the most reactionary of the czars. Criminals, knaves, hypocrites, bullies, thieves, placemen flocked to the Bolshevik banner. The eventual liquidation of the whole fantastic and stupid experiment became inevitable. "The greatest failure in all history," Mr. John Spargo calls Bolshevism. *One* of the greatest failures it certainly is, and it dramatically reenforces the many lessons of history that illustrate the law of regression and of the reversion to the mean.

"The Great Man" theory of progress is utterly unsound and fallacious. Humanity is not lifted up and carried forward by heroes, or demi-gods, or super-men. The seers and prophets are those who interpret tendencies rightly, who see things as they are, who forecast the future because they realize all the implications and necessary effects of the present. We cannot appeal to the non-existent. We cannot create something out of nothing. The prophets and leaders. as Mr. Wells says, do but call forth elements that are latent in mind and conscience of hosts of ordinary men and women. We are all strange bundles of contradictions, mixed motives, conflicting instincts and impulses. We are all to a certain extent "educable" and plastic. We respond to the good, and we succumb to the bad in us. The great leaders make their appeal to the latent good, and for a time they may succeed, perhaps even beyond expectations. But the struggle recommences, the less creditable motives and desires reassert themselves, the old habits insidiously resume control. The reaction that results is not necessarily equal to the action; if it were, no progress would be possible. *Something remains of the new faith,* the conquest over the lower self. The general moral tone in society is higher because of the generous enthusiasm, the infectious zeal, the conversions, the new evangel, the precept and example of the master. We revert to the mean, but the mean is found, in the moral and spiritual realm, to be somewhat or distinctly better than before the change. We say, if we lapse, that we had not really understood ourselves, and that we had not sufficiently identified ourselves, consciously, with our higher qualities. The master had energized, mobilized, organized and made effective the latent and potential forces.

But we must not fold our hand and wait for the genius, the master, to push us forward and place us on a higher plane. Genius is rare and unforeseen. It is not true—to quote Lord James Bryce, in substance—that the occasion *always* brings the man, or that demand for leadership *always* produces the supply. History flatly contradicts the too optimistic generalization which asserts the contrary. When the master "happens"—and no one can tell beforehand *where* a genius will be thrown up by nature—human advance may be facilitated. But to neglect all the other means of facilitating progress in a moral, spiritual and social direction is to sacrifice the certain, the permanent, for the occasional and accidental. The main effort of high-minded and humanitarian thinkers should be to elevate the mean, the average, by unceasing education and by honest agitation of the problems that challenge attention and enjoin solution under penalties—penalties in the form of misery, friction, ill will, catastrophe. One may not agree wtih Mr. Wells that history up to date has been "a race between education and catastrophe" in which the latter has generally won, for, if this were true, mankind would not be where it is today intellectually and morally. Progress is a *fact* to the sober-minded student of man and society; not merely a dogma or hope. Education has won many a race in history, but it can win more frequently and more decisively if, instead of depending on exceptional genius, we emphasize constantly the need and ample possibilities of patient, sustained, modest educational work on democratic lines. The alternative to progress by education is progress by fits and starts, by convulsions—often unfortunate and futile convulsions—with subsequent reversion to the mean. It is unscientific and foolish to underestimate the intelligence of the average body of men and women who suffer by reason of unjust survivals and of maladjustments. If the grievances they are supposed to have are real, and not imaginary, their problems can be stated, formulated and explained to most of them, and so can the proposed solutions. *If humanity cannot be educated, it cannot be reformed.* There are Bourbons in every class that learn nothing and forget nothing, but they are in the minority. What is reasonable in reform makes its appeal to reason. What is just in reform—no matter how radical it may seem at first—strikes a responsive chord in conscience, in the sense of right and honor, and makes the still small voice imperative and compelling. Modern democratic societies, says Bryce, are *what their leaders make them.* This is largely true, though an overstatement of the case. But leadership in a modern society need not be the privilege of the few. It can become the privilege of thousands of thoughtful, sincere men and women in their respective spheres of influence. Newspapers, periodicals, popular books, pamphlets, trade union meetings, civic and cultural clubs—all these, and many other agencies, have it within their power to carry on systematic education of the masses, provided they first fit themselves for the task by earnest study and reflection, and thus gradually elevate the mean.

OPPOSITION VERSUS INDIFFERENCE

BY HAROLD BERMAN

A MAN should never be afraid of opponents, but mortally afraid of those who are neither opponents nor the exponents of his ideal or outlook, nor for that matter, the exponents or opponents of any outlook or philosophy in particular. An opponent is he who has given the particular philosophy or outlook cherished by you some earnest and more or less consistent consideration, and is ready to do so again if new facts and added information are presented to him, but who sincerely finds himself at present unable to concur in your views or to accept your methods or cure as the panacea for the particular ill or ills it proposes to cure. Enlightened opposition implies by its very term a readiness to learn, a willingness to accept something new and different from the philosophy and outlook that one has espoused all along provided that the new prove more acceptable to his rationalizing facilities or mystical and intuitional needs and inspirations than the old system, in which case one is quite ready to accept it and make it his only guide in life and quite irrespective of the destruction that it brings in its train to one's inherited notions, his preconceived and cherished ideals and the number of one's hallowed idols that it will inevitably lay in the dust.

An opposition of this dynamic and enlightened nature not only is legitimate but becomes a positive incentive, and, on occasion, even an inspiration to the thinker and the creator, serving as it does to spur him on in his search of new knowledge, of new truths with which to impregnate his own opinions and outlooks, to broaden his field of vision as well as to clarify all disputed points and formulas. And being that the missionary spirit is exceedingly strong in all of us, and no sooner is a belief or *Anschauung* recognized by ourselves as *the truth,* and, hence, as possessing the essence of salvation, physical, mental or spiritual, in it than we itch to preach it and make it known to our fellow-men, so that it becomes the medium of their salvation as well, we usually do go a step further afield and seek not only to defend our own assailed position but exert ourselves at the same time to convert our opponents, and occasionally do succeed in doing it, our own opponents persumably being open to conviction as all men engaged in the search of truth invariably are. It is in this manner that all philosophies and 'ologies make their headway in life, and from their beginning as the treasured possession of one or more favored discoverers or originators become the property of the many, though they inevitably become considerably diluted in the process of popularization and acceptance by the large masses of the people who could not possibly be expected to grasp all their postulated intricacies as well as their abstruse points. Its raging and torrential whirlpools have to be drawn off into the shallow wading pools fordable by the man of low stature, as otherwise they would either refuse to enter the stream altogether, or, having entered it, would be overwhelmed by its strong currents and swept away to their destruction. A thesis must be "watered down" considerably in order to make it acceptable to the weak stomach of the average man, but the essence of its principle cannot, and must not, be abrogated. These constitute the very soul, the life-breath of the thesis, and by tampering with the soul of a living organism we are destroying the body that it dwells in as well, and then we should have nothing whatever left of the entire cherished object.

But that, however, applies only to the undiscriminating mass of the people, and does not at all apply to the chosen, reasoning few who are, above all else, anxious to get at the truth and nothing but the truth. In the case of these superior men one should, on the contrary, take care that the idea be presented to them in its pristine purity, clarity and perfection, as these men do boast the stomach for strong meat; and, furthermore, they are of the seed of the martyrs who might sooner or later become the apostles to carry the divine Gospel, so strenuously opposed by them now, to the very ends of the earth in days to come. They will disseminate it, that is, after they have become converted from opponents into adherents, when they will become as zealous in your cause as they had been formally in its antithetical counterpart.

This gēnre of man, the kind that does his own thinking and is truly anxious for light and leading, is the very one into whose keeping the fate of your ideal may be safely entrusted. Of necessity, *he had to* be your opponent, even an active and sincere opponent, as the more active and sincere his opposition the more zealous and devoted will his adherence be after his conversion. Your Saul of Tarsus, persecutor of truth and its exponents, becomes the Saint Paul after he had beheld the vision of truth on the road to persecute its preachers. But no Pauls are ever bred out of the great masses of indifferent or jeering artisans and petty tradesmen to whom the welfare of their craft or trade is of far greater concern than all the systems of salvation and all the 'ologies in the universe. From these only lackeys and footmen of an idea are made, the "yea" shouters and the coach-followers of the great procession *after* it has become the mass demonstration. They, also, will be found on the band wagon when the proper time arrives, feebly mouthing words that they little understand and care less for.

The preacher of a new religious or social faith should *seek* with all his might to provide himself with opponents of such mettlesome calibre, who in the long run will prove even greater importance to him in his final hour of triumph than the facilely-acquired adherents of a certain, inconsequential, sort. Such an opponent, it is quite true, may prove a Calvin or a Torquemada and burn your body at the stake ere your idea has had the chance to convert him or others. But he is worth taking a chance with if you are truly earnest in your faith, inspired by its truth and ready to assume serious risks and hazards on its behalf. You will then either save his soul while preserving its shell, the body, or he will save your soul at the expense of your body, which is of little moment to you after all when the well-being and the salvation of your own and others' immortal souls is concerned.

Your idea or *Anschauung* has need of an opponent even as your body has need of nutrition and pure air as means for keeping life within it. And the trouble with us men of the present generation is that we have no opponents worthy of the name. Outside of the realm of economics-applied economics, of course—there seems to be no division of opinion among men. People have grown complacent and tamely acquiescent, tolerant to the point of absurdity. Fighting over abstract ideas and principles has become ungentlemanly, needless and a sore waste of time. Tolerate the other fellow and his vagaries and errors so that he in turn will tolerate you and your vagaries and errors and all will be as peaceful and as harmonious as a graveyard, where all is decorum and peace because the occupants of the various graves had long since settled their accounts with their God and men, even as they did with life itself, living blood no longer courses in their veins while the worms have nibbled away again and again at their brains. The peace and harmony that we now enjoy in the realm of religion and abstract reasoning generally, far from importing to us the arrival of the long prayed-for millenium, really betokens *the twilight age,* the age of expiring lights and the oncoming of darkness, or at least of the lesser and dimmer lights of the night by which only the coarser and more material objects are clearly seen, while the finer ones are barely discerned and as if through a haze or fog. No one is certain about them; no one cares, or is able, to discern their true being and composition—and of what practical difference is it to us after all? Such seem to be man's thoughts, his perhaps unconscious and unanalyzed reactions to these abstruse matters, and, hence, his easy going and good natured behavior towards his so-called opponents and the supposed controversialists who have long since abandoned all controversy.

Far different is, however, man's behavior in things material and concrete, whether these affect his immediate well-being or at some possible more or less remote time. Man will not only haggle, and haggle mightily, about his day's wage or the price of a bushel of corn, but also about the possible coming changes in the system of production and distribution of wealth, which change may most likely not affect his own well-being at all and perhaps not even that of his immediate successors in life. But these matters indubitably *are concrete* in the sense that they affect his day's wage and, hence, his standard of physical comfort, the amount of money he is to have in his pocket in return for that bushel of corn, while the changes in our economic system, should they come today or tomorrow or next year, also are bound to affect them in the same way, and mayhap, even to a larger degree. But ideas, outlooks and philosophies languish, and will continue to languish, with us for lack of any serious, well defined and obstinate opposition.

Just as long as men will refuse to crack even metaphorical skulls over religious, moral or esthetic views, as they now do crack *physical* and *actual heads* over the question of Unionism, the tariff, foreign markets, Imperialism and the like material questions, it will profit the preacher but little to go on preaching his ideals and exert himself in the thankless task to have them become the lighthouse radiating light and leading to erring man.

Where there is no friction the needle cannot become magnetized, and hence, remains incapable of acting in turn on the inert lump of iron. Similarly, where there is no friction of ideas, no serious clash between life-philosophies and outlooks but all is peacefully indifferent and indolently drab, serene and matter-of-fact, the dull and lifeless metal of life cannot be magnetized by any new ideas, but is doomed to remain inert; and the one who seeks to awaken it is simply indulging in useless effort and wasted motion. The old, long established systems, outlooks and philosophies will persist, despite the repetitive monotony and lukewarm dullness of their preachers and exponents because of man's mechanized, routine habits and his constitutional mental inertia which urges him on the path of least physical or mental resistance. But new systems and values have as much chance to survive, spread and propogate their kind as has the proverbial snow-ball in the eternally hot nether regions in an atmosphere wherein touch and sight are the only two of man's senses to survive and function in their full force, while the other and more delicate senses have become merely rudimentary or vestigial in their action.

LEAN CATTLE

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID

Lean cattle, ranged against the rim
  Of sunset's cloud-smudged glow,
Sharp-hipped, with scrawniness of limb,
  Knee-deep in drifted snow;
Forlorn of eye, and shivering,
  They stand in mute appeal
To Whom, or what, of God, or thing,
  No longing may reveal.

Thin silhouettes of weird design,
  Bespeaking patience dumb,
In shrunken jaw and brisket line,
  Stand rigid, stark, and numb.
As night befalls the evening's wane,
  And Man his rest may find,
Lean cattle, motionless, in vain
  Await the tempered wind.

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

Flyleaf in a Virgil Manuscript Formerly in the Library of Petrarch.

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

VOLUME XLIV

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THE OPEN COURT

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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Volume XLIV (No. 12) DECEMBER, 1930 Number 895

VIRGIL

Publius Vergilius Maro. 70-19 B. C.

BY ELIZABETH CARUS

THIS year marks the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of Virgil and it is being noted by exhibitions and commentaries on his accomplishments and his influence through these twenty centuries. He gave to Italy, then devastated by civil war, bankrupt and depopulated, the spiritual force and the creative impulse which made it possible for her to establish herself as a unified whole, and it is his interpretation of it which has become a part of our world thought. Augustus was the founder of the political ideal of the Holy Roman Empire; Virgil, the poet of Italy, was the inspired authority thereof who kept alive the nobler conception of sovereignty.

Virgil is famous for three main volumes of poetry, the Eclogues, a group of pastoral poems, the Georgics, which praise the simple life and labor, and the Aeneid, an epic of the Roman nation.

Virgil was born in 70 B. C. near Mantua. At the time of his birth Italy was absorbed by the struggle for supremacy between Rome and the provinces. He received a very thorough education first at Cremona and the University of Milan, later at Rome. We know little of the following years except that his travels must have brought him over all Italy for in his poems he shows an intimate knowledge of the country from the Alps to the straits. (Virgil was living in the country). In 42 B. C. when the general confiscation of land took place, Virgil was living in the country, and in the Eclogues he gives a vivid account of the confiscation of his father's farm. Later through influential friends the farm was restored.

The Eclogues, begun in the country, were finished at Rome. For some time before their publication Virgil was one of a group of close friends who had in common a vision of new possibilities and a new meaning for poetry. The poetry then in vogue was of the stilted, scholastic Alexandrian school which could not develop any further. This group, which included the poets, Gallus, Varius, and Macer, produced a large amount of poetry. With the appearance of the Eclogues, Virgil became the leader of the movement, now known as Virgilism. His fame and influence were immediate. The new poetry in Greek literary forms, with simple musical rhythms, was not perfect in workmanship, but it was free and it was alive. In the Eclogues, as in all the writings of Virgil, there is a mystic and a prophetic note foretelling a Golden Age about to be realized. He is under the spell of the greatness of Rome, yet he is Italian in spirit and has that great quality of expressing the yearning of the soul in its deeper moods.

The promises of the Eclogues are treated as actual facts in the Georgics, which were inspired by his friend Maecenas. In those days the influence of a poet in moulding public opinion was very great. Italy was economically exhausted and needed men to develop her unused wealth which lay idle in virgin soil, forest and swamp. Virgil sought to awaken a new interest in the land with the little touches of genius which make poetry of everyday tasks, he transfigured the simple hard life of the farmer and idealized agriculture and industry, making the Georgics the most perfect poems of native Italian life.

Shortly before the Georgics were finished Octavius was made supreme and the unification of Italy was complete. To celebrate this event Virgil started the Aeneid which became the complete expression of his profound thought and his philosophy of life, his dreams and his ideals. After eleven years, in 19 B. C. the epic was finished, and in order to perfect it Virgil visited Greece. He had planned to stay three years, but he met Augustus in Athens, and returned with him the same year. At Megara, where they stopped on the voyage, Virgil was taken sick. They hurried home. Virgil died a few days after reaching Brundisium and was buried at Naples, where his tomb was, for a long time, held in religious veneration.



CARTHAGO
DIDO

GIOVANNI FABRINI
DA FIGHINE,
Sopra il Quinto Libro de l'Eneide di Virgilio.

INTEREA mediũ Aeneas, &c.] Mentre che Didone ſi ſepelliua, & ſi piagneua; Enea era già nel mezzo del mare per andare in Italia. Et voltandoſi indietro, vidde che tutta Cartagine ſi ſplendeua di fiamme di fuoco, e non ſapeua la cagione.

INTEREA medium [illegible] tenebat
Certus iter : [illegible] ſecabat,
[illegible]
[illegible] flammis. quae [illegible]
[illegible] : duri magno ſed amore dolores
Polluto, [illegible] furens quid fœmina poſſit,
[illegible] Teucrorum pectora ducunt.

Eſpoſitione de le parole, de le fauole, de l'iſtorie, e luoghi grammaticali.

Con queſto principio di Libro Virgilio accozza ſecondo la ſua vſanza il quarto libro, la maggior parte del quale egli ha tolto di Homero. Perche tutte le coſe ch'egli racconta qui ſi fanno intorno alla ſepoltura di Patroclo. E ben [illegible] che quiui Homero introduce perſone che atteggiano con le Carrette, & Virgilio qui fa fare vna [illegible] nautica. Et è da [illegible] che non poteua eſſere, [illegible] di intero Enea [illegible] Sicilia, però [illegible] noi diciamo, che egli nauigò intorno al primo naſcimento del giorno. E però ſi diſſe,

[illegible]
[illegible]

A [illegible] che Didone ſi ammazzò, e ſi piagneua, fece poco progreſſo in mare, tirando [illegible]

A PAGE FROM AN ITALIAN EDITION OF THE AENEID 1588.

By the command of Augustus, Virgil's request to have the Aeneid destroyed was overruled. Instead Virgil was given divine honors and the Aeneid was regarded as an inspired writing to be consulted for omens of the future of the empire and its rulers.

The dominant idea of the Aeneid is that of an universal empire founded by divine decree, and glorifying not only Rome, but all of Italy. Virgil tried to fuse into a homogeneous whole a Latin Iliad, an annalistic epic of the nation, and the celebration of the struggles and triumphs of his own age. This task was one of supreme difficulty and many times in periods of depression he thought it hopeless. He wanted to make his epic a guiding force to the whole Latin world.

The main part of the story describes the founding and establishing of Rome by Aeneas, the highest point of which is reached when he sails up the Tiber and lands on the spot which is to become Rome. To this theme Virgil adds the seven years of wandering from Troy and the love story of Dido and Aeneas, which became one of such enthralling interest that it almost absorbed the whole action of the poem, but Virgil's transcendental vision draws the two themes together and unifies them. Aeneas is taken into the underworld and undergoes an experience similar to conversion. One sees in a fourth dimensional view the past and the future side by side where one senses the ultimate secret of the universe and its creative processes. The picture is one of haunting impressions and of the eternal search into the unknown.

The greatest criticism of the poem has been concerning the pious character of Aeneas, who is not human in that he never thinks of his own desires or gains; to Virgil, however, he was a religious ideal, guided by a higher power, the founder of the empire and the idea of divine sovereignty.

Virgil tried to include all the knowledge and riches of the world in the Aeneid. To the simple Homeric structure he added the refinements of later Greek poetry, the high ornamentation of Alexandrian verse, and the new romantic motives which made him the source of romanticism for later ages. We are just now beginning to appreciate the poem as a treasury of Italian antiques, for it records the geography and ethnography of ancient Italy, the religious practices, the social life and civic institutions of the time.

Except for the glorification of Augustus, Virgil kept clear of

A Map Showing the Wanderings of Aeneae

partisan passions, and he could thus idealize the monarchy sincerely. He was the voice of Rome and the interpreter of its part in the history of the world. From this time the state was bound up with the sanctions of religion, as is shown by the title Augustus, which means the venerable with both a political and a religious significance. Throughout the empire the idea of a universal religion was developing, one main feature of which was that a Saviour would come who would establish peace on earth and a kingdom of righteousness. In the fourth Eclogue Virgil prophesies the birth of a child who would fulfill these expectations. Because of these Christian sentiments, even though they were expressed entirely in pagan terms, and because they expressed the very foundations upon which Christianity was based, the church recognized Virgil, and believed him to be inspired by God.

The Aeneid was never forgotten as were the classics of Greece. It was read and memorized and made the basis of education. It was the lay bible of the middle ages, the inspiration of poets. Virgil, himself was called The Poet. His name became a tradition to which were ascribed the qualities of a magician, and which had nothing in common with the original character of the poet. This legendary Virgil is said to have built a castle from which the emperor could see and hear all that was done and said in Rome; he made a lamp which lighted the whole city, and many other marvelous things. The same kind of stories, often the same ones, are ascribed to Aristotle and other ancient celebrities. The fact that he became the center of these legends shows how widespread was his fame and his influence.

After Virgil's death an endless literature began to grow up about him, and it still continues to grow. The first good commentary on his work was produced in Syria and the best portrait preserved of him is in fine mosaic, found at Tunis near the site of the ancient city of Carthage where Aeneas had been seen a thousand years earlier.

The following tabulation of the number of editions of his works and the languages in which they are printed is given by the Union Catalogue in the Library of Congress.

EDITIONS OF VIRGIL IN THE UNITED STATES

A recent survey of the Virgil material in the United States carried on by Project "B," Library of Congress, sheds much light on the prevalence of this favorite classic in American libraries. It is a surprising fact that upon a single appeal made by the Chairman of the Bimillenium Committee, 98 libraries responded to the call and supplied data for their holdings. The request for material was limited to editions other than school texts, and to a certain date, so that it may be assumed that the figures quoted represent minimums rather than maximums.

The tabulation attached hereto shows in detail the distribution of the editions of Virgil and discloses the fact that the student by means of Union Catalogs of the Library of Congress, is enabled to locate copies of Virgil proper, either complete works or individual parts, within the territory of the United States, exclusive of all works about Virgil.

Of these 2145 represent individual editions (entries in Union Catalogs) which again are supplemented by additional 1554 locations, so that about every other edition listed in Union Catalogs is represented in two or more libraries.

Neither the works relating to Virgil, the travesties, nor the legends, are included in this tabulation. These, in themselves, form an additional catalog of no mean size.

Nor does the scholar of a foreign country, wishing to pursue studies in his own language, have to forego this privilege, since the survey shows that almost all of the principal languages are well represented in the Union Catalog as follows:

Polyglot	4	Gascon	2	Norwegian	1
Catalan	1	Greek	10	Portuguese	16
Danish	4	Hebrew	1	Scotch	3
Dutch	12	Hungarian	1	Spanish	37
Esperanto	2	Irish	1	Swedish	6
Gaelic	1	Italian	137	Russian	3

EDITIONS OF VIRGIL IN THE UNITED STATES

Vergilius Maro, Publius.	Total editions	In more than one library.
Latin texts:		
Works	846	692
Aeneid	179	103
Bucolics & Georgics	54	40
Bucolics	81	34
Georgics	80	56
Total (except *)	1,240	925
*Minor works	44	48
English texts:		
Works	164	156
Aeneid	219	230
Bucolics & Georgics	17	13
Bucolics	52	20
Georgics	35	56
Total	487	475
French texts	105	23
German texts	85	21
All other languages	184	62
Total	2,145	1,554

ETHICS AND REALITY

BY T. SWANN HARDING

THE field of ethics and morals seems very chaotic to one trained in science. In spite of the fact that systems of ethics are many and varied it is a peculiar fact that the majority of people the wide world over are quite well agreed as to the good in certain acts and the bad in certain others. Moreover this agreement has existed for some centuries. This suggests at once that there are rules at work in the sphere of ethics and morals quite as surely as in that of physics, and that they are probably as true on the average, or statistically, as the rules governing the actions of atoms and molecules. It also suggests that there could be formulated a system of ethics as "true" for its specific reality as systems of physics are for their particular reality. Quite probably several such pragmatically "true" systems could be formulated, each quite useful, and dozens of quite useless fictional systems could be altogether eliminated.

In America we are especially interested in crime. We speak proudly of our crime waves and we have a crime commission to investigate them. Their existence is very real and yet our method of dealing with them is still, in many instances, very primitive. This becomes apparent in *In Prison* by Kate O'Hare, a book no one should read who cherishes fictions more than hypotheses dealing with reality. Oddly enough, it describes as still existing in American prisons abuses which the Webbs (in their *English Prisons Under Local Government*) considered atrocious in English prisons of the seventeenth century. I refer particularly to the attendants' habits of mulcting and defrauding prisoners of money and sustenance illegally. It is also still possible for a person to be convicted of some infraction of social custom—for social custom interprets law and reading the Constitution or the Bible in public may or may not be illegal, depending upon momentary social customs—and ultimately sent to prison. Here this person may actually be the victim of anti-social acts much worse than those which brought about incarceration and may also be compelled to break certain laws more fundamental than those whose infraction brought about imprisonment. Very curious isn't it?

For instance contract labor may be prohibited in the prisons of a certain state. That state and others may also have laws saying that all prison-made goods must be clearly labeled as such. The prisoner may, however, be so farmed out to an overall manufacturer in a distant state that he or she gets fifty cents to a dollar a month for work worth $5 a day and the profits go not to the federal government nor to the state, but to the contractor. Furthermore he or she may be compelled to sew labels into finished garments which insist they were produced at the factories of industrialists several hundred miles away; these prison products are then sold as privately manufactured, and quite illegally. Finally, the prisoner may be beaten or assulted; he may be, and often is, exposed carelessly to infection by the most awful diseases, and he leaves the institution, willy nilly, a complete adept at all forms of criminal technic whether he has learned anything else or not.

The National Crime Commission has, in its preliminary reports, observed that such prison abuses still exist in the United States on a very considerable scale. But, if we wished, we might consider a step still earlier in the process—that of "responsibility" which is a word that covers a fiction. For we condemn and punish if the person committing an anti-social act was "responsible" for his action whereas, in reality, responsibility is itself established empirically in each case and, from a scientific standpoint, means exactly nothing. For there are only three kinds of criminals: 1. The chronically and incurably mischievous who should be intelligently restrained for the rest of their natural lives; 2. the psychic and glandular types, or those with other physiological lesions, who can be cured by medical therapy and released as entirely new characters; 3. the normals who, under great stress, make an isolated detour into crime, who should be compelled to make civil restitution and discharged in care of their "conscience," (for they have a something that gives them the very devil the rest of their lives) after it has been determined medically and psychologically that they are perfectly normal.

That in itself is all very interesting. The present fiction is that the person performed an anti-social act. He must be punished; he must make retribution to society, in order to deter others, or he must at least be reformed. The fact is that in many prisons he is mis-treated, nothing is done to change his social habits for the better, he is exposed to infection, compelled to break other laws more fundamental than those he broke outside prison, and sent forth bitter and psychopathic. Higher prison officials are still frequently appointed as political favors; lower officials are underpaid and unintelligent; all are very often entirely untrained. We are not by innate nature maliciously savage people. Just why do we do such things as have been described? Just why do we persist in believing in fictions so manifest when facts are so easily ascertainable? I rather think we have something to learn from quite non-criminal people in their ordinary, everyday habits of conduct, and I want to adduce three examples, which may seem trivial, but which may also yield considerable information upon examination and analysis.

The other morning a woman burst in upon me quite radiant because her daughter had won a rifle contest in college; she was with the winning team and she also made a high record personally. The mother's enthusiasm seemed to me at first exceedingly pernicious, later only somewhat silly. My first feeling was to become indignant and sermonize—i.e. to assume the inherent inerrancy of my views, arrived at after long and devious study, and their supreme right to triumph over hers when expressed emotionally. For the shooting of guns and marksmanship have to me many connotations of value which they do not have to the superficial and quite innocently and ignorantly frivolous woman who asked me to share her enthusiasm.

The essential utility of guns is to kill. They may be used to kill birds or animals, but few of us need them for that purpose. The only widespread need we could ever have would be for the killing of human beings. This brings up the specter of war, or of police violence, and the possibility that complete familiarity with firearms will very probably develop in anyone a psychological state quite less inimical to bloodshed than that of a person like myself who never touched a firearm, if I remember correctly. In short the values evolved by long and arduous study arose in me. But there was no time to explain all of that. It would have taken me several hours even had the woman been disposed to listen. She would then have been unable to understand because she had not been accustomed to think; she took current fictions at face value. For me to become emotionally disdainful and arrogantly seek to enforce my views would have been useless. What I actually did was make some very silly remark to the effect that young women were apparently trained in college these days to make them capable of dealing effectively with their husbands somewhat later.

A second instance: Two gentlemen sat behind me on the street-car this morning talking of a third man whose name should, I suppose, be Chaos. They were discussing what they called "efficiency" and "system" and it became quite apparent that Chaos was one of these helter-skelter persons who had no place for anything and everything was somewhere else. They agreed on that. But they did not get much further. For within five minutes it developed that one of them, A, was himself far more precise than the other, B. When A began to tell exactly how he did things B soon began interrupting to show where this or that practice was not systematic, was not efficient, but was actually a fettering bad habit. The argument rapidly became passionate and it ended with A's departure from the car. Nothing at all had been accomplished except a display of bad temper.

By third instance concerns a married couple who sat across from me recently in a shoe store. The woman was buying two pairs of shoes. The man quite apparently had no objection to that. In fact I knew him quite well and I knew his wife. He was the kind of man who thought of things literary first and everything else thereafter. She was the kind of woman who would think of shoes or a dress first and might think of things intellectual secondly. Quite suddenly he remembered something and withdrew from his brief-case a magazine containing an article of his which had just appeared so illustrated as greatly to please him. Intoxicated with his interest and anxious to show the illustrations to her he burst in, at a moment the shoe salesman had turned aside, and brought the article to her attention.

The result was explosive. She became very indignant and in tones quite audible to me some ten feet away told him that he was ridiculously ignorant and rude and would never learn any manners. She was interested in shoes and interviewing a salesman whereupon he, like a child, rudely interrupted. The salesman meantime had turned to the couple and viewed the spectacle with astonishment. The husband, however, laughed, shrugged his shoulders as one would to some irritable child, put the article away and assumed a gentlemanly interest in shoes again. A moment later, entirely due to his adroit handling of the situation, the woman was quite herself and they were rather merrily discussing shoes. Here we have a miniature study of an element which could completely disrupt a marriage except for the fact that the husband, and I happen in this instance to know both parties to the conversation very well, has his emotions so well disciplined that he does not allow them to go out on parade on matters of no particular intellectual consequence.

Reviewing these trivial instances more abstractly what do we find? First they are important because they and millions like them, are part and parcel of the reality of everyday human behavior and conduct. From such simplicities spring later complexities like war spirit, personal and group contention, social misunderstandings, broken homes, and crimes. Secondly, three needs stand forth before we can formulate a new and scientific ethical and moral system. These are: First, more pure, unindoctrinated facts; more knowledge. For had the woman in instance one known enough to realize all the implications of what her daughter was doing, to evaluate the phenomena of reality more properly, and to visualize consequences by a process of imaginative abstract thought based, however, on knowledge, she might have acted differently. The misfortune remains that a state university thoughtlessly considers it acts upon a sound psychological and intellectual principle when it inculcates marksmanship.

The second need is that for the meticulous and rigorous definition of terms. The two men who argued had no fixed definition for the words "system" and "efficiency." Probably old Chaos himself thought he was quite systematic in Walt Whitman's notoriously unsystematic way, or in the manner of literary gentlemen who can find nothing at all after prim people straighten up their studies. However, it would be possible to go fact-finding and perhaps to discover what system was best in this or that office, how much system enabled it to function more efficiently and just where superfluous system became an impediment. Facts would be needed first; then careful and precise definition of terms so that everyone interested could understand perfectly the ideas for which certain word symbols stood.

Hence a third thing is needed. It is a sort of personal thing and it involves emotional discipline on the one hand and, on the other, a reluctance to interpret our own sincere private opinions, or the basic postulates which we happen to respect, as indiscriminately good for all and sundry. The woman who bought shoes had a different standard of values from that of her husband; this quite naturally involved a different standard of conduct and a different interpretation of what constitutes bad conduct—rudeness in this case. She called her husband ignorant and rude. She was very much irritated at the time. She was in such an emotional pet that she was psychologically incapable of reasoning dispassionately or accurately. For she knew that her husband was not only highly educated—he had advanced university degrees; but he was widely known and recognized as a profound scholar, extraordinarily informed on social questions.

Now, having been irritated into a pet the woman became rude through lack of emotional discipline. Grant, for sake of argument, that her husband's action was mildly rude; it had a powerful intellectual drive behind it; he had a subject of great human importance in mind and his offense was a minor infraction of courtesy. Hers was public, sustained, and emphatic. But worse still she rationalized her own irritation and rudeness as the just wrath of a highly cultivated lady at the boorishness of an unmannerly clown. This argued that her standard was the best and the only possible standard of values; that she had a perfect right to impose it on other people because "all decent people" (and was she not their accredited representative?) behaved in accordance therewith. Her husband's emotions were under such complete control that he neither ridiculed the onslaught nor replied in kind. He was so tactful that it disappeared without leaving a ripple and he acted thus first because he had acquaintance with a wide field of knowledge about human behavior, and secondly because he knew it would be absurd for him, in turn, to set up his personal conduct and emotional reactions as the standard of right for anyone—especially for his wife!

But, you say, this is silly. This is petty. These are mere casual individuals and insignificant incidents of no import. Admitting that they indicate some ethical confusion in the minds of individuals, there is an ethical system universally recognized as correct and people should be urged to try and live in accordance therewith. Right there I differ. I contend that the reason people are so pettish, so confused, so ignorantly superficial, or so sincerely perplexed is because we have not taken the trouble to formulate any scientific system of ethics based upon the facts of reality as at present ascertainable. I admit that ethical theories of conduct must in any case be based upon a postulate. I even admit that you can base them on a varied assortment of mutually antipathetic postulates and, by sufficiently disregarding your beliefs in fiction when you are in contact with an imperious bit of reality, live about the same "good" life in any case. But I argue that this sort of thing is itself helter-skelter and chaotic and that we owe it to ourselves to formulate a scientific system of ethics.

Consider very briefly the extant ethical systems. What postulates are assumed by various ethical systems—very, very respectable systems too—in order to build good lives thereupon? One is the existence of a god, of one sort or another, who makes demands of one sort or another. This postulate is secure and helpful so long as societies are primitive and homogenous and so long as the god is defined quite precisely by the group as a whole, and a vast majority of the group as individuals concur the rightness of the definition. In a society such as ours where god is defined so utterly differently by so many individuals or groups, this postulate is valueless. It amounts to no more than asking the god to ratify our own highest notion of what ought to be, which is a phrase-garb used to protect errant and anemic fictions from the bleak winds of reality.

We may revert to conscientious sentimentalism. We may take as our basic postulate some such sentiment as pity, sympathy, altruism, unselfishness or the pious and fervid affirmation of a fundamental principle from which practical morality certainly *ought* to be deduced. But what has this to do with the teeming reality which surrounds us? We may take Kant's imperative and seek so to act that things will become better by our acting so, but to refrain from acts which would make things worse if everyone committed them. But what do we mean by better and worse? We may say with him that the good will is that which acts out of respect for moral law and may therefore alone be held to be morally good, which is a charming verbal rondelet but seems somehow to lack grasp on reality. We may make all sorts of *a priori* rules; we may invoke hedonism or utilitarianism; we may actually postulate a principle in reverse to all that is usually considered good and moral and deduce therefrom some system, like that which rules a gang, which is singularly ethical within a restricted group.

We need go no further than the law to discover how much at sea we really are in such matters. I perform a certain act. I happen to be seen and apprehended. I happen to be relatively poor. I am therefore brought to trial for a penitentiary offense. I am to be judged by a learned judge and a jury of my peers. In what does this justice inhere? How is the case decided? Normally in one of two ways, ignoring as incidental to any case at law the emotional and fact-obfuscating antics of lawyers of sorts who seek to raise doubts, confuse and mislead. Way number one consists in citing precedents. The lawyers go back to look for cases like mine and to discover what was done about such cases. Yet there never was in the history of the world a case just like mine though the decision is rendered in terms of that case which may have been tried a decade or two ago under entirely different circumstances. (Remember always that under the same law reading the Constitution in public sometimes is and sometimes is not criminal.) Actually the case cited as precedent had nothing whatever to do with me standing here and now before a judge for this particular offense. It is a mere fiction to assume that it could have anything to do with my case which cannot be subsumed under it without assuming a decision in advance, a contingency the whole absurd process has been invoked to avoid.

Process number two is that of deliberately making some imposing fundamental postulate in resounding and impressive terms and in asserting that my action is inimical to social stability. Thus, the law being quite the same in each case, it may at one time be stated by the judge that the reading of the Constitution by the prisoner at the bar constituted an incendiary act inimical to society and that acts inimical to society must be penalized by so many years in the penitentiary; at another time it may be stated that the innocent reading of the Constitution does not constiute an act inimical to society and that anyway it is a fundamental postulate in this country that we have freedom of speech and expression at all times—therefore the prisoner should be dismissed and perhaps eulogized.

Neither legal process seeks to interrogate the facts of reality, to ascertain all the particulars relevant to this specific event and to arrive at a dispassionately scientific judgment on the basis of those facts. True enough this process is rendered difficult in the absence of some well-formulated system of rational ethics. Just that is what is needed and leading thinkers recognize this. Thus we find Whitehead saying in *Process and Reality:*

> "The actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence."

Whitehead is trying to write like a philosopher and it is a fiction among them that the simplest truths must be stated in the most forbidding language, but he evidently means about what I have just said above. John Dewey, who shares the fiction that confused verbiage is a great philosophic advantage, says this in writing on "Individualism, Old and New" in *The New Republic* for February 5, 1930 (p. 296):

> Individuals will refind themselves only as their ideas and ideals are brought into harmony with the realities of the corporate age in which they act. The task of attaining this harmony is not an easy one. But it is more negative than it seems, more negative than positive. If we could inhibit the principles and standards that are merely traditional, if we could slough off the opinions that have no living relationship to the situations in which we live, the unavowed forces that now work upon us unconsciously but unremittingly would have a chance to build minds after their own pattern, and individuals would, in consequence, find themselves in possession of objects to which imagination and emotion could stably attach themselves.

Again this needs translation. For one impediment to clear thinking on the part of the masses is that its thinkers have quite universally invested belief in the fiction that fundamental truths cannot be expressed simply, perhaps for fear that being too easily understood they will not win respect. However, Dewey must mean that our ethical system should be in harmony with the reality of the age in which we now live. Shaw (in his *Intelligent Woman's Guide*) naturally expressed the idea much more plainly. He simply said:

> The reason we are in such a mess at present is that our governments are trying to carry on with a set of beliefs that belong to bygone phases of science and extinct civilizations. Imagine going to Moses or Mahomet for a code to regulate the modern money market.

Where does this leave us? As omniscient beings, when we regard molecules, we observe that they follow certain statistical rules and we formulate a system of physics designed to explain what molecules do. But all molecules do not do what we say they do; however, enough of them follow our propositions for us to say that they are in statistical agreement with our scientific hypotheses. In the social sciences, however, we are not omniscient beings. We are rather curious, precocious molecules of a gas seeking objectively to determine the physical laws which statistically govern the gas of which we ourselves form an intimate part at the time. We try to be objective, but we remain human. If we find a statistical law which we do not happen to follow we say it is not "right" even though the vast majority of molecules do follow it. We must control our emotions and try to realize that all human molecules do not necessarily do what we do. Hence we must look to scientists, who try very hard to be objective, to study these questions and, using the same scientific method they use in physics, formulate an ethical system that has reality.

How far can our American scientists, who do delve into general and social problems, be expected to make scientific method understood to the masses and to advise its use in the solution of ethical problems? I can cite but one here. However, he is a leading scientist-sermonizer on public questions and his scientific reputation is unassailable. Of his frequent sermons I pick the one on "Alleged Sins of Science" which appeared in February, 1930, *Scribners.* Herein he defends science against all charges of having done evil. He is unwilling to admit, for instance, that science helped cause the Great War and helped make it horrible. Yet he has done nothing of which I am aware to formulate a system of scientific ethics which would make war anachronistic. Instead he comes out at this late date for the Golden Rule and greets with joy increased church membership. He takes a fling at loose morals and at the new art and literary forms. The gist of his attitude may be found in this sentence:

> "Rather does the scientist join with the psalmist of thousands of years ago in reverently proclaiming 'the Heavens declare the glory of God and the Firmament sheweth his handiwork.' The God of Science is the spirit of rational order and of orderly development, the integrating factor in the world of atoms and of ether and of ideas and of duties and of intelligence. Materialism is surely not a sin of modern science."

This is nothing more nor less than an effort to make old bottles hold new wine and to preserve the pretended reality of what may once have been a humanly helpful hypothesis but what is now an antiquated fiction as a basic postulate for a system of ethics.

I turn from this to a statement of Prof. Albert Einstein which appeared in the *New York Times* during January, 1930. It was in part as follows:

> "It has now become a general recognized axiom that the giant armaments of all nations are proving highly injurious to them collectively. I am even inclined to go a step further by the assertion that, under present-day conditions, any one state would incur no appreciable risk by undertaking to disarm—wholly regardless of the attitude of the other states. If such were not the case it would be quite evident that the situation of such states as are unarmed or only partially equipped for defense would be extremely difficult, dangerous, and disadvantageous—a condition which is refuted by the facts. I am con-

vinced that demonstrative references to armaments are but a weapon in the hands of the factors interested in their production or in the maintenance and development of a military system for financial or political-egotistic reasons. I am firmly of the opinion that the educational effect of a first and genuine achievement in the realm of disarmament would prove highly efficacious, because the succeeding second and third steps would then be immeasurably simpler than the initial one; this for the obvious reason that the first results of an understanding would considerably weaken the familiar argument for national security with which parliamentarians of all countries now permit themselves to be intimidated. Armaments can never be viewed as an economic asset to a state. They must ever remain the unproductive exploitation of men and material and an encroachment on the economic reserves of a state through the temporary conscription of men in the active periods of their lives—not to mention the moral impairment resulting from a preoccupation with the profession of war and the moral processes of preparing a nation for it."

Here, by contrast with the American Millikan, we find the words of a socially conscious scientist who speaks from an intimate knowledge of the facts of reality and who makes no use whatever of archaic fictions. The contrast is striking but I know no physical scientist in America capable of such a statement, though a few isolated social scientists might be cited. I know also that no one would greet with greater covered or ouvert hostility an effort to apply scientific method to the social problems of today's reality than the leaders and publications of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Their constant admonition is go easy, do not be controversial, do not be adversely critical, avoid acrimonious issues—a curiously timid and sequacious attitude indeed, and one from which we have little to hope.

This brings me to a brief concluding statement which may be inadequate but should serve to outline how a useful system of scientific ethics could be evolved. Morals or ethics should be the subject of a system of causes deliberately created as the premises of reasoning; the conclusions deduced from these premises must coincide with the rules of practical morality the recognition of which life has forced upon us, regardless of our past systems and postulates, and which constitute the reality of ethics or morals. How can we go about elaborating this system?

First the rules of the moral reality of the here and now must be clearly expressed. What are people doing and why are they doing what they do? How do psychopathic and economic factors condition their conduct? Such questions as these must be answered statistically by the collection of more facts, more instances, more specific particulars which, in turn, will be more knowledge. Today too many social scientists follow the old technic of laying down *a priori* postulates and then only collecting such facts as fit into their preconceived fictions. The facts they do collect are therefore indoctrinated. Instead of this a vast number of fact-finding agencies must collect and correlate facts in some such manner as the economic bureaus of the Department of Agriculture do in order to trace price trends or to find out how hard farm women really work and what they think.

This done, and it will take quite a while before it is scientifically worth while to do anything else, the production of axioms and definitions will follow. Broad statements—laws which form hypotheses—must be formulated and each word in them must be clearly defined. Their entire meaning must also be precise and their axioms simply expressed. From these premises propositions must then be derived. Had we had them in hand, for instance, in 1917 it would have been quite possible for social scientists to have predicted with fair accuracy just what would happen in the United States after the passage of the Volstead Act. Had it been possible to present these facts to the public in simple, non-hysterical terms, an intelligent vote might have been taken upon an abstraction which, in turn, might have saved us from may crimes and other devious necessities we had, instead, wastefully to learn from reality.

The propositions deduced from the premises must coincide with the empirical moral rules of reality. If the system leads us to deduce that all parents will instinctively treat their children kindly any juvenile court official can tell us how unreal and fictional our system must be, for so many parents are deliberately very cruel to their own children. We must make sure of such coincidences and keep them as perfect as possible. Then at last we shall be in a position to develop an entire theory by deducing from the initial propositions, as in geometry, all of the theorems those propositions logically entail. These theorems must again be compared with the facts of reality, as we go along. As long as facts and theorems are compatible we are on the right track; when the contrary is true we must modify or replace our ethical system of causes, for it has then become a pure fiction and can no longer have wide practical utility.

This process would still leave quite a number of systems of ethics in existence from which to choose, each seeming logically valid to about the same extent as the others. Dozens of systems would, however, fortunately be eliminated at once and need occupy us no more. They could be taught historically but not as valid in present reality. Finally, that ethical system should be adopted which was based on the smallest number of theorems and those most consistently connected with the existing body of science as a whole. This system would, like the present system of physics, explain the phenomena of reality and would also be a time and labor saving device by predicting future realities for us in various postulated terms.

Reverting now to my original three "trivial" cases—what would this mean? 1. It would necessitate getting more facts and broadening knowledge, because human beings are so constructed that they automatically act differently when in possession of a large number of facts than when in possession of very few, or of errors. 2. It would necessitate the clear and concise definition of word-symbols, axioms and propositions, so that like chemists when engaged in their profession, we should all everywhere know what a person was talking about when he said system, or good, or efficiency. 3. It would necessitate sufficient discipline of the emotions to enable us to refrain from interpreting our personal opinions as true for all men, and to reason logically and dispassionately about the facts of reality which confront us.

To accentuate our present ignorance I may cite an example that appeared in the paper on the day I wrote this. We all know that a great many people regard the high-priced workers in the building trades as unethical gougers who overcharge and underwork. This is a very common opinion and one often expressed without any tangible evidence being cited. Actually it is a fiction. If the twenty thousand skilled building mechanics of the District of Columbia average two hundred days work a year apiece they may consider themselves fortunate. It is improbable then that their average income will be equal to the monetary expenditure expert economists declare to be necessary for the adequate support of a family of five. Their work is seasonal and they have to charge whatever they can get when they work in order to tide them over periods of ill-timed idleness. At the moment six thousand of them happen to be out of work and the unions are endeavoring to write the five-day week into every agreement made with employers in order to distribute the quantity of work about more evenly among the workers and during the year. Here we have a situation in reality and certain labor unions have endeavored to meet it in the only way they know how in view of the limited number of facts available to them.

Actually the building industry is one of many industries and is closely related thereto. We need a specific number of new buildings annually and we need a specific number of mechanics to construct them. We also need so much coal, so many pianos, so many loaves of bread and so many fountain pens. However, nobody knows how many of any of these things the country needs—what the relative importance of various industries is, or exactly what number of workmen should be engaged in each. Perhaps we have too many building mechanics as things are. Who knows? Perhaps their effort to get a five-day week is socially, economically, and ethically expedient. Who knows? We have no code to guide us in such matters because we lack a system of economics related to present-day reality quite as surely as we lack a system of ethics. Therefore many of us regard as maliciously unethical a group of workmen who are trying in the only way they know how to solve a pressing economic problem. The method is imperfect because they do not know all the facts, and no fact-finding agency has taken the trouble to ascertain them and construct a rational system related to reality. So we go ahead blindly and whether labor is "right" or "wrong" in its action we cannot tell. Evidences of this self-same muddle-headedness may be discerned in every branch of the social sciences, —economics, politics, group conduct or ethics, and the only way we can get anywhere is by accumulating more knowledge, adopting definite terms and axioms, and dispassionately building objective logical systems statistically true to the reality of our time.

THE PATTERNS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

(Concluded)

THE oldest articulate form of Dualism is the ancient Persian religion, given to the Persians in the sixth century B. C. by Zoroaster, otherwise known as Zarathustra. Reality is conceived as a struggle between two irreconcilable principles, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil. This ethical Dualism is represented in the Christian religion to this day in the conception of the conflict between God and evil, or the personification of evil in the shape of Satan.

The classic example of philosophic Dualism is the philosophy of Plato. We have already discussed Plato's philosophy under Spiritualism, as he is usually classed with the Idealist philosophers, because of his emphasis upon the supernal realm of the Ideas.

In Aristotle we find somewhat of an attempt to resolve the sharply-sundered Dualism into more of a unity. *Form* has now taken the place of *Idea,* and *Form* can only be realized through the medium of matter. Matter is that which has the potentiality of becoming something, while Form is the directive principle which guides and determines the process of becoming.

Scholasticism, the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church, is a modified form of Aristotelianism. Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth century scholastic, is the thinker who did the greatest part of the work of adaptation. The Scholastic philosophy, with a few modern revisions, still reigns in Catholic institutions of learning.

Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, that is, philosophy after the Renaissance, was also an exponent of Dualism. Reality is composed of two substances; matter, or extended substance, and spirit, or thinking substance. The essence of matter is its space-filling property, said Descartes, while the essence of spirit is its property of thought or consciousness. Also, spirit is unextended, does not fill space. God is the creator of both matter and spirit, but Himself is a pure spirit. Only man, in the Cartesian scheme, has a soul. All animals other than man are unconscious chemical machines, strictly mechanical in their behavior, which is a rigid mechanism of causes and effects. Indeed, the entire material world is a mechanism, capable of being reduced to a realm of cause and effect by science, according to Descartes. The material body of man, too, is a machine. But the conduct of this body-machine is somehow controlled by the soul, which comes in contact with the nervous system through its seat in the pineal gland, in the middle of the forehead, thought Descartes.

The weak point in Descartes' system obviously is his inconsistency in sharply sundering spirit from matter, and then assuming that spirit can interact with the body-machine and influence its actions. If the material world, the human body included is a complete and closed circuit of mechanically determined causes and effects, how can a spiritual cause break its way into the already complete chain of material causation? How can matter and spirit, by definition belonging to two different realms of being, act upon one another?

Cartesian Dualism, then, proved to be an unstable philosophy, owing to the impossibility of accounting for the interaction ot matter and spirit. The philosophy of Descartes evolved into two other philosophies. Spinoza resolved the Dualism into a Monism by setting up the hypothesis of a single substance, which is God, making itself known to us by two attributes or aspects, Matter and Spirit.

Another school of philosophers, seizing upon Descartes' idea of mechanical causation in the material realm of being, founded the mechanistic philosophy, which holds that the universe is a machine, an iron-clad reign of cause and effect. Spiritual substance was discarded by the mechanists as a superfluity. Thev attempted to explain away the fact of consciousness by reducing it to a motion of material particles.

The Behaviorist psychology is based on the mechanistic hypothesis: Hence its denial of consciousness, since there is no place for it in a closed circuit of material causes and effects. A rather drastic way of getting rid of a troublesome fact that does not fit into a preconceived theory! What fact can be more certain than the fundamenal fact of consciousness? John B. Watson says that consciousness probably is an illusion. But an illusion itself is a state of consciousness, a mental state that is wrongly interpreted. If there were no such thing as consciousness there could be no such thing as illusion. Therefore in admitting the existence of illusion Watson is also admitting the existence of consciousness.

Getting back to our subject, Dualism is represented to-day by Bergson, the Neo-Platonists, the Scholastics, and a few other philosophies of less importance. The Dualism of Bergson demands a word of notice. The dichotomous division, characteristic of every form of Dualism, is made between matter and a Life Force, or *Elan Vital,* which pushes its way up through matter in higher and higher forms of life by means of a process of Creative Evolution. Bernard Shaw is an adherent of this doctrine. In connection with the science of biology the theory is known as Vitalism. Biologists are divided into two camps, the vitalists and the mechanists. The latter maintain that life is a purely physico-chemical affair, in opposition to the former, who believe in an *Elan Vital* which animates matter and raises it from the inorganic to the organic level.

We are now ready for a brief discussion of Monism. The word stands for a philosophical attempt to reduce reality to one principle, or one substance. Hence, both Materialism and Spiritualism are forms of Monism, in that they set up either matter or spirit as the only substance. But in actual philosophical usage the term *Monism* is generally reserved for a doctrine which received its most characteristic expression in Spinoza, the Moorish-Jewish philosopher who lived in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century.

We have already seen how the Dualism of Descartes evolved into the Monism of Spinoza. The great difficulty inherent in Dualistic systems is the problem of accounting for the interaction and connection of two such sharply-sundered substances as matter and spirit. Spinoza escaped this difficulty by affirming a single substance which manifests itself in two attributes, matter and spirit. This substance he called God, the One, the All. Spinoza's system therefore is a Pantheism, since God and the world are one. Dualism is theistic; that is, God is conceived of as being apart from and distinct from the world. Spiritualism obviously is also pantheistic, while Materalism is atheistic.

In Spinoza's Monism the problem of the relation of matter to spirit is solved by assuming the parallelism of the material and spiritual aspects of the one true substance. Every material phenomenon has accompanying it a parallel psychic phenomenon. When a chain of causes and effects passes through a circuit of sense organs, sensory nerves, brain, and motor nerves, issuing in a muscular response, the material circuit is complete in itself. But accompanying this closed material circuit is a parallel circuit of mental causes and effects, composed of sensations, perceptions, volitions, and other states of consciousness. As Huxley has put it, for every *neurosis* there must be a *psychosis,* and vice versa. That is, for every movement of the particles composing the nervous system, there must be a definite accompanying state of consciousness in the psychic aspect of being. In psychology this doctrine is called *psycho-physiological parallelism.*

According to Spinoza, not only is every neurosis accompanied by a psychosis, but every physical phenomenon has its corresponding psychical correlate. Thus even atoms and electrons have, in a very rudimentary form of course a psychic life. The interconnection of physical and psychical, of material and spiritual, is very easily accounted for on this hypothesis. Underlying both matter and spirit, and fundamental to both of them, is the true reality or substance, and hence neither material nor spiritual causation is ultimate. The true causal activity takes place in the one true substance, which Spinoza calls God, and manifests itself to us in the two parallel aspects, known to us as matter and spirit. It follows that spirit cannot influence matter; neither can matter influence spirit. Both must change in parallelism with one another, through changes in the underlying substance. Body and soul, then, are a unit, and not two separate things as Dualism contends.

There is no exact prototype of Monism among the ancient philosophers, because the mind-body problem is a comparatively recent development. The earliest Greek thinkers, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, however, somewhat approximate Monism. The problem of philosophy for them was to find the one permanent substance beneath all the diversity of the world. Thales thought that water was this primal element. Anaximenes held that it was air, while Anaximander said that the *apeiron,* the limitless, a sort of fiery mist, had condensed itself into things as we know them. The primal substance, whether water, air, or the limitless, was alive. These early philosophers took this for granted because the distinction between organic and inorganic, between consciousness and unconsciousness, had never occurred to them.

The Stoic philosophers held a doctrine also roughly similar to that of Spinoza, inasmuch as they held that the universe is a unity, animated by the World Reason, of the laws of nature. The Stoics are best known for their ethical doctrines, which were widely current among the Romans before the Empire adopted Christianity. Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher-emperor and the author of the famous *Meditations,* was a Stoic. Conformity to Natural Law, or the World Reason, is the essence of the Stoic ethic. Reality has an ethical drift, and we must find this drift and live in harmony with it if we would work out our ethical salvation.

At this point it will be useful to compare the ethics of the systems of philosophy we have so far reviewed. Materialism and Naturalism hold that moral law is social or human law; Dualism finds moral law in Divine law, or the law of a God or Creator; Monism maintains that moral law is Natural law. In systems of Spiritualism, evil is considered either as a necessary step leading to an ultimate good; or else an illusion proceeding from our ignorance of the ways of the Absolute. Spiritualism has ever found the problem of evil its great stumbling block, and its ethical theory is more or less an attempt to explain away evil, rather than to meet it squarely.

Returning to the subject of Monism, we find that it is still a live philosophy to-day. Many scientists see in it the only theory that does full justice to both physical science and the facts of consciousness and mental life. It is a combination of Materialism and Spiritualism, retaining the strong features of both while escaping their difficulties. Albert Einstein, while not definitely committing himself to any system of philosophy, has confessed that he feels strongly drawn toward the Pantheism of Spinoza. Two eminent modern philosophers, S. Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, the latter a noted biologist, are followers of Spinoza and his Monism.

We are now ready for a brief examination of Sensationalism, or Phenomenalism as it is also called. Both of the above words have unfortunate popular connotations. The reader must not suppose that Sensationalism is the philosophy of the modern newspaper man. Philosophic Sensationalism has no conception whatever with journalistic sensationalism.

In our discussions of Spiritualism and Dualism we were obliged to anticipate a great deal of our discussion of Phenomenalism, in order to show the influence of Hume, the typical philosopher of Phenomenalism, on Kant and all later philosophers. This is another instance of the profound influence even rival systems of thought exercise upon one another. It is impossible to discuss a single one of the fundamental types of philosophy without bringing every other type into the discussion. There could be no more convincing refutation of the notion that the different philosophers are entirely out of touch with one another, and that nothing permanent is ever accomplished in philosophy.

As we have seen, Phenomenalism was introduced into philosophy by David Hume, the eighteenth century Scotch philosopher and historian. His doctrine was the next step in the evolution of the thought of Locke and Berkeley.

Locke had been a Dualist, maintaining the independent existence of both mind and matter. But he left an opening in his system that was to serve as the starting point of his successor, Berkeley. Locke distinguished between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter. The primary qualities were hardness, durability, and extension in space, while the secondary qualities were color, sound, odor, etc. Only the primary qualities were objective, that is, belonging to matter in its own right. The secondary qualities were subjective, or contributed by our own minds, believed Locke.

Berkeley demonstrated that the so-called primary qualities of matter were just as subjective as the secondary qualities, and that all our impressions of matter were mental. He dropped the notion of material substance and reduced reality to spiritual or mental substance alone.

Hume logically completed the evolution of this line of thought by destroying the notion of spiritual substance. We have already seen the arguments by which he brought about this result. In a word, he demonstrated that the notion of spiritual substance underlying our sensations, perceptions, volitions, and memories was an inference that would not hold water logically. Nothing was now left existing except sensations or phenomena. Hence the terms

Sensationalism or Phenomenalism in connection with Hume's system.

Along with Hume's Phenomenalism went a doctrine of causation that threatened to knock the foundations from under not only Religion, but Science as well. If we analyze our notions of cause and effect carefully, said Hume, we can find no compulsion, no necessity in any given effect following a given cause. When one billiard ball strikes another billiard ball we expect the latter to be set into motion by the former. We think that the effect must of necessity follow the cause. But a little analysis reveals that it is not a certainty, but only a probability—a very high probability in this case—that ball B will·be set into motion by Ball A. Suppose that one had never seen the collision of two billiard balls, or of two pieces of matter of any kind. Would one be able to deduce beforehand that ball B would have motion transmitted to it by ball A? We can find no logical reason why any effect should follow from a given cause. In the above example, to one who had never seen the phenomenon in question, it would be just as logical to suppose that the second ball would fly off into space, or remain stationary while checking the first ball. Almost anything could be supposed to happen and pure logic would be powerless to choose between the alternatives.

In truth, we learn the sequence of any given "cause" and "effect" relationship only through experience. The mind then associates the two, so that when we see A we naturally expect to see B follow. The greater the number of times our anticipation is fulfilled, the stronger our mental association of A and B becomes. But from this we cannot logically deduce that A and B are bound together by a causal necessity. All that we can say is that it is highly *probable* that B will follow A.

It is through the influence of Hume's above analysis of the cause and effect relationship, by which he reduced causation to little more than an association of ideas, that the terms *cause* and *effect* have fallen into disfavor among scientists, and that *antecedent* and *consequent* have taken their place. The laws of science, any careful modern scientist will hold, are mere statements of probability, not rigid, invariable "laws" of nature.

Hume's analysis of causation also had momentous implications for Religion. The two strongest arguments for the existence of

God, the *cosmological* and the *teleological* arguments, were based on the older notion of causality. In the cosmological proof the universe was considered the "effect" which only God as a "cause" could explain. The teleological argument held that the design and purpose apparently evident in the world pointed to a "cause" in the form of an intelligent being who did the designing. By demolishing the concept of causation and substituting for it the concept of mere sequence, Hume rendered it impossible to prove the existence of a Deity. Hume's philosophy, then, gave a tremendous impetus to Agnosticism. Thereafter, belief in God could be only a matter of faith, faith unassisted by reason. It may interest the reader to know that Hume himself had faith in the existence of God.

There are no ancient prototypes of Phenomenalism, because that philosophy is a very modern development. The Greek Sophists, however, somewhat approximated Phenomenalism in their skepticism. Real knowledge is impossible, all knowledge is opinion, believed most of the Sophists. The most extreme form of this skepticism was that of Gorgias, who said, "Nothing exists; if anything existed it could not be known; if anything could be known it could not be communicated to others."

Humian Phenomenalism is in great favor to-day among a brilliant school of philosophers who have approached philosophy through the gateway of science. Karl Pearson, the English physicist and mathematician; Wilhelm Ostwald, the German chemist; and Ernst Mach, an Austrian author of great works on physics and mechanics, have philosophical systems very closely resembling Hume's Phenomenalism.

Hume was, perhaps, the most influential philosopher in the history of European philosophy, although that fact is not adequately realized. Indeed, it can be said without fear of exaggeration that every system of philosophy after Hume up to the present day bears unmistakable signs of Hume's influence. We have already seen how the systems of Kant and the German Idealist were attempts, in part at least, to escape the skepticism of Hume. Other schools of philosophy hold that Kant's refutation of Hume was an evasion rather than a real answer, and hence Hume's doctrines play even a greater part in the systems other than German Idealism.

We have now completed our survey of the fundamental types of philosophy. It now remains for us to demonstrate how complex modern systems of philosophy can be analyzed into their simple components.

Let us take the philosophy called Pragmatism, certainly one of the dominating systems of to-day. Pragmatism also goes under the names of Humanism, and Instrumentalism. William James is usually associated with Pragmatism, F. C. S. Schiller with Humanism, and John Dewey with Instrumentalism. This difference in terminology must not be allowed to mislead the reader. Pragmatism, Humanism, and Instrumentalism represent what is substantially one system of thought.

Pragmatists (whatever they may call themselves) frequently speak of a doctrine called "radical empiricism." Radical empiricism is a species of Humism or Phenomenalism, in that it holds that the world of actual experience, the world of sensations and perceptions, is the real world. When the Pragmatist says that the world is made of a stuff called "pure experience" he is merely advancing the doctrine of Phenomenalism.

The most characteristic teaching of Pragmatism is its famous theory of truth. Truth, according to Pragmatists, is a mental weapon forged by the mind for the purpose of gaining control over experience. For example, the atomic theory of chemistry is a concept or mental tool which has enabled us to enrich our experience to a marvellous extent. We all know the rôle modern chemistry has played in medicine, industry, and in many other walks of life. It is unessential whether atoms really exist or not. The atomic theory is true, according to the Pragmatist, because it has proved such a potent instrument in gaining control over our environment and enhancing the fullness of our lives. Utility and workability are the principal tests of truth.

This doctrine of truth is not new by any means. It was hinted by one of the ancient Greek Sophists, Protagoras, who said, "Man is the measure of all things." The Pragmatic view of truth is a natural development proceeding from the skepticism of Hume. If we can have no knowledge other than that of probabilities and sequences, it behooves us to accept those sequences as true which it is useful for us to accept as true.

Let us subject the system of Bertrand Russell to our method of chemical analysis. We find that Russell's views on ethics and religion are similar to those of Epicurus. Moral codes and systems are merely human devices for securing the maximum of happiness for man; religion to Russell is a species of fear, which it is to man's interest to leave behind him. The world, according to Russell, is made of a stuff that is neither mind nor matter. "Neutral monism" is the name given this doctrine. This neutral stuff consists of "events." The entire conception is a variety of Humian Phenomenalism, for the "events" are phenomena or sensations. Russell places great faith in the absolute nature of mathematical truth, which he holds is independent of experience. In this respect, then, Russell is somewhat of a Platonist, since he affirms the independent existence of abstract ideas in the form of mathematical propositions. Thus the philosophical system of Bertrand Russell is a compound of Naturalism, Phenomenalism, and Platonism.

What are some of the benefits that would accrue from a more widespread interest in philosophy? Has philosophy any practical value?

The reading of the philosophers cannot help having a beneficent effect on one's character and ideals. Contact with the great philosophers, who were invariably men of the loftiest character and the highest moral idealism, is an experience fully as worthwhile as contact with the great minds of literature, music, and art. The calm, quiet pleasures of reflection and study come to be valued more highly than the degrading pleasures of modern life. Our hurried, but withal aimless, lives, are largely the outcome of false valuations and ideals. The lust for material gain is largely responsible for the feverish tempo of modern life. A truer sense of values, which the study of philosophy can hardly fail to instil, would do much toward freeing man's mind of the low ideals and petty material ambitions which are responsible for so many of the ills of modern society.

THE ENGLISHMAN WHO BECAME A POPE

BY J. V. NASH

THE recent agreement entered into between Premier Mussolini and the Vatican, resulting in the restoration—along much restricted lines—of the temporal power of the Pope, opens up a number of unusual prospects for the future of the papacy.

For instance, there is the possibility of the election, for the first time since the Reformation, of a non-Italian Pope. While the relations of Italy and the Vatican were still unsettled, the choice of a foreign Pope would have been extremely hazardous. The Italian government, if brought into conflict with an alien Pontiff, might have used his nationalty as an excuse for his expulsion from Italy and possibly for abolishing the papacy or subjecting it to the secular power. But since the Vatican has secured the rights of a sovereign nation, under treaty guaranties, these difficulties disappear, and the question already is being asked, will the next Pope be an American?

Although in pre-Reformation days there were many non-Italian Popes, it is curious that Ireland, for centuries the chief bulwark of Catholicism in northern Europe and famed as "the Isle of Saints," whence missionaries went out to convert European pagans, has never given a Pope to the Church, while Anglo-Saxon England can claim at least one Roman Pontiff. Stranger still, it has been charged—rightly or wrongly—that this English Pope was the cause of Ireland's long political subjection to England, from which she has only in our own day to a large extent freed herself.

The story of the English Pope is one of the most singular and romantic in the checkered history of the papacy. Being so little known to-day, it is worth recalling at this time. In order to follow its course more realistically, let us transport ourselves in spirit back to the year 1100 A. D.

In that year, the Norman kings had already held England for a generation; a Westminster Abbey occupied the site of the present reconstructed building, the fortress-church of Mont-Saint-Michel stood guard before the French coast, much the same in appearance as it has been described by Henry Adams in our time, and the glory of the cathedral of Chartres was already born. In Venice, St. Mark's looked out over the Adriatic, but in Rome St. Peter's was far different from the magnificent Renaissance basilica known to our modern tourists.

About twenty miles northwest of London lay the ancient town of St. Albans, where visitors nowadays seek out in St. Michael's church the tomb of the great Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, one-time Lord Chancellor of England, essayist and philosopher.

St. Albans was built near the site of the Roman city of Verulamium, bricks and stones from the ruins of which were used in the construction of early Christian churches, in the walls of which they are still visible. The beginnings of St. Albans itself far antedated the coming of the Anglo-Saxons. Here, according to tradition, the saint from which the present town takes its name was martyred in 303 A. D., a Christian church being built on the spot. Centuries rolled by, and in 793 Offa, the Saxon king of Mercia, who believed that he had discovered the relics of the saint, caused to be erected to "the blessed martyr's" memory a great monastery which in time became one of the wealthiest and most renowned in all England.

Before the end of the tenth century, the abbot of St. Albans began the construction of a magnificent abbey church. Wars delayed its erection, which was not pushed ahead until after the Norman conquest. It finally was consecrated in 1115, although completed long before. The great abbey church of St. Albans, much changed and restored, but with some of its original architecture remaining, still stands above the little river Ver, overlooking the pleasant English countryside. Here, in this peaceful land, much bloody fighting took place in the Wars of the Roses.

Hertfordshire, the county of which St. Albans is a municipal borough and market town, offers a typical English landscape of wooded hills and fertile valleys, with the chalk-downs of the Chilton Hills lying low on the northern horizon. Storied streams, such as the Lea and the Colne, tributaries of the Thames, and the Ivel and the New wander through the rolling terrain. Except for the presence of railways, the general aspect of Hertfordshire has not changed much between 1100 A. D. and the twentieth century. Such was the setting of St. Albans in 1115 A. D., when the glorious abbey church was dedicated.

One day in the summer of that year, a barefoot Saxon boy of fourteen or fifteen years might have been observed trudging along the dusty highway leading to the monastery gates. The little fellow's home was at Abbot's Langley, a feudal fief of the monastery of St. Albans a short distance away. His name was Nicholas Breakspeare.

It is rather singular that the names of the two Englishmen who have attained positions of universal sovereignty in Christendom, the one as Supreme Poet of the people and the other as Supreme Pontiff of the still undivided church, should have been so curiously alike. The name Breakspeare, like Shakespeare, has alternative spellings; e.g., Brekespear and Brakspere. Both men were of humble origin, and authentic biographical information about them is almost equally scanty.

The boy Nicholas' father, Robert Breakspeare, while of lowly station, seems to have come of worthy stock. According to William of Newburgh, a contemporary Augustinian canon and chronicler, the elder Breakspeare was of "slender means." Nothing is known of the mother except that she survived for many years; for after Nicholas became Pope we hear of her appealing to him for financial aid.

But to return to the boy, whom we left making his way along the English highway on that summer day in 1115. At last he reached the great outer gate of the monastery, at which he knocked timidly. In due time it was opened by a friar. The latter, recognizing the lad, admitted him and led him to the abbot, of whom he asked permission to join the brethren of the monastery. His own father, it appears, tiring perhaps of the wretched existence of an Anglo-Saxon tenant farmer, had some time before entered the monastery as a lay brother. The Norman nobility ruled the land with an iron hand, so that there was little opportunity for a son of the Anglo-Saxon peasantry to aspire to a place in the sun.

The father abbot heard the boy's story with kindly interest, and, according to the account that has come down from Matthew Paris, replied, "Have patience, my son, and stay at school yet a while till you are better fitted for the position you desire." Apparently he had been learning his letters, in what little free time he had, at the monastery school. This, in an age of widespread illiteracy, indicates unusual ambition on the part of the boy.

But it appears that Nicholas hung about the monastery until his father, shamed doubtless by his presence, ordered him away. And so, seeing nothing before him but a life as a poor farm laborer, a beggar, or a vagabond, the boy one night gathered his few belongings, wrapped them, we may suppose, in an old handkerchief, and started out along the high road to London. But in London, too, all the avenues to advancement were controlled by the ruling Normans; so Nicholas decided to shake the dust of England from his feet and try his fortunes abroad.

Thus began one of the strangest careers in the Middle Ages. Forty years later the Norman King of England, Henry II, was to meet in Italy this former humble subject of the English Crown and to greet him as his spiritual father and fellow-sovereign. For the poor Saxon boy who had trudged along the road to St. Albans and thence to London in those far-away days was now Pope Adrian IV, Sovereign Pontiff of the Universal Church and King of the Papal States.

How had Nicholas Breakspeare come to be where he was? Unfortunately, the records of his rise in the Church are all too scanty and sometimes even contradictory. Our chief authorities are Cardinal Boso and John of Salisbury, two English contemporaries and friends of Pope Adrian. Boso was appointed chamberlain to the Pope and was in especially intimate relations with him. Tradition has it that he was the Pope's nephew, but this cannot be confirmed.

According to Boso, Breakspeare upon leaving England made his way first to Arles, in France, where he continued his studies. During a vacation he went on a visit to the monastery of St. Rufus, near Avignon, about fifty miles south of Lyons, where he found the surroundings so congenial that he joined the brethren of the Cistercian Order there and was made a canon. In 1137 he became abbot.

As abbot of St. Rufus, important business for the monastery took him to Rome. He must have been of a pleasing personality and easily recognized ability; for the reigning Pope, Eugenius III, kept him in Rome and in 1146 created him Cardinal and Bishop of Albano, one of the suffragan sees of Rome.

William of Newburgh is authority for the statement that the strictness of Breakspeare's rule as abbot of St. Rufus had resulted in defamatory charges being preferred against him to the Pope by the canons of the abbey, and that it was to exonerate himself that he went to Rome. This statement, however, is not supported by Boso, nor does it harmonize with Nicholas' own words to John of Salisbury after he had become Pope:

"The office of Pope, he assured me, was a thorny one, beset on all sides with sharp pricks. He wished, indeed, that he had never left England, his native land, or at least had lived his life quietly in the cloister of St. Rufus rather than have entered on such difficult paths, but he dared not refuse, since it was the Lord's bidding."

Cardinal Breakspeare rose rapidly to prominence in the councils of the Church. In 1152, we find him entrusted with a mission to Scandinavia as Papal Legate. In Norway he reorganized the Church, establishing the archiepiscopal see at Trondhjem, where stood the shrine of St. Olaf, the patron saint of Norway. He is credited also with having reformed the civil institutions of the country. According to Snorro, Cardinal Breakspeare earned greater popular honor and deference in Norway than any other foreigner who had ever visited the country. He also did important work in Sweden, uniting that country in closer bonds with the Papacy.

On Breakspeare's return to Rome from his successful mission in the North, he was acclaimed with great applause. The reigning Pope, Anastasius IV, dying soon thereafter, Breakspeare on the very next day was unanimously elected to the vacant throne. The date was December 3, 1154. He took the name Adrian IV.

Adrian's reign of not quite five years was destined to be one of the most turbulent in the history of the Papacy. We may well believe that at times he wished that he had never set foot in Rome. The Pope at this time was a full-fledged temporal sovereign, ruling large sections of Italy. The political conditions in that country, when he assumed the tiara, were bordering on anarchy. The local barons were engaged in warfare among themselves as well as with the Pope, and travel on the highways was at the mercy of their depredations. Rome itself was in revolt under the leadership of the brilliant Arnold of Brescia. For a time, the Pope had to flee from Rome. Finally, he placed the city under interdict. This had the desired effect. Arnold escaped into the country but later fell into the hands of the government, and, in accordance with the harsh customs of those days, was burned at the stake.

Hardly had these difficulties been surmounted when Adrian found himself at odds with the Emperor, the renowned Frederick Barbarossa, who was coming to Italy for his coronation as head of the Holy Roman Empire. Adrian went out to meet him at Sutri, some thirty miles north of Rome. On June 9, 1155, the Pope and the Emperor met. The Pope, on horseback, expected the Emperor to hold his stirrup while he dismounted, but the Emperor refused the act of homage. Adrian quietly dismounted and, in a conference with Frederick, insisted that before he could have further dealings with him, the required homage must be performed. The Emperor finally yielding the point, another meeting was arranged two days later. Frederick on foot came to meet the Pope on horseback, and meekly held his stirrup. Then the Pope agreed to crown him as Emperor, the coronation taking place shortly afterwards in St. Peter's.

While the coronation services were going on, Frederick's troops encamped in the city were attacked by the Roman republican faction. After a long day of fighting, the latter were defeated, with losses of 1,000 killed or drowned in the Tiber and 200 prisoners. The Romans, however, managed to hold the city; so the Emperor decided to withdraw. Bidding farewell to the Pope at Tivoli, he turned northward, burning Spoleto on his way.

Adrian's next troubles were with the Norman king of Sicily, William I, who had ascended the throne in February of the year in which Adrian became Pope. Open warfare followed Adrian's refusal to recognize William's kingship. William, at the head of his troops, ravaged the Italian country, whereupon Adrian excommunicated him. The Pope himself took the field with his forces. It was during this troubled period that John of Salisbury visited him at Beneventum in the summer of 1156 and spent three months with his fellow-countryman.

King William seems to have got the better of the struggle; in

June, 1156, the Pope had to agree to peace. He confirmed the king in the possession of large territories, while the king on his part took the oath of allegiance to the Pope, with the promise of an annual tribute and the defense of the papal lands.

Adrian then made peace with the turbulent Roman populace, and early in 1157 returned to the Imperial City. But his recognition of William's pretensions greatly angered the Emperor Frederick, with whom the Pope soon found himself in open hostilities. Adrian formed a league with the Lombards against the Emperor and once more entered into the midst of a campaign. He was about to issue an edict of excommunication against the Emperor—always a convenient weapon against an enemy whom a mediaeval Pope could not thrash in a stand-up fight—when his troubles were ended by his own sudden death, of quinsy, at Anagni, on September 1, 1159.

His reign had been filled with bitterness and anxiety, foes encompassing him on all sides. Even his cardnals divided themselves into two factions on great questions of policy. As Adrian himself expressed it, "the Lord had kept him continually between the hammer and the anvil," and it was said that "the solitariness of his supreme position and unique office was increased and made more dreary by the isolation which he, as an Englshman, felt among Italians." The visit of his personal friend, John of Salisbury, doubtless cheered hm much. Another of the pleasant incidents of his career was a visit from Henry II, king of his native England.

Although a number of modern authorities have cast doubt upon the affair of the donation of Ireland by Adrian, the genuineness of it appears to be established beyond dispute. It is conceded by the official *Catholic Encyclopaedia.* The deal seems to have been engineered by John of Salisbury, apparently on his own initiative, during his lengthy stay with the Pope in 1156. The transaction would have been advantageous to the Papacy by making the king of England an acknowledged vassal of the Pope; for on the church in England the royal hand lay heavy.

Most of the contention has centered round the authenticity of the papal bull, "Laudabiliter," but explicit confirmation of the incident is found in the statement of John of Salisbury in a work entitled *Metalogicus,* in which, speaking of Adrian IV, he says:

"At my solicitation he gave and granted Hibernia to Henry II, the illustrious King of England, to hold by hereditary right as his letter to this day testifies. For all islands of ancient right, according to the Donation of Constantine, are said to belong to the Roman Church, which he founded. He sent also by me a ring of gold, with the best of emeralds set therein, wherewith the investiture might be made for his governorship of Ireland, and that same ring was ordered to be and is still in the public treasury of the King."

As this work was composed in 1159 or 1160, and the earliest existing manuscript of it dates from the period 1175-1200, the genuineness of this testimony, supported as it is by other evidence, seems practically iron-clad. Moreover, the donation was officially confirmed by Adrian's successor, Alexander III, about the year 1159, and again by letters dated September 20, 1172, although the charge of forgery has been raised in connection with these letters. At any rate, the transaction was recognized by the official acts of many succeeding Popes.

Because of the disturbed political conditions at home, Henry II did not undertake to extend his authority into Ireland until 1171, long after the death of Adrian. It is argued by some historians that Henry II never actually accepted the Pope's offer, as he did not wish to acknowledge the overlordship of the papacy, and that when he finally did invade Ireland it was for the purpose of establishing a claim by blunt "right of conquest."

The legal justification for the donation of Ireland was based on the theory of the Pope's sovereignty of all islands; that Ireland had fallen into a state of disorder, and that the king of England would, as the vassal of the Pope, restore peace, order, and security.

For the next four hundred years, the kings of England styled themselves Lords of Ireland; then, in the Reformation period, Ireland was brought directly under the British Crown. The Irish themselves acknowledged the legality of Adrian's donation, as late as 1467, when the Irish Parliament in one of its acts decreed that

"as our Holy Father Adrian, Pope of Rome, was possessed of all sovereignty of Ireland in his demesne as of fee in the right of his Church of Rome, and with the intent that vice should be subdued had alienated said land to the King of England . . . . by which grant the said subjects of Ireland owe their allegiance to the King of England as their sovereign lord . . . . all archbishops and bishops shall excommunicate all disobedient Irish subjects, and if they neglect to do so shall forfeit 100 pounds."

Strangely enough, it does not appear that the papacy ever formally rescinded Adrian's donation of Ireland, even after England severed relations with Rome. But that, perhaps, is no more strange than that the kings and queens of England have continued to bear the title, "Defender of the Faith," conferred by the Pope upon Henry VIII, for that royal theologian's zealous literary assaults on Protestantism.

THE USE OF THE WORD JEN IN THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS

BY HUANG K'UEI YUEN AND J. K. SHRYOCK

THE problem connected with the use of Jen in the Analects is altogether different from that involved in the use of Tao. Compared with most of the other important words in Chinese thought, Jen is easy to translate. There is nothing mystical about it, and all writers use it in approximately the same sense.

The Hsueh Wen says that Jen is composed of two characters, Jen, or man, and Erh, or Two. Chinese commentators agree that Erh has the significance of Lin, or neighbor. In other words, the whole character is concerned with the relations between a man, and the other men with whom he comes in contact. This relation is defined by the Hsueh Wen as Ch'in. The word Ch'in as a noun means relatives or family, but here it sems to be a verb, meaning "to treat as a relative." The word, then, not only stands for a man's relations or attitude toward others, but also signifies what that attitude ought to be. One should treat all men as if they were members of his own family, that is, he should love them. In this sense it has become the chief Confucian virtue. Ch'en Hsuan, a scholar of the 18th Century, explains Jen as "to love others equally."

In the Analects, Jen is used as an adjective and as a noun. The usual verb is Ai, to love, but the two are equated. Jen, unlike the English word love, applies only to the virtue of benevolence, and not to the affection between the sexes, but Ai is used in both senses. Confucius sometimes uses Jen in such a sweeping way as to include in it all the virtues, and so Legge and other translators occasionally translate it by virtue, but the fundamental meaning of the word is love, or benevolence. Chu Hsi points out that love does include all the virtues.

The Tsu Yuen, a modern source book of words and phrases, gives three uses of the word.

1—It is the principle that makes man man, the essence of humanity. To love men unselfishly is Jen.

2—A kernel.

3—A negative use. When a man is unable to use his limbs, his body is not Jen.

These last two uses need not be considered. The Tsu Yuen also gives thirty common phrases in which Jen occurs.

In the Analects the word is used 109 times. It is the central word of Confucian ethics, the keystone of the arch. This is in direct opposition to the Taoists, who belittle the virtues in general and Jen in particular, Chuang Tzu even going so far as to say that to love men is the way to injure them. Jen really comes into its own in the Analects, so much so that an American writer has recently said that in Jen, Confucius introduced a new concept into Chinese thought. This is hardly accurate, for the word occurs eight times in the Tao Teh Ching, as well as in earlier classics, but its use before Confucius is not so frequent, nor so important.

When used as an adjective, the word is translated as good, benevolent or virtuous.

"The Jen man first considers. . . ." (6, 20).

"The Master said, 'Yu is not Jen. . . .'" (17, 21, 6). This was because Yu did not have the right attitude toward his parents.

"The Jen man will not seek to live by injuring Jen." (15, 8). Here the meaning could be freely rendered by, "The benevolent man would rather die than do anything unkind." The word is used both as a noun and as an adjective in the same sentence.

The interesting point in the way that Confucius uses Jen is this. He very seldom speaks about it without being asked, and when he uses it unasked, he says very little about it except that it is a fine thing. The last quotation is a good example. To say that a Jen man would rather die than injure Jen really does not tell much about what Jen is. Jen is used so often in the Analects, and is so important in the history of Confucian doctrine, that western scholars have paid little attention to the evident reluctance of Confucius to define exactly what he meant by the word. This reluctance was brought out even more clearly when he was forced to speak on the subject. Evidently the definition of Jen was a matter of vital importance to the disciples. Again and again they questioned Confucius about it. Confucius was too honest to avoid the question, but usually, instead of attempting a clear cut definition, he applied the word to the needs of the one who had inquired. The result was that each time he was asked about Jen, he gave a different answer.

Fan Ch'ih asked concerning Jen. He asked three times, and received the following answers.

"The Jen man first considers the difficulty of his task, and afterwards thinks of acquisition." (6, 20).

"The Master said, 'It is to love men'." (12, 22). The subject of this sentence is Jen, while the predicate is Ai.

"To be grave at home, reverent in business, and loyal to men." (13, 19, 1).

Of these replies, only the second gives much satisfaction to one seeking a definition.

Yen Hui asked concerning Jen.

"The Master said, 'To subdue oneself, and restore propriety'." (12, 1, 1).

Yen Hui was persistent and asked what the steps in this process were. He was told not to look, listen, speak nor act except according to Li, which may be inadequately translated as propriety.

Chung Kung asked concerning Jen, and was told;

"When abroad, (to behave) as if receiving a guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; that which you do not wish for yourself, do not give to (other) men." This last is the Confucian version of the Golden Rule, which in the Chinese is positive as well as negative. (12, 2).

Szu-ma Niu asked concerning Jen.

"Jen is to be slow and cautious in speech." (12, 13, 1). It is explained that this is because the Jen man realizes the difficulty of acting correctly.

Tzu Chang asked concerning Jen. The form of the reply is, "Confucius said," instead of the usual "the Master said," which may indicate a different source for this section. The answer was;

"To be able to practice five things everywhere." (17, 6) These five are humility, generosity, sincerity, earnestness and kindness.

Tzu Kung asked, "If a man confers benefits on the people and is able to assist all, is this Jen?" (6, 28, 1).

"The Master said, 'Why speak of Jen only? Such a man would be a sage. The Jen man, wishing to establish himself, establishes others; wishing to enlarge himself, enlarges others; to judge by what is near; this is the art of Jen."

In this quotation, Jen appears to be only a part of perfect virtue, or holiness, but this point depends upon whether the character Hu, which ends the first sentence, is to be interpreted as a sign of interrogation, or of exclamation. The passage is difficult to put into English, especially the words translated "establish" and "enlarge."

These passages show that Jen was a subject of intense interest to the disciples, mostly young men of noble families who came to Confucius for instruction in politics and ethics. They belonged to a class which considered the government of the country as their profession, and they regarded their instruction from the sage as a very practical preparation for an official career. Yen Hui was thirty-one when he died, and Tseng Tzu was twenty-six at the time of Confucius' death. No higher tribute could be paid to the best Chinese society of the time than that it regarded the kind of instruction which Confucius gave as the proper preparation for a life of government service.

The passages also show how Confucius varied his answers to the man he addressed, and the theory is advanced in this paper that they also indicate his reluctance to speak on the subject of Jen, or to give a definition of his position. On occasions where he does not appear to have been questioned, his remarks contribute little to an understanding of the word.

"I have not seen a person who loved Jen. . . . He who loved Jen, would value nothing above it." (4, 6, 1). He goes on to say that one always has the strength to be Jen, and then qualifies this by saying that if there were an instance where Jen was unattainable, he had never seen it.

"The Master said, 'Where Jen is involved, a man must not yield even to his teacher'." (15, 35).

"The Master said, 'Firmness, endurance, simplicity and modesty, are near to Jen'." (13, 27).

"Even if an ideal ruler arose, it would require a generation for Jen to prevail." (13, 12).

While these are valuable statements, they do not help much in determining what Confucius' idea of Jen was. Neither does the remark of Tseng Tzu, (8, 7, 2), that Jen is the life-long responsibility of the scholar.

The difficulty is, that here is what seems to be a relatively simple word, yet it is necessary for the disciples to question Confucius about it over and over again, and except in one passage, they find it impossible to get a clear answer. That Confucius was really reticent on the subject is apparent from the following passage.

"The Master seldom spoke of profit, of the Decree, and of Jen." (9, 1).

This raises a serious problem, especially for those who have translated Jen by virtue. The word occurs in the Analects, which is a short book, 109 times. To say that Confucius seldom spoke of virtue is absurd, for he seldom spoke of anything else. Soothill and Legge translate the word here by "perfect virtue," meaning, probably, that he would not admit anyone to have been perfect. That he did not accept anyone to have completely realized Jen is true, but that is not what this passage says. It maintains that Confucius seldom discussed the word which is used in the book of his collected sayings 109 times. Soothill ignores the problem in his notes, but Legge is frank enough to admit that there is a problem, and that he does not know how to solve it. Why should Confucius be said to have seldom discussed the very word for which he is famous, the key to the system which goes by his name, especially when that word appears on nearly half the pages of the book which records his conversation?

There is only one explanation which is at all adequate. It is that Confucius was really reluctant to speak on the subject, but that he was forced to do so by his disciples. At the time he was teaching, the word must have been under constant discussion among the class of men from whom Confucius drew his pupils, but probably the exact meaning had not been determined, or a new content was being given it in a period of change and ferment. Lao Tze and Confucius were the leaders, but there must have been many men who were discussing and analysing the same problems with which they dealt. It was a time of intense intellectual activity and stimulus, and the content of the word Jen was of vital importance. Confucius realized the difficulty as well as the importance, and therefore he avoided the subject unless he was forced to consider it. The disciples rendered a great service by compelling him to discuss it, for in his answers he reached some of the highest points ever attained by the human mind.

The analysis of the character shows that it stands for the relation of a man to his neighbors. It is not unreasonable, then, for us to interpret the question which the disciples asked so often in this way.

"What is my duty toward my neighbor?"

That question was discussed several hundred years later in Palestine. There also the Master refused to give a definition as an answer, replying by a story.

"Who is my neighbor?"

"A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho. . . ."

Confucius gave answers which show that his view was strikingly like that of Christ. He applied the word to the man. For one, it meant devotion to his parents, for another, to be slow in speech, for a third, to gain self-control, for a fourth, to behave according to the recognized rules of society. Love, then, is a principle which each man must apply for himself. It is an attitude rather than a rule of conduct, and that is probably why Confucius was so reluctant to discuss it. His disciples, like the Jews, wanted hard and fast rules, such as to give a tenth of one's income to charity. Confucius, like Christ, tried to avoid saying anything that could be crystallized into such a rule. His answers show that he considered love to include all the virtues, even self-respect and self-control; that it was not sentimental, for it must be firm and just; that it did not obliterate the distinctions of society, for it included the proper treatment of parents and the recognition of moral obligations and customs. And above all, Jen was universal, since it meant to love all men. A man should love his neighbor as himself, or as Confucius put it, what he did not wish for himself, he should not give to others. It is not surprising that the ethical teaching of the Chinese should center about the word Jen, or that Confucius should be eulogized as "The teacher of 10,000 generations."

THE DEVIL, THE WORLD AND THE FLESH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

(Concluded)

MUSIC, DANCE AND DRAMA OF INFERNAL ORIGIN

THE Devil has been popularly credited with the invention of music. Victor Hugo repeatedly refers in his works to the popular belief in the diabolical origin of music. Asmodeus himself, in LeSage's novel, *le Diable boiteux* (1707), asserts that he is the inventor of music. This popular belief is based on Church tradition, which ascribed the origin of music, not without good reason, to the Devil. Catholic asceticism denounced all instrumental music as the Devil's work. Even some Protestant sects not many decades ago condemned music during religious services as a Satanic artifice to lure men's thoughts away from God. The popular English preacher, Rowland Hill, long ago admitted the fact that the Devil had all the good melodies, and a popular hymn-writer of this country likewise thought it unfortunate that Diabolus should have all the good tunes.

This view is shared by many modern writers who can hardly be said to believe in Beelzebub. James Huneker, in his already quoted *Bedouins*, speaking of the Devil, affirms, "Without him . . . there would be . . . no music . . . He created the chromatic scale—that is why Richard Wagner admired the Devil in music—what is *Parsifal*," the great American art critic concludes his pæan of praise of the Prince of Pleasure, "but a version of the Black Mass?" Dr. Henry van Dyke, in a statement dated February 27, 1921, credits the Demon with the invention at least of jazz-music. The songs of a musical comedy are considered by our high-brow critics "the Devil's own ditties."

The Devil always has given sufficient proof of his musical talent. Again James Huneker, in his *Bedouins* just quoted again, goes so far as to call Satan "the greatest of all musicians." The vocal ability of the demons of hell was early discovered by the medieval monks. Thomas de Cantimpré, writing in the thirteenth century, tells how a demon composed a famous song about St. Martin and circulated it abroad all over France and Germany. In the second, more sketchy, part of Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* (1802), the Principle of Good and the Principle of Evil appear in open competition, singing antiphonies. The French composer, Boieldieu, believed that he had composed the "Valse infernale" for his comic opera *Faust* (1828) with the help of the Devil in person.

But Satan's greatest musical work is perhaps the *Sonata del Diavolo* (1713) nominally composed by Giuseppe Tartini, an Italian musician. According to Tartini's own testimony, the Devil appeared to him in his dream and played on his violin an air of such great beauty that the composer, upon awakening, seized his own instrument and played "The Devil's Trill."

Diabolus is also credited with a sonata by Gérard de Nerval in *la Sonate du Diable* (1830). This story tells how a musician, chagrined that his daughter understood nothing of music, offered her hand to the man who could write and execute the best sonata, "be it the Devil in person." The Evil Spirit, who is never slow to appear when called, arrived with two accompanists at the musical tournament, which the master had arranged. The Devil, it transpired, had written the best sonata of all the aspirants to the hand of the maiden. But an angel, wishing to checkmate the Devil, on the evening preceding the day fixed for the tournament, handed a sonata to the young man who was in love with the musician's daughter. But even the angelic sonata was inferior to that of the infernal composer. However, when the Devil's players approached the end of their superb composition, convinced of their final victory, the young man surreptitiously substituted his own parchment for theirs and thus won out in the end.[11]

While the Devil plays all instruments equally well, he seems to prefer the violin. He was said in the Middle Ages to own a violin with which he could set whole cities, grandparents and grandchildren, men and women, girls and boys, to dancing, dancing, until they fell dead from sheer exhaustion. The Devil appears in this rôle in the medieval legend of the Pied Piper, which is well known to English readers through Robert Browning's poem, "The Pied Piper of Hamelin" (1843), Robert Buchanan's opera, *The Piper of*

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[11] Mr. W. H. Snyder has written, in 1911, a drama in three acts entitled *The Devil's Sonata.*

Hamelin (1893), and Miss Josephine Peabody's play, *The Piper* (1909). The miraculous musician in this legend carried off one hundred and fifty children when the inhabitants of Hammel in Saxony refused to pay him for ridding them of the rats, which had infested their town. This Pied Piper was, according to Johannes Wierus and Robert Burton, none other than the Devil in person. The rats were the human souls, which the Devil charmed by his music into following him. In the Middle Ages, the soul was often represented leaving the body in the form of a mouse. The soul of a good person, it was believed, comes out of the mouth as a white mouse, while, at the death of a sinner, the soul escapes as a black mouse, which the Devil catches and carries off in his sack to hell. Mephistopheles, it will be remembered, calls himself, in Gœthe's *Faust,* "the Lord of rats and mice" (i. 1516). Death, the Devil's first cousin, if not his *alter ego,* similarly is represented, in the Dance of Death, marching off the souls to hell to the accompaniment of a merry tune on his violin.

Satan appears as a fiddler in the poem *"Der Teufel mit der Geige,"* which has been attributed to the Swiss anti-Papist, Pamphilius Gengenbach, of the sixteenth century. Klemens Brentano, in the fragmentary *Romanzen vom Rosenkranz* (written in 1909 and published posthumously in 1852), represents the Devil playing the violin, sending forth from this instrument shockingly shrill tunes. In Lenau's *Faust* (1836), Mephistopheles takes the violin out of the hands of one of the musicians at a peasant-wedding and plays on it a diabolical *czardas,* which fills with voluptuousness the hearts of all who hear it. An opera *Un Violon du Diable* was played in Paris in 1849, and Benjamin Webster's extravaganza in verse, *"The Devil's Violin,* was performed the same year in London. The Devil also appears as a limping fiddler in a California legend, which appeared, in 1855, in the *Pioneer,* a Californian magazine, under the title "The Devil's Fiddle." In his story "les Tentations ou Éros, Plutus et la Gloire" (1863), Charles Baudelaire presents the Demon of Love holding in his left hand a violin, "which, without doubt, served to sing his pleasures and pains." We also meet the diabolical musician in "The Devil in a Nunnery," a medieval legend modernized by Francis Oskar Mann (1914). In this story, the Devil, disguised as a pilgrim, enters a convent, and plays on his "cithern" for the entertainment of the nuns. Slyly he drifts into the most voluptuous music, until the nuns are overcome with old memories that should be dead. The effect is so disastrous to their serenity that in expiation a fast is ordered for the next day.[12]

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Naturally the Devil is also the originator of the dance, particularly the rapid and fantastic variety. Asmodeus, in Le Sage's previously mentioned novel, assumes credit for the invention of the dance.[13]

The demons inherited their dancing ability from the ærial spirits, who were too etheral in nature to walk prosaically on earth. For this reason, dancing is their distinguishing characteristic. In many legends, the Devil becomes the dancing partner of the girls who show too great a fondness for dancing, and who, therefore, must dance with their diabolical partner without rest or repose till they fall dead. Friedrich Hebbel has used this legend in his poem "Der Tanz" (1832). In this romance, based on an Eiderstedt legend, a young girl is seized by such transports of joy in dancing at a ball that she keeps whirling about after all the others have left the hall. When her mother warns her that she is fatiguing herself and asks her to stop dancing and go home, the girl boastfully replies that even if the Devil himself were present, he could not tire her out. But no sooner has she uttered these words when a young man in dark clothes approaches her and invites her to dance with him. The girl accepts the invitation, and the pair swing around in the empty hall. But now the girl finds no joy in her dancing; she feels rather as if she stood on the edge of her grave. The mother enters the hall and again asks her daughter to stop dancing. But the young girl cannot break away from the grasp of the weird looking youth, who holds her so firmly in his arms. Suddenly blood spurts out of her mouth; and as she sinks dead to the ground, the diabolical young man disappears in the fog and the night.

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[12] In this connection it may be interesting to refer to the following Irish tale mentioned by Leland in a footnote to his translation of Heine's *Elementargeister:* Pat O'Flanagan, the tailor, was dancing in mad joy with the Devil, who was fiddling, while both took alternate sups from Satan's whisky-bottle. "Whin, och what a pity! all at wanst this foine parrety was broken up by the appairence of Judy, Pat's wife." In the end, the Devil goes off with Mrs. O'Flanagan.

[13] It is believed that our waltz originated in a dance called *la Volta* performed at the medieval Witches' Sabbath. See Margaret Alice Murray's *The Witch-Cult in Western Europe* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 134-5.

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In addition to his sponsorship of the dance, the Devil is likewise regarded as the inventor of the drama. Asmodeus, who figures in the novel by LeSage, contends that he is the creator of comedy. Certainly the Church condemned all secular dramatic performances as *"pompæ diaboli."* The Church fathers declared that all dramatic arts emanated from the Devil (Pseudo-Cyprian: *De Spectaculis,* iv; Tatian: *Oratio ad Græcos,* xxii). St. John Chrysostom also denounced the "Satanic corruptions of the stage." Indeed, the actors were regarded by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, and even for many centuries afterwards, as servants of Satan and denied the holy sacraments and burial in consecrated ground. It is a matter of common knowledge that Molière, the creator of the French comedy, who died in 1673, was considered unfit for Christian burial. In revenge, the condemned comedians starred Satan in their plays. Protestants were likewise opposed to play-production. During the sixteenth century, the faithful were forbidden by the Church of England to attend plays of any kind, and any person connected with the stage was denied the offices of the church.

The Puritans considered the play-house the Devil's own place. Stephen Gosson, in his *School of Abuse* (1579), affirmed seriously of theatrical productions: "There is more in them than we perceive; the Devil stands at our elbow when we see not, speaks when we hear not, strikes when we feel not, and wounds sore when he raises no skein, nor rents the flesh." Archbishop John Sharp of London (1645-1714) said that going to the theater was equivalent to looking at the Devil. Our own George Jean Nathan, who certainly cannot be suspected of orthodoxy, fancifully terms the theater "the house of Satan" in his book by that title (1926). A story is told of the demon who entered a woman in the theater and, when exorcised, excused himself by saying that he had found her in his own "demesne."[14]

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[14] See Thornton S. Graves, "The Devil in the Playhouse," *South Atlantic Quraterly,* XIX (1920), 131-40.

LUCIFER AS LITTÉRATEUR

The Devil was also regarded by our ancestors as the patron of publications. The assertion that his Satanic Majesty hates nothing so much as writing or printer's ink is surely a calumny. In Samuel Crothers' essay, "The Merry Devil of Education" (1910), Diabolus declares, "Ink is my native element." The German mystic, Jacob Bœhme, relates that when Satan was asked the cause of God's enmity toward the Adversary and of the latter's subsequent downfall, he replied, "I wished to be an author."[15] The punishment meted out to Satan for his diabolical genius has evidently not cured him of his literary aspirations.

The Devil is recognized as a great writer, although he may never have received any royalties on work published over his own signature.[16] Having been denied copyright privileges on earth, and probably also lacking asbestos paper, Diabolus must perforce publish over human signatures. He finds it, moreover, to his advantage to dictate his ideas through the pens of mortals in order to carry on his work better on earth.

It may be said without exaggeration that all writers, consciously or unconsciously, owe their inspiration to the Devil. Gœthe remarked jokingly on the tenth of January, 1789, that he would have to sell his soul to Satan in order to write his *Faust*. But it is not necessary to enter formally a bond with Beelzebub in order to obtain his aid in writing a book. The Devil is always near to them who are engaged in the profession of letters. It is not without good reason, therefore, that the priests maintain that "the writers are all more or less demons" (Victor Hugo: *les Quatre vents de l'esprit*, 1882, and *Toute la lyre*, 1888-93).

It is a well-known fact that books have in all times been considered tools of hell. For the things that men write have their influence in formulating the ideas and ideals of the reader, and to this extent authors stand in the service of Satan. Thomas Carlyle also believed that he served Satan, but his only regret was that he received no reward for his services. "Sad fate!" he exclaimed, "to serve the Devil and yet get no wages even from him."

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[15] The word "author" is used in this connection in its current meaning.

[16] In this connection it is interesting to note that Diabolus has been credited with the authorship of the biggest Bible in the world—the *gigas librorum*—which is found in the Royal Library at Stockholm and which is therefore called the Devil's Bible.

It is especially the imaginaive works of literature which are generally considered to be of infernal inspiration. When Asmodeus, in LeSage's noteworthy novel, maintains that he is the inventor of all things that make for beauty in this world, he might just as well have said that he was also the creator of literature. If, from modesty, he did not personally make this assertion, others affirmed it for him. It stands to reason that whatever we read for our enjoyment is in the eyes of Catholic asceticism of infernal origin.

But apart from its joy-giving quality, what we call *belles lettres* is decidedly diabolical in its essence. The writers themselves admit the infernal origin of their work. "I have heard all the men of lettres say that their profession was diabolical," asserts Eugène Delacroix. The demonic element is most essential for the success of great creative literary works other than treatises of a scientific or historic nature. The fire and originality in many a masterpiece is due to that power which Timolean calls *Automatia* and Gœthe, in his conversation with Eckermann in 1828, *das Dämonische*—the dæmonic—"that which cannot be explained by reason or understanding, which is not in our nature, but to which we are subject."[17] Voltaire believed that, to be a successful author, it was necessary to have *le diable au corps.* In full agreement with the dictum of the patriarch of Ferney, Gottfried Keller, the Swiss novelist, has this to say in regard to literary success:

> "He who has had no bitter experience knows no malice; and he who has known no malice has not the Devil in him; and he who has not the Devil in him cannot write anything that will have force and vigor."

Fiction figures in the eyes of many men as a fabrication of the Fiend. Many indictments may indeed be drawn up against all forms of fiction. On account of its frequently immoral matter, the novel has received the condemnation of many a moralist. "The personages of fiction," the great Toystoy declares, "have souls; and it is but truth to say that their malignant authors send them forth among us like demons to tempt us and to ruin us." According to the famous Russian author, Balzac, the Titan of the French novel, is the Lucifer of literature. But the creator of the *Comédie hu-*

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[17] Gœthe undoubtedly used the word "demonic" as a synonym for "supernatural" with a complimentary connotation. But a writer may be inspired by a good or an evil spirit according as to whether the gravitation of his imagination is toward heaven or hell.

maine is not the only French novelist who has been under anathema. It has been said that all French novelists are of the Devil's party. Nor, for that matter, will the romancers of other countries take their places among the elect of heaven.

Many a well-known noveltist, in other countries as well as in France, has produced his work *cooperante Diabolo.* The Fiend has always shown partiality in aiding fictionists. The German fantastic writer, E. T. A. Hoffmann, held the opinion that the Devil was "an ever helpful aid-de-camp of story-tellers in need of help." Tradition has it that the demons of hell guided the pen of many a fiction writer. Asmodeus, for example, wishing to take vengeance on the monks, his sworn enemies, whispered the *Decameron* (c. 1350) into the ears of Boccaccio, while Beelzebub avenged himself on the devil-fighting knights of the Middle Ages by inspring Cervantes with *Don Quixote* (1605-16).

As for poetry, no argument is needed to show that this emotional art is an expression of the powers of darkness. The poetry of passion in particular is poison. All lyricists are the Levites of Lucifer. Moreover, poetry is often used to sing the praises of the Prince of this world. Byron, the poet of doubt and despair, is not the only "chanter of hell," as Lamartine called him. Even Milton, the great Puritan poet, showed himself as a partisan of the powers of darkness. "The reason," said William Blake, "Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of angels and God, and at liberty when of devils and hell, is because he was a true poet, and of the Devil's party without knowing it." It cannot be denied that the personality of the Devil was the chief preoccupation of the poet. Addison and Dryden, among many other English and foreign authorities, regarded Milton's fallen archangel as the focal point of attention or the real hero of the poem. "The finest thing in connection with this [Milton's] *Paradise,"* says Taine, in his *Histoire de la littérature française* (1863), "is Hell; and in this history of God the chief part is taken by the Devil." What fascinated also Chateaubriand in Milton's poem was the character of Satan, whom he considered the finest conception of all poetic personifications of Evil.[17a]

Criticism, as all creative writers will agree, is without any doubt whatsoever the work of the Devil. "Literary criticism," says Sainte-Beuve, "the kind that I am writing, is alas! hardly compatible with Christian practice . . ." The literary critic may wish to be fair, but not infrequently the animus of professional rivalry or scorn seizes him, and he plays the rôle of the Spirit of negation and destruction. The critic of books and their authors, considered in this light, is nothing if not a Devil's advocate. On the other hand, the writers with whom the critic differs are identified by him, in one way or another, with the person of the Devil.

[17a] On this question, see Emily Hickey's article, "Is Satan the Hero of *Paradise Lost?" Catholic World,* XCVI (1912), 5871.

But not only literary works enjoyed the distinction of being considered of diabolical inspiration. In Catholic eyes, the majority of books produced by men owed their origin to the unholy devices and corruptions of Satan. It is a well-known fact that, in the good old days, every book printed without the approval of the Church was associated with the demons of hell.[18]

THE DEVIL AS RADICAL AND REFORMER

The Devil was popularly regarded as a pioneer of progress. He was hailed as the standard-bearer of the great reformers and innovators of all ages. Satan was credited with all aspirations for improvement in every field of human activity. The Church contended that it was Satan who inspired the opposition against priestcraft and kingcraft, and that it was the Devil who filled man with the love of liberty, equality and fraternity. Diabolus represented discontent with existing conditions in matters social, political, and ecclesiastical. He was identified with the spirit of progress so disturbing to those who are satisfied with the existing order of things. Every democratic institution, every social reform, was attributed by the reactionaries to the machinations of the spirits of hell.[19]

The French Revolution was regarded by the Catholic Church as a creation of the Evil Spirit.[20] It was asserted by Catholicism that France was possessed of the Devil during the revolutionary period. According to Victor Hugo, the Catholics believed that the members of the Convention were carried off at their death by the Devil (*les Misérables* I. i. 10). This great French poet himself, in his royalist days, described the Convention as a Pandemonium (*Odes et poésies diverses,* 1822). Marmontel had already previously said that the members of the Convention were "living bronze figures of demons."

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[18] In this connection it may be well to refer the reader to the story, "The Printer's Devil," published anonymously in 1836 and reprinted in the present writer's anthology of *Devil Stories* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1931).

[19] Soviet Russia, on account of her experimentation in social and political reforms, is envisaged at the present day by two writers as the "Devil's workshop."

[20] The Catholic view of the French Revolution down to the present day may be seen in *le Diable et la Révolution* (1895), a work written by the impostor Leo Taxil and dedicated to Pope Leo XIII.

The priests taught the French peasants that the civil Constitution promulgated by the Convention, which transferred the property of the Church from the Catholic hierarchy to the French government, was the diabolical masterpiece of this infernal Revolution. Count Joseph de Maistre, the theoretical proponent of absolutism in church and government, also considered the French Revolution the work of Satan (*Considérations sur la France,* 1796). His yokefellow, the Viscount Joseph de Bonald, saw in Jacobinism "the reign of demons." Chateaubriand, the partisan of pontiffs and potentates, shared this Catholic view with regard to the French Revolution. In *les Martyrs* (1809), he went so far as to put the revolutionary hymn of his country into the mouth of the Devil.

The revolutionaries, no less than the reactionaries, regarded the French Revolution as the work of Satan. The difference in the conception of this great historical event by the two parties is that the monarchists considered the revolt agains the God-ordained powers as a sin, whereas the republicans saw it in a different light.

Either party was absolutely correct in regarding Satan as the moving spirit of the French Revolution. For the emperean rebel is the incarnation of the spirit of revolt in men and the instigator of all social and political upheavals on earth. The Devil, waging on earth the war he started in heaven, will always be found as a partisan of those who seek to throw off the yoke of their heavenly ordained oppressors. Satan is the grandest symbol of protest against tyranny, celestial or terrestrial, that the world can conceive. "The Devil," says Anatole France, "is the father of all anarchy." Was not Satan the first of all rebels against constituted authority? Did he not first utter the words, *"Non serviam,"* which burn on the lips of all revolutionaries? Satan was the symbol of the movement for the liberation of the human spirit from the bonds of absolutism,—a movement which started with the French Revolution. He was the embodiment of the revolutionary movement, which was sweeping Europe a century ago. He was the leader of the great army of Human Freedom, as Heine called the lovers of liberty of his day. It was under the standard of Satan that the oppressed masses in all European countries fought in 1830 against the princes and potentates, who assumed to rule them by divine right. Satan stood at the head of all the agitators and conspirators against political oppression of the past century, and as predicted by the Italian poet, Rapisardi, Lucifer will also accomplish the social revolution which is now preparing in all European countries and bring a new era for mankind, in which social equity as well as political equality will be effected.

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The Devil was represented by the theologians as the Arch-Fiend, the bitter enemy of the good and holy men. The champions of the common folk, on the other hand, saw in Satan the defender of the downtrodden, and the protector of the poor and helpless against the high and mighty of the land. The Devil, who has always been a democrat, is said to have interfered in favor of the peasants or serfs against the feudal lords. The Fiend appears in the folk-lore of all European countries as the defender of accused innocence, and as an exemplar of honesty and fidelity. Diabolus exerted his powers of retribution on misers, on men who brought no good to themselves or to others despite all their hoarded wealth. He was also represented as a chastiser of the Pecksniffs, the moral pretenders. Satan was universally regarded as the Nemesis of the publicans and ale-wives who adulterated the beer they poured out, or who gave short measure to their customers. Gratitude is the crowning quality with which man has invested the Devil of his dreams. Many medieval legands report the Devil's gratitude whenever he is treated with justice. With regard to this trait, Satan can certainly be cited in marked contrast to the sons of Adam.

THE DEVIL AS HEDONIST

Satan has always been portrayed as the Prince of Pleasure. The joys and delights of life were considered by Catholic ascetics as emanations from hell. "Laughter and gaiety," said St. John Chrysostom, "come not from God, but from the Devil (*Opera* vii. 97; x. 590). The modern diabolist, Charles Baudelaire, similarly detected the Devil in human laughter. The excitable poisons, such as tobacco, alcohol, opium, hashish, were for this French poet "Satanic suggestions," the most terrible means employed by the Evil One to enslave humanity. They all represented for him "artificial paradises."[21] Liquor is to our own teetotalers the Devil's invention. "King Alcohol is the Devil's worst emissary on earth," recently said a certain Methodist preacher.[22]

The Church looked upon Lucifer as the lord of earthly love. The affection of one sex for another was believed, from the earliest period of the Christian era, to be under the special control of the powers of hell. Carnal love was regarded by the Christian monks and missionaries as nothing short of demoniac possession, and its enjoyment was believed to lead man to certain and eternal perdition.

The Church considered celibacy to be the only perfect state, and hesitated for a long time to give its sanction to marriage, which it regarded as unworthy of the "spiritual man." St. Paul denounced marriage in strong terms. "Celibacy must be chosen," said St. Tertullian, "even though the human race should perish." Origen denounced marriage in the following terms: "Matrimony is impure and unholy; a means of sensual passion." When, at the Council of Trent, marriage was finally included among the sacraments of the Church, it was regarded as a *remedium amoris* conceded by the kindness of God to the turpitude of the "natural man."[23]

WOMAN AS INSTRUMENTUM DIABOLI

The Church fathers believed that Satan brought about the downfall of men through the allurements of women. All women were regarded as the daughters of the Devil, and all men as bewitched by these sorceresses of Satan.[24] St. Paul expressed his horror of women's charms. He confessed that it was only by the strongest practice of faith that he could stay in their society and remain sinless. As Satan is the eternal tempter, so is woman in the eyes of the Church the eternal instrument of temptation—*instrumentum Diaboli,* the most efficient of stalking-horses, behind which the Devil goes hunting for the immortal souls of men. St. Cyprian said, "Woman is the instrument which the Evil One employs to possess our souls," and St. Tertullian addressed the beautiful sex with the following words: "Woman, thou ought to go about clad in mourning and ashes, thine eyes filled with tears of remorse, to make us forget that thou hast been man's destruction. Woman, thou art the gate to hell." This feminine-diabolical kinship is expressed by the rabbis in their belief that both the Devil and woman entered the world simultaneously.

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[21] See Wilhelm Michel's essay, "Baudelaire und die Gifte," *Masken.* Bd. XXIII. Heft 21 (1930).

[22] The reader will recall in this connection Captain John Silver's song—"Drink and the Devil had done for the rest."

[23] On the final inclusion of marriage among the sacraments, see G. Serrier: *le Mariage contrat-sacrement.* Paris, 1928.

[24] Mr. H. M. Tichenor, former editor of the *Melting Pot,* in his clever booklet, *Satan and the Saints* (1918), has described the manner in which the saints escaped the sorceries of Satan incorporated in the daughters of the earth.

Many thinkers and writers seem to concur with the fathers of the Church with regard to women. The belief in woman as Satan's instrument in his work of temptation is almost universal among moderns. The German poet and playwright, Lessing, back in the eighteenth century, asserts, "The hand of a woman is often the glove in which Satan conceals his claw." Prosper Mérimée speaks fully in the spirit of the Church fathers when he says, "Woman is the surest instrument of damnation which the Evil One can employ." Woman is especially used by the Devil as a tool to lead man to ruin. This belief explains the French proverb which says, "Man is tow, woman is fire, and the Devil blows on it." Anatole France also affirms, "It is through woman that the Devil takes great advantage of man." Barbey d'Aurevilly believes that women possess greater powers of temptation even than the Devil himself. "Women," this writer says, "are all temptresses, ready to tempt God or the Devil."

Woman's natural inclination to evil is expressed by Gœthe in the following lines:

"When towards the Devil's house we tread,
Woman's a thousand steps ahead." (*Faust* i. 3980-81.)

Other writers think that woman is a match for the Devil in wickedness. Schopenhauer's contempt for woman is too well known to need further comment. "Where the Devil gets through, a woman will get through, too," says Mérimée. "The Devil," this writer also expresses through the mouth of one of his characters, "has nothing left to teach women who overdress themselves and coil their hair fantastically." (We post-Victorians might say, "who underdress themselves and bob their hair fantastically.")

Kornel Makuszynski believes that woman is even more wicked than the Devil. In his *Another Paradise Lost and Regained* (1926), this Polish writer affirms that "Satan himself would not do the things a woman will do and lay to his charge."

Thus woman is believed by modern writers to be possessed of the Evil One. "Every woman," Barbey assures us, "has a devil somewhere who would always be her master, were it not for the fact that she has two others also in her—Cowardice and Shame—to interfere with the first one." This saying is fully in keeping with the proverb which affirms that "The heart of a beautiful woman is the most beloved hiding-place of at least seven devils."

Many writers go so far as to express their belief that woman is partly or wholly the Devil in person. Woman is for Diderot a combination of angel and Devil. Heine does not consider woman wholly diabolical, but he does not know at what point in her the angel ends and the Devil begins. Molière considers woman as the very Devil, and for Balzac woman is a perfected Devil.

Baudelaire regarded woman as wholly diabolical in body and spirit. As a dandy he despised woman, as a Catholic he considered her "one of the most seductive forms of the Devil" and wondered why she was admitted into churches. "Woman," again says this French poet, "is the feminine form of the Other, the most dangerous incarnation of the Evil One." Commenting on the romance *le Diable amoureux* (1772), he remarks, "The camel of Cazotte, camel, Devil, and woman." It should be remembered that Baudelaire was less attached to the form of woman as to her spirit, which he regarded as diabolical. Verlaine, following the lead of the poet Baudelaire, his master in Satanism, likewise believed in woman's identity with the Devil ("Femme et chatte," 1866). Strindberg saw in woman a living Gehenna adorned with all the allures of Satan.[25]

For the etcher Rops, who was also a disciple of the diabolist Baudelaire, woman is the demonic incarnation of lust, the daughter of darkness, the servant of Satan, the partner of hell, the vampire who sucks the blood of the cosmos. In Barbey's tales as in Rops' etchings, we behold woman engaged in her worship of the Devil. She is described by these diabolist and decadent artists as an adept in all black arts and an expert in all forms of sexual perversion. She is portrayed wallowing in the wildest orgies of lewdness and licentiousness, continually invoking, extolling and worshipping Lucifer, the lord of lust.

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[25] On the woman as an impersonation of the Devil, see also the end of the chapter "The Form of the Fiend" in the present work.

Concerning love, too, the Church fathers find support among many poets and philosophers of modern times. Voltaire regarded the Devil and love as synonymous. Love, for Alfred de Vigny, was the art of the Devil and not of the Deity. This pessimistic poet, considering love as idle and mendacious, did not deny to it, however, a narcotizing value in the hands of Satan. Baudelaire always saw the Satanic side in love, and proved his thesis by the animal names we give to the woman we love. "Have not the devils the forms of beasts?" he asks. "The one and supreme bliss of love," this poet again says, "rests in the certainty of doing evil; and man and woman know from birth that in evil is found all pleasure." "Love," this diabolist again affirms, "is the most terrible of all incarnations at the service of Satan." Schopenhauer, in his essay, "Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe" (1859), arrived at the same conclusion, arguing that love does not exist to make us happy, but to deceive us under the cover of happiness, and to compel us to perform actions profitable to the human race, but suicidal to the individual. The conception of love as a demonic factor prevails throughout all modern literature; Ibsen, Toystoy, Ola Hanson, Przybyszewski, Prus, Hardy, and Shaw, all perceiving in eroticism not an ideal which should be pursued, but a cosmic power which makes the human being a puppet moving to some incomprehensible goal.

CONCLUSION

Thus the Devil is the representative of terrestrial interests and enjoyments, in contrast to those of the spiritual realm. As a skillful reasoner and logician, he plays havoc with those who dispute his clever materialistic philosophy, for he excels in dialectic. He stands for the glorification of the flesh in painting and sculpture, in the dance and drama, in fiction and romantic adveture, depicting forbidden pleasures in vivid colors, luring on the amorous and the yearning to supposed happiness only to dash this expectation into an empty sense of unreality and frustration. It is his restless impulse in men which provokes them to unsettle the old order of things and become reformers in the hope of promoting greater happiness. His efforts are inspired by a lusty, democratic hedonism. The protean character of this supermalevolent Personality is attested by a mixture of beneficent traits, such as his ambition, his spirit of good fellowship and democracy, and a progressive desire to unsettle things too long established. Besides which, what would life be without the gratification of the senses? Drabness itself is a mockery of life. But to submit this important Personage to close cross-questioning by Kantian or Huxleyan dialectic is taking an unfair advantage over this mysterious mythological entity, this superhuman presence in our midst.

THE SELF

BY CHARLES EUGENE BANKS

Out of the cosmic cell I came,
  Out of the voiceless deep;
Kept alive by a mystic flame,
  Fighting endless sleep;
Groping upward, dumb and blind;
  Trackless the way before;
Mystery shrouding all behind
  Whispering "Nevermore"!

Fish and serpent, soaring bird
  Sweeping the azure dome;
Lion, leopard, caveman, Kurd,
  Each gave me a home.
Field or forest, man or beast,
  Weapon of claw or stone,
Always slaughter on flesh to feast,
  Always the sun-bleached bone.

Stark barbarian, pirate bold
  Sailing the wine-dark sea;
Miner braving the Arctic cold,
  These I came to be.
Always the eager endless quest,
  Always the inward fire,
Always the better out of the best,
  Always the heart's desire.

Urged by greed I rose to power,
  I soared on eagle wings,
I fought for glory, had my hour
  In company of kings;
Then down again to dreamless dark,
  Close sealed in royal tomb,
With never a stroke of time to mark
  The years of my golden gloom.

I woke to Beauty; my senses thrilled
  With odors of evening cool;
A night bird sang, the pale moon spilled
  Silver in dusky pool.
Winds roared, trees moaned; on shoreward seas
  Plumed horsemen madly strove;
Flowers blushed in the amorous breeze
  And I stood at the door of Love.

Calm-eyed Justice, crimson gowned,
  Miser counting his gains;
Martyr deep in dungeon bound
  Straining against his chains;
Yoeman, Noble, Hero, Seer,
  Japheth or Shem or Ham,—
All I know of the past is here,
  All I have been I am.

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